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

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

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THE CONTEST FOR NORTH SUMATRA

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

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The Contest for North Sumatra

Atjeh, the Netherlands and Britain 1858–1898

ANTHONY REID

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Preface

This study describes the painful transition of North Sumatra from a number of independent states to a part of Netherlands India. This is seen not as a simple conflict of Netherlands imperialism and Indonesian parochialism, but as a three-sided contest in which the independent commercial interest of the Straits Settlements played an integral role. The future Netherlands Indian provinces of Atjeh and Oostkust van Sumatra were the last to resist Dutch influence because they were almost exclusively the commercial preserve of Britain. It was not until the end of the century that Holland overcame this difficulty and established her claim over the whole area, giving way to the demands of British commerce in the East Coast but ignoring them in the case of Atjeh.

The three parties to this contest are naturally very unequally represented in the available documents. If Atjehnese state records existed they have never been discovered, and the Atjehnese view is presented directly only in a few inaccurate popular epics recorded at the time. On the other hand the principal advantage of using British as well as Dutch sources is that the former provide a relatively sympathetic account of Atjehnese aims with which to balance the natural predisposition of the latter.

Although the Atjeh war continued well into the twentieth century, I have terminated my detailed discussion of events in 1898. Until that date the three-sided contest was a real one. After it, the fate of North Sumatra was decided and the central problem became that of pacification. Though extremely important for the subsequent history of Indonesia this is a separate question and one, moreover, which has already received some scholarly attention.

This study has grown out of a Ph. D. dissertation submitted to Cambridge University in 1965. My thanks are due to King's College, Cambridge, for making the project possible. I was fortunate to receive the encouragement of the late Victor

149578

Purcell, who died shortly after completing the supervision of his last student. Much advice and help was also received from Prof. C. D. Cowan (London); Mr. A. van Marle, Prof. W. F. Wertheim, Dr. J. Woltring and Dr. J. Reinsma (Netherlands); and Dr. Teuku Iskandar (Kuala Lumpur). Dr. Woltring was kind enough to let me use his typescript for the third volume of his *Bescheiden Betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland,* which proved very useful for my chapter 7. I am indebted to Dr. R. Nieuwenhuys and the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde for many of the photographs.

University of Malaya A.R.
Kuala Lumpur, 1968

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Abbreviations

WHERE possible I have used the names of the writer and recipient of all letters of substance. With the exception of the last two, the following abbreviations have been used only to describe letters which enclose the letter to which reference is made.

G.G.	Governor-General of Netherlands India
Kol.	Ministry of Colonies, The Hague
B.Z.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs (*Buitenlandse Zaken*), The Hague
C.O.	Colonial Office, London
F.O.	Foreign Office, London
I.O.	India Office, London
S.S.	Governor of the Straits Settlements
Col. Sec.	Colonial Secretary, Singapore
Alg. Sec.	General Secretary (*Algemeene Secretaris*) of the Netherlands Indian Government

Archives and files have been abbreviated as follows:

Kol. Kab.	*Kabinets-archief* of the Netherlands Colonial Ministry
Kol. Geh.	*Geheim-archief* of the Netherland, Colonial Ministry
Kol. Op. Verb.	*Openbare Verbalen* of the Netherlands Colonial Ministry
Cons.	*Consulaats-archief* of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry
I.P.D.	India Political Despatches, India Office, London
C.P.D.	Collections to India Political Despatches, India Office, London

Publications have been abbreviated as follows:

BKI	*Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsche Indië,* published by the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal- Land-, en Volkenkunde.

Cons. Versl.	*Verzameling van Consulaire en Andere Verslagen en Berichten*
DNB	*Dictionary of National Biography*
ENI	*Encyclopedia van Nederlandsch Indië*
IG	*Indische Gids*
IMT	*Indisch Militair Tijdschrift*
JAS	*Journal of Asian Studies*
JMBRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Malayan Branch*
JSBRAS	*Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Straits Branch*
JSEAH	*Journal, Southeast Asian History*
NNBW	*Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek*
P.P.	Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons
RHR	*Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*
TBG	*Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* published by the Bataviaasch Genootschap
VBG	*Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap*
VKI	*Verhandelingen van het Koninklijk Instituut*

A Note on Spelling

For place names, I have followed modern Indonesian spellings wherever this is possible without pedantry. In the case of Atjehnese place names, this involves following a complex orthographic system first developed by Snouck Hurgronje to represent the frequent diphthongs of spoken Atjehnese. Thus, for example, the port long referred to by non-Atjehnese as Olehleh is Ulèëlheuë, while Kertie is Keureutoë. These spellings of course follow the Dutch/Indonesian phonetic system, whereby *j* reads as English *y*, *dj* as English *j*, *tj* as English *ch*, and *sj* as English *sh*.

Personal names of Indonesians, on the other hand, have been romanized according to standard English/Malaysian practice, except where there is reason to believe the person concerned himself used some other style.

The name of the capital of Atjeh presents a special problem. It was traditionally referred to simply as Atjeh, or Banda Atjeh (Atjeh town) when a distinction from the country as a whole was required. The Dutch, however, after capturing in 1874 what they had wrongly called the *kraton* of the Sultan, found that the only name for the palace area among Atjehnese was Kutaradja (the King's fort). They therefore adopted this as the name for the city. In 1963, however, the name was officially changed again to Banda Atjeh. I have referred to the town as Banda Atjeh until its capture by the Dutch in January 1874, and as Kutaradja thereafter.

Although the word 'Indonesia' was not current in the nineteenth century, I have occasionally used it to translate the Dutch *Indië*, where there would otherwise be confusion. I have also referred to the indigenous inhabitants of the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago as 'Indonesians'.

Whenever dollars are referred to without qualification, these are Spanish/Mexican silver dollars current in South-East Asia during the nineteenth century. For the changing value of these in terms of sterling, the reader should consult Appendix 3.

Introduction

The rise of Atjeh[1]

SEEN from the centre of both pre-Islamic and modern Indonesia, Sumatra north of the equator appears peripheral. Though racially Indonesian, its people were hardly touched by the great civilizations of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit. An arm of Indonesia outstretched towards India and the West, North Sumatra built its own unique tradition as a link between two worlds. From the viewpoint of Islam, however, it was for five centuries the pivot of the Archipelago.

The north-west corner of Sumatra was the first landfall of Indian and Arab traders seeking the riches of China and the Spice Islands. They established trading posts here from the eleventh century, and by the end of the thirteenth had brought Islam and political organization to several growing port-kingdoms. The greatest of these was Samudra (later Pasai) which so developed in the fourteenth century as to give its name to the whole island. Its port—modern Lhokseumawe—was for 150 years the most easterly base on the Muslim trade route, and a great centre of scholarship as well as commerce.

For a brief period before the Portuguese onslaught North Sumatra was eclipsed by Malacca as the major centre for

[1] The best sources for the early history of North Sumatra are R. H. Djajadiningrat, 'Critische Overzicht van de in Maleische Werken Vervatte Gegevens over de Geschiedenis van het Soeltanaat van Atjeh,' *BKI* 65 (1911), 135–265; H. K. J. Cowan, 'Bijdrage tot de kennis der geschiedenis van het rijk Samoedra-Pasei', *TBG* 78 (1938), 204–14; T. J. Veltman, 'Nota over de Geschiedenis van het Landschap Pidië', *TBG* 58 (1919), 15–157; Teuku Iskandar (ed.), 'De Hikajat Atjeh', *VKI* 26 (1958); T. Iskandar (ed.), *Bustanu's-Salatin*, (Kuala Lumpur, 1966); Mohammad Said *Atjeh Sepandjang Abad*, (Medan, 1961). A. K. DasGupta, 'Acheh in Indonesian Trade and Politics 1600–1641', (Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1962); E. Netscher, 'De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602 tot 1865', *VBG* 35 (1870); W. H. M. Schadee *Geschiedenis van Sumatra's Oostkust*, I (Amsterdam, 1918). For the sociological background Snouck Hurgronje *The Achehnese*, trans. A. W. S. O'Sullivan (Leiden/London, 1906) is still in a class by itself, though some of its judgements are coloured by its political purpose.

Muslim traders in the region. Pasai retained its status as the centre of Muslim learning, however, and became a natural rallying point for the Muslim traders after the fall of Malacca in 1511. The Muslims of North Sumatra, moreover, were better able to withstand the new sea-power, since their prosperity depended as much on their production of rice, pepper, camphor, and betelnut as on their ability to attract the fickle entrepôt trade.

The sharply divided states of the north coast were only united as part of the reaction to the Portuguese intrusion. Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah of Atjeh, a hitherto unimportant state at the extreme north-west of the island, rallied all the anti-Portuguese forces to expel the newcomers from their footholds at Pidië (1521) and Pasai (1524). This conquest was popular and permanent. The rich plain of the north coast was henceforth united with the valley of the Atjeh river (Atjeh Besar, known to Europeans as Atjeh Proper or Groot-Atjeh), from which it was separated by low hills. Although *orang Pasai* at least were still recognizable types until modern times, all adopted the Atjehnese language, accepted the legitimacy of the Atjeh Sultans, and considered themselves Atjehnese. Until the mid-seventeenth century relatives of the Sultan were placed in authority over Pidië, Pasai, and the more important Atjehnese centres on the west coast. Foreign traders were restricted to the capital near the mouth of the Atjeh river—Banda Atjeh Dar-es-Salaam. Its importance on the new Muslim trade route through the Sunda rather than the Malacca Straits drew population to it, until Atjeh Besar became one of the most thickly settled areas in Sumatra, with a nineteenth-century population of about 300,000.

For a century after the conquests of Ali Mughayat, the wealth of the port-capital gave successive Sultans the mastery over the aristocracy whose wealth was in agriculture. All were pressed into the service of the royal policy of aggrandizement, based on the twin ambitions of ousting the Portuguese from the Malacca Straits and monopolizing the export produce of Sumatra and Malaya.

The counter-crusade against Portuguese Malacca followed naturally from the origins of the Atjehnese state. Sustained for 120 years, it linked religion and patriotism more closely than

elsewhere in Indonesia, and brought Atjeh into greater contact with Western Asia. Sultan Ala'ad-din Riayat Shah al-Kahar (1537–71) took the formal step of submitting to the suzerainty of the Turkish Sultan in return for military assistance against the Portuguese. The memory of this short-lived connexion was kept vividly alive in Atjeh by the red Ottoman flag, variants of which the Sultans used, and by the great cannon *lada setjupak* guarding the *dalam* (royal enclosure) in Banda Atjeh. These were revered as gifts from the Caliph in token of his protection over his most distant vassals.[1]

The power of the Atjehnese Sultanate both internally and externally reached its peak under the brilliant but ruthless Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607–36). Royal control was effective over all the important ports of the west coast of Sumatra as well as the east coast as far south as Asahan. His voyages of destruction ranged as far as Pahang, on the east coast of the Malay Peninsula, and foreign traders were forced to bow to his wishes. His wealthy court was a centre of scholarship unrivalled in the archipelago.

Atjehnese tradition credits Iskandar Muda with the administrative division of the country into *ulèëbalang*-ships and *mukims*, and this receives confirmation from the comment of a French traveller that 'he has exterminated almost all the ancient nobility and has created new ones'.[2] The mukim[3] was originally an association of several villages to support a single mosque under the religious authority of an Imam (Atjehnese *Imeum*). The *ulèëbalangs* (cf. Malay *hulubalang*=war-leader) were probably originally the foremost servants of the Sultan, rewarded by him with a number of mukims in feudal tenure. This pattern is evident both in Atjeh Besar and in the most important subordinate states. In Pidië there were also chiefs bearing the title *mantròes* (cf. Malay *menteri*=minister), which reinforces the

[1] P. Voorhoeve, 'Atjeh', *Encyclopedia of Islam* I (Leiden/London, 1960), 743. Djajadiningrat, pp. 146 and 153–4. C. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, 208–9. *Lada setjupak*=one measure of pepper, all that remained to the Atjehnese ambassadors by the time they succeeded in conveying their tribute to the Caliph.

[2] Beaulieu, 'Memoires du Voyage aux Indes Orientales', p. 63, *Relation de Divers Voyages Curieux*, ed. M. Thévenot, Part II (Paris, 1664).

[3] A Muslim parish, able to provide the forty males necessary under Shafi law for the Friday prayer service.

notion that the Atjehnese aristocracy derived at least their titles from the era of an extremely powerful ruler.[1]

If Iskandar Muda's reign was the classic golden age to which reference was always made by later generations of Atjehnese, it was nevertheless the succeeding years of decline which really set the political pattern for Atjeh. After Iskandar's death and that of his immediate successor, the leading chiefs insured themselves against a recurrence of tyranny from the centre by placing four female rulers on the throne in succession. During this period (1641–99) the Sultanate was reduced to a symbol, its status recognized by all Atjehnese while its effective control was limited to the port and capital. Imams, *ulèëbalangs, mantròes* and other officers of the state became hereditary, secular, territorial chiefs. In Atjeh Besar three federations of chiefs emerged to protect their own interests. Each federation, or *sagi*,[2] became known only by the number of mukims it contained when its position was formalized—thus 26 on the right bank of the Atjeh River, 25 on the left, and 22 in the much larger upland district (whose population expanded until by the nineteenth century it in fact contained 36 mukims). The three Panglima Sagis, originally chosen to lead the sagis in war, quickly became hereditary chiefs, claiming a special position as guardians of the Sultanate. This position was formally recognized by the monetary gratuity which each Sultan paid them at his installation. In the two lowland sagis the power of the hereditary panglimas ultimately ceased to correspond to this formal status, though the Panglimas Polem[3] of the stronger upland sagi were always among the most powerful men in the realm. In the course of time other *ulèëbalangs* of Atjeh Besar also rose to a position of formal prominence, and were included in deliberations concerning the succession. Thus nineteenth century Atjehnese came to speak of 'the twelve *ulèëbalangs* who appoint and dethrone princes'—four from each *sagi*.[4]

From this period no Sultan was in a position to command

[1] Veltman, pp. 78–9.

[2] *Sagi*=corner, Atjeh Besar being visualized as a triangle with its base on the coast.

[3] The title Pòlém (elder brother) was given to the first Panglima Sagi of the XXII Mukims because he was an illegitimate son of Iskandar Muda and older than the latter's immediate successor; Veltman, pp. 69–70.

[4] Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, 88–92 and 132–9.

obedience, and concerted action could only be taken with the agreement of important *ulèëbalangs*. Yet the latter showed respect for the dynasty, and even the most powerful never tried to seize the throne for himself. The affairs of court and harbour were not those of the *ulèëbalangs*, and each could ignore the other except in times of internal crisis or external attack.

This internal decline of the Sultanate was accompanied by an equally rapid loss of its outlying possessions. Dutch naval and commercial power ensured the permanent dissolution of the Atjehnese empire soon after Iskandar Muda's death. Thenceforth Atjeh was limited to those areas which had already been effectively acculturated by 1641—basically the northern coastal strip and the scattered ports of the West Coast as far south as Barus.

Siak

In the north-eastern coastal district as far south as Rokan, the once-powerful Batak state of Aru had been a battleground for Atjeh and the Malay Sultanate of Johor from 1540 until 1612, when Iskandar Muda was finally victorious. The small river-states of Asahan, Panai and Bila all ascribe the origin of their dynasties to Iskandar Muda's invasions and the Atjehnese hegemony of the early seventeenth century. With the passing of this hegemony the Bataks, though numerically dominant, remained in the interior, and the river-states of the East Coast came under the domination of groups of Minangkabaus from Central Sumatra (especially in Batu Bara), and Malays from Johor (especially in Rokan and Deli). Because of its convenience for taking Minangkabau produce to Dutch Malacca, the Siak river became important in the eighteenth century, and its Minangkabau rulers were able to extend their influence to the north. This influence was most effective in Batu Bara, was much resented in Asahan, and was scarcely felt in Serdang, Deli, and Langkat further to the north. Occasional expeditions, of which the last occurred under Sultan Abduljalil Saifuddin (1791–1811), reasserted Siak's weak suzerainty as far to the north as Tamiang, the border state of Atjeh.

After this reign Siak's prosperity vanished, its trade disrupted first by the militant *Padri* movement in Minangkabau and later by the commercial eclipse of Malacca.

Penang and the British

In Atjeh the restitution of male rule under an Arab dynasty in 1699 and a Bugis one in 1727 did nothing to restore the fortunes of the Sultanate. A series of succession disputes, coups, and counter-coups during the eighteenth century brought the political fortunes of Atjeh to their lowest ebb.

The court continued to gather a moderate income from the trade of the capital, which was still the main base for Indian shipping in the western part of the Malay world. About twelve ships a year brought opium and cloth from the Coromandel coast to exchange for the betelnut and pepper grown on Atjeh's north coast, the gold and camphor of the west coast, and the tin imported from the Malay Peninsula. This trade, in which India-based British merchants played an increasing role, encouraged the English East India Company to look upon Atjeh as a likely base for gathering Indonesian produce to exchange against China tea, and for refitting the Indian fleet during the north-east monsoon. But the Atjehnese had never lost their proud distrust of any foreign military establishment on their soil. A series of overtures from 1762 were all rebuffed, until in 1786 the British settled on a satisfactory alternative in Penang.[1]

The establishment of a British entrepôt at Penang was one of two contemporary developments which profoundly altered the economic and political pattern of Atjeh in the period after 1786. The other was the introduction of pepper-cultivation to the previously undeveloped region on the west coast between Singkil and Meulaboh. About 1787 an enterprising Atjehnese —Leubé Dapa, chief of Susoh[2]—had contracted to supply pepper to a merchant from the moribund British settlement at Benkulen, in South-West Sumatra. Aided by a stream of immigrants from the north coast, he succeeded so well that a string of new Atjehnese colonies under his authority along this coast

[1] H. R. C. Wright *East Indian Economic Problems of the Age of Cornwallis and Raffles* (London, 1961), pp. 249–54 and 327–30; D. K. Bassett, 'British Commercial and Strategic Interest in the Malay Peninsula during the late Eighteenth Century', *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, ed. Bastin and Roolvink (Oxford, 1964), pp. 122–40; William Milburn, *Oriental Commerce* (London, 1813), II, 329–31.

[2] Leubé (Malay and Arabic *labai*) = a mosque official. The secularization of this title is typically Atjehnese.

were producing 83,000 pikuls (5,000 tons) of pepper in 1803.[1] By the 1820's the figure had risen to a peak of about 150,000 pikuls, half the world's production.[2] The bulk of this new source of supply was absorbed not by the East India Company but by the enterprising merchants of Salem and Boston. Twenty-one American ships visited the new 'pepper-coast' in 1802, and they continued to dominate the trade until the 1850's.[3]

Neither these Americans on the west coast nor the Penang merchants anxious to absorb the trade of the near-by north coast subscribed to the view of the sultans that foreigners should trade only in the port of their capital. In the reign of Sultan Jauhar al-Alam Shah (1795–1823) the contest was played out between the royal desire for centralized commerce and the ultimately irresistible desire of the merchants for anarchistic free trade.

At no time was Jauhar's authority accepted throughout Atjeh. Initially, it was Leubé Dapa who was unwilling to surrender any of his extensive powers on the west coast to the Sultan. Later opposition came from the *ulèëbalangs* of Atjeh Besar and Pidië. Having served aboard one of the East India Company's ships in his youth, the Sultan was well disposed toward the British. He spoke English well, employed Europeans as his chief advisers, and attempted to introduce some western notions of government. He sought an alliance with Britain to help subdue his vassals and in return offered to channel trade through his capital to Penang. But the Penang merchants were against him, partly because they disapproved of his European advisers, but mainly because they opposed his efforts to impose royal authority over the commerce of the coasts.

The coup which took place against Jauhar in 1813 would have been impossible without unofficial support from Penang. Sayyid Husain—British subject, Penang tycoon, and descendant of a discarded branch of the Atjeh royal house—seized the opportunity provided by the dissatisfaction of the *ulèëbalangs* with Jauhar. The judicious application of some of Husain's

[1] J. W. Gould, 'Sumatra—America's Pepperpot, 1784–1873', *Essex Institute, Historical Collections,* 122 (1956), pp. 102–4.

[2] Milburn *Oriental Commerce,* revised ed. (London, 1825), p. 155.

[3] Gould, pp. 116–32.

wealth induced the important *ulèëbalangs* of Atjeh Besar to proclaim Husain's son Sultan with the title Saif al-Alam Shah.

However the naval war which broke out between the rival sultans proved ruinous to the principal branch of Penang's trade. A new Governor, Colonel Bannerman (1817–20), persuaded the Government of Bengal that to restore the trade and secure Britain's position in the Malacca Straits it was essential that Britain intervene in favour of the stronger candidate. Captain Coombs, who was sent from Calcutta in 1817 to investigate the rival claims, supported the view of Penang that Saif al-Alam enjoyed greater popular support.

Stamford Raffles, then Lieutenant-Governor of the Company's Benkulen settlement, deemed otherwise. Penang's policy of unrestricted trade based on political fragmentation was opposed to his dream of a British raj in South-East Asia based on support for the traditional rulers. His policy in Sumatra was to check fragmentation by limiting trade to a few royal ports.[1] Any hesitation he might have felt about supporting the legitimist candidate on these grounds was dispelled by a false report that his hated enemies, the Dutch, were negotiating to help Jauhar against Saif and Penang. He wrote at once to warn Jauhar against the Dutch, promising at the same time to try to obtain the support of the Bengal Government for his cause.

In Calcutta, in October 1818, Raffles persuaded Lord Hastings that the security of the Straits of Malacca demanded a British foothold in North Sumatra as well as the new settlement at the southern end of the Straits which Raffles was to establish at Singapore. Raffles was now given the casting vote in a joint commission with Captain Coombs, empowered to sign a defensive treaty with whichever of the Atjehnese rivals appeared to command greater support.

In Atjeh Besar the Panglima Sagis repeated their earlier refusal to support Jauhar al-Alam. Nevertheless Raffles obliged a reluctant Coombs to agree to a treaty with Jauhar at Pidië, signed on 22 April 1819. The East India Company thereby undertook to supply Jauhar with arms and money and to use its influence to remove Saif from Atjeh; Jauhar undertook not

[1] Wright, pp. 283–5. J. Bastin *The Native Policies of Sir Stamford Raffles in Java and Sumatra* (Oxford, 1957), pp. 98–9.

to interfere with British shipping to the ports still controlled by Saif—Ulèëlheuë (*anglice* Olehleh, the port of Atjeh Besar) and Lhokseumawe (Telosamoi or Telok Semawe). More generally, the treaty established a defensive alliance between Britain and Atjeh. Atjeh was to allow no European residents and make no foreign treaties without British consent. The East India Company was granted the right to trade in all Atjehnese ports and to appoint an agent at the Sultan's court.

Jauhar was still too weak and the Penang Government too half-hearted to give any practical effect to the treaty beyond those parts of it designed to end the destructive naval war. In 1820 Saif al-Alam was chased out of Atjeh by a British gunboat, but Panglima Polem continued to defy Jauhar, who died in December 1823 without ever having re-entered his capital. No British agent was appointed.[1]

Raffles's intervention in Atjeh was but one incident in the Anglo-Dutch colonial squabble which followed the Napoleonic wars. During the second half of the eighteenth century British country traders had spread their activities eastward from India and later from Penang. At the same time the financial collapse of the Dutch East India Company was speeded by the isolation of Java during the Franco-British wars of 1777–83 and 1793–1802. Finally, during the British military occupation of Padang (1795–1819), Malacca (1795–1818), Java (1811–16), and the other Dutch possessions, British commerce was given the fullest encouragement to expand into the lucrative South-East Asian field. By the end of this period British cloth manufactures had captured the Indonesian market, while the tropical island produce provided invaluable articles of exchange in the China trade, the most lucrative of the East India Company's activities.

The decision of 1814 to return to a strong, royalist Holland all her Indonesian possessions was made in Europe for European reasons. It was opposed by those Englishmen who had

[1] These events are discussed with much documentary evidence in C. D. Cowan, 'Early Penang and the Rise of Singapore', *JMBRAS* 23, Part 2 (1950); John Anderson *Acheen, and the Ports on the North and East Coasts of Sumatra* (London, 1840); P. H. van der Kemp, 'Raffles' Atjeh-overeenkomst van 1819', *BKI* 51 (1900), pp. 159–240. See also Djajadiningrat, pp. 206–7; E. S. de Klerck *De Atjeh-oorlog* (The Hague, 1912), pp. 83–92; Puvanarajah and Suntharalingam, 'The Acheh Treaty of 1819', *JSEAH* 2, No. 3 (1961), pp. 36–46. The text of the 1819 Treaty is printed in P.P. 1873, 75, pp. 149–51.

acquired important interests in South-East Asia, and who feared that the return of the old Dutch system of exclusive treaties would destroy British commerce there. British officials in the East, of whom Raffles was only the most extreme, were anxious to minimize the effect of the Dutch reoccupation on areas not under the authority of either country. One such was the East Coast of Sumatra, which would be affected by the Dutch return to Malacca. Shortly before giving way to his Dutch successor in 1818, the British Resident, Major Farquhar, visited Siak, where he persuaded the Sultan to guarantee in writing the future freedom of British trade.

More important than Siak by this time were the states to the north, whose rich volcanic soil came into use only during the Atjeh civil war of 1815–21. Some Atjehnese pepper-growers had then shifted their activities eastward to Langkat and Tamiang. Their techniques were soon copied by the Bataks in the interior of the Deli region. The Malay river-capitals of Langkat, Deli, Serdang, Batu Bara and Asahan quickly became known in Penang as 'the pepper-ports' because of their new commercial importance. Their combined pepper-exports climbed to a peak of 30,000 pikuls in 1823–4, though dropping to half that amount when peace in Atjeh brought pepper-prices down to normal.[1]

In 1823, therefore, Penang sent John Anderson to the 'pepper-ports' with instructions to persuade the rajas of the advantages of continued free intercourse with Penang. Anderson was well received. The Sultan of Deli signed a written agreement that he would not allow the Dutch to settle in his country and would not alter his moderate customs duties. Serdang and Langkat gave him letters, and Asahan and Batu Bara verbal undertakings, to the effect that their ports would remain open to British commerce. Lastly, Anderson visited Sultan Ibrahim of Siak, who assured him he had abandoned nothing of his earlier treaty with Farquhar and gave a written promise not to allow the Dutch into Siak. Despite this solemn assurance, the Sultan had in fact agreed the previous year to the renewal of an exclusive treaty of 1761 with the Dutch.[2]

[1] Cowan, 1950, p. 140. John Anderson *Mission to the East Coast of Sumatra in 1823* (Edinburgh/London, 1826), p. 422.

[2] Anderson, 1826, *passim*. Cowan, 1950, pp. 76 and 132–3. Nicholas Tarling, 'British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago 1824–

Anderson's mission created considerable annoyance in London, where an end to colonial disputes with the Dutch was being sought through negotiation. As early as 1818 it had been realized in London that some limits would have to be set to the restored authority of the Dutch in the interests of British commercial and strategic claims in the area. The urgency of a settlement was increased by Raffles' incessant provocation of the Dutch, which culminated in the establishment in 1819 of a British post at Singapore within territory claimed by the Dutch.

At the outset of negotiations in 1819, Britain was clear on its two fundamental aims: first, to safeguard British commerce in all South-East Asia save the modest area (Java and the Moluccas) acknowledged as Dutch possessions; secondly, to retain control of the Malacca Straits route to China. For both reasons, Raffles' new settlement at Singapore was valuable. Beyond this, however, Castlereagh sought no territorial gain, and was content for Holland to assert a vague political hegemony over the archipelago in order to exclude more dangerous powers.

Forced to yield over Singapore, the Dutch eventually seized on the principle of a territorial demarcation as a guarantee against further British political claims in the islands, especially Sumatra.[1] The treaty eventually signed in London on 17 March 1824 arranged for the transfer to Holland of all British settlements in Sumatra (Benkulen), and to Britain of all Dutch possessions in India and the Malay Peninsula (Malacca). For Sumatra, Britain undertook: 'that no British Settlement shall be formed on that island, nor any Treaty concluded by British authority with any Native Prince, Chief or State therein' (Article 9). Holland made a similar undertaking regarding the Peninsula.

The second article of the treaty, intended by the British to

1871', *JMBRAS* 30, Part 3 (1957), pp. 129–30; Netscher, 1870, pp. 148–60; Schadee I, pp. 23–39. Anderson's treaties are contained in the anonymous *An Exposition of the Political and Commercial Relations of the Government of Prince of Wales Island with the States on the East Coast of Sumatra from Diamond Point to Siak* (Penang, 1824).

[1] Detailed accounts of the negotiations are contained in Harry Marks, 'The First Contest for Singapore, 1819–1824', *VKI* 27 (1959); Nicholas Tarling *Anglo-Dutch Rivalry in the Malay World, 1780–1824* (Sydney, 1962), pp. 81–173; P. H. van der Kemp, 'De Geschiedenis van het Londensche Tractaat van 17 Maart 1824', *BKI* 56 (1904), pp. 1–244.

apply only to Java and the Moluccas, forbade Holland to charge British subjects and vessels more than double the duty on Dutch subjects and vessels in her Indonesian ports. It was the third article which the British hoped would safeguard their trade with Sumatra and other islands not under direct Dutch authority:

> The High Contracting Parties engage that no Treaty hereafter made by either with any Native Power in the Eastern Seas shall contain any Article tending, either expressly, or by the imposition of unequal duties, to exclude the Trade of the other Party from the Ports of such Native Power; and that if, in any Treaty now existing on either Part, any Article to that effect has been admitted, such Article shall be abrogated upon the conclusion of the present Treaty.

Raffles's Atjeh Treaty conflicted explicitly with the third article, and also with the ninth if this were understood in a retroactive sense. Raised by Britain late in the negotiations, the question was amicably settled by an exchange of notes. Canning and Wynn acknowledged:

> A Treaty concluded in the year 1819, by British Agents, with the King of Acheen, is incompatible with the 3d [*sic*] Article of the present Treaty. The British Plenipotentiaries therefore undertake that the Treaty with Acheen shall, as soon as possible, be modified into a simple Arrangement for the hospitable reception of British Vessels and Subjects in the Port of Acheen. But as some of the provisions of that Treaty . . . will be conducive to the general interests of Europeans established in the Eastern Seas, they trust that the Netherland Government will take measures for securing the benefit of those provisions. And they express their confidence that no measures hostile to the King of Acheen will be adopted by the new Possessor of Fort Marlborough.

The Dutch plenipotentiaries accepted these terms, and undertook in reply:

> . . . that their Government will apply itself without delay to regulate its relations with Acheen in such a manner that that State, without losing anything of its independence, may offer both to the sailor and the merchant that constant security which can only be established by the moderate exercise of European influence.[1]

[1] The Treaty and appended notes are in Marks, pp. 252–62; and in

Thus a special status of independence friendly to the Dutch was envisaged for Atjeh. No longer threatened in the Indian Ocean, Britain had apparently abandoned the view that a foothold in Atjeh was a major strategic advantage. The expressed motive behind Britain's insistence on the continued independence of Atjeh was simply that to repudiate completely a treaty so recently made would be 'objectionable, in point of faith and impression'.[1]

These Atjeh arrangements were given less practical effect even than those of 1819. The Indian Government allowed Penang to decide how to apply them in the altered circumstances following Jauhar al-Alam's death. The Governor, Robert Fullerton, however, decided that the promised modification of Raffles's treaty was unnecessary because the treaty had never been effective, and also harmful because it would afford recognition to the Sultan of Atjeh:

> The more ports are open, the greater competition among sellers, and it certainly is the obvious policy of the Government to encourage that freedom. Any arrangement of the more powerful of the neighbouring states, European or Native, having a tendency to overawe and subjugate the numerous petty states with whom our trade is conducted and then establish a monopoly for themselves, would be an event much to be deplored.[2]

Penang therefore kept its relations with the Atjeh Sultans to a minimum, and never informed Jauhar's successors that Raffles' treaty was no longer recognized by Britain. Even when Sultan Muhammad Shah (1823–38) himself appealed to the treaty in 1826 he was not disabused about it.[3] Later Governors of the Straits Settlements themselves occasionally revived Raffles' treaty when it suited them. In 1844, Butterworth reminded the Sultan of the treaty 'which particularly grants the

W.G. Maxwell and W.S. Gibson (eds.) *Treaties and Engagements affecting the Malay States and Borneo*, (London, 1924), pp. 8–16.

[1] Tarling, 1962, p. 167. Also ibid. pp. 163 and 171; and Tarling, 1957, p. 129. The view of Van der Kemp, 1900, pp. 192–210, that the Atjeh provisions of the treaty were consciously intended by the British negotiators to undo the work of Article 9, has been laid to rest by Tarling.

[2] Memorandum by Fullerton of 21 March 1825, quoted Van der Kemp, 1900, p. 191n. See also Tarling, 1957, pp. 130–1; Cowan, 1950, pp. 158–9.

[3] Van der Kemp, 1900, p. 184.

trade of all the Atjehnese ports to the British'.[1] These local aberrations were, however, overlooked in London, where it was assumed until the 1860's that the promise given to Holland had been carried out.

Anderson's treaties of 1823 with the east coast states met a similar fate. Local British officials acted on the assumption that the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty invalidated all such engagements, though they did nothing to inform the Malay rulers concerned. Only later were these pre-1824 Sumatra treaties resurrected in the Straits Settlements as weapons against the advancing Dutch.

Nineteenth-century Atjeh

In the contest of Jauhar al-Alam's reign, the real winners were the coastal 'rajas'[2] and their European trading partners. No later Sultan attempted to channel trade to Ulèëlheuë, which lost all importance in the export trade. The royal right to levy duties in other ports, though fitfully asserted by the opportunistic brothers of Muhammad Shah,[3] was rapidly abandoned in return for an annual *hasil* (tribute) from the rajas.

Thus the Sultanate was weakened in relation to the numerous vassal river-states now dotting the west coast as well as the north. As against this, however, must be set the new wealth which more than doubled the export earnings of the whole country during Jauhar's reign. By the 1820's Atjeh far surpassed even its sixteenth-century output, producing more than half the world's pepper. A Penang estimate of this period valued Atjeh's exports at about 1.9 million Spanish dollars, of which $400,000 worth reached Penang in small Asian craft, $1 million worth was taken by Americans in west-coast pepper,

[1] Tarling, 1957, pp. 136–7. In the detachment of a much later period a Foreign Office official conceded that Raffles's treaty continued legally valid after 1824, because it could not be repudiated without the knowledge of one party; Memo by Hertslett 4 July 1893, F.O. 37/824.

[2] In Atjehnese eyes the upstart rulers of the new pepper-producing states were lower in rank than the older-established *ulèëbalangs*, although most of them had their new '*ulèëbalang-ship*' confirmed by the Sultan. In the popular Malay parlance of the coast, however, all were 'rajas.' Henceforth the inverted commas will not be used.

[3] Tarling, 1957, pp. 132–3.

and the remainder was shared between Indian, French, and Arab shipping.[1]

The peak pepper output of all Atjeh exceeded 250,000 pikuls in the 1820's, but this was more than the world market could absorb. Not until 1871 did pepper-prices again reach the levels of 1822–3. Atjehnese production fluctuated widely in response to the unstable prices in Europe. Its average in the period 1830–70 was probably about 150,000 pikuls p.a. at a price near $6 a pikul. Soil exhaustion and the pull of Penang's busy market dictated two major shifts in the centre of Atjehnese pepper-production during this period. About 1830 the balance shifted from Leubé Dapa's old coast south of Meulaboh to newly established centres further north—Paté, Rigas, Teunom, and Meulaboh itself. In the 1850's a third region began to flourish around the north-eastern tip of Sumatra between Lhokseumawe and Tamiang.[2] Men were always to be found in Atjeh Besar or Pidië ready to try their hand either as seasonal workers or permanent settlers in these new regions. The leading pioneers of new districts, often of the *ulèëbalang* class in Atjeh Besar, set themselves up as virtually autonomous rulers of different rivers in the newly opened areas. All recognized the suzerainty of the Sultan, however, and endeavoured to obtain authorization from him.

During the first half of the nineteenth century neither European influence nor that of the Sultan was sufficiently continuous in these pepper-growing dependencies of Atjeh to prevent their becoming classic fields for 'gunboat diplomacy'. The usual malpractices exchanged between sellers and buyers became embittered in times of exceptionally low prices. Then an occasional murder, robbery, or mutiny from the Atjehnese side would be answered by the destruction of a village by American, British or French gunboats. As high profits could be made under such conditions, none of the Powers cared to

[1] Minute of Malay Translator 15 March 1825, in Cowan, 1950, p. 155; Gould, 1956, p. 218. Compare Light's figure of $400,000 to $500,000 for the exports of the north coast in 1789, at a time when the west coast was relatively unproductive; H. P. Clodd *Malaya's First British Pioneer. The Life of Francis Light* (London, 1948), p. 157.

[2] The best account of the Atjehnese pepper trade between 1786 and 1860 is in Gould, 1956, pp. 207–39 and 297–319.

bolster the Sultan's authority or hold him responsible for 'outrages'.[1]

More settled conditions were introduced by the vigorous Tuanku Ibrahim (1838–70), whose royal title was Sultan Ali Ala'ad-din Mansur Shah. Dominant even during his weak brother Muhammad's reign, he took over on the latter's death as guardian of the young heir Sulaiman. His long, capable reign was disturbed only between 1850, when Sulaiman came of age and vainly tried to claim his birthright, and 1857, when the young Sultan died. Ibrahim accepted the autonomy of the new 'pepper-rajas', but exploited the divisions among them to establish and extend his own authority.[2] In his careful policy of internal alliances, one of his most useful supporters was his brother-in-law Teungku[3] Raja Pakeh Dalam, *ulèëbalang* of Pidië (c. 1830–79), who was extending his influence by a series of alliances which resulted in the formation of a 'federation' of twelve *ulèëbalangs* in the Pidië district under his leadership. He was formally recognized by Ibrahim as ruler of Pidië in a *sarakarta* (decree) of April 1853. A year later Teungku Pakeh was commissioned to assist Ibrahim's son, Pangeran Husin, to re-assert Atjeh's authority on the east coast for the first time in almost two centuries. Supported by a fleet of about two hundred Atjehnese prahus, Husin obliged the rulers of Langkat, Deli and Serdang to accept Ibrahim's suzerainty and to use new seals bearing the title 'deputy [respectively *pahlawan, wakil* and *wazir*] of the Sultan of Atjeh'.[4]

[1] Ibid. pp. 229–49 and 295–9; Tarling, 1957, pp. 133–7; *ENI* I, p. 77.

[2] The best example was Ibrahim's success in adding to his small directly-governed royal domain three important mukims formerly under the control of a delinquent *ulèëbalang*; K. F. H. van Langen, 'De Inrichting van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder het Sultanaat', *BKI* 34 (1888), pp. 397 and 405–6.

[3] In most of Atjeh the title *Teungku* is used to denote an ulama of some consequence. *Ulèëbalangs* use the title *Teuku*, while members of the Sultan's dynasty use the usual Malay *Tuanku*. The Pakeh dynasty of Pidië was an odd exception, based on the eighteenth-century origins of the dynasty with a Bugis holy man, who was, of course, *Teungku*. (Veltman, pp. 79–84). Only in the east coast of Atjeh were *ulèëbalangs* known as *Tengku*, in accordance with Malay practice.

[4] Veltman pp. 113–4 and 136; Mohammad Said, p. 319. This extension of Atjehnese authority obviously also owed something to the contemporary colonization of the coast between Lhokseumawe and Tamiang, previously very sparsely inhabited.

In Ibrahim's hands, therefore, the Atjeh Sultanate became again a real force, attempting to establish its authority over all of North Sumatra.

Dutch policy

The conflict in commercial interests between Britain and the Netherlands was by no means solved by the London Treaty of 1824. Holland, in desperate need of revenue, could not be expected to tolerate continued British commercial predominance in its own empire. Yet this could only be curtailed by protectionist measures which certainly infringed the spirit of the London Treaty, if not always its letter. Altercations began almost immediately over the application of Article Two to the duties charged in Java. These were exacerbated by the arrangement whereby all the produce compulsorily delivered to the Government under the *cultuurstelsel* (cultivation system) begun by Van den Bosch in 1830 was carried to Holland by the *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatschappij* (N.H.M.). It was inevitable that British commerce in Java would lose ground to Dutch in the first decades after the restoration. But this did not prevent British merchants and statesmen from harbouring a bitter suspicion of a colonial system which was acquiring an international reputation for illiberal autocracy.[1]

British policy hardened, therefore, against any attempt to extend Dutch authority from Java to the other islands and particularly Sumatra. In 1824 the British plenipotentiaries had been reassured on this by 'the solemn disavowal, on the part of the Netherlands Government, of any desire to aim, either at political supremacy, or at commercial monopoly, in the Eastern Archipelago.'[2] This desire to avoid extended responsibilities was sincere, but on the other hand the Netherlands Indian Government had no intention of repudiating any of the various treaties which together had given the former Dutch East India Company a position of ill-defined suzerainty over almost the whole archipelago. Economic stringency dictated the limitation of effective Dutch activity in the first half of the

[1] P.P. 1840, 49, pp. 1–207; Tarling, 1957, pp. 86–122; De Klerck, pp. 123–39.

[2] Note addressed by the British Plenipotentiaries to the Plenipotentiaries of the Netherlands, in Marks, p. 257.

century, however, only to the most immediately profitable areas. Van den Bosch,[1] the great exponent of profitable colonialism, believed that Dutch control should be extended to cover Java, Bangka and Sumatra, while the other islands should be ignored. By a cautious use of influence he hoped to win the voluntary allegiance of all the Sumatran rulers south of Atjeh within twenty-five years, to establish small Dutch posts at the most important river-mouths, and to adjust their tariffs in favour of Dutch commerce to the limit allowed by Article Two of the London Treaty, which the British had intended would apply only to Java.[2]

In practice this scheme had to be subordinated to the necessities of the war the Dutch had been fitfully pursuing since 1820 against the so-called *Padris*[3]—militant puritan reformers of the Wahhabi type who had gained a dominant position in Minangkabau during the first decades of the century. Nevertheless Djambi was forced to accept Dutch sovereignty and a military post at Muara Kompeh in 1833–4. The pace quickened after the fall of the *Padri* stronghold of Bondjol in 1837. Inderagiri recognized Dutch authority in 1838, and Singkil and Barus were occupied in 1839–40. In 1840, a military detachment pursuing *Padri* remnants crossed the island from the west in response to an appeal from a minor chief in the Asahan district, chased out the Raja of Panai, and was subsequently permitted by Batavia to establish a post at the confluence of the Panai and Bila rivers. Meanwhile, in accordance with instructions from Van den Bosch, a Dutch envoy was negotiating to offer Sultan Ismail of Siak the protection he so keenly desired. By the end of 1840 he required only Government approval to conclude a treaty.[4]

The Straits merchants were quick to notice these advances after 1837, and forwarded a series of protests to London. The

[1] Governor-General 1830–3; Minister of Colonies 1833–9.

[2] De Klerck, pp. 141–3; J. M. Somer *De Korte Verklaring* (Breda, 1934), pp. 45–7.

[3] So-called by Europeans, presumably because they were first described by analogy with the *padres* (priests) of the Christians. R. A. Kern, 'Padri', *Encyclopedia of Islam* III (Leiden/London, 1936), p. 1018; B. J. O. Schrieke, 'Bijdragen tot de Bibliografie van de huidige godsdienstige beweging ter Sumatra's Westkust, *TBG* 59 (1919–21), pp. 249–57; Muhamad Radjab, *Perang Paderi di Sumatera Barat* (Djakarta, 1964).

[4] De Klerck, pp. 143–5, 173 and 181–2; Schadee I, pp. 50–6.

post at Panai-Bila incurred special hostility because of the complaints of some traders and chiefs from Batu Bara, five of whose comrades had been hanged by the Dutch garrison who thought, perhaps rightly, that an attempt was being made to drive them out.[1]

In 1840 the British Foreign Secretary was Lord Palmerston. He had already battled with the Dutch for five years over the Java duties and was anxious to avoid a similar situation in Sumatra. Not deterred by the weakness of the case against the Dutch advances in terms of the 1824 Treaty, he seized on a diffident suggestion of the Governor, Samuel Bonham, to assert the validity of Farquhar's 1818 engagement with Siak, with its guarantees for British trade.[2] Furthermore, he argued, the Dutch treaty with Djambi, communicated to Britain only in 1841, contravened Article Three of the London Treaty. The conquest of Barus and Singkil appeared to infringe the guarantee of Atjeh's independence. Palmerston also raised Article Six of the London Treaty, which required the approval of The Hague for all Dutch advances in the East. Since none of these appeals to treaty rights was conclusive, he was obliged also to bluster in general terms about 'the hostile spirit and tendency of the proceedings of the Dutch authorities in the Indian Seas'.[3]

In The Hague a more cautious Colonial Minister, J.C. Baud (1839–48), was more willing to listen to such complaints than his predecessor. Baud was impressed by a memorandum from a former governor of the West Coast of Sumatra warning against acquiring more territory than could be assimilated by the colonial system. Moreover, the Minister considered, since most Minangkabau produce had been redirected to the west coast by the Dutch occupation, control of the eastern rivers could no longer justify a quarrel with Britain. Van den Bosch's twenty-five-year plan for Sumatra should be lengthened to a century, and the new posts on the east coast should for the moment be abandoned.

In accordance with Baud's instructions of September 1841, the Netherlands Indian Government reluctantly withdrew its

[1] P.P. 1842, 30, pp. 125–36; Tarling, 1957, pp. 139–40; De Klerck, p. 176.

[2] Bonham to Maddock 5 November 1840, P.P. 1842, 30, p. 147.

[3] Palmerston to Disbrowe 29 January 1841, ibid. p. 145. Also ibid. pp. 145–81; Tarling, 1957, pp. 139–44.

posts from Panai-Bila and Inderagiri, and broke off negotiations with Siak. Batavia insisted on keeping the post at Djambi for the defence of Palembang, but no differential duties were thenceforth levied there. On the other hand little effect was given to the Minister's instructions to reserve nominal sovereignty over the vacated states and to continue showing the flag there.[1]

Even Baud did not admit the validity of any of Palmerston's arguments. The British were simply informed that the posts on the east coast had been required only for temporary military purposes and were being withdrawn. A British proposal to compromise over the interpretation of the London Treaty was not taken up, so that the matter was left at issue.[2] But the spirited and apparently successful way in which Palmerston had championed their cause won the admiration of the Straits merchants and encouraged them to rely on Britain's pre-1824 Sumatra treaties as guarantees against Dutch expansion.

Atjeh did not figure seriously in the plans of either Van den Bosch or Baud. Over a thousand miles from Batavia, its commerce was in other hands, and its independence guaranteed against any Dutch encroachment. Fulfilment of the 1824 undertaking to protect commerce in Atjeh was completely out of the question. Holland's resources were overtaxed in protecting her own commercial interests, let alone those of Britain, France and the United States, who dominated the Atjehnese trade. The only official Dutch contact with Atjeh before 1850 was a low-ranking mission of 1837 which protested against the sheltering in Atjeh of mutineers from a Dutch schooner. The commissioners offended royal protocol by visiting subordinate ports before the capital, and were given a cool reception on their arrival. Batavia rejected the commissioners' suggestion that Atjeh be forthwith placed under blockade. Nevertheless no initiative was taken to ease relations or even formulate a coherent policy towards the Sultanate.[3]

On the contrary Dutch officials in the West Coast of Sumatra were allowed to drag the Government into a state of open hostility to Atjeh in the course of the war with the *Padris*. The

[1] Somer, pp. 47–56; Schadee I, pp. 58–63; De Klerck, pp. 192–4.
[2] Tarling, 1957, pp. 144–6.
[3] De Klerck, pp. 158–63.

southernmost states claimed by Atjeh—Barus, Tapus, Singkil and Trumon—all had mixed populations of Malays and Atjehnese. In Singkil and Tapus at least the Atjehnese had gained the upper hand since the decline of Dutch power in the eighteenth century. A series of border conflicts and appeals from the Malay chiefs prompted the Dutch local authorities to constitute Trumon an independent buffer state and to annex the other three states to the south. Little attention was given to the angered reaction of Atjeh, though it was well known that men from many parts of the state had assisted in the spirited resistance offered by Singkil and Tapus.[1] Little wonder that many west-coast Atjehnese gained the impression that a state of war existed between Atjeh and the *Kompeuni* (as they called the Dutch Government).[2]

Onthouding (abstention) in the outer islands remained official Dutch policy throughout the 1840's, though local officials were able to bend it slightly in their relations with Celebes and Borneo. But the view that profitability should be the sole criterion governing the rate of expansion was beginning to seem anachronistic in view of the greater assertiveness of France and America in areas the Dutch considered their rightful colonial heritage. The successful intrusion of Raja Brooke in Sarawak (1841–5) and an abortive one by the American Gibson in Djambi in 1851 caused uneasiness in The Hague. In 1852 Atjeh also began to appear as a possible Achilles Heel for the Dutch. Napoleon III was reported to have received an Atjehnese envoy, Sidi Muhammad, and presented him with a letter and a sword of honour for Sultan Ibrahim.[3] Expansionists in Batavia were not slow to exploit the new bogey of foreign intervention as the only way of inducing tight-fisted politicians to allow a forward step.

[1] Ibid. pp. 145–52 and 164–7; Schadee I, pp. 56–8.

[2] De Klerck, p. 214. Long after the demise of the (Dutch) United East India Company in 1799 the Netherlands Indian Government continued to be known throughout Indonesia simply as 'The Company' (Atjehnese: *Kompeuni*).

[3] Hagel (Paris) to B.Z. 1 and 2 November 1852, B.Z. 3076. De Klerck, p. 208. Sidi Muhammad was an Atjehnese from Meulaboh, who appears to have been associated with the Atjehnese embassy to Turkey in 1850-1. He was sent back to Atjeh with a French merchant vessel in 1853. See below pp. 84–5.

Colonial Minister Pahud[1] was sufficiently disturbed by the danger to issue directives in April 1853 which were amplified later in formal instructions issued to himself as the new Governor-General in 1855. There should be no further involvement by the Dutch in the internal government of the Indonesian states, but treaties clearly excluding the possibility of foreign intervention were to be sought with all states. In the case of the Sumatran states which were still independent—notably Atjeh and Siak—Dutch sovereignty should not be asserted, so as to respect Britain's interpretation of Article Three of the London Treaty.[2]

Despite this injunction, Batavia was still slow to abandon its cold disdain for Banda Atjeh. In 1854 the viceroy gave instructions for 'showing the flag' regularly in Atjeh, but he repeated a ban on any friendly overture toward the Sultan 'as long as there is no attempt at friendly relations from the side of that chief'.[3] The first warship sent to Atjeh under the new policy, in 1855, committed the old fault of visiting subordinate ports before the capital, and did nothing to improve the Dutch image there.

Yet Sultan Ibrahim was acute enough to see the futility of a dispute with Holland, and he welcomed politely a more senior and more judicious mission which Pahud sent to him the following year. His apparent readiness to forget past differences at last converted Batavia to a policy of trying to work through the Sultan as a focus of order rather than against him. General Van Swieten, then Governor of the West Coast of Sumatra, was authorized to negotiate a treaty of friendship. Signed in Banda Atjeh on 30 March 1857, this treaty annulled the grievances of each party and provided in general terms for friendship and commerce between them. Van Swieten refused Ibrahim's request for a mutual defensive and offensive alliance.[4]

[1] Charles Ferdinand Pahud (1803–73). After twenty-four years as a financial official in Indonesia he became Minister of Colonies in the Liberal Ministry of 1849–53 and also the subsequent Centre Ministry. He resigned to become Governor-General, 1855–61. *NNBW* 3, cols. 945–9.

[2] Pahud to Van Twist 29 April 1853, copy Kol. to B.Z. 29 April 1853, B.Z. 3136. Also Somer, pp. 57–97; De Klerck, 197–201 and 209; Graham Irwin, 'Nineteenth Century Borneo: A Study in Diplomatic Rivalry', *VKI* 15 (1955), pp. 151–6.

[3] Besluit of 14 April 1854, quoted De Klerck, p. 213.

[4] Mohammad Said, pp. 283–98; De Klerck, pp. 214–29. The treaty is

Clearly neither party had lost its distrust of the other overnight. Yet with a more positive policy in Batavia the treaty could have marked the beginning of a more permanent Dutch influence in Atjeh. The Governor-General had intended to maintain the link by sending a vessel annually to Atjeh, but only in 1858 was this done. The following visit, in 1861, was prompted by another of the familiar border grievances.[1] The old hostility was quick to reappear.

Sultan Ibrahim had not neglected to consult his older and more respected ally before signing the treaty with Van Swieten. In 1856 he had asked the Governor of the Straits Settlements whether he 'should be on friendly terms with the Dutch'. Blundell had replied saying that this would increase the Sultan's prestige.[2] Such an assurance was essential, as the Atjehnese were most unlikely to accept an alliance with Holland at the expense of one with the British—their main trading partners. It was, therefore, no coincidence that Atjeh and Holland were closest to understanding each other in a period of smooth Anglo-Dutch relations. Ibrahim's question would have been answered very differently in the 1860's or early 1840's. But the 1850's were a period of great opporunity for the merchants of the Straits Settlements, who could afford to relax their suspicion that Dutch exclusiveness was the source of all their problems.[3] Moreover the *Cultuurstelsel* had helped restore Dutch commerce to the point where the more liberal governments in office after 1848 could afford to pursue a more relaxed tariff policy.[4]

For Penang in particular, on which the North Sumatra trade was centred, the period after 1845 was one of marked improvement which became a boom in 1853. Until 1845 the trade of Penang had been virtually stagnant; by contrast it more than doubled between 1852–3 and 1858–9.[5] The increasing

Appendix 3 in ibid. pp. 438–40. An English translation is in P.P. 1873, 75, pp. 157–8.

[1] De Klerck, pp. 229–32.

[2] Tarling, 1957, pp. 164–5.

[3] Already in 1851 the Straits Government had declined to interfere in the dispute between Ibrahim and Sulaiman, partly out of deference to Dutch sensibilities; ibid. pp. 151–2.

[4] P. J. Blok *History of the People of the Netherlands,* trans. O. A. Bierstadt (New York, 1912), V, p. 466.

[5] T. Braddell *Statistics of the British Possessions in the Straits Settlements* (Penang, 1861), Table facing p. 6. And see Table 1 in Appendix 3, below.

speed and regularity of shipping in this period[1] favoured the development of fixed entrepôts like Penang where cargo could be loaded quickly. The slow American vessels prepared to wait several months while collecting a cargo of pepper ceased to be economic. The last large American fleet visited the west coast of Atjeh in 1853, and within a few years the bulk of the Atjehnese pepper-crop was being marketed in Penang.[2] The value of Sumatran pepper-exports to Penang increased from $155,000 in 1851–2 to a temporary peak of a million dollars in 1857–8, when prices were high. In the same period the total Penang-Sumatra trade roughly doubled.[3]

The other new source of wealth was the tin-mining which began to expand rapidly in Perak and southern Thailand after 1850. Whereas the local trade of Penang had formerly been almost exclusively with North Sumatra, the ratio after this boom period was approximately Sumatra 3: Thailand 2: Malaya 1, with the balance shifting gradually in favour of Thailand during the 1860's.

The boom was over by 1859, the Sumatra trade in particular levelled off again, pepper prices fell, and Penang traders were once more ready to find political causes for their difficulties.

* * *

Nineteenth-century North Sumatra faced a unique problem in that its commerce was almost exclusively with Britain, which, by the Treaty of 1824, had denied itself any political control. Independence had then appeared the answer; but in the more intense commercial and imperial competition of the second half-century complete independence was not possible for a small state. The chapters which follow describe the agonizing process of untangling this dilemma, with the ultimate result of bringing North Sumatra into Netherlands India. They attempt to show why instead of softening the direct confrontation of colonized and colonizers, the crucial role of British Penang helped to make that confrontation exceptionally painful.

[1] A fortnightly P.&O. steamer service between Suez and Hong Kong, calling at Penang, was established in 1853; W. S. Lindsay *A History of Merchant Shipping* (London, 1876), IV, pp. 390–3.

[2] Gould, 1956, pp. 322–7.

[3] *Tabular Statements of the Commerce and Shipping of Prince of Wales' Island, Singapore and Malacca, 1853–4, 1854–5, 1857–8, 1862–3 and 1867–8.*

1

The Contest for the East Coast of Sumatra 1858–1865

The Siak Treaty of 1858

Sultan Ismail of Siak (1827–64) never succeeded in becoming master of his turbulent country. No sooner had he escaped from his father's tutelage in 1840 than he was faced with a rebellion by his brother-in-law. This was put down by the Sultan's younger brother, Tengku Putra, who virtually ruled the country thereafter as Raja Muda.[1] In view of later Dutch experience with Ismail, it is safe to assume that his own incapacity was the principal cause of his difficulties.[2]

Ismail's dignity received a final affront in 1854, when an Atjehnese fleet obliged all the East Coast states as far south as Serdang to recognize the suzerainty of Sultan Ibrahim. Unable to retaliate, Ismail sailed to Singapore in 1856, where he vainly appealed to the Governor, E. A. Blundell, for assistance. He then made a pact with Adam Wilson, Chief Clerk in a Singapore merchant house, who agreed to assist him to defeat Tengku Putra and re-establish his authority in the 'dependencies' taken by Atjeh, in return for commercial privileges in Siak and a third of the profits from the area to be reconquered.

Disregarding a warning from Blundell, Wilson took a force to Siak in November and established himself, if not the Sultan, in a position of power. Tengku Putra was quick to appeal to Blundell against the Englishman, who he claimed was breaking Britain's 1824 obligation to abstain from interference in Sumatra. When the Governor washed his hands of Wilson, Putra appealed through the Raja Muda of Riau to the Dutch

[1] Schadee, *Geschiedenis van Sumatra's Oostkust* I, p. 68.
[2] See below, p. 28.

Resident there. Ismail followed suit, since he was disenchanted with Wilson and realized that the British would not defend him if the Dutch supported Putra.[1]

Pahud, now Governor General, held to the policy he had enunciated as Colonial Minister in 1853. To avoid a clash with Britain eighteenth-century claims to sovereignty should not be revived and a simple treaty of friendship should be concluded with a Siak still recognized as independent. J. F. N. Nieuwenhuyzen, the Resident of Riau, was sent to Siak in June 1857, whereupon Wilson's agent fled to Singapore. As Nieuwenhuyzen found the rival brothers both welcoming his help against Wilson he concluded the desired treaty of friendship, though advising the Government to accept the Sultan's offer of sovereignty over Siak.

The Colonial Ministry had passed to the ultra-conservative Pieter Mijer[2] who saw less reason than his Governor-General for refusing Ismail's offer. Consequently, when at the end of 1857 the news reached Batavia that Wilson had returned and established himself on Bengkalis Island, Pahud sanctioned a more forceful intervention. Nieuwenhuyzen was sent back to Siak in December with J. H. Tobias, his successor at Riau. The Dutch expedition first chased an indignant Wilson out of Bengkalis, despite an Act of Cession of the island which the Englishman was able to produce. The two delegates then negotiated with Sultan Ismail, Tengku Putra, and four Siak *suku*-chiefs for a formal political treaty which was signed on 1 February 1858.[3]

[1] Tarling, 'British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago 1824–1871' (1957), p. 160; Schadee I, pp. 69–72; De Klerck, *De Atjèh-oorlog* (1912), pp. 238–9; C. B. Buckley *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore* (Singapore, 1902), II, pp. 637 and 663–4. Reprinted in one volume, Kuala Lumpur, 1965.

[2] Pieter Mijer (1812–81) filled various legal positions in the N.I. Government (1833–51) before being appointed to the *Raad van Indië* (1851–5). Back in Holland he became a Conservative Colonial Minister (1856–8), earning criticism for a severe restriction of the press in Java. In the Second Chamber (1860–6) he led the conservative reaction against colonial reform. In 1866 he again held the Colonial portfolio for a few months, before resigning to become Governor-General. His self-appointment caused a constitutional crisis and brought down the Conservative Ministry. As viceroy Mijer moderated his conservatism with pragmatism. He was an admirer of J. C. Baud, whose biography he wrote in 1878. *NNBW* III, cols. 896–8.

[3] De Klerck, pp. 239–41; Schadee I, pp. 71–3.

The content of this treaty was important not only for Siak but also as a model for subsequent Dutch expansion in Sumatra. The Siak rulers declared their country to be a part of Netherlands India under Dutch sovereignty (Article 1) and permitted a Dutch military post initially at Bengkalis, later at other points as agreed (Article 4). Those who eventually succeeded the Sultan and the Raja Muda would have to swear allegiance beforehand to the Governor-General and obtain the approval of his representative in Riau (Articles 30 and 32). Without the permission of the Resident of Riau the Sultan could not correspond with foreign governments (Articles 7 and 8), or allow foreigners to reside in Siak or obtain land or mineral rights there (Articles 12 and 17). The Netherlands Indian Government could if desired take over the royal taxes and other revenues provided appropriate compensation was given the chiefs concerned (Article 26). In return for all these and other undertakings, the Sultan, the Raja Muda, and the *suku-* chiefs would be maintained in their rights. Provided they abided by the treaty, the 'internal government' of the Sultanate would not be interfered with (Article 37).[1]

These terms suited Sultan Ismail, who had never wielded effective power anyway. Tengku Putra proved less tractable, although his *de facto* rule was confirmed by Article 32: 'The Sultan undertakes to leave the government of his country to the governor [Raja Muda]'. I. Walland, the first Assistant-Resident of Siak who took up his duties in May 1859, proved unequal to his pioneering task of 'rule by advice'. He was obliged to recommend that the treaty be amended to allow him to rule directly, and his relations with Tengku Putra deteriorated so far that the Dutch garrison had to be brought from Bengkalis to the capital. Putra fled to oppose the Dutch from neighbouring Kampar, while a third brother was appointed to rule in his place under the Sultan.[2]

Walland's private forward policy received no support from his superiors. In Riau Tobias regretted his tactlessness,[3] while James Loudon was provoked to instruct that all Residents and

[1] The thirty-nine-article treaty is printed as Appendix IV of De Klerck, pp. 441–50. See also Schadee I, pp. 73–7.

[2] Schadee I, pp. 77–9.

[3] Tobias to Pahud 31 Dec. 1860, copy G.G. to Kol. 22 March 1861, Kol. Geh. 100/H, 5916.

Governors in Netherlands India should avoid any step which might necessitate the further assumption of direct authority. This controversial Minister of Colonies[1] took the opportunity to emphasize his view of 'each extension of our authority in the Indian Archipelago as a step nearer to our fall, and the more so as we have already far outgrown our strength in that respect'.[2]

Stability was only achieved in 1864. Ismail's eccentricities finally alienated all his chiefs, and the Dutch replaced him by the third brother, Sultan Sharif Kassim. At the latter's request Tengku Putra was restored to his former position as governor under the Sultan. During 1863 the Netherlands Indian Government took over the opium farm and some other Siak taxes. The traditional government however remained, and Siak became a classic case of nineteenth-century Dutch indirect rule.[3]

The official British response to the occupation of Siak was much milder than experience had led the Dutch to expect. Respecting the 1824 undertaking not to interfere in Sumatra, Blundell consistently refused to heed appeals from Ismail against Putra, from Putra against Wilson, and from Wilson against the Dutch. He was unmoved even by the news that the Dutch intended to occupy Siak:

> How far such an establishment may interfere with the freedom of trade secured to us by the treaty of August 31st, 1818 . . . remains to be seen. It may perhaps be considered that there has been an absence of courtesy on the part of the Dutch authorities in not inform-

[1] James Loudon (1824–1900) was the son of a British official who followed Raffles to Java. After legal training in Holland and a varied career in Java (1846–58) he became Secretary-General of the Department of Colonies in 1859. In 1861 he was given the Colonial portfolio by the Conservative leader Van Zuylen van Nijevelt, who was soon forced to resign by his opposition to Loudon's popular reforms of the forced cultivation and protectionist systems. Loudon survived the resulting controversy until early 1862, when he refused either to form his own government or to join a Liberal one. He was Royal Commissioner for South Holland until 1872, when appointed Governor-General by the Liberal Van de Putte. As viceroy he was responsible for declaring war on Atjeh, and resigned in 1875 when the incoming Conservative Minister refused to endorse his conduct. *NNBW* III, cols. 790–1. F. W. Stapel *De Gouverneurs-Generaal van Nederlandsch-Indië* (The Hague, 1941).

[2] Loudon to Pahud 8 June 1861, Kol. Geh. 100/H, 5916.

[3] Schadee I, pp. 79–81. H. A. Hijmans van Anrooij, 'Nota omtrent Het Rijk van Siak', *TBG* 30 (1885), pp. 270–1 and *passim.*

ing us of their intention to form an establishment in Siak, but in other respects . . . I am inclined to consider such establishments to be very beneficial. Siak has long been in a state of anarchy and disorganisation, and wherever such a state of affairs prevails, trade is at an end and plunder and piracy are unchecked.[1]

This view was probably shared by most of the merchants of Singapore, whose trade with the Siak of Sultan Ismail was depressingly small, and who had not found Dutch control of Djambi to their disadvantage.

Hostility to Dutch advances had also softened in London. In 1857 Wilson had complained about the treatment he and the British flag had received from the Dutch. The Foreign Office found no case for defending this adventurer, but its representative in The Hague was instructed to reiterate the position Palmerston had taken in 1841: ' . . . the Dutch have no right to interfere with the independence of native princes, acknowledged by us as so existing previous to our treaty with Holland in 1824'.[2] Nevertheless when the Siak treaty was communicated to the Foreign Office by the Dutch in September 1858, it was received with a simple acknowledgement, was not translated, and gave rise to no discussion at all.[3]

The reason for this passivity may have been the policy suggested by Pahud in 1857, adopted in The Hague and explained to the British Chargé d'Affaires the following year, that any tariff introduced in Siak should be non-differential.[4] In this area of most concern to the Straits, Dutch statesmen were anxious to avoid giving any encouragement to British suspicions. Since the freedom to trade was the only issue on which Blundell had expressed anxiety, the Foreign Office probably saw no need to renew its threadbare case.

One thing, however, is certain. Article 2 of the Siak treaty

[1] Blundell to Secretary 7 January 1858, quoted Tarling, 1957, pp. 161–2. Tobias also was impressed by Blundell's goodwill toward the Dutch settlement, to Pahud 31 December 1861, copy G.G. to Kol. 22 March 1861, Kol.Geh. 100/H, 5916.

[2] Shelburne to Abercromby 10 October 1857, private, quoted Tarling, 1957, p. 161.

[3] Tarling, 1957, p. 162. Memo by Percy Anderson 5 January 1874, F.O. 37/534. Neither the Foreign Office nor the India Office possessed a Dutch translator, I.O. to F.O. 27 July 1861, F.O. 37/421.

[4] Tarling, 1957, p. 162. De Klerk, p. 241.

cannot have been understood in London, nor its existence suspected in the Straits. It defined the limits of Siak as they had been at the peak of its power, including Asahan, Batu Bara, Serdang, Deli, Langkat and Tamiang as 'dependencies'. These 'pepper-ports', as they were known in Penang, exported to that port pepper, rattans, gutta percha and India rubber to the annual value of £150,000, which greatly outweighed the value of the Siak trade.[1] This immensely fertile and potentially important area appears to have been slipped into a minor treaty without being noticed in Europe. Even in The Hague the significance of Sultan Ismail's territorial ambitions was not understood. Had it been, it is unlikely that even a Minister of Mijer's temper, let along a Loudon, would have sanctioned such a vast increase of responsibility.

The Kompeuni moves north

Only with the appointment of Elisa Netscher[2] as Resident of Riau in 1861 did Ismail's claims find a champion of sufficient skill and tenacity to make them effective. Almost at once Netscher identified himself with a policy of expansion to the limits set by the 1858 treaty. He succeeded in spite of the well-justified caution of many of his superiors.

Support from Batavia was only given when Netscher was able to show the apparent desire of some of the northern states to submit voluntarily to Dutch sovereignty. In February 1862 the Pangeran of Langkat arrived in Siak, and appealed to the Assistant-Resident for Netherlands protection. The Pangeran, Tengku Ngah, had grown up in Siak and was naturally inclined to look thither for assistance against his many enemies both internal and external. He also had ambitions in Tamiang, which were opposed by the dominant Atjehnese faction there.

[1] Penang Chamber of Commerce to Cavenagh 25 September 1862, copy in Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

[2] Elisa Netscher (1825–80) spent almost all his life in Indonesia. He served in the 'Political Affairs' section of the General Secretariat in Batavia until appointed Resident of Riau in 1861. Subsequently he was Governor of Sumatra's West Coast (1870–8) where his rigidity towards Atjeh was again a disadvantage, and member of the *Raad van Indië* (1878–80). His considerable knowledge of Malay history and affairs is evident in several articles in the *TBG*, and in his 'De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1603 tot 1865', *VBG* 35 (1870); *NNBW* III, col. 983; Schadee I, pp. 168–9; De Klerck, p. 337.

The Atjehnese expedition of 1854 had confirmed his rule in Langkat and bestowed the title 'Indradiraja Amir, Pahlawan Atjeh'. But a few years later Sultan Ibrahim had commissioned an energetic member of the Atjehnese royal house, Tuanku Hashim,[1] 'who represents my authority as far as Serdang',[2] to establish what control he could in the border region. Hashim established his headquarters at Pulau Kompai, a strategic port between Tamiang and Langkat. Making skilful use of his royal prestige and some hastily arranged marriage alliances, he had succeeded by 1861 in ending the Pangeran's influence entirely in Tamiang and threatening it in Langkat. It was not surprising, therefore, that Tengku Ngah offered to cede Pulau Kompai to the Dutch in return for help against the Atjehnese and their friends.[3]

This appeal obtained the necessary viceregal approval for a journey by Netscher to the so-called 'dependencies' of Siak: 'to try peacefully to withdraw the states on this coast from the usurped authority of Atjeh, and bring them back to acknowledge again that of Siak, and thereby to establish Netherlands sovereignty over that part of Sumatra'.[4]

Dutch writers have shown characteristic anxiety to establish

[1] A great grandson of Sultan Mahmud Shah (1760–81), Tuanku Hashim was distinguished from other members of Atjehnese royalty by his intelligence, his education, and his adherence to the demands of Islam. He acted as Sultan Ibrahim's deputy in Atjeh's eastern dependencies until ejected by the Dutch in 1865. He then established himself in Langsa, where he grew pepper and married the Raja's daughter. His influence in this district was the chief reason it was among the last coastal areas to submit to Dutch rule. Hashim however moved to Atjeh Besar at the outbreak of war in 1873, and remained there until his death in 1897. He took a leading part in the defence of Banda Atjeh in 1873–4, and was appointed guardian of Sultan Muhammad Daud in 1874. He was chiefly responsible for maintaining the influence of the Sultanate during the war, and was especially successful in raising funds for the court. Though declared of age in 1884 Daud never escaped from his tutelage. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, pp. 149–50; Lavino to van Lansberge 17 February 1877, Cons. Penang 102; Mohammad Said, pp. 320–1.

[2] This commission was inscribed on the flag which Hashim flew at Pulau Kompai; Schadee I, p. 138.

[3] Ibid. pp. 85–7 and 101–4. Mohammad Said, pp. 316–22; Netscher to Sloet 27 September 1862, copy G.G. to Kol. 28 March 1863, Kol.Op.Verb. No. 3, 1344; Cavenagh to Durand 3 October 1864, Coll. 2 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[4] Netscher to Sloet 27 September 1862, loc. cit., quoting Besluit of 27 March 1862.



Map 2. The Disputed States of the East Coast of Sumatra.

the constitutional validity of Siak's claim, on which the Netherlands occupation of these 'dependencies' was based.[1] It is not an easy task. If right of conquest were the sole criterion, the Atjehnese expedition of 1854 was the most recent and had achieved recognition as far as Serdang. As recently as 1859 Atjeh had provided Sultan Muhammad of Deli with a new seal on his accession to the throne.[2] Further south Atjeh had attempted to gain influence indirectly by giving Sultan Ahmad Shah of Asahan a status similar to Hashim's as 'wakil Sultan Atjeh' for the whole region between Serdang and Siak. In terms of sentiment, Siak was the less unpopular power,[3] partly because it was less powerful and martial, partly because its people were Malays like those of the Deli area.

Neither claim was conclusive. Like the British before them, the Dutch were in fact obliged to treat with each ruler as if he were independent, even while basing their whole case on Siak's sovereignty. However, the physical presence of Atjeh was felt and resented more in the north, and that of Siak in the south. It was significant that the appeal to Dutch protection had come from Langkat, which alone of the major states had a sizeable Atjehnese minority. Deli too sought protection against Atjeh, while Serdang was unable to decide which was the lesser evil. Moving further south, Asahan had long been the state most implacably opposed to Siak, to whom it denied that it had ever been subject.[4]

A Minangkabau nobleman, Raja Burhan Udin, whom Netscher sent before him reported that no one in the area was ready to recognize Siak's authority. The influence of Atjeh pre-

[1] E.g. Netscher, in *TBG* 14, (1864), p. 350; Schadee I, pp. 148–51; De Klerck, pp. 242–6 and 255–9. Netscher's concern with the question led him to a vain investigation of the Malacca archives, which must nevertheless have stimulated his important 'De Nederlanders in Djohor en Siak, 1602 tot 1865', *VBG* 35 (1870); Netscher to Sloet 27 September 1862, loc.cit.

[2] Copies of the various seals are in Cavenagh to Durand 15 October 1864, Coll. 2 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83. A *sarakarta* from Sultan Ibrahim, confirming Muhammad's father Osman as Sultan of Deli, is still in the possession of the Sultan of Deli. It is reproduced in H. M. Zainuddin *Tarich Atjeh dan Nusantara* (Medan, 1961), p. 418.

[3] Atjeh's unpopularity was admitted even by the Raja of Asahan; Fox to Protheroe, May 1864, Coll. 6 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[4] Statement of Yang di Pertuan of Asahan in Penang 3 October 1864, Coll. 2 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83; C.A. Kroesen 'Geschiedenis van Asahan', *TBG* 31, (1886), pp. 98–99 and 103–5.

dominated in Langkat, Deli and Serdang, all of which states welcomed the idea of Dutch protection. However, Batu Bara, Panai and Bila were under the influence of Asahan which, though not tributary to Atjeh, wanted no connexion with either Siak or the Dutch.[1] The firm but popular rule of Sultan Husain (1813–54) and that of his successor Ahmad Shah had brought Asahan to an exceptional position of power in the whole region between Serdang and Siak.[2]

Netscher's first voyage to the 'dependencies' in August 1862 was conducted with considerable skill in view of these difficulties. Accompanied by some of the leading Siak chiefs, he visited Panai, Bila, Serdang, Deli and Langkat. The Pangeran of Langkat had by then regained his state from Tuanku Hashim and was very anxious for Dutch protection, but Netscher avoided any written commitment to him in view of the complicated and disputed relations between Langkat and its neighbours. The chiefs of the other states visited readily signed acknowledgements of Netherlands Indian sovereignty, and in return were confirmed in office by Netscher. The rajas undertook to make no treaties with other governments nor to permit foreigners to reside in their countries without the Resident's permission. With considerable difficulty Netscher persuaded most of the rajas to recognize Siak's suzerainty, but for Deli a special formula had finally to be devised associating it on an equal footing with Siak under Netherlands India.[3]

On his northward journey Netscher failed to obtain an interview with Sultan Ahmad Shah, the Yang di Pertuan of Asahan, and therefore sent the Sultan of Deli and a Dutch *Controleur* to him as mediators. Proudly but politely clinging to his independent status, Ahmad still declined to meet Netscher except on shore. The Resident rejected this, and left the Yang di Pertuan with a summons to explain within two months why the British flag had been seen flying from his territory.[4]

The offenders, as Ahmad duly explained, were in fact some

[1] Schadee I, pp. 86–7; Netscher to Sloet 27 September 1862, copy G.G. to Kol. 28 March 1863, Kol.Op.Verb. No. 3, 1344.

[2] Kroesen, pp. 95–103.

[3] Schadee I, pp. 87–92; Netscher to Sloet 27 September 1862, loc. cit.

[4] Schadee I, pp. 93–7; Netscher to Sloet 27 September 1862, loc. cit. Translations of Netscher's letters to Sultan Ahmad Shah are in Cavenagh to Durand 28 October 1862, Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

Penang Chinese, who as farmers of the opium and gaming monopolies in Asahan as well as the import and export duties had considerable influence with the Yang di Pertuan. The latter's explanation was that the Chinese felt they needed this British protection against the Pangeran of Langkat who flew the Dutch flag. Netscher was however probably justified in believing the flags were hoisted for his benefit, since the Chinese were among the strongest opponents of the Dutch connexion in Asahan.[1] Netscher considered the Chinese should be dealt with in the same way as Wilson had been, but Batavia warned him sharply to refrain from hostilities unless he received specific instructions.[2]

Despite Asahan's attitude, Netscher's brief mission had achieved a remarkable extension of Netherlands authority—remarkable particularly in view of Loudon's emphatic opposition to any such extension only a year before. It had been possible only because the fiction that all the minor states had become part of Netherlands India in 1858 made further approval from The Hague unnecessary. The Netherlands Government was not informed of Netscher's mission until seven months after it had taken place, and then only because international complications had arisen.[3] By the middle of 1863, The Hague was at last in a position to understand the seriousness of a Dutch occupation of this disputed area. But by then retreat from the position taken could only have been an impossible humiliation.

British objections

Of the two countries offended by the Dutch forward movement, the protests of Britain were naturally respected more than those of Atjeh. Yet Atjeh had the better case, and by flouting it the Dutch reaped an added harvest of problems ten years later.

[1] This must be ascribed mainly to their tight commercial links with Penang, and perhaps also to their fear that the Dutch would take over the profitable Asahan opium farm and place Chinese under their direct rule, as was done in Siak in 1863. Kroesen, pp. 105 and 111. Schadee I, p. 79.

[2] Netscher to Sloet 12 November 1862; Wattendorf to Netscher 12 December 1862; copies G.G. to Kol. 28 March 1863, Kol.Op.Verb., No. 3, 1344.

[3] Sloet to Van de Putte 28 March 1863, Kol.Op.Verb. No. 3, 1344.

The reaction to Netscher's mission in the Straits was in sharp contrast to Blundell's acquiescence in the occupation of Siak, for three major reasons. The trade involved was more considerable; the interested party were the Penang merchants, who jealously guarded their staple Sumatra trade, rather than those of Singapore with their wider interests; and a new Governor, Colonel Orfeur Cavenagh (1859–67), was much more energetic and assertive than his predecessor in defence of what he held to be British interests.[1]

From the beginning Cavenagh adopted a vigorous policy of emphasising to the rajas concerned that Britain did not recognize Dutch claims over them. In July 1862 he first received notice of Netscher's intentions from Asahan, where exploratory letters from the Dutch had caused alarm.[2] He immediately sent the Resident Councillor of Penang, Major Man, to investigate some standing grievances of Penang traders against the Pangeran of Langkat and a chief of Deli. At the same time Man was to establish whether Anderson's engagements with Deli, Serdang and Langkat were still being satisfactorily executed.[3]

Man's visit to these three states followed within a few days of that of Netscher. The Sultan of Deli was absent in Asahan at the time and his rivals in Deli, who had no desire to see the Sultan protected by Dutch arms, gave Man the general impression that 'The Natives appeared all to have a lively dread of their Dutch acquaintances, and earnestly to desire a closer connexion with the British.'[4] At Serdang the Raja claimed he had been bullied by Netscher into signing a document but desired British protection—a position he repeated in letters to Penang.[5]

Without the interference of Man and subsequent British demonstrations, Netscher's careful work in the disputed states would have been an almost immediate success. The East Coast

[1] Cowan *Nineteenth-Century Malaya* (London, 1961), pp. 16–17.

[2] Yang di-Pertuans Besar and Muda of Asahan to Cavenagh, 29 Du'l-hijja 1278H (27 June 1862), translation Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

[3] Protheroe to Man 6 August 1862, Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68. Although it was not part of Man's instructions, Netscher found the prevailing impression in Penang was that he had been sent principally to check on the Dutch; Netscher to Sloet 27 September 1862, loc. cit.

[4] Man to Protheroe 9 September 1862, Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

[5] Bashar ud-din to Cavenagh 22 August 1862, translation in Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

was torn by a mass of petty disputes; none of the contending rajas was able to resist physical pressure from the Dutch; and all could have been expected to profit from the stability which European advice backed by force could offer such an area. Yet Penang was closer and better-known than Riau, and as long as the rajas were left in doubt as to which European power would finally prevail, some of them were bound to resist Dutch advances. During the uncertain period between 1862 and 1865 the area divided on the lines of old rivalries, with Deli and Langkat clinging to the Dutch despite considerable internal opposition, Asahan relying on the British, Serdang undecided and Batu Bara divided.

The Sumatra merchants of Penang were quick to organize an effective campaign in defence of the *status quo*. On the one hand they forwarded a series of petitions to the Government, and to mercantile pressure-groups in Britain, urging that Palmerston's policy of 1841 be reapplied.[1] On the other they appealed to the Sumatran rulers to favour British rather than Dutch protection, assuring them that Britain would not allow them to be conquered by Holland.[2]

Foremost among these merchants was Lawrence Nairne, who had already fought Dutch aggression as Chairman of the Penang Chamber of Commerce in 1841.[3] Dutch control had ended his trade with Singkil and Barus in the 1830's,[4] and he was determined to prevent the same happening to his considerable trade with the East Coast of Sumatra. As an associate of Boon Teng, the Penang merchant who controlled most of Asahan's economy, Nairne had a particular stake in that country.[5] The Yang di Pertuan's first appeal to Cavenagh in June 1862 asked the Governor to reply through Nairne, and in later letters he spoke of 'having left the agency of my country

[1] Chamber of Commerce to Cavenagh 25 September 1862, copy Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68; Nairne to Crawfurd 10 March 1864, copy Crawfurd to Russell 10 May 1864, F.O. 37/421; Nairne to Russell 31 October 1865, Coll. 15 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[2] Enclosures in Netscher to Sloet 23 April 1863, copy G.G. to Kol. 24 May 1863, Kol.Op.Verb. No. 16, 1356.

[3] P.P. 1842, 30, pp. 141–2. Tarling, 1957 p. 141.

[4] Nairne to Russell 31 October 1865, Coll. 15 to No. 33. C.P.D. 83.

[5] Ahmad Shah to Netscher n.d., translation in Coll. 5 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83; Fox to Protheroe May 1864, Coll. 6 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

unto L.Nairne, esq.'.[1] Nairne provided the principal moral support of Asahan's resistance to Netscher, both by direct encouragement of Ahmad Shah and constant advice to his influential younger brother, Tengku Pangeran, who was in Penang during much of 1862 and 1863.[2] The Yang di Pertuan was thus kept aware of Britain's case against Holland. He was, for example, well enough informed to plead that his state was subject to Atjeh, and therefore guaranteed against Dutch aggression by Britain in the 1824 Treaty.[3]

The attitude of the Straits Government was necessarily more cautious than that of the merchants, but it faithfully reflected the same deep distrust of the Dutch. This was clearly indicated in Man's judgement on his journey to the East Coast:

> It would undoubtedly be a great blessing to civilisation in these seas if a progressive Christian Government possessed the dominion of these fertile regions, but the traditional policy of the Dutch has inspired our European merchants with such a deep rooted distrust of their commercial system, and the Natives with such an utter hatred of their rule, that any extension of their authority creates universal alarm, and all classes prefer rather to trust themselves to the instincts of self-interest in barbarians, than to the tender mercies of a nation which has hitherto sought to enforce, wherever its sway extended, the strictest principles of monopoly and the most unmitigated despotism.[4]

Cavenagh made these views his own. As his principal diplomatic weapon he decided to develop Palmerston's 1841 policy by asserting emphatically the validity of Anderson's 1823 treaties.[5] When Netscher informed him that English flags had been seen in Asahan, he replied haughtily that this was not surprising under the provisions of Anderson's treaties, copies of which he forwarded to Netscher, 'with a view of preventing any misconception as to the present relations between the British Government and the native states'.[6]

[1] Ahmad Shah to Boon Teng 21 Safar 1282H (16 July 1865), translation in Coll. 13 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[2] Enclosures in G.G. to Kol. 11 October 1865, Kol.Kab.W/D, 5981.

[3] Ahmad Shah to Lewis 14 Muharram 1281H (19 June 1864), translation in Coll. 11 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83. Also De Klerck, p. 277.

[4] Man to Protheroe 9 September 1862, Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

[5] Cavenagh to Durand 19 September 1862, Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

[6] Cavenagh to Netscher 5 January 1863, Coll. 2 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68;

But in the absence of any instructions from London or Calcutta Cavenagh was unable to give his friends in Sumatra the promise of British protection which they so earnestly demanded. He was obliged to play an empty hand with the maximum of bluff, to make it as difficult as possible for the Dutch to claim a *fait accompli* on the East Coast before the matter had been settled diplomatically in Europe. In response to increasingly desperate appeals from Asahan, the furthest the Governor would commit himself in writing was to promise the Yang di Pertuan:

> ...if our friend will content himself with the Government of his own country and refrain from interfering in the affairs of other Native Chiefs he will have no cause to fear any attempt to subvert his rule, and . . . will be allowed to remain unmolested, whilst he may rest assured that there will be no diminution in the friendship which has so long existed towards him on the part of the British Government.[1]

When the Yang di Pertuan unexpectedly arrived in Penang in August 1864, the only instructions Cavenagh had received in response to his frequent demands for a spirited policy were 'carefully to abstain from any proceeding which can give just cause of offence to the Dutch'.[2] He therefore had no alternative but to tell Ahmad that although the matter was still under discussion in Europe, Asahan stood no chance of British protection in the event of hostilities with the Dutch, since it had no treaty with Britain.[3]

Nevertheless Cavenagh appears to have done as much as possible to demonstrate the firmness of British intentions, without compromising himself by exceeding his instructions in writing. He responded to an appeal from the Singapore Chamber of Commerce to show Britain intended to uphold its treaties of 1823,[4] by sending a gunboat to the coast not once but four times in the space of two years. The *Pluto* visited Asahan,

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also Cavenagh *Reminiscences of an Indian Official* (London, 1884), pp. 337–40.

[1] Cavenagh to Ahmad Shah 21 July 1863, Coll. 8 to No. 86, C.P.D. 68.

[2] Wood to Government of India 30 September 1863, No. 75, I.P.D. 6.

[3] Cavenagh to Durand 27 August 1864, Coll. 7 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83. Cavenagh, pp. 354–5.

[4] Logan to Protheroe 4 November 1862, Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

Deli, Langkat and Serdang in March[1] and again in August 1863. In August Lawrence Nairne accompanied the commander of the *Pluto,* who frightened the Sultan of Deli by pointedly asking his reason for flying the Dutch flag.[2] In May 1864 the *Pluto* was once more visiting the Sumatra coast, Captain Fox having received written instructions 'to restrict himself to an expression of the ordinary feelings of friendship entertained by the British Government towards its neighbours, and scrupulously to refrain from holding out any hopes of our interference.'[3] Despite this solemn injunction Fox managed to intimidate the pro-Dutch Dato of Batu Bara, who claimed Fox had warned that the Dutch flag would be pulled down along the East Coast within a month. At Deli the Commander was reported to have advised the Sultan to write to Singapore rather than Riau if he were ever again in need of European help.[4] One more British warship visited the coast in April 1865.[5]

This show of strength temporarily met Cavenagh's intention by strengthening the position of those in eastern Sumatra who opposed Dutch rule. But in the absence of any support from London his policy was bound to collapse as soon as the Dutch called his bluff. They did so in June 1864 by installing *Controleurs* at Deli and Batu Bara, after the Governor-General had been reassured by news from England that Lord Russell intended to try to avoid a dispute.[6] Already a vigorous Liberal Minister of Colonies, Fransen van de Putte (1863–6), had endorsed an even more forceful policy than that suggested by Batavia. He had instructed that *Controleurs* be appointed to all the states which would accept them and that the Riau naval station be reinforced. In his view, the decision for a forward policy had already been irrevocably taken, and these measures

[1] Eales to Protheroe 30 March 1863, copy I.O. to F.O. 5 July 1863, F.O. 37/421.

[2] Netscher's journal of a journey to the East Coast, copy G.G. to Kol. 24 November 1863, Kol.Geh. 101, 5926.

[3] Protheroe to Macpherson 4 May and Macpherson to Fox 13 May 1863, Coll. 6 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[4] Netscher to Sloet 20 June 1864 and Report of Lt. Metmen 31 May 1864, copies G.G. to Kol. 26 July 1864, Kol.Kab.D[3], 5998.

[5] Schadee I, p. 163.

[6] Sloet to Van de Putte 27 March 1864, Kol.Geh. 101, 5926; Netscher to Sloet 20 June 1864, in G.G. to Kol. 26 July 1864, Kol.Kab.D[3], 5998; Schadee I, p. 125. See below, p. 53–4.

were simply the indispensable tools for carrying out such a policy.[1]

Atjehnese objections

More serious in the long run than British objections to the Dutch forward movement were those of Atjeh. Even before Netscher's first voyage to the area, Sultan Ibrahim had informed the Commander of the Dutch warship *Bromo* that the East Coast belonged to him as far as Panai and Bila, and that he would call in the Dutch to assist if he was ever too weak to deal with rebels in that district. Soon after, in a reply to Sloet van de Beele's announcement that he had assumed the viceroyalty (17 October 1861), Ibrahim proposed a settlement to define the borders between his country and Netherlands India.

The friendly tone of this letter and of Ibrahim's treatment of the grievance about which the *Bromo* had been sent decided the Governor-General to keep the door open for peace with Atjeh. He wrote to Atjeh on 23 December 1862, requesting the Sultan to send an envoy to Riau to settle the east coast boundary with Netscher. Already it was too late for the Dutch to make real concessions. But for almost another year the Governor-General's letter lay at Padang where the Governor considered his vessel insufficiently seaworthy to deliver it.[2]

In September Ibrahim had heard about the Dutch advance from the Yang di Pertuan of Asahan. He appealed at once to Cavenagh against the Dutch: 'we feel very sorry in our mind; we wish to expel them from our country; but we have not enough power at the moment'.[3]

In the Straits, however, the policy was still one of political fragmentation, and Atjehnese authority was as much resented as Dutch. As the Acting Resident Councillor of Penang put it:

> . . . it is our policy, I think, not to recognise an Authority which would tend only to interfere with the freedom of trade in the several ports and rivers along the Coast of Sumatra. The object of the Raja

[1] Van de Putte to King 21 July 1863, Kol.Op.Verb. No. 17, 1359; Van de Putte to Sloet 16 August 1863, Kol.Kab.B[8], 5965.

[2] De Klerck, pp. 255–7; Schadee I, pp. 146–7.

[3] Ahmad Shah to Ibrahim 2 September 1862: Ibrahim to Cavenagh 11 October 1862: translations in Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68.

of Acheen is to close these openings whenever he can do so, and compel the people to bring all their produce to Acheen, or else to establish custom-houses to levy Duties on the spot; and this our open acknowledgement of his active jurisdiction would strengthen his hands.[1]

For this reason Britain gave no diplomatic support to Atjeh's claim to the area, even though the 1824 guarantee of Atjehnese independence would have made this a good case. Only as a tactical move did Nairne advise Asahan to tell the Dutch that it was under Atjehnese sovereignty.[2] Later the idea was even mooted in Penang and Asahan that Atjeh had ceded its rights on the east coast to Britain.[3] Officially no encouragement was given to Atjeh at all, and later appeals from both Sultan Ibrahim and Tuanku Hashim of Pulau Kompai[4] remained unanswered like the first. Cavenagh did ask H.M.S. *Odin* to call at Atjeh on its return to Trincomalee in January 1863, but this visit was apparently intended only to find the Sultan's views on the east coast question without expressing any British view of the matter.[5]

Obtaining no reply from either Singapore or Batavia, Ibrahim deputed the *ulèëbalang* of Meureudu, Chut Latif, to see for himself. Arriving at Pulau Kompai with thirteen prahus in April 1863, Chut Latif summoned the rulers of Deli and Langkat to explain whether the Dutch had really taken their countries. They refused a meeting.[6] In Serdang and Asahan, however, the fleet was well received. If Chut Latif's plan had been to rouse all the anti-Dutch elements to punish the rajas of Deli and Langkat, as the latter feared, the plan was evidently

[1] Macpherson to Protheroe 30 November 1863, Coll. 1 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[2] Tengku Pangeran (Penang) to Ahmad Shah 22 Rabi'l-akir 1279H (17 October 1862), translation in G.G. to Kol. 11 October 1865, Kol.Kab. W/D, 5981.

[3] Pro-memoire about Asahan expedition, copy B.Z. to Kol. 10 January 1866: and Ahmad Shah to Nairne 20 Dul-hijja 1280H (27 May 1864), translation G.G. to Kol. 11 October 1865: both Kol.Kab. W/D, 5981.

[4] Ibrahim to Cavenagh 22 Jumadi-ul-awal 1280H (4 November 1863) translation Coll. 9 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83; Hashim to Macpherson 11 Jumadi-akir 1281H (11 November 1864), translation Coll. 3 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[5] Hay to Cavenagh 17 January 1863, copy I.O. to F.O. 27 July 1863, F.O. 37/421.

[6] Sultan Mahmud (Deli) to Altheer 9 Dul-qada 1279H (28 April 1863) and enclosures, translation G.G. to Kol. 13 June 1863, Kol.Kab.B[8], 5965.

abandoned in view of the small Dutch sloops guarding those ports. Only Batu Bara was fired upon, probably because Asahan encouraged such a move, but the fleet returned to Pulau Kompai after exchanging only a few shots with the shore.[1] Its leader's report must have persuaded Sultan Ibrahim that nothing could be done against the Dutch in that area by force.

Netscher reacted violently to the first news of this expedition, since he had always adopted the attitude that any demonstration of 'usurped' Atjehnese authority south of Cape Tamiang was illegal. He proposed an ultimatum demanding that the Sultan withdraw all his ships on pain of war. The Governor-General, however, ordered him to restrict himself to defending those who had accepted the Dutch flag. On the one hand instructions were still awaited from The Hague; on the other, the Atjehnese ships had not violated International Law and the Straits merchants would be quick to seize upon any illegal actions from the Dutch side.

The Resident's next report was able to show that the Atjehnese fleet had fired on Batu Bara, where a Dutch flag had been flying. This made Sloet van de Beele decide to send the *Bromo* again to Atjeh to ask for an explanation.[2] At the same time the *Bromo* was able to deliver the long-forgotten letter taking up the question of a boundary settlement.

Not surprisingly, the Commander of the *Bromo* was received less warmly than before. Sultan Ibrahim refused to settle his boundaries with Netscher, as the Governor-General had suggested, since that officer was the cause of his troubles. The 1857 Treaty had named the Governor of the West Coast of Sumatra as the Dutch representative in Atjehnese matters (Article 7); consequently Ibrahim would deal only with him. In explanation of the Batu Bara incident Ibrahim explained that Chut Latif had been sent to the East Coast to collect the *hasil* due to the Sultan, and that Batu Bara had been fired upon because it refused this. He was unaware of the presence of a Dutch flag. If the Dutch did raise their flags, it was only proper that the Sultan be informed of it so that he could protest if necessary.

[1] Sloet to Van de Putte 24 November 1863 and enclosures, Kol.Geh. 101, 5926. The Yang di-Pertuan's unlikely version of the incident is in Ahmad to Cavenagh 1 July 1863, Coll. 8 to No. 86, C.P.D. 68.

[2] Besluit of 19 August 1863, copy G.G. to Kol. 24 November 1863, Kol.Geh. 101, 5926.

To this the Dutch commander returned an embarrassed silence.[1]

The *Bromo*'s visit forced Batavia to face the Atjehnese case, which had hitherto only appeared indirectly through Netscher's one-sided reports. The *Raad van Indië* regretted that Siak's claims in 1858 had been accepted without investigation, so that Atjeh's rights had been underestimated. Nevertheless, it advised, these claims must now be defended since Dutch prestige in the East Coast had become identified with them. Sultan Ibrahim's written reply over the Batubara incident ('Of this I know nothing. My friend was not entitled to have this flag flown in my country without my prior permission') was arrogant, but since it denied knowledge of the event it could not form a *casus belli*. There should be no more talk of boundary settlements, but the Riau and Padang stations should be reinforced to defend the limits set by Netherlands India.

Sloet van de Beele agreed with his council. A boundary settlement with the Sultan should not be pressed, he declared, '. . . it will suffice to admit to him, without definite demonstration, no rights on any native states east of Cape Tamiang, and to continue to protect those states which have recognized Netherlands sovereignty'. Precautions would be taken in case this position did lead to war with Atjeh.[2]

Once again, as in 1838, Atjeh had been allowed to appear as the implacable enemy to whom the only answer was force. This narrow view originated with Netscher, whose horizon was limited to his own province where Atjehnese ambitions interfered with his own. In Batavia, Netscher's shortcomings were realized, yet his attitude finally prevailed because there was no Dutchman to champion a more positive Atjeh policy. Such a policy had been applied in the 1850's, but at the first real test it again fell a victim to Batavia's resentment of the state from which its influence was excluded, both politically by the 1824 Treaty and commercially by the merchants of Penang. The greater tragedy of Netscher's East Coast policy was not the bitterness it created in Atjeh, but the conviction it fostered

[1] Report of Lt. Brutel de la Rivière 15 September 1863, copy in ibid. The report is also quoted at length in De Klerck, pp. 264–7.

[2] Sloet to Van de Putte 24 November 1863, and enclosures, Kol.Geh. 101, 5926; De Klerck, pp. 267–9. The correspondence between Sloet and Sultan Ibrahim is Appendix V in ibid. pp. 451–2.

among Netherlands Indian officials that a violent collision with Atjeh was sooner or later inevitable. The conviction was only hardened by the knowledge that mistakes on the Dutch side had contributed to the crisis.

The Dutch expedition of 1865

Throughout 1864 Batavia adhered to its policy, approved by Van de Putte, of defending the status quo. Netscher's constant appeals to drive the Atjehnese from Pulau Kompai were ignored.[1] Action was finally decided on in defence of Tamiang —the state where Dutch rights were weakest.

Siak's claim to Tamiang apparently rested on one conquest by Sultan Abduljalil Saifudin (1791–1811). In 1823 Anderson found Tamiang fully recognizing the Sultan of Atjeh, to whom half its duties were sent as tribute.[2] By sentiment as well as race the bulk of the population was Atjehnese, as the Dutch recognized in returning it administratively to Atjeh in 1906.[3] Tuanku Hashim was respected as the representative of the Sultan, but direct authority over the tiny state was disputed among four petty chiefs all claiming some rights to levy duties. Both Langkat and Deli had at various times become involved by assisting one of the petty chiefs. The most important of the four was however recognized by foreigners to be the pro-Atjehnese Raja Bandahara.[4]

The internal disputes of Tamiang led to the plunder of a Chinese *tope* (a small sailing vessel) in January 1863, and the murder of two Chinese traders later in the same year. Khoo Poh, a major Sumatra trader and a connexion of Nairne, was the merchant involved in both losses, and he invoked British force to support his demand for satisfaction.

The Straits authorities favoured sending a gunboat to Tamiang but were held up by the Government of India, which, having just received Wood's instructions to 'abstain from giving just cause of offence to the Dutch', decided to await a clarifica-

[1] De Klerck, pp. 270–4.
[2] Anderson, 1826, pp. 235–6.
[3] *ENI* IV, p. 295.
[4] Schadee I, pp. 99–101; J. A. M. Cats baron de Raet, 'Vergelijking van den vroegeren toestand van Deli, Serdang en Langkat met den tegenwoordigen', *TBG* 23 (1876), p. 24; Cavenagh to Durand 15 October 1864 and enclosures, Coll. 2 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

tion of policy.[1] In London, however, no objection could be seen to the gunboat, since Tamiang appeared to be part of Atjeh, whose independence was guaranteed under the London Treaty. On Russell's insistence the Dutch were informed of the British intention, but only as 'an act of courtesy'.[2]

The Foreign Office was evidently surprised at the Dutch reply asserting that Tamiang had been part of Netherlands India since the Siak treaty of 1858 and that the responsibility of redressing grievances was therefore Dutch. Instructions approving the dispatch of a gunboat were quickly cancelled and replaced by a letter stating that sovereignty in Tamiang was being discussed.[3] Meanwhile Fransen van de Putte wrote urgently to Batavia, explaining that his government had claimed sovereignty over Tamiang and suggesting that the Governor-General arrange a quick and amicable settlement of the outrages there.[4]

The Dutch *Controleur* in Deli was deputed to settle the affair. He quickly retreated from Tamiang, empty-handed and fearful, after having his moustache pulled by the irreverent Atjehnese. The Raja Bandahara claimed to be a subject of the Sultan of Atjeh, and told the official bluntly that 'if English subjects were molested by his men, he did not require the mediation of the Dutch Government'.[5]

Netscher was furious, and once more demanded an ultimatum to force the Sultan of Atjeh to remove his flags and his men from the area. The majority of the *Raad van Indië* on the other hand considered that in view of the dubiousness of Dutch rights in Tamiang such a policy would needlessly waste lives and money. It advised simply paying compensation to Khoo Poh out of government funds and avoiding any conflict with Atjeh.

To the Governor-General this practical suggestion appeared to be only delaying the inevitable conflict, and allowing Atjeh-

[1] Govt. of India to Wood 8 February 1864 and enclosures, Coll. 1 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[2] Merivale to Layard 7 April 1864: Layard to Merivale 16 April 1864: F.O. 37/421.

[3] Cremers to Milbanke 18 June 1864, copy Milbanke to Russell 22 June 1864, F.O. 37/421; Tarling, 1957, p. 170.

[4] Van de Putte to Consul Marseilles 18 June 1864, telegram, and to Sloet 25 June 1864, both Kol.Geh. 101, 5926.

[5] De Raet, pp. 24–6. De Raet to Netscher 18 August 1864, copy G.G. to Kol. 29 September 1864, Kol.Geh. 200, 5927.

nese and British influence on the East Coast to increase in the meantime. Like Netscher and a dissenter in the *Raad* he favoured an ultimatum. But in view of the *Raad's* advice, and his anticipation that in the event of a war Atjehnese resistance might be sustained by British and Pan-Islamic encouragement, he decided to await the decision of the home government.[1]

Evidently Fransen van de Putte favoured a quick use of force to establish Dutch authority in Tamiang, though his instructions were conveyed only verbally with a senior official returning from leave. The Governor-General therefore ordered an expedition in August 1865. However, he decided after all against any prior ultimatum to Atjeh on the ground that this would have taken valuable time without necessarily producing the withdrawal of Tuanku Hashim.[2] Thus a dramatic confrontation was sensibly avoided, but at the same time one further opportunity was neglected of attempting a *modus vivendi* with Atjeh.

The Dutch expedition of seven steamers and 1400 men met little resistance when it arrived before Pulau Kompai in October. Tuanku Hashim had departed several months before. His brother, Tuanku Hitam, had been left in charge of the defences, but fled with his followers after only a slight skirmish. At Tamiang, similarly, the Raja Bandahara was absent in Atjeh, and the remaining chiefs submitted immediately. Netscher declared the Pangeran of Langkat to be ruler of the state under Siak, and announced to the chiefs that the Tamiang river would thenceforth be recognized as the boundary between Atjeh and Netherlands India. Two men were arrested for the murder of the Penang Chinese and sent to Batavia for penal labour.[3]

The expedition had first visited the other reluctant 'dependencies' of Siak, where it had been decided to establish Dutch rule forcibly. The Yang di Pertuan of Asahan had steadfastly

[1] Sloet to Van de Putte 29 September 1864 and enclosures, Kol.Geh. 200, 5927; De Klerck pp. 275–6.

[2] De Klerck pp. 277–8; Sloet to Van de Putte 8 and 25 August 1865, Kol. Kab. N[17], 5980.

[3] Schadee I, pp. 138–40; De Klerck pp. 278–9. The Tamiang river in fact divided Tamiang in half, so that in 1879 the Dutch were obliged to adjust the boundary with Atjeh and remove the southern half from the Pangeran's control.

refused to yield and had collided with Dutch officials when trying to re-establish his influence over the minor states to the south—Panai, Bila and Kota Pinang.[1] Serdang was also considered to belong to the enemy camp, as a consequence of the Atjehnese expedition, or the visiting British warships, or more probably its continuing territorial squabble with Deli. Moreover, fears were no longer entertained from the British side since Lord Russell had shown himself reluctant to pursue the British protests after the beginning of 1864.

The chiefs of Batu Bara and Serdang were brought to immediate submission by the mere appearance of the Dutch force. But at Asahan the Yang di Pertuan and his two brothers fled to the interior, despite an over-complicated Dutch encircling movement. Consequently, Netscher had little choice but to declare Ahmad to have lost his throne and to entrust the government to his brother-in-law, Naamal Ullah, the representative of a branch of the royal family which had lost popularity by its earlier opposition to Ahmad's father. A Dutch *Controleur* was appointed to advise him.[2]

When the defeated brothers came in submission a few weeks later, Netscher allowed Ahmad to stay in Asahan, though exiling his stronger brother, Tengku Pangeran, together with the Datuk Laxamana of Batubara, who had also been in close touch with Penang. The period of uncertainty and instability in the area was at an end. 'Our influence on this coast can now be said to be permanently established', Netscher reported with pardonable exaggeration after the expedition.[3]

Only Asahan failed to accept the new régime once it had demonstrated its permanence. There, Naamal Ullah, who was retained as a 'provisional' Yang di Pertuan wholly dependent on the Dutch, failed to recommend himself to the Bataks of the interior. These districts were in constant rebellion in favour of Ahmad Shah until July 1867, when Netscher brought up another force to overawe the rebels, and decided to exile Ahmad. Peace did not long outlast the Resident's visit, so that in 1868 he was obliged to remove Naamal Ullah and entrust the gov-

[1] Kroesen, p. 107; Ahmad Shah to Man 10 Shaban 1281H (8 January 1865) and 23 Rabi' al-awal 1282H (15 September 1865), translations respectively in Coll. 12 and Coll. 5 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[2] Kroesen, pp. 108–11; Schadee I, pp. 131–7.

[3] Netscher to Van de Putte 9 November 1865, Kol.Kab. M[19], 5980.

ernment to a council of the four principal Malay chiefs of Asahan. This measure at last conciliated the Bataks and peace was restored in 1870 when the last and most determined opponents of the Dutch were hunted down and killed.[1]

This futile rearguard action was purely local, without any encouragement from outside. Obliged to accept his powerlessness, the Sultan of Atjeh attempted no further contact with the East Coast. He appealed again for a decision from Britain, but with as little success as before.[2] When in March 1867 a Dutch warship brought him the compliments of a new Governor-General the East Coast was not discussed. The Dutch commander was received properly but coolly, and Mijer's letter remained unanswered.[3] Anxiety about Dutch intentions began to be an important consideration for the Sultan and his circle.

For all their bluster the Straits merchants were equally helpless. Cavenagh's reply to the announcement of the Dutch expedition was proud but empty. It was out of his power, he said:

> ...to warn such British subjects as are now engaged, under the faith of the several treaties between Great Britain and the Native States, in carrying on trade with the East Coast of Sumatra, against taking part in any resistance that may be offered to the Netherlands Indian forces.

More revealing was his renewed plea to London for a definition of British policy, lest his administration be open to the charge of misleading both its own subjects and the Sumatran rajas.[4]

Still no reply came from London, until in 1866 Cavenagh was finally told that the Government favoured admitting the territorial claims of the Dutch in favour of commercial concessions.[5] By then passions were cooling in the Straits. The merchants of Singapore, whose relatively small Sumatra trade was

[1] Kroesen, pp. 111–36; Schadee I, pp. 140–5. Ahmad Shah was finally restored to the throne in 1886, shortly before his death; Hamerster *Bijdrage tot de kennis van de Afdeeling Asahan* (Amsterdam, 1926), pp. 47–53.

[2] Ibrahim to 'The Prime Minister of England', 2 Shaban 1282H (21 December 1865), copy at p. 309 of F.O. Confidential print in C.O. 273/14.

[3] De Klerck, pp. 279–80; Schadee I, p. 148.

[4] Cavenagh to Sloet van de Beele, and Cavenagh to Muir, both 18 September 1865, copies Coll. 14 to No. 33, C.P.D. 83.

[5] Grey and Ripon to Govt. of India 16 May 1866, No. 33, I.P.D. 9.

on the increase, were quicker to accept the Dutch occupation than those of the northern settlement.[1] Penang's suspicions were kept sharp by the depression in its Sumatra trade until 1866, which may have owed something to the instability of the Deli-Asahan area though much more to the low pepper prices of the 1860's. But from 1868 the labours of those Europeans who had been pioneering tobacco plantations in Deli since 1863 began to be rewarded by outstanding crops. By 1872 there were about 70 Europeans and 4000 Chinese in Deli, most of whom were concerned with the booming tobacco industry.[2] The Dutch were careful in this district not to alienate Penang by discriminatory or restrictive measures. As a result Penang merchants controlled completely the carriage and transhipment of the tobacco, and provisioning and banking for the planters. Suspicion of the Dutch remained, but objections to their annexation of the 'plantation district' soon began to appear rather old-fashioned.

The departure of Orfeur Cavenagh, when the Straits Settlements became a Crown Colony in 1867, removed another obstacle to a more flexible policy towards the Dutch in Sumatra. Cavenagh's parting shot was to write to the Sultan of Deli to recommend a 'firm reliance' on the British Government, which would always be ready with advice.[3] The first Governor of the new Colony, Sir Harry Ord, was by contrast a man with considerable understanding of Dutch policy, and little sympathy with the merchants of the Straits.

* * *

To sum up, Netscher's determination and the economic success which crowned it overcame the opposition of the Straits merchants, which was not seriously supported in London. Nothing, on the other hand, was done to modify the effect upon Atjeh of Holland's advance. Despite its relatively capable

[1] Read to Van Zuylen van Nijevelt 22 June 1866, extract in B.Z. 3136. Table in I.O. to F.O. 10 May 1867, F.O. 37/450.

[2] Schadee I, pp. 171–87; G. C. Allen and A. G. Donnithorne *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya* (London, 1957), p. 97.

[3] Hasselman to Van Zuylen van Nijevelt 6 September 1867, Kol.Kab. X[9], 5994. In his memoirs written ten years later, Cavenagh retained his dissatisfaction with the Foreign Office's Sumatra policy; Cavenagh, pp. 339–40.

leadership at this time, the Sultanate was being driven into a dangerous state of isolation.

The following chapter shows how diplomacy set the logical seal on Netscher's achievement. Ineffective protest gave way to commercial equality and co-operation between England and Holland for the exploitation of the East Coast of Sumatra. But the Anglo-Dutch agreement of 1871 was explicitly made at the expense of Atjeh, which once again was neither consulted nor responsibly considered.

2

The Sumatra Treaty of 1871

A false start, 1863–1866

In opposing the Dutch advance in Sumatra from 1862, the merchants and officials of the Straits Settlements expected the support of their home government. It was, after all, the leader of the 1859–65 Whig Government, Lord Palmerston, who had protested so vigorously against similar advances in 1841. But the world had changed in twenty years. British commerce was no longer unrivalled in the East. France and America, soon to be followed by Germany and Italy, were ready to dispute the Anglo-Dutch colonial monopoly in South-East Asia. The unmistakable liberal trend in Dutch commercial policy after 1848 confirmed the view of the Foreign Office that strategic corners of the world were better in Dutch hands than in those of some stronger Power. Thus the Foreign Office gradually shifted its ground, and by 1871 it had abandoned to the Dutch not only the East Coast of Sumatra but Atjeh as well. Until 1867, the powerlessnessness of Straits interests to resist such a course of action was increased by the paralysing uncertainty over which department should represent their interests in Whitehall.

The first full indictment of the Dutch advances was received in Whitehall early in 1863. As the Government of India argued forcefully that the protest simply reasserted rights acknowledged by the Dutch in 1842, the papers were sent on to The Hague without serious consideration.[1] It was left to the British Minister there, Milbanke, to compile a formal protest. His notes of 21 February and 13 April 1863 argued that the occupation of Siak conflicted with Britain's treaty rights with both Holland and Siak, that the northern ports were in any case totally in-

[1] Government of India to Wood 8 January 1863 and enclosures, Coll. 1 to No. 75, C.P.D. 68. Russell to Milbanke 11 February and 27 March 1863, F.O. 37/421.

dependent of Siak, and that nothing could justify Holland's departure from the position taken by Baud in 1842.[1]

There could be no question, however, of a second Dutch withdrawal from the East Coast. Unlike that of Baud, Dutch governments after 1859 were publicly committed by the States-General's ratification of the 1858 Treaty with Siak, which was there defined as extending to Tamiang. The Liberal Thorbecke Ministry of 1862–6 was in full agreement with Batavia that there could be no withdrawal under British pressure in full view of both the Parliamentary opposition and the east coast Rajas. Moreover, it was reasonably held, Holland's treaty obligations extended only to avoiding interference with British commerce on the east coast. Milbanke was given a note effectively rebutting the British complaints.[2]

No progress was made during 1863, as the Foreign Office sent on to The Hague the appeals of Asahan and its British supporters against Dutch actions.[3] The brunt of this futile argument fell on Milbanke, who, in the opinion of W. H. Read, who visited him in May 1864, was 'heartily tired of the complaints of the Penang merchants, who deal in general accusations but state no facts, and does not seem pleased with the Indian Government for forwarding such unsubstantial accusations'.[4] When in London early in 1864, Milbanke explained to the Foreign Secretary that the Dutch could not withdraw over Siak, and complained about the lack of specific evidence of abuse by the Dutch. Lord Russell decided to discontinue the complaints until more specific information arrived.[5]

The Netherlands representative, Baron Bentinck, had already done good work in explaining to Russell the liberal intentions of the Thorbecke-Van de Putte Government, and

[1] Milbanke to Van der Maesen de Sombreff 21 February and 13 April 1863, copies Milbanke to Russell 24 February and 13 April 1863, F.O. 37/421.

[2] Van der Maesen to Milbanke 15 July 1863, copy Milbanke to Russell 21 July 1863, F.O. 37/421; Van de Putte to Sloet 16 July 1863, and Van der Maesen to Van de Putte 15 July 1863, Kol. Kab. Z^{6}/Y, 5964; Van de Putte to Van der Maesen 12 June 1863, Kol.Op.Verb. 3, 1344. De Klerck, *De Atjèh-oorlog*, (1912), pp. 285–7.

[3] Layard to Merivale 1 August 1863 and reply 15 August 1863: Russell to Milbanke 11 September and 23 October 1863: F.O. 37/421.

[4] Read to Van de Putte 29 May 1864, Kol.Kab. I^{5}, 5969.

[5] Note by Russell 15 May 1864, F.O. 37/421.

the advantages British Sumatra merchants would draw from this liberalism. Russell smilingly told Bentinck, 'Well, I won't quarrel with you if I can help it', and soon after instructed Admiral Harris, the British Minister in The Hague, to 'at all events not press harshly on the Dutch Government'.[1]

In The Hague, Van de Putte pressed this advantage by explaining to Ward, the British Chargé d'Affaires, his plans for a liberal reform of tariffs. In particular he undertook that Siak, like Djambi before it, would be excepted from the Netherlands Indian tariff, so that British trade there would in no way be injured or interfered with. Reporting this, Ward suggested that British protests might be withdrawn in return for guarantees that the trade between the Straits and the East Coast would not be interfered with.[2]

The way forward was now clear. The point, apparent from the arguments of all the spokesmen of the Straits,[3] was not that the British merchants had a grievance but that they had learnt to distrust the colonial and commercial policies of the Dutch. The *Friend of India* had expressed these feelings: 'If the Dutch would only guarantee free trade we could see them take all Sumatra with indifference. But this they will not do, nor if they promised to do so, could they be trusted.'[4] As the exchange of protests and rebuttals dragged aimlessly through 1864 and 1865 it became obvious to the Foreign Office that its task was to quieten the suspicions of the Straits merchants by exchanging its non-recognition of the Dutch advance for an explicit agreement over tariffs. Apart from the failure of the Dutch to communicate all their East Indian treaties, a senior official admitted,

> ...there does not yet appear to be any specific ground of complaint against them. . . . All we require is a distinct assurance . . . that . . . in their Eastern possessions . . . they will not levy differential duties

[1] Bentinck to Van der Maesen 29 December 1863, copy B.Z. to Kol. 2 January 1864, Kol.Kab. F/C, 5967; Russell to Ward 5 January 1864, F.O. 37/421.

[2] Ward to Russell 18 January 1864, F.O. 37/421; Nota of 15 January 1864, Kol.Kab. A[1], 5967.

[3] E.g. Crawfurd to Layard 20 December 1863 and 6 June, 1864: Memo by Man 11 June 1864: F.O. 37/421; Cavenagh to Wood 21 January 1865, extract in I.O. to F.O. 6 April 1865, F.O. 37/450.

[4] *Friend of India* 14 May 1863. The passage quoted was underlined in Kol.Geh. 101, 5926.

or place other restrictions on British trade. The present note [a restatement of the Dutch case] is not . . . sufficiently explicit on that point.[1]

Yet the Foreign Office gave little attention to formulating a definite policy to break this impasse. There was only a partial success even in framing a consistent case against the Dutch advances.[2]

Van de Putte seized the initiative at the end of 1865 with a more far-reaching plan to settle differences in South-East Asia. He had already succeeded in passing a new colonial tariff act through the States-General in July, reducing import duties from 24 per cent. to 16 per cent. on foreign produce, and from 12 per cent. to 10 per cent. on Netherlands produce by 1868, and barring differential duties altogether from Djambi and Siak.[3] This was a small victory in the large-scale attack he wished to undertake on protection, monopoly and forced cultivation in Netherlands India. He hoped to recommend these reforms, including a non-differential tariff throughout Netherlands India, to conservatives in the States-General by obtaining from Britain the acknowledged right to occupy the whole Archipelago. This should include Sarawak, where Brooke would be bought out, as well as Atjeh and Siak, but not the British colonies of Labuan and Singapore. Complete equality of trade in the Archipelago would grant the essential British demands of 1824 and subsequently, so that Holland could fairly expect in return to have its interpretation of the territorial provisions of 1824 recognized.[4]

This offer would indeed have gratified the British negotiators of the 1824 Treaty. But the Admiralty now held that Brooke's private raj was too important strategically to be abandoned.[5]

[1] Note by Layard 11 June 1864, F.O. 37/421.

[2] In May Anderson decided to accept the 1858 Siak Treaty but deny its application to the states to the north. But the India Office continued to insist on the validity of Britain's pre-1824 Sumatra treaties. Memo by Anderson ? April and 9 May 1865: Merivale to Layard 6 April 1865 and enclosures: Russell to Milbanke 18 May 1865: F.O. 37/450.

[3] De Klerck pp. 292–4; G. Gonggryp *Schets Ener Economische Geschiedenis van Indonesië* (Haarlem, 1957), p. 114.

[4] Nota, 'Herziening van het Londensche Tractaat van 17 Maart 1824', dated 14 December 1865 in Kol. to B.Z. 14 March 1866, B.Z. 3136; Milbanke to Hammond 31 October 1865, private, F.O. 37/450.

[5] Tarling, 'British Policy in the Malay Peninsula and Archipelago 1824–1871' (1957), p. 211.

In other respects the project appealed to the British officials concerned. Departure from Palmerston's 1841 policy may have seemed easier after the Prime Minister's death at the end of 1865. Lord Clarendon, the new Foreign Secretary, gave grudging approval to Layard's plans for taking up the Dutch initiative: 'The Dutch are narrow-minded and exclusive but we have less to fear from them than from others and a good understanding with them is important and I apprehend not impossible.'[1] Both the India Office and the Colonial Office approved a change of policy, though the impending transfer of the Straits Settlements from the former to the latter prevented either Office from influencing policy significantly.[2]

Milbanke was informed that Britain would surrender its 'treaty rights with regard to Sumatra' in return for non-differential duties and the opening of the coasting trade to British shipping throughout Netherlands India.[3] This was extravagantly hard bargaining, for it not only denied Van de Putte's most important demand, in Borneo, but also added an extremely important condition in the coastal trade. The only remaining incentive for the Dutch was freedom to deal with Atjeh, since they denied Britain's competence to judge their occupation of Siak. Van de Putte's Ministry was naturally unenthusiastic.[4]

This progressive ministry was obliged to resign at the end of May when Van de Putte's reform of the forced cultivation system failed to pass the Second Chamber. Pieter Mijer, one of the strongest opponents of liberal reform, returned to the Colonial Ministry and stifled the negotiations with Britain.[5]

Towards a 'Siak Convention'

In Britain, also, hope of a general settlement in South-East Asia soon faded. After a year's desultory correspondence with

[1] Minute by Clarendon 29 December 1865, on memo by Layard 26 December 1865, F.O. 37/450. Also Tarling, 1957, pp. 174–5.

[2] Memos of 3 February and 16 May 1866, No. 33, I.P.D. 1866.

[3] Clarendon to Milbanke 30 March 1866, F.O. 37/450.

[4] Milbanke to Clarendon 6 April 1866, F.O. 37/450.

[5] *NNBW* III, Cols. 1897–8; Mijer to Van Zuylen 23 June and reply 26 June 1866, B.Z. 3136; Milbanke to Clarendon 22 June and 5 July 1866, F.O. 37/450.

the Legation in The Hague the Foreign Office decided in March 1867 to protest formally against Netscher's treaties with the Siak 'dependencies', which had been communicated the previous May.[1] Within a few weeks of this protest, the Straits merchants at last had the matter of Dutch 'encroachments' in Sumatra raised in the House of Commons.[2] These two events appear to have brought the attention of the Foreign Office back to the East Coast of Sumatra and persuaded officials to seek at least a local settlement there as a way to escape from the uncomfortable posture of non-recognition.

A report from The Hague was encouraging. The Conservative Heemskerk Ministry, without the presence of Mijer who had nominated himself Governor-General, could be relied upon to seek a satisfactory settlement.[3] Van de Putte's opposition liberals were known to be at least as well disposed. The Foreign Office proceeded to draw up a lengthy treaty, designed to ensure that in every detail British traders should enjoy the same privileges as Dutch in 'the eastern coast between the river Jambi and Cape Tamiang.' A minute tersely added: 'The independence of Acheh should be guaranteed'.[4]

Though prepared by April 1867, the draft treaty was held up for five months while the voluminous past correspondence was printed for the edification of the Colonial Office, now responsible for the Straits Settlements.[5] Neither the Colonial Office nor its new Governor, Sir Harry Ord,[6] were yet sufficiently versed in the matter to influence policy in a positive

[1] Stanley to Ward 16 February 1867, F.O. 37/450; Tarling, 1957, p. 176.

[2] Debate of 11 March 1867, *Hansard* 185, Col. 1645.

[3] Ward to Stanley 29 March 1867, F.O. 37/450.

[4] Undated minutes at beginning of F.O. 37/487.

[5] The bulky F.O. prints were forwarded, with the draft treaty, in F.O. to C.O. 17 September 1867, C.O. 273/14.

[6] Major-General Sir Harry St. George Ord (1819–85) served in the Royal Engineers from 1837 to 1855. Between 1855 and 1864 he served the Colonial Office in several missions to the Gold Coast, Paris and The Hague in negotiations leading to an Anglo-Dutch exchange of territory on the Gold Coast in 1866; see below, p. 62. He was Lt. Governor of Dominica (1857–60) and Governor of Bermuda (1861–7), the Straits Settlements (1867–73) and Western Australia (1877–9). In Singapore his high-handedness so alienated the old 'Straits hands' that a 'Straits Settlements Association' was formed to oppose him. He favoured intervention in the Malay states and exasperated the Colonial Office by dealing with the rajas without authorization. *DNB* 42, pp. 236–7; Cowan, 1961, p. 29.

way.[1] Ord did, however, venture the crucial but dubious prognostication that the Straits merchants would be satisfied with an agreement that present and future Dutch advances in Sumatra would in no way increase the charges on British trade.[2] Sceptical of Penang's complaints, Ord had evidently asked a local commission to find specific evidence of hardship, and none had come to light.[3]

In July 1868 the Foreign Office draft was at last submitted for the approval of the Dutch. In the time since Mijer's departure three ministers had held the Colonial portfolio in The Hague. A constitutional dispute between the States-General and the defiant Heemskerk Ministry supported by the King was finally resolved by the formation of a new centre ministry in June 1868.[4] Both its leading figure, Van Bosse, and its Colonial Minister, De Waal, were moderate liberals apparently favouring freer trade and non-differential duties in the Colonies. As ever 'a perfect chaos of opinion over Colonial questions' would make their task difficult, but Admiral Harris,[5] the new British Minister, was hopeful that Holland's growing fear of Franco-Prussian rivalry would smooth the way to an agreement with England.[6]

But for the Dutch there was little reason to depart from the *status quo* in Sumatra. De Waal's predecessor had agreed with his colleagues not to continue the policy of justifying to Britain Dutch actions in Sumatra, since this 'would give the appearance

[1] Minutes on F.O. to C.O. 17 September 1867, and draft reply, C.O. 273/14.

[2] Ord to Buckingham 16 January 1868, copy C.O. to F.O. 25 March 1868, F.O. 37/487.

[3] Canters to Van Zuylen 25 March 1868, copy B.Z. to Kol. 31 March 1868, Kol.Kab. Q^5, 6000.

[4] E. van Raalte *The Parliament of the Kingdom of the Netherlands* (London, 1959), pp. 18–20; Blok V, pp. 482–6.

[5] Admiral Sir Edward Alfred John Harris (1808–88) was the younger brother of Malmesbury, the Conservative Foreign Secretary of 1852 and 1858–9. He joined the navy in 1823, but sat in the Commons from 1844 until 1852. Thereafter he held a succession of consular and diplomatic posts before being appointed to The Hague in 1867. He was knighted in 1872 for his part in negotiating three Anglo-Dutch treaties. *DNB* 25, p. 12. In his anxiety to conclude the Sumatra negotiations he was inclined to exaggerate their commercial importance and to oversimplify Dutch opposition as a case of conservatives opposing liberals.

[6] Harris to Stanley 7 May and 24 July 1868, F.O. 37/487. *Idem* 12 March 1869, F.O. 37/488.

of not being sure of our good right'.[1] The proposal now cautiously explained by Admiral Harris appeared to change nothing, since Van de Putte's tariff law already gave British trade the substance of its demands. The most objectionable aspect of the proposals from the Dutch viewpoint was the implication that British approval was required before Holland's possession of the East Coast could be considered valid.[2] Good relations with England were very desirable, but a detailed treaty was the worst way to achieve them, since it would give another opportunity for parliamentary critics to attack the government's colonial policy. The Dutch Foreign Minister suggested rather a clause to clarify the 1824 treaty.[3]

Yet the Dutch by no means rejected the idea of a treaty. De Waal wrote later that he had long been convinced of 'the untenability of the position in which we were placed with respect to Atjeh by the promise of 1824 about its independence. The agreement desired by England provided an excellent opportunity to be freed from these fetters.'[4] Only this, he claimed, had led him to accept the principle of a treaty. In his first discussion of the matter with Harris, De Waal urged that the draft be extended to include Atjeh.[5]

The 'untenability' of Holland's position had been felt since 1864, when Batavia had first contemplated war with Atjeh. Consequently one of Van de Putte's objects in 1865 had been to gain a free hand in 'this centre of Mohamedan agitation and slavery'. The effect of the 1824 provision, it had then been observed, was to reserve Atjeh for any other power than Britain or Holland.[6] Though there was virtually no contact between Batavia and Banda Atjeh after 1865, the issue was kept alive for the Dutch by the contiguity of their new East Coast possessions with Atjeh. De Waal was even able to tell the British that some Atjehnese chiefs (who could only have been the Raja of Idi and his friends) had asked for Dutch sovereignty.[7]

[1] Van Zuylen to Hasselman 31 March 1868, Kol.Kab. Y[12], 5996. Also Hasselman to Van Zuylen 13 March 1868 and reply 17 March 1868, B.Z. 3136.

[2] De Waal to Roest 16 October 1868, B.Z. 3136. De Klerck, p. 302.

[3] Harris to Stanley 24 July 1868, F.O. 37/487.

[4] De Klerck, p. 302, quoting De Waal, *Onze Indische Financiën* I (1876).

[5] Harris to Stanley 24 July 1868, F.O. 37/487.

[6] Nota of 14 December 1865, in Kol. to B.Z. 14 March 1866, B.Z. 3136.

[7] Harris to Stanley 14 August 1868, F.O. 37/487.

De Waal did not press for the inclusion of Atjeh in the treaty. Instead he modified the draft with Harris so that it would refer to any future, as well as past, Dutch acquisitions in Sumatra. This was regarded in The Hague as a veiled reference to Atjeh, which could not be mentioned directly in the treaty without alarming the Sultan and attracting the attention of the European Powers.[1]

Bargaining over Atjeh

De Waal's verbal request to extend the treaty to Atjeh found the Foreign Office without a policy. The 1824 guarantee of Atjeh's independence had been virtually forgotten until the Tamiang incident brought it to mind in 1864.[2] The following year the Foreign Office had thought little of surrendering this guarantee in a general settlement. But at the same time Straits merchants fearful of further Dutch advance in Sumatra were reviving Raffles's 1819 Treaty with Atjeh, claiming in its defence Palmerston's notion that the 1824 Anglo-Dutch treaty was not retroactive.[3] Lawrence Nairne referred to Raffles's treaty when forwarding an appeal from Sultan Ibrahim to the Government, and the India Office followed him in accepting the validity of the treaty.[4]

Whatever Britain's precise commitments in Atjeh amounted to, however, the officials concerned were agreed that there was no point in upholding them. The most crucial views appear to have been those of Percy Anderson, the Foreign Office official who had followed all the Sumatra developments since 1862:

> the . . . Colonial Office could not prevent the Dutch from having Acheen some day or other—it is not likely that, having the whole of the rest of the island, they will leave one corner alone out of respect for an antiquated Treaty, and we are not very likely to go to war about it. As to the port of such vital importance to British commerce, it is produced every now and then by our Straits merchants as an

[1] De Klerck, pp. 302–3. The significance of this wording was lost on the British negotiators in London, and also on Governor-General Mijer. See below, p. 64.

[2] Memo by Hertslett 1 June 1864, F.O. 37/421.

[3] Ricketts to Layard 22 August 1865, F.O. 37/450.

[4] Nairne to Man 31 January 1866 and Merivale to Layard 10 May 1866, pp. 309–10 of F.O. print in C.O. 273/14.

important element in the question, but hitherto we have done very well without it—it never will be of any use to anyone as long as it belongs to the Sultan . . . —we can never have it, and therefore why not the Dutch, except on the dog-in-the-manger principle?[1]

The Colonial Office agreed that a voluntary submission of the Sultan to Holland would be in Britain's interest, since 'Acheen had much better be in the hands of Holland than of France or the United States'.[2]

Only Buckingham, the Colonial Secretary, gave thought to Britain's responsibilities towards Atjeh, which he evidently took to include Raffles's treaty. He did not consider these an obstacle to an eventual surrender of Atjeh, but thought Britain should not commit itself so soon. Lord Stanley, the Foreign Secretary, had suggested that Harris might tell the Dutch confidentially that Britain 'would be disposed to deal liberally with Acheen' if the commercial proposals proved satisfactory.[3] This, argued Buckingham,

...in fact implies that if the treaty be made with the Dutch we will arrange as to Acheen without the Sultan's concurrence or assent. Such an intimation . . . would justify him very much in treating with any other power and breaking with us—while his port is represented as of great importance to our Indian commerce.[4]

The Foreign Office agreed, and Harris was instructed to make no reference to Atjeh 'in the present state of the negotiations'.[5] There can be no doubt, however, that this Conservative Government had no more intention of continuing to uphold the independence of Atjeh than the Gladstone Government which succeeded it in December 1868.

The attitude of the Foreign Office towards Atjeh was in accordance with its natural preoccupation with security and smooth relations with the major Powers. In the past it had always been the colonial authorities in the Straits, reflecting

[1] Anderson to Jervois 20 September 1868, F.O. 37/487.
[2] Minute of 30 August 1868, on F.O. to C.O. 22 August 1868, C.O. 273/23.
[3] Hammond to Rogers 22 August 1868, C.O. 273/23.
[4] Minute by Buckingham 5 September 1868: also *idem* 3 September 1868: and Rogers to Hammond 18 September 1868: C.O. 273/23.
[5] Stanley to Harris 23 September 1868, F.O. 37/487.

the local merchants' desire for completely uninhibited trade, who had held out for the independence of the Sumatran states. This policy was abruptly reversed by Sir Harry Ord after 1867.

Ambitious, self-confident, and overbearing, Ord was never on good terms with the old Straits hands and had little time for their prejudices. The most notable, though dubiously successful, achievement of his past career had been to recommend and negotiate a rationalization of British and Dutch possessions in West Africa.[1] He was anxious to use this experience to arrange a Sumatra settlement with the Governor-General in Batavia.[2] Abandoning completely the old Straits policy of political fragmentation, he favoured the division of the area among the three major powers—Britain, Holland and Siam.[3] Efficient government was to be preferred to self-government, he considered, in Atjeh as in the states of the Malay peninsula. In a long despatch he described Atjeh in most unflattering terms, concluding that its acquisition by Holland under a treaty with Britain 'can be but an unmixed benefit for the people and all those who are brought into contact with them'.[4]

By his striking reversal of Straits policy Ord must be considered one of the principal authors of the Atjeh provisions of the 1871 Sumatra treaty. No other Straits opinion was heard in London at the time the treaty was being planned, not even that of the Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, Colonel Anson,[5] who

[1] Douglas Coombs *The Gold Coast: Britain and the Netherlands 1850–1874* (London, 1963), Chapter 2 *passim*. Coombs attacks this settlement as a 'monstrous blunder' because African interests were disregarded with disastrous results.

[2] Ord made no secret of this ambition, so that rumours of an impending mission reached the Dutch from Singapore long before the matter had been considered in London. Read to Hasselman 19 July 1867, Kol.Kab. Y[9], 5994; Van Zuylen to Hasselman 12 May 1868, Kol.Geh. No. 55, 5938.

[3] Cowan, 1961, pp. 60–2.

[4] Ord to Buckingham 9 December 1868, copy C.O. to F.O. 28 January 1869, F.O. 37/488.

[5] Colonel (later Major-General) A. E. H. Anson (1826–1925) was an officer of the Royal Engineers. In 1867 the Colonial Office made him its first Lieutenant-Governor of Penang, with the right to exercise the government of the Straits Settlements in the absence or incapacity of the Governor. He was acting Governor twice (February 1871–April 1872 and April 1877–May 1880) but was never promoted and never enjoyed the full confidence of the Colonial Office. He particularly resented the overbearing ways of Ord. Anson *About Others and Myself* (London, 1920); Cowan, 1961, pp. 80–1; *Who Was Who*.

had much more sympathy for the Atjehnese.[1] But though Ord's Atjeh policy was heartily criticized later in the Straits Settlements, it was not entirely without contemporary support from merchants. By the late 1860's commercial activity had reached a scale where security was becoming valued more than anarchic freedom, so that commercial opinion was beginning to favour European, and even Dutch, rule. A feud between Keureutoë [Kerti] and Lhokseumawe disturbed trade on the east coast of Atjeh after 1867, and gave frequent occasion for some merchants, led by the *Straits Observer*, to call for European intervention.[2]

Ord anticipated that Raffles's 1819 treaty with Atjeh would probably appear to Whitehall the principal obstacle to Dutch control of that country. He therefore suggested that it should finally be altered into a simple commercial agreement, as the 1824 Anglo-Dutch Treaty had decided. 'There has been nothing', he added, 'in the conduct of the Sultan of Acheen towards us of late years, nor indeed as far as I am aware of his predecessors at any time since 1819, to render it incumbent on the British Government to interpose its offices on his behalf.'[3]

The Foreign Office was provoked by this letter to consider Britain's obligations towards Atjeh for the first time. A careful memorandum explained how Britain had gradually come to rely on its pre-1824 engagements with Sumatra rather than the Anglo-Dutch Treaty itself as bulwarks against the Dutch advance. The Straits authorities had been led to believe that all the pre-1824 engagements were still valid except those parts which conflicted with the 1824 Treaty. However, the writer concluded, Britain's confused obligations to Atjeh would not have to be raised at all unless Britain desired it, since the Dutch might very well dismember Atjeh piecemeal without ever taking issue with Britain.[4]

To the Foreign Office, however, the importance of establishing Britain's obligations towards Atjeh was not that they might be fulfilled, but that they might be bargained away against tariff concessions. In the words of the new Liberal Foreign

[1] See below, p. 74, and Anson's minute of 10 March 1873, on F.O. to C.O. 6 March 1873, C.O. 273/73.

[2] De Klerck, pp. 330–1.

[3] Ord to Buckingham 9 December 1868, loc. cit.

[4] Memo by Saunderson 1 February 1869, F.O. 37/488.

Secretary, Lord Clarendon: 'The Treaty [of] 1819 with Acheen is . . . but a poor instrument for the extraction of commercial facilities from a Government with the proverbial "fault of the Dutch" .'[1] However, Ord should be allowed to make the most of it in discussions with Mijer in Java. As had been previously decided, Ord would be allowed to discuss the draft Sumatra treaty with Mijer but not to offer the concession he so desired over Atjeh. This concession should be kept till the last in case the Dutch used it to influence the Atjehnese. But Ord was permitted to give as his personal opinion that Britain might be expected to 'deal liberally' over Atjeh.[2]

Ord's discussions with Mijer in July 1869 changed little. Opinion in Java, as in Holland, objected to the detailed nature of the draft, and to any suggestion that Britain had a right to bestow recognition on the Dutch acquisitions. On the other hand Mijer knew 'no reason derived from Netherlands interests which could stand in the way of placing the subjects of both nations in an equal position with respect to trade, etc.' Mijer also wanted to have the draft limited to the East Coast of Sumatra, where it had begun, in order to avoid having to change the tariff in the west coast ports occupied since 1824.[3] But although he was anxious for a free hand in Atjeh, as he showed in a separate despatch written the day after his report on the discussions,[4] Mijer in no way pressed the question with Ord and appeared even to overlook the diplomatic obstacles to Dutch action there.[5] The reason must have been that even more than De Waal he wanted Atjeh's future to be agreed informally rather than embodied in a public treaty which would tie the Government's hands in its future dealings with the Sultanate. Mijer told De Waal in a private letter that though he had done his duty in discussing and amending the draft, he would personally prefer no treaty at all with Great Britain.[6]

Knowing his Governor-General's scepticism, and under pres-

[1] Minute by Clarendon, n.d. on ibid.

[2] Hammond to Rogers 23 February 1869, F.O. 37/488; idem 5 November 1868, C.O. 273/23.

[3] Mijer to De Waal 7 July 1869, copy Kol. to B.Z. 30 January 1870, B.Z. 3136.

[4] *Idem* 8 July 1869, quoted De Klerck, pp. 324–5.

[5] Ord to Granville 10 July 1869, copy C.O. to F.O. 2 September 1869, F.O. 37/488.

[6] Harris to Clarendon 27 January 1870, F.O. 37/488.

sure in the States-General on a number of important colonial issues, De Waal continued to put off the Sumatra negotiations throughout the remainder of 1869. In January 1870, when Harris pressed him to take the matter up again, De Waal repeated his preference for an informal settlement, with the Dutch doing their part through the contemplated liberalization of the Netherlands Indian tariff in 1872.[1] But though an informal agreement might well have been more in Britain's real interest, the Foreign Office felt obliged to present the Straits merchants with a formal treaty to replace the Palmerstonian policy of protest in which the merchants had put their faith. Harris was instructed to demand that negotiations begin at once.

The Dutch could delay no longer, particularly as they were anxious for the signature of another treaty allowing Indian labourers to emigrate under contract to Surinam, which Britain now made conditional on the signing of the Sumatra treaty.[2] In January 1870 De Waal at last got to work amending the British draft in accordance with the criticisms of Mijer and the *Raad van Indië*, which closely resembled those of his own department.[3]

If he was to be pressed to a treaty, De Waal was determined to have greater clarity on the question of Atjeh, which was the only bait he would be able to offer the many critics of such a treaty. Moreover an adjustment of Holland's relations with Atjeh had become more urgent in the course of 1869. The *Kompeuni's* advance on the East Coast of Sumatra had alarmed Atjeh into seeking protection elsewhere and particularly from Ottoman Turkey. An appeal for Turkish protection against Dutch aggression, signed by sixty-five Atjehnese 'notables' came to the knowledge of the Dutch Legation in Constantinople in February 1869.[4] This news, together with the first discussion of an Anglo-Dutch Sumatra treaty shortly before, had prompted De Waal to warn the Governor-General to pay more attention to

[1] *Idem* 14 January 1870, F.O. 37/479.

[2] Minute by Anderson, n.d. on Harris to Clarendon 14 January 1870, F.O. 37/479; Clarendon to Harris 19 January 1870, F.O. 37/488.

[3] De Waal to Roest van Limburg 30 January 1870, B.Z. 3136. Roest to Harris 10 February 1870, in Harris to Clarendon 12 February 1870, F.O. 37/488.

[4] Keun (Constantinople) to Roest 2 December 1868 and 3 February 1869, B.Z. 3076. A translation of the Atjehnese petition, finally obtained in 1870 by bribing a Turkish archivist, is printed in De Klerck pp. 461–2.

Atjehnese affairs in future. Mijer's reply to this letter, received in The Hague in September 1869, pointed out that the Dutch advance on the East Coast of Sumatra had created very hostile relations with Atjeh, and that a violent collision was sooner or later inevitable. Atjeh's appeal to Turkey was a natural result of the growing hostility.[1]

To add urgency to these views, the Suez Canal was opened in November 1869, giving new importance to the Malacca Straits route to China, and consequently to the strategic position of Atjeh.

Intending to dispel any doubt about Britain's intentions, De Waal's comments on the British draft included a note welcoming 'the disposition of the British Government—apparent especially from Art. XVI of the draft [applying its provisions to future annexations]—to assist in the extension of Netherlands authority over all Sumatra.' To encourage such a disposition even more, De Waal expressed his intention to return the goodwill by revising the tariff and the laws governing coastal shipping in Netherlands India.[2]

This language was immediately understood by Admiral Harris, who suggested to Whitehall that the bargain hinted at by De Waal be made explicit in notes to be exchanged at the signing of the treaty. The treaty itself, he considered, should succeed if limited to the East Coast of Sumatra.[3] Such an agreement would, he claimed, be 'a success and under the circumstances as much as I could expect'.[4]

Whitehall was sceptical. In his draft for the Colonial Office Percy Anderson did not favour the proposed exchange of notes 'unless the Netherlands Government should make it an indispensable condition to the signature of the Convention', because it would be most unlikely to influence any Dutch plans for tariff revision anyway.[5] The Colonial Office concurred without reconsidering the matter, and Harris was instructed accordingly.[6] The position appeared still to be that, though Atjeh

[1] De Klerck, pp. 321–5.

[2] De Waal to Roest 30 January 1870, B.Z. 3136.

[3] Harris to Clarendon 12 February 1870, F.O. 37/488.

[4] *Idem* 7 March 1870, private, MS. Clar. dep. c. 484; *idem* 7 March 1870, F.O. 37/488.

[5] F.O. to C.O. 26 February 1870, F.O. 37/488.

[6] Notes on F.O. to C.O. 26 February 1870, and C.O. to F.O. 9 March 1870, C.O. 273/42; Clarendon to Harris 10 March 1870, F.O. 37/488.

must ultimately be sacrificed to the Dutch, it would be preferable for Britain itself not to have to make the sacrifice publicly.

Finding the British unresponsive over Atjeh, De Waal specifically requested in April a statement annulling the 1824 Atjeh provisions. Though clear enough to dispel all doubt, this should remain secret so as to avoid alarming the Sultan of Atjeh. De Waal suggested a note from Lord Clarendon clarifying the relevant portion of the draft treaty.[1]

Harris's refusal of this request, conveyed to him verbally, was the first clear indication to the Dutch that Britain did not share their interpretation of 'areas over which the sovereignty of the Netherlands may hereafter be extended'. Harris was told within a few hours that Holland considered freedom to deal with Atjeh a *sine qua non* for the treaty, which had, indeed, only been negotiated on the understanding that Britain intended to include Atjeh. The 1824 reservation could be of no use to Britain, Harris was told, and it prevented Holland from fulfilling its obligation to protect European shipping in Atjehnese waters.[2]

This attitude caused no alarm to Percy Anderson, who continued to guide policy on the subject at the Foreign Office. 'We shall not practically lose anything,' he explained, 'for in the natural course of events it is impossible that Acheen should remain independent'. The Dutch would never leave it alone out of mere respect for the 1824 Treaty.[3] The British objective in 1824, he added:

> ...was to prevent hostile acts on the part of the Dutch against the King of Acheen: this security might still be required—but there does not seem to be any valid reason against peaceable annexation, made with the consent and by the act of the King of Acheen.[4]

Anderson's view was firmly seconded by Harris in a private letter to Clarendon,[5] and the Colonial Office made no objec-

[1] De Waal to Roest 20 April 1870, B.Z. 3136.
[2] Roest to Harris 2 May 1870, and Harris to Clarendon 4 May 1870, F.O. 37/488.
[3] Minute by Anderson 11 May 1870, F.O. 37/488.
[4] F.O. to C.O. 13 May 1870 (Anderson's draft), F.O. 37/488.
[5] Harris to Clarendon 13 May 1870, private, MS. Clar. dep. c. 484.

tion. Anderson was free to draft the notes Britain would be prepared to exchange in explanation of the treaty. The British note, to be signed by Admiral Harris, expressed confidence that Holland would renew its 1824 promises 'that no measures hostile to the King of Acheen will be voluntarily adopted by the Netherlands authorities'; while it stated that Britain would not oppose 'any friendly treaty' bringing Atjeh into similar relations with Holland as those of Siak. Apparently believing that this wording would not upset the Sultan, Anderson did not share De Waal's desire to keep the notes secret.[1]

Anderson's choice of words was based on the known Dutch intention to use the 1858 Siak Treaty as a model for future relations with Atjeh. But De Waal could not bind his government to avoid aggression, especially after receiving Batavia's alarming interpretation of its relations with Atjeh. He amended Anderson's draft notes, omitting the word 'friendly' and acknowledging only that Holland might be obliged by its responsibilities for European commerce to extend its influence to Atjeh.[2]

Anderson's concern for a peaceful transition in Atjeh was now overlooked, and Britain accepted De Waal's important amendment without demur. It similarly accepted his softening of the Dutch 'intention' to reform the Netherlands Indian tariff to a 'wish', and his insistence that the treaty should safeguard Holland's right to make the same legal distinction between British subjects of European and of Asian origin as was made with Netherlands Indian subjects. Anderson had previously considered the latter condition 'quite inadmissable'.[3] In other respects the agreed final draft, now called the 'Siak Convention', granted the substance of Britain's demand for commercial equality in Siak and any parts of Sumatra later to be annexed to Netherlands India.[4] This was hardly a great victory in view of the fact that tariffs had never been levied by the Dutch in Siak, and that a non-differential tariff was unilaterally applied to all Netherlands India at the beginning of 1873, as had been Van de Putte's intention as early as 1865.

[1] Clarendon to Harris 19 May 1870, F.O. 37/488.
[2] The British draft notes with final Dutch amendments are in B.Z. 3136.
[3] Minute by Anderson 23 February 1870, F.O. 37/488.
[4] F.O. to C.O. 16 June 1870: C.O. to F.O. 21 June 1870: Clarendon to Harris 6 July 1870: F.O. 37/488.

British pressure may, as Harris insisted, have helped the Dutch Liberals in a general way. But the principal advantage Whitehall drew from this treaty was to escape from the uncomfortable posture of protest against Dutch *faits accomplis* in Sumatra. Harris and Anderson, the British officials most concerned with the agreement, expressed their pleasure at its conclusion not because it was in Britain's interest, but because it put an end to a long and tedious correspondence.[1] The Dutch Foreign Minister was privately convinced that:

> ...the English Government has had no other aim than to find an effective and suitable means to put an end to the ceaseless annoyances with which they have been pestered for so long, and . . . it will therefore be more or less indifferent whether this is done in one manner or another, provided it is done.[2]

On 18 July 1870, Harris informed Roest van Limburg that negotiations could be considered closed, as Britain had accepted all the Dutch amendments.[3] The Dutch ministers were naturally pleased to have the substance of what they wanted, but agreement was held up further by domestic opposition to another transaction with Britain.

The 'link' between three Treaties

From the beginning of his term of office, De Waal had shown an interest in getting rid of Holland's profitless and troublesome possessions on the Gold Coast. He submitted the idea for the King's approval in April 1869. However, the *Raad van State,* the King's council of advisors, declared itself against the surrender of any Netherlands territory except as part of a general settlement like that of 1824. It suggested that negotiations with Britain over the Gold Coast 'be seized as a point of departure for settling our interests in Netherlands India'.[4]

[1] Harris to Clarendon 9 June 1870: Minute by Anderson 11 May 1870: F.O. 37/488; Harris to Clarendon 13 May 1870, private, MS. Clar.dep. c. 484.

[2] Gericke to Van Bylandt 9 July 1871, private, J. Woltring (ed.) *Bescheiden Betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland,* Tweede Periode (1871–98), I (The Hague, 1962), p. 150. See also Van Lansberge to Gericke 29 April 1871, ibid. p. 114.

[3] Harris to Roest 18 July 1870, B.Z. 3136.

[4] Woltring I, p. 16; De Klerck, p. 309; Coombs, p. 61. For the Gold

De Waal at first resisted the temptation to link the Sumatra and Gold Coast negotiations because of his preference for a discreet understanding with Britain over Atjeh. In May 1870, he applied again for royal authority to cede the unwanted possessions. Knowing the disposition of the *Raad,* he claimed that Britain had offered compensation for the Gold Coast by recognizing Siak as Dutch and allowing Indian emigration to Surinam. On 13 June the *Raad* advised the King to agree to the cession only in the framework of a general settlement giving Holland freedom to advance in Atjeh, and establishing the principle of non-contiguous colonial territory in a preamble to the three treaties. Having by then obtained British agreement over Atjeh, De Waal readily accepted these terms and thereby obtained the royal consent to Gold Coast negotiations on 24 June.[1]

In accordance with this agreement, the Dutch Ministers asked Britain to link the prospective Gold Coast treaty to the Surinam and Siak conventions by a prologue setting forth their common motives of 'good will and sound policy'. Though Holland's Gold Coast possessions had been offered to Britain unconditionally in private talks before the royal assent, they were first offered officially in July only in the general framework demanded by the *Raad van State,* involving broader demands in Indonesia and Surinam.[2] These new demands were quickly dropped when Lord Granville, Clarendon's successor at the Foreign Office, suggested leaving the Gold Coast out of the settlement.[3] The only agreed link between the three treaties was that they should be signed at the same time, and should stand or fall together before the States-General, whose ratification was necessary for all treaties.

In August King William's approval was obtained for the Siak Convention in the terms agreed upon in April.[4] Because of public pressure for an announcement of the Surinam Con-

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Coast background see Coombs, *passim,* and McIntyre 'Disraeli's Election Blunder', *Renaissance and Modern Studies* V (1961), pp. 78–85.

[1] Woltring I, pp. 19–20; Coombs, p. 68; Harris to Clarendon 3 June and 1 July 1870, F.O. 37/479.

[2] Harris to Clarendon 3 June and 1 July 1870: Harris to Granville 11 July 1870: F.O. 37/479.

[3] Harris to Granville 25 July 1870, F.O. 37/479.

[4] Roest to King 15 August 1870, B.Z. 3136.

vention, De Waal decided after all to sign the two completed treaties on 8 September,[1] while negotiations over the Gold Coast dragged on until 25 February 1871.

Before the three treaties could be submitted to the States-General, the *Raad van State* had to be consulted once again. Only the Siak treaty met its demands, though it claimed that Sarawak would be required as well as freedom for Atjeh to balance the loss of the Gold Coast possessions. Even in Atjeh the *Raad*, supported in this by the King, seemed to fear that dangerous and unjustifiable privileges bordering on co-sovereignty were being surrendered to Britain. The Thorbecke Ministry of 1871–2, which had inherited the troublesome treaties from its predecessor, decided to ignore these criticisms and to proceed to the real test before the deputies.[2]

Unlike the *Raad*, the Second Chamber was kept in ignorance of the secret notes exchanged after the signature of the Siak Convention. Consequently the commission of members appointed to examine the three treaties expressed unanimous disappointment with the Siak one. Instead of providing the expected compensation for the loss of the Gold Coast, the convention read like a series of commercial concessions to Britain. What then, they asked, was the nature of the 'link' between the treaties which the Ministers had had to uphold without being able to explain. The treaty appeared wholly unnecessary for Great Britain, which was already enjoying its commercial provisions, and dangerous for Holland, which appeared to be admitting that Britain's sanction was needed to validate the 1858 Siak Treaty. The Second Chamber rejected the convention by 36 votes to 28, though it had surprisingly passed the Gold Coast Treaty by four votes.[3]

Designed to help Dutch Conservatives accept the loss of territory in West Africa, the 'link' between the two treaties was instead now impeding the further progress of the Gold Coast

[1] Harris to Granville 16, 30 and 31 August 1870, F.O. 37/480. The final Dutch text of the Siak Convention with its confidential notes is App. VI in De Klerck, pp. 453–6.

[2] Raad van State to King 4 April 1871: Notulen Ministerraad 11 April 1871: Gericke and Van Bosse to King 19 April 1871: Gericke to King 21 April 1871: Woltring I, pp. 70–7, 80–105 and 107.

[3] Notulen Ministerraad 8 July 1871: Gericke to Van Bylandt 8 July 1871: Woltring I, pp. 145–6. Coombs, pp. 89–92. De Klerck, p. 314.

Treaty. In conversation Granville appeared anxious to have the 'link' dissolved and the Gold Coast transfer arranged quickly so that discontent on the Coast could be quelled.[1] The Netherlands Ministers, on the other hand, doubted whether the Gold Coast Treaty would be able to pass the more conservative First Chamber without the 'compensation' of territorial gains in Sumatra.[2] Moreover, as the Netherlands Minister in London pointed out:

> ... my impression is that a renewal of negotiations on a new basis will not be impossible, the more so because it seems to me that they attach much importance here to the ratification and execution of the treaty already adopted concerning the cession of the Guinea Coast; so that the principle of the link, so much criticized by some members of the Chamber, will end by being useful to us. . . . For otherwise, without another treaty, where will be the compensation to us for the cession?[3]

Van Bylandt probably exaggerated British enthusiasm for the Gold Coast, but there was no doubt about the willingness of Whitehall to accommodate itself to any reasonable form of Sumatra treaty. After some hesitation Harris was authorized to relieve the Dutch from taking the initiative by stating that Britain would welcome Dutch proposals for a new treaty more acceptable to the Chambers.[4]

The Dutch Ministers quickly produced an abbreviated draft, probably based on a suggestion by Van Bylandt.[5] Its first article annulled British objections to Dutch expansion anywhere in Sumatra, and referred specifically to the Atjeh reserve of 1824 but not to Britain's inadmissable objections to the 1858 Siak Treaty. Thus the intention of keeping the Atjeh

[1] Van Bylandt to Gericke 11 and 12 July 1871, both private, Woltring I, pp. 150–3; Coombs, pp. 93–5.

[2] Gericke to Van Bylandt 9 July 1871, private, and Gericke and Van Bosse to King 4 August 1871, Woltring I, pp. 149–50 and 170–4. Harris reported that Gericke had suggested dissolving the link in a conversation of 8 July, but in writing Gericke always denied having done so; Woltring I, pp. 146–7, 155–6, 158–9 and 168–9; Tarling, 1957, p. 183 and note.

[3] Van Bylandt to Gericke 11 July 1871, private, Woltring I, p. 151.

[4] Harris to Gericke 21 August 1871, Woltring I, p. 178. Also ibid. pp. 149–50, 155, 161–8 and 176–7; Tarling, 1957, p. 183. C.O. notes on F.O. to C.O. 12 July 1871, C.O. 273/53.

[5] Gericke to Harris 29 August 1871: Van Bylandt to Gericke 17 July 1871: Woltring I, pp. 179–82 and 157–8.

arrangements secret was sacrificed to the need to make the treaty's advantages for Holland more manifest. For the rest, Articles II-VII of the old treaty were abbreviated into one article guaranteeing equal treatment for British and Dutch commerce in Northern Sumatra, and another article safeguarding the Netherlands Indian legal distinction between Asians and Europeans.[1]

The new treaty was signed on 2 November 1871, and passed the Second Chamber by an overwhelming majority on 16 December. The First Chamber gave an easy passage to all three treaties, since the Sumatra treaty was now accepted by conservatives as a 'compensation' for the less popular Gold Coast cession.[2] Opposition members in the Chambers, however, pointed out what the Colonial Department had feared from the beginning of the negotiations—the publicity given to Atjeh's new position would virtually compel Holland to interfere whether ready to do so or not, since other European Powers, as well as the Sultan himself, were thereby notified that Holland intended to take Atjeh sooner or later.[3] To this extent the final Sumatra treaty was an even more lamentable document than its predecessor.

Afterthoughts

The heaviest responsibility for Britain's failure to consider seriously the future of a country which had been commercially, and to some extent morally, dependent on a British port for almost a century, lay with Sir Harry Ord. As long as he was in Singapore the Colonial Office was given no reason to suppose that Atjeh warranted either protection or sympathy from Britain. Consequently no check was placed on the Foreign Office's inclination to treat the Sultanate as a pawn in its game for freer trade.

[1] The correspondence concerning the details of the new treaty is printed in Woltring I, pp. 178–83, 191–3, 196–8, 201–2 and 205–7. The text is in Appendix 2 below.

[2] Coombs, p. 97; De Klerck, p. 315.

[3] Vandenbosch *Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815* (The Hague, 1959), p. 195; Baron Rengers *Schets eener Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederland van 1849 tot 1891,* (The Hague, 1905–7), II, p. 83; De Klerck, p. 303. The treaty prompted Multatuli to predict a major war in Sumatra within two years; W. F. Wertheim, 'De geest van het Oostindische Gouvernement', *BKI* 117 (1961), p. 452.

Ord departed on leave early in 1871, leaving the government in the eager hands of Colonel Anson, whose interest in a new policy was probably stimulated by his resentment of Ord's overbearing way with subordinates. As Lieutenant-Governor of Penang Anson had been 'on very friendly terms' with some of the leading men of Atjeh, and had invited the Shahbandar, Panglima Tibang, to meet the Duke of Edinburgh at a Penang ball.[1] As acting Governor, he wasted no time in setting up a commission to consider policy toward the independent Malay states and supporting its recommendation that missions be despatched to Atjeh and Perak to seek more satisfactory and permanent relations with those troublesome states.[2] At the end of 1871 the Sultan of Atjeh himself appealed to Britain for help and advice to prevent the Dutch from treating with his vassals. The acting authority in Penang again suggested a mission to discuss the matter with the Sultan, and Anson forwarded this to London without comment. In view of the treaty just concluded, the Colonial Office was obliged to forbid these ventures, and the Foreign Office went so far as to inform the Dutch about Sultan Mahmud's appeal. Nevertheless Anson's despatches showed the limitations of Ord's picture of Atjeh, and aroused some sympathy for that country in the Colonial Office.[3]

In contrast to the position in Holland, little was known in England about the three Anglo-Dutch treaties until well after their signature. Only in 1872 was there a brief debate on the subject in the Commons, stimulated by *The Times'* report of the passage of the three treaties through the Dutch First Chamber. Members expressed anxiety about both the Gold Coast and the Sumatra treaties.[4] Papers concerning the former were soon presented to the House, but the latter remained in obscurity until its effects were felt in 1873. The Straits Association, the London lobby for those very Straits merchants for whom the Sumatra treaty had supposedly been concluded, did however

[1] Anson *About Others and Myself* (London, 1920), p. 284.

[2] Cowan, 1961, pp. 80–5; W. D. McIntyre 'British Policy in West Africa, the Malay Peninsula and the South Pacific . . . 1870 to 1876' (Unpublished Ph. D. thesis, London, 1959), pp. 180–1.

[3] Anson to Kimberley 23 January 1872, and minutes attached, C.O. 273/56; Gericke to Heads of Missions (circular) 30 April 1872, Woltring I, pp. 338–9; Kimberley to Ord 19 March 1872, draft, C.O. 273/63.

[4] *The Times* 6 February 1872; Debate of 13 February 1872, *Hansard* 209, cols. 209 and 319–29.

voice its belated opposition to the treaty during 1872.[1]

The British election of 1874

Early in 1873 the worst fears of the critics of the Anglo-Dutch deal were exceeded. In April a Dutch force attacked Atjeh and was obliged to retreat within three weeks after losing its commander and eighty men.[2] In June the Ashantis attacked and devastated Elmina, the centre of the Gold Coast settlements recently transferred from Holland. Two important colonial wars had begun. In reporting the attack on Elmina, *The Times* set the tone for later criticism by linking the two disasters as products of the same unhappy bargain.[3]

Rear-Admiral Sherard Osborn quickly took up the attack on the still imperfectly known Sumatra treaty in a letter to *The Times*. He found it 'hardly possible to conceive a greater political error from a naval and commercial point of view' than the surrender of control over the Straits of Malacca, which the previous 1824 Treaty had been designed to secure. Holland was not dangerous but, he warned: 'For "Holland" read "Germany" and then weigh the consequences'.[4]

The same anti-Prussian drum was strategically beaten in the House of Lords by Stanley of Alderley,[5] an eccentric peer belonging to that small band of Englishmen moved by sincere sympathy for the people of Indonesia and opposition to European expansion at their expense. He took pleasure in explaining Atjeh's illustrious past to the Lords, and called on the Government to use its influence to prevent Holland proceeding with the war in Sumatra. If the Dutch did persevere and subject Atjeh to their pernicious colonial system, he warned, this would

[1] W. E. Makepeace, O. E. Brooke and R. St. J. Braddell (eds.) *One Hundred Years of Singapore,* (London, 1921) II, p. 298.

[2] See below, pp. 96–7.

[3] *The Times* 11 July 1873.

[4] Ibid. 12 July 1873. Osborn was the author of *My Journal in Malayan Waters* (London, 1860).

[5] The 3rd Baron Stanley of Alderley (1827–93) had thrown up a promising career in the Foreign Office in 1858 to travel through Asia as a Muslim, Shaikh Morad, in which guise he shocked colonial society but delighted several Malay rajas whose guest he was. He was refused a visa to Netherlands India. *Straits Times* 2 July 1859: Bentinck to Goldstein 22 September 1859: Van Zuylen to Goldstein 12 October 1859: all with Van Bylandt to Gericke 29 July 1873 in B.Z. Atjeh. Also Cowan, 1961, pp. 55n. and 204–5.

be to the ruin of the prestige among Asian Muslims of Britain, which had undertaken to uphold Atjehnese independence.[1]

Stanley called for papers concerning the Sumatra treaty, which at last made the subject generally known in Britain. When the papers appeared in October, they evoked the patronizing condemnation of *The Times:* 'the concession to a foreign state of a right to annex territory in exchange for dominions ceded to us is hardly consonant with modern English notions of our proper relations to inferior races'.[2]

Gladstone's government was now faced with the firm association of the Atjeh and Ashanti wars in the popular mind, despite the fact that the link between the respective treaties had been forged solely to meet the prejudices of Dutch conservatives and had never been important to the British negotiators. The idea that the same sordid bargain had started both wars was naturally fostered by the Government's Tory critics, as was the fear that Holland with her colonies might fall a prey to German expansionism.[3]

On 24 January 1874, England was surprised by Gladstone's decision to face a quick election. Disraeli, replying the same day to his rival's policy speech but lacking any major domestic theme, turned his attack to Gladstone's foreign policy. In particular he singled out as 'an act of folly or of ignorance rarely equalled', the transactions whereby control of the Malacca Straits had allegedly been surrendered in return for encumbrances which had led only to the Ashanti War.[4] In reply Gladstone poked fun at the remoteness of Disraeli's chosen theme, 'about as far off as the Kingdom of Brobdignag'. But he could not avoid answering the charge.[5] The 'Straits of Malacca issue' became the bitterest, if not the most central, point of contention during the short election campaign.

The Foreign Office busied itself with memoranda enabling Gladstone to reply, but not with complete success. At first the

[1] Debate of 28 July 1873, *Hansard* 217, cols. 1077–80.

[2] *The Times* editorial, 11 October 1873.

[3] E.g. Sir J. D. Hay *Ashanti and the Gold Coast* (London 1874), p. 63; T. G. Bowles, 'The Ashantee War Unnecessary and Unjust', *Frazer's Magazine* January 1874, p. 124; *Morning Post* 29 January and 2 February 1874. See also Van Bylandt to Gericke 6 February 1874, Woltring I, p. 680.

[4] *The Times* 26 January 1874.

[5] Ibid. 29 January 1874.

Permanent Under-Secretary, Lord Tenterden, advised that Atjeh had nothing to do with control of the Straits of Malacca, and that it was the Conservative Ministry of 1868 which had prepared a draft treaty acknowledging Dutch possession of the portion of Sumatra where the Straits were narrowest—Siak.

Gladstone was given little credit for making this point. Disraeli caused a stir by suggesting that the Prime Minister would have difficulty with his prayers that night after so twisting the issue away from Atjeh.[1]

The Conservatives themselves had only then realized that their strongest case was that the Liberals had surrendered the independence of Atjeh. 'Upon England rested the bloodshed which had taken place in Atchin', proclaimed the candidate for Darlington, Thomas Bowles,[2] who was the principal inspiration of the Conservative case. Disraeli, too, concentrated his second attack on the surrender of Atjeh rather than 'the Straits of Malacca', though he evidently still considered the alleged strategic loss to England was of more electoral significance than blood spilt in Sumatra.

Lord Tenterden then tried to show that the Conservatives themselves had been prepared to surrender Atjeh in 1868. The point was made by Gladstone and stoutly denied by Derby (formerly Stanley, the Conservative Foreign Minister)[3] and there the matter rested when the voters went to the polls on 3 February.

Gladstone's strongest point was that Conservative policy over Atjeh in 1868 had been the same as that of his government. The treaty had in fact been carried through by permanent officials and evoked little interest at the time from politicians of either colour. For the Conservatives it may be said that their Buckingham, as Colonial Secretary, showed more interest than his successors in the effects of the treaty on Atjeh, and achieved the postponement of a definite promise to surrender the Atjeh reserve.[4] But politicians and permanent officials alike were blind to Britain's responsibility for easing the passage of Atjeh into the modern world.

[1] Ibid. 2 February 1874.

[2] *Pall Mall Gazette* 30 January 1874. See also Bowles' letter to editor, *The Times* 3 February 1874.

[3] Derby to Editor, *The Times* 3 February 1874.

[4] Above p. 61.

Gladstone was unlucky in that he himself might have been expected to disapprove the Atjeh arrangements, in view of his reluctance to countenance additional colonial responsibilities.[1] Yet he was not brought into the negotiations at all until October 1870. When Kimberley then recommended the treaty to Gladstone as 'an example of free trade in the Indian Archipelago', he had not even mentioned the existence of Atjeh.[2] Nevertheless the decision was an important one and the Prime Minister was obliged to take responsibility for it. Indeed, if the 'Straits of Malacca' was really as far from Gladstone's mind as his electioneering jokes suggested, there was substance in Disraeli's demand for 'a little more energy in our foreign policy'.[3]

But for all the criticism launched at the Liberals, the Disraeli Government of 1874–80 proved just as anxious to press on with the Ashanti War as were the once-critical Dutch Conservatives to continue the Atjeh War, once they come into office in 1874. And the new British Conservative 'principle' of maintaining Atjehnese independence was discovered too late to be of any service to the Atjehnese.

[1] In 1871–2 Gladstone expressed this reluctance forcibly over both the Gold Coast and Fiji. Coombs, pp. 76–7; P. Knaplund *Gladstone and Britain's Imperial Policy* (London, 1926), p. 133.

[2] Kimberley to Gladstone 14 October 1870, B.M.Add.MSS. 44224, ff. 88–92.

[3] *The Times* 26 January 1874. In *Renaissance and Modern Studies*, Vol. V, pp. 76–105, W. D. McIntyre has castigated the introduction of the 'Straits of Malacca' issue as 'Disraeli's Election Blunder'. He appears to underestimate: 1) the importance of the 'link' between the treaties, particularly in Holland; 2) the volume of criticism of the Sumatra treaty in the non-Liberal British press; 3) the magnitude of the results of the treaties.

3

War and Blockade
1870–1874

Pre-war Atjehnese politics

The long reign of Sultan Ibrahim Mansur Shah, Raja of Atjeh, ended with his death in 1870. Ibrahim had learnt the secrets of power in a hard school, and after defeating the supporters of his nephew Sulaiman in 1857 he gave his country a period of relative internal stability. But even he was obliged to govern by persuasion and a system of judicious alliances rather than by force.[1]

In the coastal dependencies Ibrahim was able to obtain the sporadic collection of the *hasil raja* and to reduce the menace of piracy and banditry. But he was quite unable to stop the interminable feuds over the division of the river duties on the pepper and betelnut exported by these states. The latter part of Ibrahim's reign was disturbed by an intermittent war of this kind between Lhokseumawe, ruled by a brother of the Sultan, and Keureutoë. The former asserted, and the latter denied, that a major point at issue was Keureutoë's failure to pay the Sultan's *hasil*.[2]

From 1870 the centre of disturbance shifted from the north to the east coast. Virtually uncultivated before 1840, the region between Diamond Head and Tamiang profited from its virgin soil and proximity to Penang to surpass the west coast in pepper production in the 1860's. This became the new Atjehnese 'boom district' where fortunes were quickly made,

[1] K. F. H. van Langen, 'De inrichting van het Atjehsche Staatsbestuur onder Het Sultanaat', *BKI* 34, (1888), Part III, pp. 397–9.

[2] The state of this feud in 1868 is described in D. F. A. Hervey, 'Achin Piracy', *JMBRAS* 5 (1927), Part II pp. 318–20.

and lives sometimes as quickly lost. In 1870 Simpang Ulim, the most successful of the new settlements, refused its former tribute to Keureutoë and so became the leader of the forces opposing that state. On the other hand Idi, established earlier than Simpang Ulim and rivalling it in pepper exports, took the side of Keureutoë because of family ties and a fear of its warlike neighbour. From 1869 Idi also refused the *hasil* to the Sultan.

The ruler of Simpang Ulim was Teuku Muda Nyak Malim, a strict Muslim who punished opium smoking by death, and a vigorous and wealthy ruler who alone of the pepper-rajas conducted his own trade with Penang without any advances from Chinese middlemen. He was a formidable champion of Atjehnese independence. Tengku Chik of Idi on the other hand was an Indian who lacked these patriotic or religious scruples and coveted the affluence which had come the way of the Sultan of Deli under Dutch protection. Hard-pressed by Simpang Ulim, he appealed to the Resident of Riau. Thus the pattern of the East Coast of Sumatra was repeated in Eastern Atjeh, Dutch proximity giving to a local feud the character of a conflict between 'patriots' and 'pro-Hollanders'.[1]

In Atjeh Besar Sultan Ibrahim's power was also severely circumscribed by that of the *ulèëbalangs*. In the contest of the 1850's[2] the strongest supporter of the defeated Sultan Sulaiman had been his brother-in-law Teuku Muda Ba'et, whose power in the upland XXII Mukims was exceeded only by that of Panglima Polem. Ba'et was not reconciled to Ibrahim even after Sulaiman's death in 1857, and continued to guard his widow (Ba'et's own sister) and young son Mahmud. Panglima Polem himself recognized Sultan Ibrahim though remaining on good terms with Ba'et. He and Ibrahim, the two opposite poles of Atjehnese power, avoided conflict by each acknowledging the other's sphere of authority. Even in the two lowland Sagis Ibrahim made little impression on the traditional autonomy of the *ulèëbalangs*, so that 'the basis of government rested more on mutual consultation than on the exercise of power'.[3]

[1] De Klerck, *De Atjeh-oorlog* (1912), pp. 330–1; Lavino to Read 14 August and 29 November 1873, Cons. Penang 100; Lavino to Loudon 15 October 1874 and 18 February 1875, Cons. Penang 101 and 102.

[2] See above, p. 16.

[3] Van Langen, 1888, p. 399. Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese* (1906), I, pp. 88–9 and 120–38.

From time to time the customary balance of power in Atjeh was upset by the arrival of an ambitious foreigner from India or Arabia, who based his appeal on Islam rather than on local loyalties. The most remarkable of these was the last, a Hadhramaut sayyid known as Habib[1] Abd ar-Rahman az-Zahir.[2] He arrived in the Atjehnese capital in 1864, bearing a recommendation from his previous patron, the Maharaja of Johor. More pressing recommendations were his holy birth, respected nowhere more than in Atjeh, and his considerable learning combined with a very forceful personality. Almost immediately he became the acknowledged master of the court scholars and was placed in charge of the Great Mosque.

Before long the Habib succeeded in reconciling Teuku Muda Ba'et to the Sultan and bringing Sulaiman's young son Mahmud back to the *dalam.* Ibrahim rewarded him by allowing him to preside over a specially created court with competence in all cases affecting the religious law. This gave him the opportunity to increase his influence as the upholder of the *hukom* against the *adat;* of Islamic purity against Atjehnese corruptions. However the talents and ambitions of this remarkable Arab were by no means limited to the strictly religious. He strengthened his position by marrying Sulaiman's widow, and thus becoming the ally of her brother Ba'et. Within a few years he had a wider following than any Atjehnese leader, and began to show himself able to unite very disparate elements behind a programme of long-neglected public works—in particular the rebuilding of the Great Mosque.

[1] Habib (lit. 'beloved') was an honorific title for sayyids used in Arabia, and introduced to Atjeh by Abd ar-Rahman. Snouck Hurgronje, I, 1906, p. 155.

[2] Sayyid Abd ar-Rahman bin Muhammad az-Zahir (1832–96) was born in the Hadhramaut and educated in the best Islamic tradition in Egypt and Calicut. In his youth he travelled widely in the Middle East and India, gaining enough money by his high birth, his wits, and some judicious marriages to visit Italy, France and Germany in his late twenties. He returned through Turkey and India to Singapore in 1862, where he entered the service of the Maharaja of Johor, for whom he undertook some public works. After retiring from the Atjeh war on a Dutch pension in 1878, he lived quietly in Mecca until his death. Though the leader of the Muslim party in Atjeh he was not rigidly orthodox, and was always moderate and realistic in dealing with Europeans. Alexander, 'Korte Levensschets van de' Arabier Habib Abdoe'r Rahman Alzahir', *IG* 2 (1880), Part II, pp. 1008–20; Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, pp. 158–64.

A party was quick to form against the arrogant and ambitious foreigner. Its leader was Teuku Kali Malikul Adil,[1] the hereditary supreme judge, whose office had in fact become completely secularized long before. During the Habib's absence raising funds for his mosque, this party exploited Ibrahim's suspicion of his powerful subject with the result that Abd ar-Rahman was out of favour on his return. For two or three years he tried in vain to arouse a coalition against the Sultan which would restore his fortunes. In 1868 he despaired of success and departed for Mecca.

Abd ar-Rahman was adept at using his international connexions to extricate himself from an unfavourable situation by undertaking an 'embassy'. This enabled him to return later with restored pride and with the extra prestige of favours from the Middle East. In 1868 he was almost certainly the author and bearer of the appeal from sixty-five Atjehnese 'notables' for Turkish protection against the Dutch.[2] He was known in Mecca from an earlier residence, and was able to return to Atjeh within a year with complimentary letters from the Sharif, the Pasha of Jidda, and one of his former teachers. Thus armed he was welcomed by Sultan Ibrahim, and enjoyed general respect, if not power, in the closing months of the reign.

At the news of Ibrahim's death the Habib quickly had himself elected provisional regent by the palace *ulèëbalangs* to tide over the inevitable succession crisis. Later, in about November 1870, the full council of *ulèëbalangs* elected Sulaiman's sixteen-year old son Mahmud to the Sultanate. Abd ar-Rahman was appointed co-regent and guardian of the boy with his rival Teuku Kali.

For two years the Habib's remarkable ability was given full scope. The succession dispute was ended with exceptional

[1] Literally 'Judge of the righteous King'. The office was probably established by one of Atjeh's powerful Sultans to enable some renowned scholar to administer both the *hukom* and the *adat*. It quickly lost all except ceremonial significance, and in the nineteenth century resembled that of a normal *ulèëbalang*. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, pp. 97–100.

[2] See above, p. 65. The appeal was forwarded to the Porte through the Pasha of Jidda, one of Abd ar-Rahman's contacts. It was not authorized by the Sultan, so that the sixty-five 'notables' may have been either the Habib's party in Atjeh or some Atjehnese hajis in Mecca. De Klerck, App. VIII, pp. 461–2. Van de Wall Bake to Gericke 12 November 1872 and Van de Putte to Gericke 3 January 1873, Woltring I, pp. 420 and 458–9.

speed and the regent enjoyed greater authority than most sultans. As long as control was in his skilled and experienced hands Atjeh was well placed to meet the crisis into which colonial rivalry was drawing it. But once again his very success aroused the jealousy of the Sultan. This time his Cassius was a wily, time-serving Indian, Panglima Tibang,[1] who had risen to become Shahbandar and confidant of Ibrahim and Mahmud in turn. The Habib was strong enough to have him condemned to death early in 1872 by an assembly of *ulèëbalangs* for plotting against Abd ar-Rahman's life. But Tibang was saved by the Sultan's protection and survived to play an important part in Atjehnese diplomacy.[2]

This jealousy between Tibang and Mahmud on the one hand and Abd ar-Rahman on the other vitiated what attempts Atjeh did make to extricate itself from its diplomatic isolation. The young Sultan himself appeared moderate and peaceable but he had no real power in the country, and his chosen emissary Tibang was motivated more by jealousy of the Habib than by any consistent policy.

Atjeh's foreign relations

The foreign relations of Atjeh under Ibrahim and Mahmud merit special attention because they formed the pretext for the Dutch declaration of war in 1873.

Under Ibrahim Atjeh was brought into relation with European states which had lost all contact with that remote Sultanate since the seventeenth century. Of these the most illustrious in Atjehnese eyes was Turkey, still thought of in terms of its sixteenth century power. Time and distance had removed

[1] Teuku Panglima Muhammad Tibang came to Atjeh as a boy with a troupe of Indian performers and stayed as retainer of a coastal raja and subsequently of Sultan Ibrahim. He adopted Islam, gained Ibrahim's trust and was appointed Shahbandar (port-officer). As such he had considerable contact with Europeans, visited Penang several times, and became friendly with Anson. Hated from 1873 by the Atjehnese who attributed the war to his machinations, he submitted to the Dutch in 1877 and served them loyally. J. A. Vink and 'Een Belangstellende' in *IMT* 1892, II, pp. 629–33 and 724–7; Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, II, pp. 103–4; Mohammad Said, *Atjeh Sepandjang Abad*, pp. 354–6, 369–70; Anson, p. 284.

[2] Abd ar-Rahman's role in pre-war Atjeh is well described in an undated memorandum (April 1874?) in Kol.Kab.E[24],6052; Alexander, pp. 1010–14; and Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, pp. 158–63.

political substance to Atjeh's submission to the 'Raja Rum' in the 1560's, though the sentimental tie never died.

The remarkable political connexion between the two states was renewed in 1850. Sultan Ibrahim sent an envoy to request that Atjeh be again considered a vassal province of the Ottoman Empire. Flattered and gratified, Sultan Abdul Mejid issued two *firmans*, one renewing Turkish protection over Atjeh, the other confirming Ibrahim in his royal status. The Governor of the Yemen was instructed to look after Atjehnese interests.[1] A few years later Ibrahim sent $10,000 towards Turkish war expenses in the Crimea and was rewarded with the *Mejidie* decoration.[2]

At the time of these missions Ibrahim was not pressed by European aggression, so that their only political significance can have been to confirm his position against his more legitimate rival Sulaiman. Nor, apparently, did Ibrahim remind Turkey of its *firmans* when he did feel in need of foreign help against the Dutch in 1862–5. At this time, however, European advance at the expense of Muslims in North Africa, the Middle East, India, and Central Asia was giving a political tinge to the age-old ideal of a united polity of Muslims. Disgruntled Arabs and Turks began to look to the Caliphate again as a rallying point.[3] These new ideas reached Indonesia principally by means of Arab wanderers like Abd ar-Rahman, and it was probably he who fostered the idea of Turkish protection against the Dutch. When, however, the appeal he took to Mecca in 1868 was received in Constantinople, the Porte appeared to have entirely forgotten Atjeh's existence, and the Dutch Minister was told that the appeal would be refused.[4]

Sultan Ibrahim must have been more surprised to receive two letters from France, one signed by Louis Philippe in 1843, the other despatched with Sidi Muhammad in 1853 by Napo-

[1] Travers to Heldewier 17 and 23 June 1873, copies Heldewier to Gericke 19 and 26 June 1873, B.Z. Atjeh; Rashid to Musurus 11 August 1873, Woltring I, pp. 612–3.

[2] De Klerck, pp. 216–17.

[3] T. W. Arnold *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924), pp. 173–7; R. H. Davison *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–1876* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 270–8.

[4] Keun to Roest 2 December 1868 and 3 February 1869, B.Z. 3076. Despite this assurance Abd ar-Rahman was probably awarded a *Mejidie*, as well as recommendations from the Hejaz authorities, since he wore this Turkish decoration to meet Dutch envoys in 1871. De Klerck, p. 347.

leon III. Both of these were simply expressions of goodwill in the interests of French commerce, probably evoked in both cases by French merchants and their Atjehnese protégés.[1]

The two nations with which Atjeh had most to do were Britain and Holland. The 1857 Treaty with the Dutch ended the avowed hostility between Banda Atjeh and Batavia, but did little to change the distrust with which Dutch intentions were regarded. And it was natural and normal for Ibrahim to appeal to the British masters of Penang when Dutch aggression was again feared in 1862, as previously in 1842.

The Indian Mutiny may however have lowered Ibrahim's opinion of the British. An Italian adventurer, Cesar Moreno, came to Atjeh in 1859 after having played a sympathetic part in Nana Sahib's resistance to the British.[2] His views may well have influenced Ibrahim, who was unusually impolite to a British mission which visited him in September 1859. The leader of the mission found the Atjehnese with an exaggerated impression of British losses in India.[3]

Moreno claimed to have been with the Sultan until 1862, the year when Netscher prised some of the east coast states away from Atjeh. He then went to Europe where he claimed the Sultan had authorized him to negotiate a defensive treaty with a European power, to which would be ceded the east coast area claimed by Atjeh but occupied by Holland. Ibrahim had apparently envisaged an alliance with Napoleon III, the sender of the mysterious letter which Moreno had been able to translate for the Sultan. Instead the Italian appealed first to his own country, whose Foreign Minister declined the offer in about 1864.[4] Moreno turned up again in Washington in 1868, where he tried to persuade the expansionist Secretary of State Seward to protect Atjeh in return for cession of a strategically placed island (perhaps Pulau We). The British Minister commented: 'Mr. Seward's desire to acquire territory, and parti-

[1] De Klerck, 1912, pp. 208–9 and 220, and App. I, pp. 435–6. See also above, p. 21.

[2] Moreno claimed to have joined Nana Sahib for twenty months, first as observer and then as partisan and adviser. Clipping from *New York Herald* in Thornton to Stanley 17 August 1868, copy F.O. to C.O. 4 September 1868, C.O. 273/23.

[3] Haughton to Grey 6 October 1859, Coll. to No. 21, C.P.D. 13.

[4] Van der Hoeven (Rome) to Gericke 21 June 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

cularly such as may be adapted to naval stations, . . . is so well known that . . . there may be some truth in the rumour that he is already in negotiation with Moreno upon the subject'.[1]

Ibrahim probably heard nothing from Moreno after entrusting him with some very general mission in 1862. But the Italian's activities fairly represented Ibrahim's dissatisfaction with both Britain and Holland, and his desire to find a protector against the latter without surrendering anything of his own sovereignty.

Young Sultan Mahmud, weaker than Ibrahim inside Atjeh, was more eager to befriend the major powers beyond its borders. The Penang authorities thought he had 'a strong regard for the English',[2] while Dutch sources always pictured him as a moderate man prevented only by his over-mighty subjects from seeking friendship with Holland.[3] Nevertheless there can be no doubt that no Sultan of Atjeh would have been permitted by his people to surrender sovereignty voluntarily to a European power at any time before the Dutch invasion.

The development of Dutch Atjeh policy

In The Hague the mood of the government justified all the fears of the gloomier prophets that the Sumatra treaty would precipitate war. The Ministry was keenly aware that Indonesia was no longer a forgotten part of the world and that: 'The pretension of excluding others where one will not or cannot undertake matters oneself is in the long run, at least for a small power, untenable and . . . extremely dangerous'.[4] Consequently its impatience at Holland's weak position in Atjeh increased as the relevant provisions of the Sumatra Treaty became publicly known.

In June 1870, within a few weeks of Britain's agreement to an

[1] Thornton to Stanley 17 August 1868, and enclosures, loc. cit. Moreno did not disclose the location of his Malay 'island' to the American press (though his description could only apply to Atjeh). Consequently Whitehall showed little interest in the matter.

[2] Birch to Anson 27 November 1871, copy S.S. to C.O. 23 January 1872, C.O. 273/56.

[3] E.g. Report of Burhan Udin 11 and 14 October 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol.Kab.D[33], 6042; Lavino to Read October 1873, Cons. Penang; 100; 'Een Belangstellende' in *IMT* 1892, II, p. 727.

[4] Gericke and Van Bosse to King 19 April 1871, Woltring I, p. 85. The reference was to Sarawak.

exchange of notes regarding Atjeh, De Waal wrote to explain to his Governor-General the new policy that this would make possible. More direct and constant protection of trade in Atjeh was essential, and there was no longer reason to refrain from interference lest it lead further than the 1824 Treaty allowed. Moreover Atjeh had previously shown reluctance to enter into the relations with Holland which alone would exclude other powers. Consequently Batavia should prepare for the possibility of war, while sending an exploratory mission to Atjeh on the pretext of investigating the need for lighthouses there.[1]

In Batavia however the *Raad van Indië* still regarded Atjeh as irreconcilably hostile to the Dutch, and feared to make any overture lest it lead to immediate war. Only in July 1871, after the Minister had shown his clear impatience with this attitude, did Mijer decide to despatch a steamer to investigate conditions in Atjeh.[2]

The Dutch warship *Djambi* consequently spent the last twelve days of September in Atjeh roads. *Controleur* Krayenhoff made no headway with the suspicious Atjehnese until a ship arrived on the 24th bringing Abd ar-Rahman from the west coast. Now at the height of his power, the Habib asserted himself to see that the Dutchmen were given a cordial reception and a ceremonious audience with the Sultan. He carefully explained to Krayenhoff that Atjeh lived at peace with England, France, and Turkey which had done it no harm, whereas Holland had seized Atjehnese territory on the east and west coasts despite its protestations of friendship. Nevertheless the discussions ended cordially, the Atjehnese reciprocated the Dutch presents and replied politely to the letter of Netscher, now Governor of the West Coast of Sumatra. Krayenhoff departed believing that friendship and trust had been restored.[3]

If so, it was a brief respite. The Atjehnese were immediately given fresh cause for mistrust by Dutch intervention in the dispute between Idi and Simpang Ulim. Early in August the Dutch Consul in Singapore had heard that Simpang Ulim's blockade of Idi, said to have the sanction of the Sultan, was interfering with vessels under the Dutch flag. The *Raad van Indië* judged that International Law need not be applied to

[1] De Klerck, pp. 325–7.
[2] Ibid. pp. 332–42.
[3] Ibid. pp. 344–9.

countries such as Atjeh and the *Marnix* was instructed to break the blockade. Though she found no trace of Dutch vessels in Idi, the *Marnix* chased away Simpang Ulim's blockading fleet at the very time Krayenhoff was exchanging compliments in Banda Atjeh.[1]

The *Djambi* and the *Marnix* together created sufficient alarm in Banda Atjeh for the Sultan to appeal to the Straits Settlements in October for advice and assistance.[2] Receiving no reply, he sent Tibang to Penang in May 1872, with authority to appeal personally to the British officials. Tibang however dallied in Penang, until finally in September he made a vain appeal to Ord in Singapore.

A no less important reason for Tibang's mission was the continued hostility of Atjehnese opinion towards him. He had been saved early in 1872 when his rival Abd ar-Rahman had journeyed to the west coast to raise money for the Great Mosque and had been struck down there by an illness which delayed him for six months. Nevertheless Tibang found Atjeh too unsafe a place to remain there for long.[3] Consequently Atjeh was deprived of both its principal diplomats during most of 1872.

Meanwhile the action of the *Marnix* at Idi had so provoked the rest of Atjeh against that state that the Raja of Idi was constrained to send two emissaries to Riau in March 1872. They carried authority to accept Dutch sovereignty in a defensive treaty.[4]

These events served to reverse the positions of The Hague and Batavia, not for the first time. The attitude of the Ministry, as explained in a despatch of September 1871, was that little could be expected from the Sultanate. Dutch policy in the East Coast of Sumatra could be continued in Atjeh itself by supporting and protecting the dependencies, and driving the influence of the Sultan gradually further back. In Netherlands India, on the other hand, the excellent reception given to the *Djambi* encouraged a more optimistic view of the Sultanate.

[1] Ibid. pp. 349–52.

[2] Mahmud to Anson 23 Rajab 1288H (7 October 1871), translation in S.S. to C.O. 23 January 1872, C.O. 273/56.

[3] De Klerck, pp. 364–5. Report of Burhan Udin, 11 and 14 October 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol.Kab.D[33], 6042.

[4] De Klerck, p. 362.

Asked for their advice, the responsible officials at Padang (Sumatra's West Coast) and Riau considered that a treaty like that of 1858 with Siak might become possible with Atjeh if Dutch influence there were gradually extended by frequent visits of Dutch warships. The *Raad van Indië* went further, elaborating a peaceful plan to gain the trust of Atjeh by giving clear evidence that Holland meant to respect its integrity. An ally, and eventually a dependent, could be made of the Sultan by revealing Idi's infidelity to him, and offering to see that his reluctant vassals were more diligent in future in performing their obligations to their suzerain.[1]

James Loudon, Governor-General from the beginning of 1872, had more sympathy for the views of the Ministry which had sent him out than for those of his cautious counsellors in Batavia. As against the *Raad,* which 'sought to maintain an Asiatic despot at the expense of the general welfare and development', Loudon wished to support Idi and other rebels against the Sultan.[2] He was firmly supported in this by Fransen van de Putte, who returned to the Colonial Ministry in July 1872. Like his predecessor Van Bosse, Van de Putte felt the pressure of the publicity given to the 1871 Treaty by the States-General's debates in February 1872. Local Indonesian difficulties seemed less important to these ministers than the obligation to Britain and the Dutch public to act before some other power did so. Hence Van de Putte's despatch of 26 August 1872 dismissed the 'stupid advice' of the *Raad* and urged firmer measures to defend the coastal states against the Sultan.[3]

Instead of signing a treaty with Idi however, Schiff, the Resident of Riau, had sent *Controleur* R. C. Kroesen there to investigate. Kroesen's report reinforced the view of the *Raad van Indië.* Chinese traders had the greatest influence in Idi, which was under strong pressure from its neighbours to submit again to the Sultan. Kroesen recommended that intervention in Idi should be used only as a threat to force the Sultan to agree to a treaty.

Schiff and the *Raad van Indië* emphatically endorsed Kroesen's suggestion that a mission be sent to Banda Atjeh. The *Raad's*

[1] Ibid. pp. 353–7.
[2] Loudon to Van Bosse 24 February 1872, quoted ibid. p. 358.
[3] Ibid. pp. 359–61.

new policy of co-operating with the Sultan if possible survived even the cool reception given to the *Djambi* in May 1872, due to the unwillingness of any Atjehnese to receive Krayenhoff in the absence of both Abd ar-Rahman and Tibang. It concluded from this experience that mere 'showing the flag' in Atjeh could achieve little. A purposeful, high-level mission should be sent to the Sultan, after due forewarning, to negotiate a definite agreement confirming Holland's position in North Sumatra.

Loudon acquiesced in this plan at the end of August. Schiff and Van der Wall, a Malay specialist, were named as members of the mission, with Krayenhoff as Secretary. Krayenhoff was sent once more to Atjeh in October with letters announcing the impending mission. Abd ar-Rahman was still on the west coast, and the announcement was received politely but coolly by his co-regent, Teuku Kali.

In authorizing a mission Loudon had ruled against any further intervention in Atjeh until its report was received. This decision reached Schiff in Riau only a few days too late to prevent him adding one more coal to the fire of Atjehnese mistrust. The Resident had been informed in June that the Simpang Ulim fleet was again blockading Keureutoë, Pasai, and Idi, and had seized vessels at the latter port. Acting on the *Raad van Indië's* judgement of 1871, Schiff sent the *Marnix* in September to break up the blockade. At Keureutoë the *Marnix* seized the *Gypsy*, a well-armed new schooner belonging to Teuku Paya, one of the principal antagonists of Idi, and later of the Dutch.[1]

Coming within a few weeks of the news of this outrage, Krayenhoff's announcement produced unusual activity in the Atjehnese court, to which Tibang soon returned from Singapore and Abd ar-Rahman from the west coast. In so far as there was agreement between the Atjehnese leaders, it was that the Dutch mission should be delayed until the Atjehnese discovered how much support they would receive from other countries if they refused to meet the Dutch requirements. But there was nothing but hostility between the Habib and Tibang. The former found he had lost the trust of Sultan Mahmud who no longer wanted

[1] Ibid. pp. 362–71. *Officieele Bescheiden betreffende Het Onstaan van den Oorlog tegen Atjeh in 1873* (The Hague, 1881), pp. 35–6. For Teuku Paya, see below p. 130.

to be tied to the Arab's tight apron-strings. Resentful of the slightest rebuff, he left Atjeh on another mission to Turkey.

Tibang departed at about the same time with a dual mission. He carried a letter to Schiff designed to persuade him to delay the projected mission for six months, and two other letters appealing to the representatives of various powers in Singapore. One letter from the Sultan was addressed to the French Consul, the other jointly to the Consuls of America, Italy and Spain.

Tibang had already met Schiff in Riau in September and impressed on him the desire of the Sultan's party to conclude a treaty with the Dutch. Returning in December, he persuaded the Resident that six months delay would be necessary to enable this party to establish itself against the rival Muslim party of Abd ar-Rahman, which he represented as intransigently anti-European. The Dutch were soon to be disillusioned about Tibang's sincerity, but their Atjeh policy was bedevilled for years by the Shahbandar's description of his personal rivalry with the Habib as a contest between moderate and fanatic parties.

Impressed by this picture of Atjehnese politics, Schiff not only agreed to the suggested delay, but also had Tibang conveyed back to Atjeh in the *Marnix*. The Shahbandar persuaded its captain to call at Singapore on the way so that he might complete the purchase of a steamer for the Sultan.

The casus belli

Singapore had also been the main object of Tibang's voyage in September, when he had vainly appealed to Sir Harry Ord for help against the Dutch. He had then been approached by Tengku Muhammad Arifin,[1] an able and opportunistic Minang-

[1] Born about 1843 of Minangkabau stock, Arifin was the grandson of the Tuanku of Moko Moko. He lived in Sumatra's West Coast until 1865, when he spent nine months in Banda Atjeh and married a relative of Sultan Ibrahim. Moving to Singapore, he met Read and undertook a mission for him to Bangkok. In 1869 he was sent to England on a mission from the Sultan of Trengganu, one of whose relations he had married, and was there received by Queen Victoria. Returning to Singapore he joined the entourage of the Maharaja of Johor. Schiff described him as 'a young man of excellent manners, very intelligent, who speaks and writes excellent English' —to Loudon 24 February 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 13 May 1873, B.Z. Atjeh. Ord dismissed him equally accurately as a 'rascally intriguer'—to Kimberley

kabau aristocrat who moved easily in European circles in Singapore, where he had eventually entered the service of W. H. Read,[1] the Netherlands Consul-General. Arifin had already been cultivating the American Consul, Major Studer, for his own purposes and discussing among other things the wealth of Atjeh. In September he had suggested an Atjeh-U.S. alliance to Tibang, and soon after began to discuss this question in more specific terms with Studer. The Consul, a romantic and enthusiastic American,[2] appears to have made no secret of his personal interest in an Atjehnese alliance. Though he made no report to Washington until March 1873, he had already suggested a visit of inspection to Atjeh to the American naval commander in the Far East.

When the *Marnix* steamed into Singapore in January 1873, Arifin wasted no time in meeting the Atjehnese Shahbandar again. He took Tibang to see Major Studer on two occasions towards the end of January. Tibang presented his credentials, which empowered him to negotiate treaties with any major powers except Holland, but he had no letter which could be sent on to Washington. Major Studer nevertheless consented to outline verbally the procedure the Atjehnese should adopt in approaching the American Secretary of State, and also the type of concessions likely to attract his government to sign a treaty.

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24 March 1873, C.O. 273/65. He was employed by Read on a mission for the Dutch as late as 1884. Cons. Penang, 13, *passim.*

[1] W. H. M. Read came to Singapore in 1841 as a partner in the family firm of A. L. Johnston & Co., and soon made his mark on every aspect of the life of the merchant community. Unofficial member of the Legislative Council (1867–71) and often President of the Chamber of Commerce, he was the foremost private champion of British intervention in the peninsular Malay states, with all of which he had commercial connexions. Many of the contemporary internal disputes in the peninsular states derived from the conflict between Read's policies, which included support for the weak Sultan Ali's claim to Johor, and those of Abu Bakar. Valuing his local influence the Dutch appointed him their Consul (1857–71) and subsequently Consul-General (1871–84), with a Dutchman to assist him as Vice-Consul after 1871. His influence on Dutch policy was considerable, especially during 1873, when his confident, cavalier letters to Loudon urged the necessity and simplicity of crushing the Atjehnese. See his *Play and Politics. Recollections of Malaya by 'An Old Resident'* (London, 1901); Buckley, pp. 367–8; Cowan, 1961, pp. 34, 167 and 180; C. M. Turnbull, 'The Origins of British Control in the Malay States before Colonial Rule', in Bastin and Roolvink, (eds.) *Malayan and Indonesian Studies*, pp. 171–81.

[2] Makepeace, Brooke and Braddell (eds.) *One Hundred Years of Singapore*, II, pp. 503–4.

In particular, America would expect extra-territorial rights and a protective tariff in favour of American cloth. Tibang was elated at the degree of encouragement Studer offered, and promised to return as soon as possible with the proper documents.[1]

On 14 February, a few days after the *Marnix* had departed for Atjeh with Tibang on board, Read returned to Singapore after a short stay in Bangkok. Arifin, the assumed agent of Atjeh, now told the whole story to the Netherlands consul.

The motives of this wily Malay have never been established. Read suggested that Arifin had genuinely co-operated with Tibang on the understanding that he would be appointed Atjehnese consul in Singapore, but had returned to Read when Tibang departed without leaving him any advance on his salary.[2] But Read's own explanations were sometimes contradictory. And the Consul-General was among the strongest champions of an aggressive policy against Atjeh. It must be at least an open question how much he encouraged Arifin, who was entirely under his influence, to believe the Dutch would approve of any double-dealing which would provide them with a *casus belli*. Read consistently championed Arifin's evidence against Studer, and maintained the intriguer in his service despite protests from Batavia.[3]

Read made the most of Arifin's information in a dramatic telegram of 16 February. This assured Loudon that Studer had appealed to the Admiral of the American fleet, who could be in Atjeh in two months. Moreover, Read claimed, an Italian agent interested in founding a penal colony in South-East Asia was

[1] The above account is based on the sometimes conflicting versions of the main participants: Studer's, to Hale 18 March 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 10; Arifin's, related to Maj.-Gen. Verspijck in Batavia on 27 July 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 2 August 1873, Kol.Kab. Q^{30}, 6040; Tibang's, told to Raja Burhan Udin, a Dutch spy, in Banda Atjeh, 30 August 1873, in Burhan Udin's report 17 October 1873, translation in G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol.Kab. D^{33}, 6042. A less reliable version of Tibang's story is in 'T. Panglima Tibang', by 'Een Belangstellende', *IMT* 1892, II, 726–7. De Klerck, pp. 377–91 gives a detailed account from the Dutch side.

[2] Read to Loudon 8 April and 7 July 1873, copies Kol. to B.Z. ? and 16 September 1873 respectively, B.Z. Atjeh. But cf. Read's first report of 20 February 1873, Cons. Singapore 8, when he claimed Arifin was simply acting out of gratitude to Read.

[3] Read to Loudon 8 September 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 13 September 1873, Kol.Kab. Q^{30}, 6040.

then in Singapore and 'would quickly be able to go to Atjeh'.[1] In transmitting this news to Holland the Governor-General in turn exaggerated it in a way which can hardly have been other than deliberate. 'Consul-General Singapore reports treachery of Atjeh,' he announced, and concluded his brief message by saying that the Italian 'expects two ships and then goes to Atjeh'.[2]

Neither Loudon nor Van de Putte had shown much patience in past dealings with Atjeh, and both appear to have welcomed this opportunity to bring matters to a head. After a Cabinet meeting Van de Putte cabled back that a fleet should be sent at once to Atjeh to make the Dutch claim immediately clear to other powers. Furthermore satisfaction should be demanded of Atjeh by obliging her to conclude the treaty which had long been the aim of Dutch policy. The Sultan should still be supported against his opponents if possible, but a sufficient force should be sent to allow of no doubt that he would meet Dutch terms.[3]

Loudon took this up in the crudest way. On 21 February he persuaded the *Raad van Indië* that a Commissioner be sent to Atjeh as soon as possible, accompanied by four battalions, 'with an ultimatum to recognise us as sovereign or war'.[4] When Van de Putte protested at this harsh alternative Loudon insisted that there was no other satisfactory guarantee which could be demanded from the Sultan. His official instructions of 4 March to J.F.N. Nieuwenhuyzen, his deputy in the *Raad van Indië*, shortly before the latter left Batavia as Commissioner for Atjeh, were 'to demand from Atjeh the recognition of Netherlands sovereignty within 24 hours, and to declare war in the case of non-fulfilment.'[5] After a bitter exchange of telegrams with Van

[1] Read to Loudon 16 February 1873, telegram, *Officieele Bescheiden*, p. 43. The bogey of foreign intervention had already been evoked in January 1873 when Abd ar-Rahman az-Zahir arrived in Penang on the French steamer *Patty*. Its owner, Roura (see p. 136 below) had evidently advised Abd ar-Rahman to appeal to France for protection, and the rumour spread that his journey to Mecca had this as its object. De Klerck, p. 284; Schiff to Loudon 25 January 1873 (telegram), Cons. Singapore 8.

[2] Loudon to Van de Putte 16 February 1873, telegram, *Officieele Bescheiden*, p. 43.

[3] Van de Putte to Loudon 18 February 1873, telegram: idem 20 February 1873 (despatch): *Officieele Bescheiden*, pp. 44 and 56–60.

[4] Loudon to Van de Putte 22 February 1873, telegram, ibid. p. 44.

[5] Quoted De Klerck, p. 425.

de Putte,[1] Loudon would concede only that sovereignty could not be stressed in the initial demand because of the effect on outside opinion. Grudgingly, Loudon sent this message on to Nieuwenhuyzen, while still insisting that the Commissioner obtain a recognition of sovereignty, either through negotiation or war. He allowed Nieuwenhuyzen little leeway when in his final instructions he forbade him to parley on shore 'because we are dealing with traitors'.[2]

Loudon was clearly convinced that this was the critical moment for action:

> An end must come to the equivocal policy of Atjeh towards the Netherlands Government. That state remains our weak point as far as Sumatra is concerned. As long as it does not recognise our sovereignty foreign intervention will continue to threaten us like the sword of Damocles. . . . Without this military exhibition it is almost certain that Atjeh will keep the matter hanging, in expectation of foreign intervention. . . . Holland can no longer allow its existence in, and peaceful possession of, Sumatra to be dependent on the whim of a state hostile to us there.
>
> Atjeh has cast the die.[3]

Fear of immediate foreign intervention in Atjeh was certainly not the cause of Batavia's impetuousness. Italy immediately denied any ambitions in Sumatra, and a full week before Nieuwenhuyzen left Penang Van de Putte had telegraphed that Studer's actions were without the knowledge or consent of Washington.[4] Loudon clearly stated his belief that the expedition would be necessary even without any immediate danger from abroad.[5] A series of rumours about foreign intentions[6] did however enable Read and Loudon to maintain the feeling of urgency they thought necessary to carry through a strong policy.

Nieuwenhuyzen's conduct after arriving before Atjeh on

[1] *Officieele Bescheiden*, pp. 46–9, 66, and 85–6.
[2] Quoted De Klerck, p. 426.
[3] Loudon to Van de Putte 25 February 1873, *Officieele Bescheiden*, p. 76.
[4] Van de Putte to Loudon 7 and 9 March 1873, telegrams, ibid. p. 48.
[5] Loudon to Van de Putte 25 March 1873, ibid. p. 76.
[6] Read hinted at German and French interest in Atjeh, as well as continuing his dramatic reports of American movements; De Klerck, pp. 403–5; *Officieele Bescheiden*, p. 45.

22 March was in accordance with the unequivocal instructions given him by Loudon. His first letter to the Sultan demanded an explanation within 24 hours of Tibang's conduct in Singapore. When this was received Nieuwenhuyzen would indicate the basis of a more satisfactory settlement between Atjeh and Holland.[1]

Sultan Mahmud replied the following day. He wished to live in peace with the Netherlands Indies Government, but his envoy to Riau had agreed on a six-month delay in the Dutch visit. Why had Nieuwenhuyzen arrived so soon? The Sultan made no reference to Tibang's negotiations in Singapore, either in this letter or in a second one on 25 March, in reply to a second Dutch ultimatum.[2] Of course he knew about Tibang's contact with the American Consul, but he must have been puzzled by what the Dutch knew of this and just what he was being asked to account for. He had done no more than his predecessors, by trying to remain on as good terms as possible with the Dutch, while looking for possible help against them from other powers. 'What then,' asked the Sultan, 'is our fault?'[3]

Nieuwenhuyzen considered the Atjehnese were only playing for time. Even had he wished to reach an understanding, this was impossible since he was forbidden to go ashore. Instead, his ship began to bombard the shore on 26 March as a sign that war had been declared.[4] Soon after a formal declaration of war was communicated to the European Powers, to emphasize Holland's claim.

The Dutch force of 3,000 men landed on 8 April. Three weeks later it was back in its ships, having suffered the most decisive repulse ever given to Dutch arms in the East. General Kohler, the commander, was killed on the 14th, and the Dutch

[1] De Klerck, Appendix XV, no. 1.

[2] Ibid. App. XV, no. 2, and XVII, no. 1.

[3] Sultan Mahmud to Nieuwenhuyzen 25 Muharram 1290H (25 March 1873), ibid. app. XVII, no. 1. The genuine bewilderment of the Atjehnese over the demands made by the Dutch is evidenced by the widespread belief that Panglima Tibang had been bribed to sign a treaty giving Atjeh to the Dutch. Teuku Paya to President Grant 4 July 1873, in Studer to Davis 12 July 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore 10. Report of Raja Burhan Udin to Verspijck, 11 and 14 October 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol.Kab. D[33], 6042. E. Blok, 'Sjair Perang Atjeh', *TBG* 30 (1885), 570–2.

[4] De Klerck pp. 421–2.

lost heavily in an abortive attack on the *dalam* two days later. Demoralized, feeling themselves besieged in a totally unknown country, Nieuwenhuyzen and the military leaders decided to retreat until a bigger expedition could be equipped after the south-west monsoon.[1]

The Atjehnese fought bravely and used their guns well but no one was more surprised then they at the Dutch withdrawal. After Tibang's apparently successful mission to Riau and Singapore they thought they had at least six months grace before any Dutch attack. Thus there was time to assemble only a few thousand men in the *dalam*. Most of these, including the Sultan himself, had fled during the attack of the 16th. They returned in surprise when they saw the Dutch retreating.[2]

Only the Atjehnese knew how very close the Dutch had been to victory. The other peoples of Indonesia knew only that for the first time in their experience a substantial Dutch army had been forced to withdraw by Indonesian defenders. The ensuing six months were tense for the Netherlands Indian Government and exhilarating for those few Indonesians beginning to believe that their European masters were not necessarily invincible.

British policy

These dramatic events thrust Atjeh into the headlines in Europe, and forced the government of Gladstone and Granville to reconsider its attitude to Dutch expansion. Britain had foresworn any right to object to an attack on Atjehnese independence, but the Dutch hoped for more than grudging toleration of their action after the friendly agreement of 1871.

The Netherlands Foreign Minister, Gericke van Herwijnen,

[1] *ENI*, I, p. 78. E. B. Kielstra *Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog* (The Hague, 1883–5), I, pp. 96–161. Nieuwenhuyzen and Loudon became involved in a major dispute subsequently over the telegram which Loudon asserted, and Nieuwenhuyzen denied, was a request for permission to withdraw. See enclosures in G.G. to Kol. 15 October 1873, Kol.Kab. D[33],6042; Wertheim, 1961, pp. 453–6.

[2] Lavino to Read 27 July and 19 September 1873, Cons. Penang 100. Reports of Dutch spies Rama Samys and Burhan Udin, respectively in G.G. to Kol. 9 September 1873, Kol.Kab. Q[30], 6040; and G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol.Kab. D[33], 6042; Teungku Dukarim, 'Hikayat Perang Gompeuni' (Leiden MS, S.H.58) pp. 36–46; Report of M. G. Scott, n.d., copy G.G. to Kol. 27 September 1873, Kol.Kab. D[33], 6042; Mohammad Said, pp. 384–425.

left his ambassador in London in no doubt about the importance of enlisting British support.

> The favourable disposition of the British Government has great value for us in our complications with Atjeh, as much because of the moral support we thereby have towards foreign Governments, . . . as because of the influence which the British possessions in the Straits can have over the conduct of Atjeh.[1]

Gericke's first appeal to Britain was prompted by Read's information about the alleged intrigues of various consuls in Singapore with the envoy of Atjeh. The 1871 Treaty, Gericke pointed out, showed Britain's conviction that the Dutch should expand in Sumatra. Consequently Granville 'could not but view with displeasure difficulties raised in other quarters to the Netherlands policy'.[2]

In the midst of a government crisis over the Irish University Bill, Granville could give little attention to intrigues in Singapore. But in the Foreign Office it was doubted whether the cordial spirit of the 1871 agreement could justify Britain in opposing the interference of third parties in the area.[3] Granville's eventual reply was friendly but evasive.[4]

As Holland moved towards war British goodwill was sought more urgently. On 5 March Gericke broached the request that the Governor of the Straits Settlements be instructed by telegraph 'not only not to hinder us, but on the contrary to co-operate with us within certain limits'. In particular the Minister sought a prohibition on the export of arms from the Straits Settlements to Atjeh.[5] But the hesitation felt in London was in marked contrast to the precipitate urgency of The Hague and Batavia. Kimberley, the Colonial Secretary, had still sent no message even of inquiry to Singapore on 11 March, when Count van Bylandt[6] sought him out to press once more the

[1] Gericke to Van Bylandt 14 March 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.
[2] *Idem* 21 February 1873, copied at F.O. 25 February 1873, F.O. 37/534.
[3] Memorandum by Vivian, 25 February 1873, F.O. 37/534.
[4] Granville to Van Bylandt 6 March 1873, F.O. 37/517.
[5] Gericke to Van Bylandt 5 March 1873, Woltring I, p. 498.
[6] Charles M. E. G. graaf van Bylandt (1818–93) was the son of an English mother and a Dutch soldier who served for fifteen years in the British army. After volunteering for the war in Belgium he entered the diplomatic service in 1840. After thirteen years in St. Petersburg he became from 1855

question of the arms prohibition. Kimberley then revealed the cause of the Government's caution. 'It could not be denied', he told the Dutch Ambassador, 'that even among the British merchants at Singapore . . . the Sumatra treaty had not found general approval'. A telegram to Singapore or a prohibition against arms exports would, he feared, create the popular impression that the Government was actively supporting Dutch interests in Sumatra. 'This business must be approached very carefully,' he confessed, 'and especially so as not to create a "Sumatra question" '. The most he was prepared to do was to write to Singapore, to assure Sir Harry Ord of British goodwill toward the Dutch.[1]

This despatch was still not sent until April after the Foreign Office had sat on it for a fortnight. It carefully instructed the Governor 'that while abstaining from all interference in the affairs of Acheen, he should maintain a friendly attitude towards the Dutch authorities in Sumatra'.[2]

The Dutch were far from satisfied to have no greater assurance than this before 3 April, when the declaration of war became known in Europe. On receipt of the news Van Bylandt redoubled his efforts to obtain an embargo on arms exports. But in a private meeting Kimberley and Granville agreed 'that we would *not* forbid the export of arms, but adhere to the general law of nations, under which arms may be seized as contraband, but are not prohibited to be exported.'[3] The ministers agreed that a telegram be sent to Ord, but only in the carefully general terms of the earlier despatch.[4]

The principal responsibility for this decision was Kimberley's. His own Under-Secretary, Herbert, had evidently assumed that the prohibition would be declared, while the Foreign Office argued the Governor's legal right to issue it.[5] But

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Holland's representative in Denmark, Sweden, Turkey and Germany, before being appointed to London in 1871. He served there for over twenty years. *NNBW* IV, col. 374.

[1] Van Bylandt to Gericke 12 March 1873, B.Z. Atjeh. Kimberley's briefer account is in a minute on F.O. to C.O. 6 March 1873, C.O. 273/73.

[2] Kimberley to Ord 1 April 1873, C.O. 273/73.

[3] Minute by Kimberley 4 April 1873, on F.O. to C.O. 3 April 1873, C.O. 273/73.

[4] C.O. to F.O. 4 April 1873, C.O. 273/73.

[5] Minute by Herbert 3 April 1873, on F.O. to C.O. 3 April 1873, C.O. 273/73; Van Bylandt to Gericke 5 April 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

Granville had become 'extraordinarily circumspect' about public opinion as a result of a recent Government defeat in Parliament and he therefore deferred to Kimberley's anxiety. Nevertheless Van Bylandt had no doubt about the personal goodwill of the Liberal ministers towards Holland:

> Everything that the English Government can do in our favour, without doing harm to itself, it will do.[1]

Only R. H. Meade, then Assistant Under-Secretary for the Colonies, appears to have supported the policy adopted out of real conviction. His minutes consistently urged a policy of genuine neutrality, for its own sake and to avoid alienating 'our Mahomedans'.[2]

But all Meade's scruples and Kimberley's caution finally counted for nothing. Sir Harry Ord answered Kimberley's telegram of 3 April by stating that he had already prohibited arms exports under a local ordinance. Disconcerted, Kimberley brought the matter before a Cabinet meeting of 5 April, which decided to play for time without capitulating to either the Dutch or Ord. The Governor would not immediately be censured, since this would attract unwanted attention, but would merely be asked for explanations.[3]

The conflicting pressures felt in London were completely foreign to Sir Harry Ord, who had not altered his opinion that Dutch rule would benefit both Atjeh and the Straits merchants trading with it. Even after the disastrous Dutch first expedition, he made no secret of his view that the subjection of Atjeh would be a 'good thing'.[4]

Ord's intention to forbid arms exports in the event of a war was made clear long before any communication with London on the subject. He had even made some token endeavours to prevent the Atjehnese obtaining arms in Singapore before there was any suggestion of war.[5] When Read first sounded him

[1] Van Bylandt to Gericke 8 April 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] Especially his notes of 1 May 1873, C.O. 273/65; and 31 December 1874, C.O. 273/77.

[3] B.M. Add. MSS. 44641, f. 93–4; Granville to Harris 5 April 1873, F.O. 37/510; Herbert to Hammond 4 April 1873, C.O. 273/73.

[4] In conversation with the Dutch emissary Weckherlin, Woltring I, p. 516.

[5] C. N. Parkinson *British Intervention in Malaya 1867–1877* (Singapore, 1960), pp. 32–3.

on the subject early in March, he replied that it was within his competence to issue such a proclamation.[1] On the 19th he assured Loudon that he would certainly issue such a proclamation 'as soon as' he was informed that hostilities had commenced. Niewenhuyzen was given the same assurance on his way through Singapore to Atjeh.[2] The Dutch authorities in the East can hardly have felt the same anxiety as their colleagues in The Hague on this point.

But the latter still feared that Whitehall might repudiate Ord's action, and Van Bylandt was again instructed to do all possible to avert such a moral blow to Dutch fortunes in Atjeh. But Granville continued to give no clear reply, beyond trying to use the feeling of uncertainty to obtain assurances about the protection of Britain's Sumatra trade.[3]

In his telegram to Ord, Kimberley carefully outlined the procedure best calculated to save everybody's face and quietly shelve the issue:

> I conclude that you had reasons connected with peace and good order of British Settlements for forbidding export of arms, and therefore do not think it necessary to interfere with exercise of your jurisdiction, but I shall desire to receive by despatch full explanation of grounds on which you have acted.[4]

Never one to make things easy, Ord had already despatched an explanation of his conduct[5] which made clear that his proclamation had not been made for domestic reasons, as specified by the local ordinance under which he had acted. On the contrary, he had acted in response to requests from the Dutch side. Even the later despatch called for by Kimberley's telegram stated that only a section of the trade of the Straits Settlements, and not its security, was at stake.[6]

Herbert at the Colonial Office, despairing of Ord, pointed out, 'As a matter of fact this is interference in favour of one of

[1] Ord to Birch 8 March 1873, communicated to Read 8 March 1873, Cons. Singapore 100.
[2] Ord to Kimberley 24 March 1873 and enclosures, C.O. 273/65.
[3] Granville to Harris 12 April 1873, F.O. 37/510.
[4] Kimberley to Ord 5 April 1873, telegram, copy in C.O. to F.O. 12 April 1873, F.O. 37/518.
[5] Ord to Kimberley 24 March 1873, C.O. 273/65.
[6] *Idem* 9 April 1873, C.O. 273/66.

the belligerents.'[1] But even after the first of Ord's unsatisfactory despatches, the Cabinet had agreed that 'Prohibition already made may continue.'[2] The proclamation in Singapore had provoked no overt outcry from the Straits, and the easiest course was to let the matter rest.

Kimberley tried once more to persuade Ord to give the proper explanation for his conduct 'without departing from the general principle that such prohibitions, not being required by the obligations of neutrals, ought to depend entirely on domestic considerations'.[3]

Still Ord failed to oblige. The prohibition simply remained in force without further reference until the eve of the second Dutch expedition, when a definite policy was deemed necessary. At the prompting of the Foreign Office, Kimberley finally capitulated and approved the prohibition, with the qualification that prior instructions from England should be sought in future.[4] The state of war had by then lasted for six months without producing any serious political repercussions in England. The Dutch were determined to make good their first setback, and sympathy with the Atjehnese seemed an unprofitable course.

Although there was only a comparatively small trade between Atjeh and the Coromandel Coast, Loudon thought it worth requesting a prohibition of arms exports also from the Government of India. After establishing that Ord's proclamation had not been instructed from London, the Viceroy simply issued a declaration of neutrality.[5] The Dutch evidently expected no more, and did not press their case.[6] Whitehall must have wished that Ord had been capable of a similarly detached impartiality.

The neutral status of the Straits Settlements was made even

[1] Minute of 1 May 1873, on Ord to Kimberley 24 March 1873, C.O. 273/65. See also Kimberley to Granville 2 May, 1873, private, P.R.O. 30/29/55.

[2] Meeting of 10 May 1873, B.M.Add.MSS. 44641, f. 106.

[3] Kimberley to Ord 16 May 1873, C.O. 273/66.

[4] *Idem* 23 September 1873, C.O. 273/73.

[5] Enclosures in Government of India to Argyll 16 June 1873, copies in I.O. to F.O. 25 July 1873, F.O. 37/519.

[6] See Loudon's thanks for the declaration, n.d., copy Alg.Sec. to Read 11 July 1873, Cons. Singapore 100. Also Van Bylandt to Gericke 7 July 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

more questionable by the desire of the Dutch to provision their second expedition from Penang. Ord was sufficiently chastened by the arms issue to request telegraphic instructions when the Dutch put the question to him. This time Kimberley and Granville agreed that there were no objections to private persons exporting provisions wherever they wished.[1] But when Ord's despatch on the question[2] arrived at the Colonial Office, Meade was struck by the way the two decisions together appeared to place Penang at the disposal of the Dutch while denying the requirements of the Atjehnese, who had no other means of obtaining supplies. He had the Crown Law Officers asked whether provisions for an invading army might not be considered 'military stores'.[3] To the embarrassment of the Foreign Office, the legal pundits decided that they should be so considered, and as such could not be exported from Penang under the terms of Ord's proclamation.[4]

In the involved legal and political debate which followed this controversial decision, the Law Officers held to their view.[5] But the permanent heads of the Colonial and Foreign Offices were in agreement that the Atjeh war was not the best place to apply an interpretation of International Law which was not generally recognized by the Powers. The Law Officers' opinion 'which might hereafter be quoted and give trouble' was cancelled, and the British position remained as it had been expressed telegraphically to Ord.[6]

Despite Kimberley's original intention, Britain therefore appeared to align itself with Holland in the war. Penang became the supply base for the Netherlands forces, who even occasionally obtained arms there after 1874, when Holland artificially 'annexed' Atjeh, ending the legal state of war. At the same time Atjehnese sympathizers could be, and were, con-

[1] C.O. to F.O. 9 July 1873 and enclosures: F.O. to C.O. 15 July 1873: F.O. 37/534.

[2] Ord to Kimberley 2 August 1873, C.O. 273/69.

[3] C.O. to F.O. 11 September 1873 (cancelled 25 October 1873), F.O. 37/534.

[4] This opinion, dated 23 September 1873, was subsequently cancelled, and does not appear in the files. It is described in a minute by Anderson, 7 October 1873, F.O. 37/534.

[5] Minutes by Anderson, Tenterden and Selbourne 7–14 October 1873, F.O. 37/534.

[6] Minute by Anderson 7 November 1873, F.O. 37/534.

victed in Penang courts for attempting to ship arms to Atjeh.

This unplanned policy was justified in the eyes of the Government in that it did not directly prompt any questions in Parliament, as Kimberley had feared. Nor is it surprising that Whitehall was little concerned whether or not it earned the bitterness of an Asian nation apparently about to disappear into the colonial embrace of the Netherlands. But the Muslim inhabitants of the Straits Settlements and the Malay peninsula were a British responsibility. It was primarily because Ord's Atjeh policy had diminished British prestige among them that it was regretted by most subsequent Governors.[1]

The first blockade

Ord's policy was at first very unpopular with the Atjeh merchants in the Straits, who feared the effect of Dutch aggression on their trade. Better-informed about Atjeh than officials in Java, the merchants assumed that the Dutch would begin hostilities by blockading Atjeh, since control of the sea was their main advantage over the Atjehnese. This view was shared by W. H. Read, who recommended a blockade 'as quickly as possible' if war was to be decided upon.[2]

Against such a move the leading merchants of Singapore appealed on 8 March, when war appeared imminent. They feared a blockade would mean the loss of the heavy advances made to Atjehnese pepper-growers during the first three months of the year in order to secure delivery during the harvesting season from May to August. Consequently Ord was prevailed upon to ask that hostilities be delayed until the end of the pepper season.[3] Read commented with disgust: 'Everybody expresses himself glad that there is a possibility of Acheen being brought to order, only they don't care about the lesson being given while they have any money in the country.'[4]

[1] Especially Clarke (November 1873–5) to Carnarvon 23 April 1874 (private), P.R.O. 30/6/40; and Weld (1880–7) to Derby 2 February 1884, C.O. 273/126.

[2] Read to Loudon 1 March 1873, telegram, Cons. Singapore 8.

[3] 25 Singapore merchants to Colonial Secretary 8 March 1873, copy S.S. to C.O. 24 March 1873, C.O. 273/65.

[4] Read to Loudon 11 March 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 13 May 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

The Dutch on the other hand had not anticipated the need for a blockade at all. They looked for a quick humbling of the Atjehnese, followed by a treaty of submission. Consequently when Nieuwenhuyzen was in Singapore on the way to Atjeh he gave Ord a written assurance 'that it is not the intention of my government to establish a blockade . . . or in any way impede the trade at present existing'.[1] The Commissioner must have hoped by this announcement to show his gratitude for Ord's attitude over the export of arms and to enlist Straits opinion behind the Atjeh expedition. His statement was immediately conveyed to the merchants and printed in the local press and it subsequently received the unqualified approval of the Governor-General.[2]

Nieuwenhuyzen's telegraphic request to be allowed to retreat changed everything. Replying on 20 April, Loudon instructed that a blockade be imposed while a second expedition was being prepared. Nieuwenhuyzen protested that this would have an unfavourable effect on Straits opinion.[3] At this Loudon referred the question to The Hague, without offering any attempt to reconcile his position with the promises given to the merchants.[4]

After consultation with Gericke, Van de Putte concluded that a blockade was both possible and necessary despite the indiscreet promises of the Java authorities. On the other hand an abrupt repudiation of these promises might provoke Britain to withdraw the prohibition on arms exports, still not approved. The Minister saw two ways of retaining British goodwill. Either the coastal pepper ports could be exempted from the blockade or Dutch consuls in the Straits could issue licenses to enable merchants to collect their advances, though not to take money or goods to Atjeh.[5] In a telegram of 26 May he suggested the

[1] Nieuwenhuyzen to Ord 13 March 1873, copy S.S. to C.O. 24 March 1873, C.O. 273/65.

[2] Plow to Singapore merchants 14 March 1873, copy S.S. to C.O. 24 March 1873, C.O. 273/65. *Straits Observer* 21 March 1873, quoted Woltring I, p. 546n. Loudon to Ord 28 March 1873, copy S.S. to C.O. 3 April 1873, C.O. 273/66.

[3] Nieuwenhuyzen to Loudon 25 April 1873, in Read to Loudon 30 April 1873, telegram, Cons. Singapore 8; Woltring I, p. 544.

[4] Loudon to Van de Putte 16 May 1873, telegram, copy Kol. to B.Z. 24 May 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[5] Gericke to Van de Putte 3 May 1873, B.Z. Atjeh; Van de Putte to King 17 May 1873, Woltring I, pp. 542–52.

latter scheme to Loudon, though authorizing a blockade as compatible with the 1824 Treaty.[1]

Loudon declared a formal blockade of Atjeh on 4 June, after an urgent telegram from Read warning that without it Penang sympathizers would succeed in aiding Atjeh. The proclamation, made known in the Straits over a week later, mentioned no concessions to the British trade.[2]

Ord at once reminded Loudon of Nieuwenhuyzen's promise, and expressed his trust that the blockading fleet had been instructed not to interfere with British shipping.[3] The merchants of Penang were up in arms, berating the Dutch for breaking both their promises and their treaty obligations. The Dutch Vice-Consul, William Padday, was urged to resign. Some disgruntled Chinese traders announced the death of Penang as an entrepôt. An 'indignation meeting' was held on 18 June, but decided to ask for more details before taking action.[4] Padday and Read asked whether they might be allowed to calm the storm by granting passes to vessels clearing in ballast to collect genuine advances either in money or kind.[5]

Loudon appeared to be waiting only to test the British reaction to the blockade. The desired permission was immediately given to the consuls, in accordance with Van de Putte's authorization.[6] This was of course a breach of strict blockade, but International Law was eventually sacrificed, as in every other case, to the mutual interest of Britain and Holland. Ord hesitated for several weeks, to the exasperation of the practical-minded Read, but finally approved the arrangement.[7]

Because of this delay the first passes were not granted before the end of July. Meanwhile three Chinese merchants in Penang had despatched a chartered steamer to Atjeh with a request to

[1] Telegram quoted in Van de Putte to Loudon 28 May 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 29 May 1873: Gericke to Van de Putte 26 May 1873: B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] The official proclamation, in English, is in S.S. to C.O. 13 June 1873, C.O. 273/67, and the *London Gazette* 4 August 1873.

[3] Ord to Loudon 14 June 1873, copy S.S. to C.O. 13 June 1873, C.O. 273/67.

[4] Lavino to Read 15 and 18 June 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[5] Read to Loudon 20 June 1873, telegram, Cons. Singapore 70.

[6] Alg. Sec. to Read 21 June 1873, Cons. Singapore 100. A translation of the same letter is in S.S. to C.O. 2 August 1873, C.O. 273/69.

[7] Read to Loudon 23 and 29 June, 7 and 10 July 1873, copies Kol. to B.Z. 6 and 16 September 1873, B.Z. Atjeh; Ord to Kimberley 9 and 25 July 1873, telegrams, copies C.O. to F.O. 9 and 26 July 1873, F.O. 37/534.

the Commander of the blockading fleet that it be allowed to join the six vessels already loading pepper for these merchants on the west coast. The Commander sent the steamer back to Penang to obtain a pass from Padday, who was not yet in a position to grant it. This episode provoked an exaggerated petition from a large group of Penang merchants on 12 July, which again obtained the Governor's support. The petitioners demanded that the blockade be lifted until the end of the pepper season in October.[1]

Throughout 1873 the Penang merchants were kept in a state of excitement against the Dutch by the activities of the blockading fleet. Of the 105 prisoners taken at sea by the Dutch in 1873, 30 were resident in the Straits. Most of these were from the British brig *Mariner's Hope*, captured off the west coast in July 1873, and declared a fair prize by a Batavia court a year later.[2] In June 1873 a schooner owned by a Penang Chinese but manned principally by Atjehnese was seized and taken to Penang. After satisfying himself that this was illegal, Padday judged it advisable to have it towed back to the site of its capture in order to placate local feeling.[3]

Between 22 July and 23 September, while the license system was effective, sixty-one passes were issued in Penang. Seventeen vessels were permitted to collect pepper and betelnut in return for advances, while the remainder collected debts only.[4] The merchants were unsatisfied, and never ceased to demand the right to take specie to Atjeh in order to pay the balance of the cost of the pepper. Without this, they claimed, there was no inducement for the Atjehnese to deliver even the pepper on which advances had been made.[5]

[1] Lim Peck Lean, Khoo Khay Chan and Yeok Liew to Kip 26 June 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 16 September 1873, B.Z. Atjeh; Penang Merchants to Ord 12 July 1873; Ord to Loudon 21 July 1873 and reply 29 July 1873; copies S.S. to C.O. 2 August 1873, C.O. 273/69; Padday to Read 30 June 1873, telegram, Cons. Penang 35.

[2] Resident of Batavia to Alg. Sec. n.d., extract Kol. to B.Z. 24 March 1874, B.Z. Atjeh; Schiff to Naval Commander 16 July 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 2 August 1873, Kol. Kab. Q^{30}, 6040; Procureur-Generaal to Loudon 18 July 1874, copy G.G. to Kol. 28 July 1874, Kol. Kab. C^{26}, 6053.

[3] Lavino to Read 18 June and ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[4] *Idem* ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[5] *Idem* 16 July 1873, Cons. Penang 100; Read to Levysohn Norman 12 August 1873 (private), copy G.G. to Kol. 26 August 1873, Kol. Kab. Q^{30}, 6040.

For all their complaints the Penang merchants succeeded in bringing about $1.5 million worth of pepper out of Atjeh in 1873, accounting probably for about two-thirds of the total crop.[1] In September, reports both from Penang and the blockading fleet suggested that passes were being abused to export pepper on which no advances had been made. The system was therefore discontinued on the 23rd.[2] For the following six months the Atjeh blockade was as nearly complete as at any time in its long history. Even at this time, however, the loyalty of the Raja of Idi to the Dutch was rewarded by exemption from the blockade, so that he was able to prosper by selling supplies at inflated prices to other parts of Atjeh.[3]

There were protests against the revocation of passes by the *Straits Times* and even by the Governor.[4] But the merchants showed much less real hostility than at the beginning of the blockade. Most of those who could fairly make use of the passes had done so. Moreover the Chinese were beginning to see that the only hope for a return to normality was in a quick Dutch victory.[5]

The second Dutch expedition

Tension began to mount with the approach of the second Dutch expedition, scheduled for November. The Dutch were well aware that it would meet a tougher resistance than did the first. National and religious feeling had been aroused in Atjeh by the apparently unprovoked Dutch attack and its repulse. Many of the *ulama* were already preaching that the war was a *jihad*, a duty and a privilege for every Muslim. In many cases traditional leaders lost influence to those known for their ability to organize war or to inspire religious enthusiasm. Sultan Mahmud, who was thought to favour an accommodation with the Dutch, was given little leeway. Of the more diplo-

[1] See tables in Appendix 3, below.

[2] Lavino to Read 19 September 1873, Cons. Penang 100. First Government Secretary to Read 23 September 1873, Cons. Singapore 100.

[3] Proclamation by Dyserinck and Kroesen in Idi 29 July 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 5 November 1873: Van Gogh to Woollcombe 2 January 1874, copy Kol. to B.Z. 1 June 1874: B.Z. Atjeh; Lavino to Read ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[4] *Straits Times* 11 October 1873. Birch to First Government Secretary 13 October 1873 and reply 23 October 1873, copies G.G. to Kol. 24 October 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[5] Lavino to Read 14 August and ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

matically experienced leaders, Tibang was a prisoner and Abd ar-Rahman a voluntary exile. Though past fifty, Panglima Polem had become the soul of the resistance as a result of his brave and energetic leadership during the first expedition. Foremost of the war-leaders who now came to prominence with him were Teuku Imam Luëng Bata and Tuanku Hashim,[1] exceptionally bitter against the Dutch since his ejection from Pulau Kompai in 1865.

During 1873 volunteers converged in the area around the capital, where the attack was again expected. Among them were the influential *ulèëbalangs* of Meureudu and Pidië, each supported by about 500 warriors. In the small ports on the west coast north of Meulaboh enthusiasm for the war was even greater and almost half the population had departed for Banda Atjeh. The greatest contribution, however, came from Atjeh Besar and particularly from Panglima Polem's followers in the XXII Mukims. Estimates placed the likely number of defenders anywhere between 10,000 and 100,000.[2]

The Atjehnese were correct in thinking that Banda Atjeh was the principal Dutch objective. Misled by the isolated instance of Idi, the Netherlands Government considered Atjeh 'exactly' parallel to Siak, where one central state made an empty claim to suzerainty over completely autonomous 'dependencies'.[3] They ignored the influence of a common language, culture, and 400-year history on the Atjehnese, and the fact that most of the dependencies were more properly 'colonies' of cultivators usually born in Atjeh Besar and retaining strong connexions there. Hence the Dutch believed their real struggle was with Atjeh Besar and that the other districts would come to terms once the Sultan was defeated, if they had not already done so before.[4]

[1] For Tuanku Hashim see above p. 31. Imam Luëng Bata's heroic role is stressed by Teungku Dukarim, pp. 47–60.

[2] Lavino to Read 18 June, 8 and 16 July, 14 August, 19 September and ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100; Report of Burhan Udin 17 October 1873 and Burhan Udin to Verspijck 11 and 14 October 1873, copies G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042; Roura to French Consul, Singapore, n.d., copy G.G. to Kol. 23 September 1873, Kol. Kab. Q[30], 6040.

[3] Van de Putte's Report to States-General, translated Harris to Derby 13 August 1874, F.O. 37/526.

[4] Lavino urged the Government to get a foothold in the dependencies

Consequently none of the dependencies except Idi was interfered with until after the second expedition. The Raja of Idi, allowed to fly the Dutch flag after May 1873, suffered continual internal and external pressure until Dutch troops were obliged to come to his defence in September.[1] On 28 July a decision was taken to attack Simpang Ulim, the most belligerent of the dependencies, but the expedition was later called off because of the shortage of men and transport.[2]

The second expedition was the largest force ever equipped by the Dutch in the East. 8,500 military and 4,300 servants and coolies were sent to Atjeh in November, while a reserve of 1,500 was soon called up from Padang. Almost half the military were mercenaries especially recruited in Holland from the riff-raff of most of the countries of Europe. Their discipline and morale appalled British observers.[3] General Van Swieten[4] was called from retirement to command the expedition, and as Government Commissioner was given political as well as military control.

Cholera had been afflicting Batavia during November and attacked the expedition the day after it left that port. About eighty men had already died before the landing at Atjeh on 9

before attacking Banda Atjeh, though he too believed the dependencies would submit if Atjeh Besar did so; to Read 27 July, 14 August and 17 October 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[1] Kielstra I, pp. 165–6. Lavino to Read 28 June, 8, 21, and 27 July, 5 September and 17 October 1873, Cons. Penang 100; Padday to Read 19 and 26 September 1873: Padday to Loudon 6 October 1873: telegrams, Cons. Penang 35; Loudon to Van de Putte 23 October 1873, Kol. Kab. D^{33}, 6042.

[2] G.G. Besluit 1 August 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 2 August 1873: Whitton to Loudon 3 August 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 12 August 1873: Loudon to Van de Putte 3 September 1873: Kol. Kab. Q^{30}, 6040; Lavino to Read 27 July 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[3] *London & China Telegraph* 3 October 1873; *The Times* 10 October 1873; Harris to Granville 27 December 1873, F.O. 37/512; Kreemer I, p. 15.

[4] Jan van Swieten (1807–88) joined the army in 1821 and served in the Java war (1827–30) and in Belgium (1830–5). In the N.I. Army 1835–62, he successfully assumed command of the 3rd Bali expedition (1849) at the death of Michiels. Civil and Military Governor of Sumatra's West Coast (1849–58) he concluded the 1857 Treaty with Atjeh. He commanded the N.I. Army 1859–62, and successfully led the 1859–60 expedition against Boni (Celebes). In retirement he sat in the Second Chamber (1864–6), presided over the Indische Genootschap (1867–72) and took an interest in Indonesian affairs. He took a vigorous part in the pamphlet war of 1879–82 which his appointment and policy in Atjeh called forth. *NNBW* III, cols. 1407–9.

December. Finding his overtures to the Sultan answered only by swords and bullets, Van Swieten began to attack Banda Atjeh from his camp near the beach on Christmas Day. The Great Mosque, strongly defended by Tuanku Hashim, fell on 6 January. Four days later an unsuccessful night attack was launched on the *dalam*, after Pidië had been shelled to distract attention. Cholera continued to rage among the Dutch troops and spread also to the Atjehnese defenders, who were obliged to bury as many as a hundred men a day in the *dalam*. On 24 January, as Van Swieten was undertaking a cautious encircling movement, the Atjehnese abandoned the pestilential, besieged fortress and retreated into the hills.[1]

'Taking the *kraton*'[2] had aroused such patriotism and tension in Holland that the march of Van Swieten's troops into the empty dilapidated fortress was hailed as a resounding victory. When the news became known in Holland 'a general enthusiasm burst out, flags were to be seen everywhere' and congratulations descended on the General.[3]

Van Swieten was not the man to run through Atjeh with the sword, even had he possessed the resources and the mandate to do so. Once established in Banda Atjeh, he declared that there must be no further aggression, so that the Atjehnese would gradually realize that the Dutch occupation was both permanent and tolerable and would make voluntary submission. Further encouraged by the rapid submission of some of the coastal states, he believed that the combined influence of persuasion and blockade would soon prove sufficient to win over the resistance. On 26 April 1874, he returned to Batavia with half his troops, declaring the second expedition complete. Colonel (later General) Pel, supported by Assistant-Resident Kroesen, was left in charge of the occupation with strict instructions to engage in no aggression whatever.[4]

[1] Kielstra I, pp. 222–323; *ENI* I, pp. 53–4; Van Swieten to Loudon 22 December 1873, telegram, copy G.G. to Kol. 24 December 1873, Kol. Kab. A[9], 6047; Van de Putte's report to States-General, translation Harris to Derby 13 August 1874, F.O. 37/526.

[2] The Atjehnese *dalam*, or royal enclosure, was for long referred to as the *kraton* by the Dutch, on the model of a Javanese palace.

[3] Van de Putte to Padday 5 February 1874, telegram, Cons. Penang 46. Also Harris to Granville 3 February 1874, copy F.O. to C.O. 9 February 1874, C.O. 273/77.

[4] Van Swieten to Pel 14 April 1874, copy G.G. to Kol. 25 April 1874:

To all first-hand observers it was apparent even in 1874 how wrong Van Swieten was. He had made negotiation with the Atjehnese impossible by abolishing the Sultanate and 'annexing' Atjeh by right of conquest.[1] Yet the Atjehnese by no means regarded themselves as defeated. On the contrary the Dutch were under siege in Kutaradja (as they called the newly conquered capital), unable to trust any Atjehnese or venture out of sight of the stockade; obliged to import all their food and materials from Penang. The Dutch forces lost 1,400 men before Van Swieten's departure, mainly from cholera, and the toll continued at about 150 a month for the following year.[2]

Atjehnese victims of both war and disease must have been many times more numerous.[3] Cholera claimed Sultan Mahmud on 26 January, among many others. Yet in Atjeh Besar the Dutch had nothing to offer the Atjehnese, and consequently they gained scarcely any adherents.

The restoration of trade

In the coastal dependencies which lived by trade the Dutch were more strongly placed. All the states envied the prosperity which came to Idi by virtue of the blockade on all its trading rivals. The first to follow Idi's example was the 'federation' of Six *ulèëbalangs* Keumangan, whose territory intermingled with its rival Pidië federation in a rich rice and betel-producing plain. The Raja of Gigiëng, as the leader of this federation was known, following the name of his main river and port, was generally respected as a man of intelligence. He realized that

Van Swieten to Loudon 18 April 1874, copy G.G. to Kol. 6 May 1874: Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052; Van Swieten to Knoop 17 October 1874 (open letter), translation F.O. to C.O. 16 November 1874, C.O. 273/77; Van Swieten to Lavino 16 March 1874, Cons. Penang 99; *ENI* I, pp. 54–5; J. Kreemer *Atjèh* (Leiden, 1922), I, p. 17.

[1] See below, pp. 156–8.

[2] Van Goltstein's Report to States-General, translation Harris to Derby 6 November 1874, F.O. 37/662; Harris to Derby 12 May 1875, F.O. 37/660. And see statistics of Dutch occupation in Appendix 4, below.

[3] One letter from Atjeh to Penang estimated that 37,000 Atjehnese had died of disease or in a battle by the end of 1874. Another stated that 18 men of the Klumpang Dua contingent had been killed by the Dutch second expedition, while 470 had died of disease. Lavino to Loudon 7 January 1875 and 15 October 1874, Cons. Penang 101.

Atjeh could not hope to drive the Dutch out a second time. Even before the fall of the 'Kraton' he offered his submission and his good offices to arrange a peace in Atjeh Besar. The blockade on Gigiëng was raised in March, prompting further submissions the following months from the states least wedded to the 'patriot' cause. These were the states south of Meulaboh on the west coast, which had been loosely linked to the Sultanate since their pepper-exporting days at the beginning of the century, and Idi's pre-war allies, Pasai and Keureutoë. Other submissions followed until at the end of 1874 only the most hostile states—Pidië, Meureudu, Samalanga, Simpang Ulim, and the states north of Meulaboh—proved unwilling to earn release from the blockade by a purely nominal submission.[1]

This was made possible by the continued Dutch optimism over the dependencies. Van Swieten promised on 31 January 1874 that the blockade would be raised on the states which submitted, and two days later he began to circulate to the rajas the six articles to be signed. These accepted Dutch sovereignty and the Dutch flag, forbade relations with foreign powers or support for enemies of the Netherlands, and opposed slavery, piracy, and unjust rule.[2] Rajas who signed the articles and accepted the flag were in no way interfered with by the Dutch, despite mounting evidence that they continued to support the Atjehnese resistance. All states continued to send men and supplies to the war party. The men of Gigiëng were particularly known for their hostility, and the Raja was reported to have given a fifth of his $10,000 Dutch bonus to the war party. At the same time the nominal submission made Gigiëng the prosperous emporium of the north coast where supplies were imported even for Atjeh Besar.[3] In no state except Idi and perhaps Tapak Tuan (where the population was mainly Malay) could a Dutchman set foot in safety.

By the end of 1874 the Dutch authorities could have little doubt that the 'submissions' which had so encouraged Van

[1] Van de Putte's report to States-General, translation Harris to Derby 13 August 1874, F.O. 37/526; Lavino to Loudon 7 January 1875, Cons. Penang 101; Kielstra I, pp. 359–67.

[2] Van de Putte's report to States-General, loc. cit.; Kielstra I, pp. 325–6; 477, 480.

[3] Lavino to Maier 8 and 23 July 1874, Cons. Penang 100; K. van der Maaten *Snouck Hurgronje en de Atjeh oorlog* (Rotterdam, 1948), I, p. 27.

Swieten were virtually meaningless as long as the war in Atjeh Besar was indecisive.[1]

Thus the original notion that the coastal states were as independent of Atjeh Besar as Deli was of Siak could no longer be a motive for the continued lenience of the Dutch authorities towards them, though it retained some popular currency. A more important motive was lack of resources. From the beginning this war, the first to reach the Dutch public through the new telegraph, aroused considerable criticism in the press and the States-General.[2] Outraged nationalism overcame dissent until the disaster of the first expedition was vindicated by the second, but thereafter the war became so unpopular that each government was reluctant to request the necessary finance to prosecute it effectively. The Minister of Marine estimated in May 1873 that even the fifty vessels he hoped to make available would be unable to blockade all Atjeh effectively.[3] In fact there were never half this number in Atjehnese waters, so that a completely effective blockade was out of the question.[4]

The most decisive reason for the rapid raising of the blockade, however, was the fear that the hostility of Straits merchants might otherwise evoke a tougher British policy towards the war. Holland was dependent on Penang as a supply base; it was obliged by two treaties to safeguard British trade; it was affected by the encouragement Penang could give to the Atjehnese war effort; and ultimately it was dependent on British diplomatic support to uphold its sprawling Indonesian empire. For all these reasons, quite apart from Nieuwenhuyzen's promises, the Dutch were unwilling to exercise a rigid blockade for long.

Although the Straits authorities were informed as soon as each state was freed for trade, the blockade was never formally lifted. The initial Dutch concern that the blockade and the declaration of war should accord with International Law so as to exclude foreign intervention was soon forgotten. Although Van Swieten 'annexed' Atjeh Besar in January 1874 and the blockade was far from effective after April, the legal position

[1] Lavino compiled a careful report on the subject on 23 December 1874, Cons. Penang 101. But the evidence had already been compelling.

[2] Harris to Granville 22 April, 1 May, 3 and 19 July 1873, F.O. 37/511. Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815* (1959), p. 197.

[3] Woltring I, p. 548.

[4] Kielstra I, p. 162.

remained blurred in order to allow for freer future action.[1]

Though a constant hindrance to the Dutch war effort, the lenient application of the blockade at least fulfilled one of its aims by reconciling some Penang opinion. The opening of many ports just as the pepper season was beginning had an immediate effect on the otherwise slack trade. The Dutch agent observed:

> . . . now the Penangites are becoming persuaded that our future commercial policy in Acheen will be based on the most liberal principles, they have ceased to regard our progress in Acheen with dissatisfaction; the majority would fain see tranquillity restored and the Penang-Acheen trade flourishing under Dutch rule.[2]

Although about half the ports remained under blockade throughout 1874, a clandestine traffic between closed and open ports ensured that most of the pepper crop reached its market. At first conducted by small boats at night, this traffic changed to the more difficult overland routes after the blockading fleet made some seizures in August 1874. Betelnut, on the other hand, was fetching such low prices that it was not worth transporting overland.[3]

Thus the Atjeh trade was able to continue. Of course Atjehnese pepper-exports dropped slightly, and betel-exports markedly, while its traditional imports of piece-goods were cut to less than a third of the pre-war level. But the merchants of Penang nevertheless did remarkably well out of the first years of the war, especially by contrast with the ruin brought upon their Peninsula trade by the Larut troubles. Even after subtracting the booming imports of Deli tobacco from Penang's trading figures with Sumatra, these showed little decline as a result of the war. Imports from Atjeh were about 10 per cent. down in 1873 and 1874, while exports to Sumatra increased rapidly after the second expedition in 1874.[4] The latter was

[1] Gericke to Van de Putte 14 January 1874, Woltring I, p. 674; Loudon to Van de Putte 30 March 1874, copy Kol. to B.Z. 1 June 1874: Van Golstein to Willebois 23 November 1874: B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] Lavino to Maier 2 May 1874: also *idem* 17 April 1874: Cons. Penang 100; Van Bylandt to Willebois 12 July 1875, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Lavino to Loudon 20 August, 16 and 30 September, 10 October and 11 December 1874; 7 January and 5 February 1875; Cons. Penang 101.

[4] See Statistical Tables in Appendix 3, below.

almost entirely due to the supply of provisions for the large Dutch occupying force, which proved a source of profit for a few Penang dealers. But in several other respects the change brought about in the pattern of the Sumatra trade by the beginning of the war was of advantage to the merchants of Penang.

The vagaries of the blockade provided a serious deterrent for any merchant further from the scene than Penang. The Indian merchants who had annually taken about 60,000 piculs of betelnut from the north coast on their way home from Penang to Madras did not visit Atjeh after the war until 1876.[1] Similarly, but more permanently, the war ended the remaining direct trade between Europe and the west coast of Atjeh. The great American trade to this area had yielded to Penang competition in the 1850's, but until 1872 a few sailing ships continued to take about 15,000 piculs of pepper a year direct from the west coast to Europe, and especially Italy.[2] The departure of these competitors helped to compensate Penang for the smaller bulk of Atjeh's total trade.

Atjehnese vessels also were immediate casualties of the war. The most successful plantation owners on the east coast of Atjeh, like the Raja of Simpang Ulim, had carried their pepper to Penang increasingly in their own ships. The tonnage of schooners and larger vessels visiting Penang under Atjehnese colours increased rapidly from 786 in 1868 to 5,100 in 1872, when it formed a quarter of the total arrivals from Sumatra.[3] In addition scores of Atjehnese-owned prahus had plied across the Straits, competing with the Chinese-owned vessels of Penang which dominated the trade of other states. Some of these Atjehnese vessels were captured or sunk by the blockading fleet in 1873.[4] The majority probably succeeded in reaching Penang, where they were transferred to Chinese ownership.[5]

[1] Lavino to Loudon 22 January 1875, Cons. Penang 101. The Madras Presidency recorded imports from Sumatra worth £64,712; £47,872; and £21,379 in the three years, 1868–70; Statistical Tables for East India in *P.P.*

[2] Lavino to Loudon 22 January 1875, Cons. Penang 101.

[3] Statistical Tables for the Colonies, in P.P.

[4] Ten Atjehnese vessels were thus accounted for during June and July 1873; Harris to Granville 10 October 1873, F.O. 37/512.

[5] Twenty Atjehnese prahus arrived in Penang in two days when the blockading fleet was absent from the east coast in June, 1873, Lavino to Read 18 June 1873. Many Atjehnese vessels were already mortgaged to

The war therefore left Penang in sole possession of a rather smaller total trade. As before, the Chinese traders, large and small, sent their few schooners and many prahus to collect the pepper of the east coast and some of the betelnut of the north coast. The largest of them despatched the handful of ships of over 100 tons on the more hazardous journey to the west coast pepper-ports. Owned by Chinese, though usually officered by Europeans, these barques, brigs, steamers and schooners were away for several months at a time. They would call first at ports on the north coast, to exchange their piece-goods or opium for the Spanish dollars which were essential for the purchase of west-coast pepper.[1]

As a result of the war Chinese traders were in almost complete control of trade with the Atjehnese. One Frenchman, E. Roura, continued to monopolize the trade of Paté (Patty) for a few years after the war, but he too was based on Penang. The large European houses of the Straits were concerned only with the export of pepper to Europe and America, and the import of European and Indian cloth to supply the Chinese traders.

It had been expected in Penang that the war and the blockade would cause a large number of failures among the smaller Chinese traders, whose financial backing was notoriously slight. A number of small firms dealing in cottons for the Atjehnese market did fail in October 1873, and a few more just before the raising of the blockade in March 1874. But the lenience of the blockade, together with the large profits accumulated in the pre-war years of high pepper-prices, prevented any widespread collapse.[2]

In sum, therefore, the effect of the blockade of 1873–4 on Penang was to concentrate the trade in the hands of the larger Chinese merchants and to replace the cloth and opium formerly sold to the Atjehnese with timber, meat, and gin now exported to the Dutch army of occupation.

Chinese; Khoo Cheat and Lim Seang to Anson 20 June, 1873, copy C.O. to F.O. 5 December 1894, F.O. 37/824.

[1] Report of M. G. Scott, n.d., copy G.G. to Kol. 27 September 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[2] Lavino to Read ? October 1873, 24 February and 2 April 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

* * *

The 1871 Sumatra Treaty had done little to soften the resentment felt in Batavia towards the proud state from which its influence had been so completely excluded. A little experience of Atjehnese affairs would have shown the Dutch, like the British before them, that the only practicable way to exert any influence over the Atjehnese, and particularly the suspicious highlanders, was to work cautiously towards gaining the confidence of the more cosmopolitan people of the coast and capital. But the individuals in charge of Dutch policy—W. H. Read as well as Loudon and Van de Putte—lacked the patience even to investigate Atjehnese conditions properly. The independent tradition of Atjeh, instead of cautioning these men, seemed to them a standing threat and insult to Holland's position in Asia. Thus they blundered into a precipitate course which made it impossible for any Atjehnese—Sultan or *ulèëbalang;* highlanders or coastal traders; Tibang or Abd ar-Rahman—to support them.

The problem of Penang made itself felt at once. Depending heavily on British support, the Dutch felt obliged to adopt a policy which allowed the commerce between Penang and Atjeh to continue. Consequently they were deprived of most of the impact of that very naval power which had won them so many past contests in the Archipelago.

4

Atjehnese Diplomacy
1873

It was hardly likely that any candidates would be found among the European Powers of 1873 to come to the defence of a small, remote Sultanate on which Holland had solemnly declared war. Yet Atjeh succeeded in evoking a remarkable amount of international sympathy, even if insufficient to alter Dutch designs.

Atjeh began with several unusual advantages over other victims of European expansion. The six months interval between the repulse of the first Dutch expedition and the arrival of the second provided an opportunity to appeal to the Powers as a fully sovereign state in imminent danger. In Penang the Atjehnese had a neutral gateway to a wider world, and one whose population was far from sympathetic to Dutch expansion. A century of pepper exporting had brought more wealth and international contact to the Atjehnese than to most Indonesians. Yet these advantages should not detract from the achievement in Turkey of that remarkable Atjehnese ambassador, Abd ar-Rahman az-Zahir.

An appeal to the Caliph

Abd ar-Rahman was at his best on an urgent diplomatic mission. As the Turkish press soon noticed, he was 'gifted with remarkable intelligence, and unusual presence of mind'.[1] Persuasive, even eloquent in Arabic, he obviously enjoyed any opportunity to argue the point with opponents of his case. Moreover, as a sayyid related to the Sharif of Mecca, he com-

[1] *La Turquie* 11 June 1873, copy in Heldewier to Gericke 14 June 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

manded a certain respect in Turkey, the more so because the ample sums furnished him by pepper-traders in Atjeh and Penang enabled him to move in a style befitting his proud birth.[1]

In April 1873 Abd ar-Rahman had recently arrived in Mecca with the intention of renewing old connexions and using his letter from Sultan Mahmud to encourage closer relations between Turkey and Atjeh. On hearing the news of war, he hurried to Constantinople with Nyak Abas, an Atjehnese pepper-grower who had made the journey with him from Penang. He arrived in the Turkish capital on 27 April, just as the Dutch troops were retreating to their ships, and went at once to the Porte to see the Foreign Minister, Safvet Pasha. After waiting daily on the Porte, he was granted a brief interview with the Grand Vezir two weeks later and was able to present his papers.[2] These included a personal recommendation of the Habib from the Sharif of Mecca and Mahmud's appeal for renewal of the ancient Turkish protectorate to ward off Dutch aggression.

Abd ar-Rahman found Turkey in the midst of the directionless period between the death of the strong, modernist Grand Vizir Ali Pasha in 1871 and the overthrow of Sultan Abdul Aziz in 1876. The Sultan had seized his freedom from Ali's stern control to indulge his own increasingly arbitrary whims. The flattery and intrigue of courtiers and foreign diplomats held sway in the Porte, where Grand Vezirs succeeded one another every few months. Nevertheless, the widespread popular discontent lacked any focus save the recurrent one of resentment at Turkey's feebleness before the Western Powers. A reaction against Ali Pasha's secularization programme had also given rise to a religious revival which was given a pan-Islamic flavour by events abroad. Turkish Muslims in Central Asia enjoyed considerable sympathy in Constantinople in their struggle against Russian and Chinese control in the 1860's and '70s. Missions came from Khiva, Bokhara, Kashgar and even Yunnan to recognize Abdul Aziz as Caliph and plead with him

[1] Elliot to Granville 23 May 1873, F.O. 78/2267. Lavino to Maier 24 June 1874, Cons. Penang 100. Lavino estimated that Abd ar-Rahman was provided with a total of $54,000 (c. £11,500) for this mission. It is not clear, however, that all was for the purpose.

[2] Enclosure in Heldewier to Gericke 29 May 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

for assistance he could not give. After 1871 such missions received more encouragement. An envoy from Kashgar in 1873 returned home with four Turkish officers to act as instructors, some light weapons, and a vague promise of protection. The dream of a universal, effective Ottoman Caliphate appealed alike to the Sultan's vanity and to the popular longing for some action to put an end to the sad tale of Turkish and Muslim humiliations.[1]

In this mood the Constantinople press took up Abd ar-Rahman's case with enthusiasm, so that the fate of Atjeh quickly became 'la grande question du jour'.[2] The *Basiret*, reputedly the most widely-read and certainly the most energetically pan-Islamic of Turkish newspapers, called for the despatch of Turkish warships to Sumatra. The *Jevaib* echoed the demand more mildly.[3] Even the semi-official *La Turquie* argued consistently and in remarkably modern terms for an active diplomatic intervention by the Porte in favour of the rights of small nations.[4]

Inside the Turkish Cabinet the cause of Atjeh was championed by the great reformer Midhat Pasha, then Minister of Justice.[5] Though lacking the subtlety necessary to control the Sultan, Midhat was the most able and honest of the ministers and the hope of the party aiming for constitutional reform and strong government. He may have used the Atjeh issue to try to regain influence with the Sultan after his dismissal as Grand Vezir, but it is more likely that he saw the issue as part of a wider struggle against the Russian Ambassador, his greatest enemy, in particular, and bullying Europeans in general.[6]

But Midhat could not have things his own way, even on this issue. When the Dutch Minister to the Porte, Heldewier, cabled

[1] R. H. Davison *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856–76* (Princeton, 1963), pp. 270–5. Arnold *The Caliphate* (Oxford, 1924), p. 173.

[2] Heldewier to Gericke 15 May 1873, Woltring *Bescheiden Betreffende de Buitenlandse Politiek van Nederland* I, p. 541.

[3] Davison p. 276. Article in *Jevaib* 25 June 1873, translated in Heldewier to Gericke 3 July 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[4] *La Turquie* 9, 17, 19, 24 May and 19 July 1873, copies in B.Z. Atjeh.

[5] Heldewier to Gericke 22 May and 19 June 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[6] For Midhat Pasha see Ali Haydar Midhat *The Life of Midhat Pasha* (London, 1903). Davison, pp. 144–5, 287–91, and 360–4. E. E. Ramsaur *The Young Turks* (Princeton, 1957), pp. 4–6. Sir Harry Luke *The Old Turkey and the New* (London, 1955), pp. 124–5.

home the news that Turkey was attracted by the idea of mediation, the Cabinet at The Hague was in consternation. Gericke pointed out that the war had been undertaken only to keep foreign powers out of the archipelago, and that it would be a disastrous precedent to allow such a power to mediate between the Netherlands Indian Government and 'native states'. Especially was this so in the case of Turkey, because of the special place that nation occupied in the minds of Muslim Indonesians. Consequently Heldewier was instructed to do everything possible to prevent the offer of mediation, which could not possibly be accepted.[1]

Heldewier was a weak and ineffective diplomat[2] who contented himself with going the rounds of the major chanceries attempting to find out what was taking place. For the Great Powers, larger interests were at stake. Dutch statesmen in The Hague and London expected their strongest support on this issue from Britain, because of that country's commitments under the 1871 Treaty, its traditional support for Holland as opposed to stronger powers in the East, and its vulnerability to pan-Islamic movements in Asia.[3] But in fact it was Russia which had the greatest interest in opposing a strong Turkey in general and Turkish protection over Asian Muslims in particular. The Russian Ambassador, General Ignatiev, was instructed always to combat the tendency to raise the Sultanate into a universal Caliphate, and more especially at this time when the envoy of Kashgar had presented himself at the Porte.[4] Ignatiev also used all his powers of persuasion and flattery with the Sultan on behalf of the pliable Mahmud Nedim Pasha, with whose party Russian influence was great, and against Midhat Pasha. Ignatiev's very considerable influence was strenuously exerted against intervention in Atjeh. 'If we have avoided

[1] Gericke to King, 13 May 1874, and other correspondence in Woltring I, pp. 536–8.

[2] 'A sot, seldom fit for business', in the opinion of the British Ambassador Elliot; Granville to Harris 3 September 1873 (private), P.R.O. 30/29/112. Also Ignatiev to Gortchakov 29 May 1873, Guber, Levinson and Mazaev (eds.), *Politika Kapitalisticheskikh Derzhav i Natsional'no-Osvoboditel'oe Dvizhenie Iugo-Vostochnoi Azii (1871–1917)*, I (Moscow, 1965), p. 55.

[3] Van Bylandt to Gericke 7 May, 1873, Woltring I, p. 528; Van de Putte to Gericke 22 July 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[4] Middelburgh (St. Petersburg) to Gericke 2 July, 1873: Heldewier to Gericke 4 June, 1873: B.Z. Atjeh.

difficulties from the Muslim side,' wrote Heldewier after the scare was over, 'we owe this *only* to General Ignatiev.'[1]

The Russian Ambassador tried to persuade the Porte that England as well as Holland would resent Turkish interference in Sumatra,[2] while he told the credulous Heldewier that the British Ambassador was secretly supporting Turkish designs.[3] Sir Henry Elliot was certainly anxious to support Turkey against Russia and Midhat against Mahmud Nedim. Anxious to check Russian advance in Asia, Britain had even encouraged the embassy from Kashgar to the Porte in 1873.[4] But Holland was not Russia, and Elliot's despatches give no suggestion that he in any way encouraged a Turkish initiative in the case of Atjeh.

The Turkish Cabinet, and more especially its weak Foreign Minister, Safvet Pasha, was accustomed to seeking foreign and particularly British advice on such international questions.[5] Safvet first wrote to his London Ambassador in order to discover Granville's advice on the matter. Soon after, on May 5th, he asked Sir Henry Elliot what reply he thought Turkey should make to the Atjehnese request. Elliot read him a lecture on the benefits of abstention. Turkey had no interests to protect, religion was not involved in the war, and Holland would certainly be determined to avenge its first defeat. Consequently Atjeh must not be encouraged. Safvet could only protest 'the difficulty for the Sultan's Government in entirely refusing to listen to people who appealed to His Majesty as the Supreme Head of their common religion'.[6] Next day he tried the French Ambassador, who was similarly discouraging.[7]

General Ignatiev's advice did not need to be sought. He volunteered it on 10 May,[8] and bullied the Foreign Minister

[1] Heldewier to Gericke 15 December 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] Middelburgh to Gericke 2 July 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Heldewier to Gericke 5, 17 and 25 May 1873, B.Z. Atjeh. In conversation with Dutch diplomats Ignatiev always alleged that Elliot was their greatest enemy, although his own despatches to St. Petersburg gave an accurate picture of Elliot's stand. Ignatiev to Gortchakov 29 May 1873, Guber, Levinson and Mazaev I, p. 54.

[4] Davison, p. 273. Ignatiev to Gortchakov 15 May 1873, Guber, Levinson and Mazaev I, p. 47.

[5] Elliot to Hammond 9 February and 2 May 1873 (private), F.O. 391/22.

[6] Elliot to Granville 8 May 1873, F.O. 78/2267.

[7] Heldewier to Gericke 8 May 1873, Woltring I, p. 532.

[8] *Idem* 11 May 1873, Woltring I, p. 533.

with it on the 14 May when the pan-Islam party seemed to be gaining the day after all. Abd ar-Rahman should be unceremoniously dismissed, he warned. If Turkey began to intervene on behalf of Asian Muslims, it would bring the other Powers to the defence of Christians in Turkey on the pattern of Russia's action in 1853.[1]

Safvet must have encountered this sort of pressure from Ignatiev before, but on a question as remote as Atjeh he could not hope to withstand it without some encouragement from Britain. In London, however, Lord Granville's advice was the same as his Ambassador's had been. Granville brought the matter before the Cabinet, which concluded 'We do not encourage the idea.'[2]

The importance of Britain's attitude is illustrated by the clear impression gained by Abd ar-Rahman himself. On his way to Constantinople, the envoy was reported to have dismissed the English as 'even worse than the Dutch'.[3] But he quickly realized the weight Britain carried in Constantinople, and began to include among his arguments that the British Government would be 'very vexed by the success of the Dutch, and would not ask for better than to support the conciliatory steps which were made by the Porte'.[4] Later he wrote to a friend in Penang stressing the urgent necessity for the Atjehnese to please, befriend, and flatter the British: 'The Sublime Porte is hoping and endeavouring to bring our affair as soon as possible to a desirable conclusion, but it wishes also that we should be in agreement among ourselves and that we should have at all cost the friendship and support of France and especially of England'. Granted this Western support, Abd ar-Rahman concluded, Turkey was confident the Atjehnese cause would succeed.[5]

As British support was not forthcoming Safvet Pasha was

[1] *Idem* 15 May 1873, Woltring I, p. 539. Ignatiev to Gortchakov 15 May 1873, Guber, Levinson and Mazaev I, pp. 46–8.

[2] Gladstone's notes on Cabinet meeting of 10 May 1873, B.M. Add. MSS. 44641, f. 106. Also Granville to Elliot 15 May 1873, F.O. 78/2263.

[3] Van Lennep (Smyrna) to Heldewier 25 April 1873, copy Heldewier to Gericke, 28 April 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[4] Ignatiev to Gortchakov 29 May 1873, Guber Levinson and Mazaev I, p. 54.

[5] Abd ar-Rahman to Roura 13 June 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 29 October 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

obliged to back down. He promised Heldewier on 15 May that Turkey would not offer mediation in any form. But within a few hours of talking to the Dutch Minister Safvet was replaced by Rashid Pasha in an unexpected palace reshuffle. Heldewier sadly renewed his labours.[1]

Abd ar-Rahman was not long in obtaining an interview with the new Foreign Minister, who then recommenced the same sounding process as his predecessor. He explained to Elliot and Ignatiev in turn the necessity the Porte was under 'of at least appearing to do something for the Muslims of Sumatra,' to preserve Turkey's prestige with its pan-Islamically inclined subjects in general and the Sharif of Mecca in particular. On the other hand Rashid made clear that the presence of the Habib was becoming increasingly embarrassing to the Government. Ignatiev repeated the danger of such adventures, while Elliot advised him 'to dismiss the Envoy with vague assurances that the wishes of his Sovereign would be borne in mind'.[2]

This advice was not lost on Rashid Pasha, who seems to have told the Habib early in June that Atjeh was too remote for Turkey to be able to do anything on its behalf. According to the agents of the Dutch Legation, Abd ar-Rahman then provoked a new crisis by appealing to the forgotten Imperial *firmans* of 1850 granting Sultan Ibrahim's petition to be considered a Turkish vassal like his ancestors.[3] The Habib personally enlisted Bessim Bey, an elder statesman who had been writer for the Grand Vezir in 1850–1, to have the relevant documents traced in the archives.[4]

These documents were brought before the Turkish Cabinet on 13 June, and provoked another round of pressure in the city and hesitation in the Porte. The case of the nationalists was now stronger, but this did not alter the hopelessly weak diplomatic position of Turkey. Abd ar-Rahman was eventually told that the *firmans* could only be considered religious documents without political significance.[5] He demanded at least some demon-

[1] Heldewier to Gericke 15 May 1873 (2 telegrams) and 17 May 1873 (despatch) B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] Elliot to Granville 23 May 1873, F.O. 78/2267; Ignatiev to Gortchakov 29 May 1873, Guber, Levinson and Mazaev I, pp. 54–5.

[3] See above, p. 84.

[4] Travers to Heldewier 17 and 23 June 1873, copies Heldewier to Gericke 19 and 26 June 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[5] Heldewier to Gericke 26 June 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

stration of Turkish sympathy, and the debate began to turn on how this could be done with least offence.

On 30 June Rashid Pasha sought Elliot's advice once again, telling him that the Cabinet had decided the previous day to terminate Abd ar-Rahman's welcome in the city. Nevertheless it was still undecided what degree of encouragement he should be given. Rashid suggested that Turkey might send a decoration to the Atjehnese Sultan, or perhaps even protest formally if the Dutch forced the Sultan to accept Dutch sovereignty, on the grounds that Turkey had already acknowledged its suzerainty over Atjeh twenty years before. Elliot was as discouraging as before. Turkey would be unwise to put forward a claim she could not seriously support, he warned, especially as this Turkish suzerainty had never been communicated to other powers.[1]

Now the Porte began to think in terms of an appeal for moderation, either directly to Holland or through the Great Powers. Such a measure was now pressed by the nationalists, and seemed acceptable to the weaker ministers as a relatively harmless way to get rid of Abd ar-Rahman.[2] As this idea began to take definite shape, the Russian Ambassador demanded explanations from the Foreign Minister. After showing Ignatiev the Atjehnese appeal of 1850,[3] which, he said, had delighted the Sultan, Rashid Pasha protested:

> You see what a difficult position I am placed in; the Sultan is eminently flattered, the Grand Vezir hesitates, and Midhat Pacha pushes on the wheel. I would pass almost for a 'traitor' if I seemed to be refusing to interest myself in these people, our coreligionists, who throw themselves body and soul into our hands.[4]

He showed the Russian Ambassador the note which the Cabinet had considered sending to The Hague, outlining the historic links between Atjeh and Turkey, and expressing the hope that Holland would renounce all future action against the Sumatran state.

[1] Elliot to Granville 1 July 1873, F.O. 78/2268.

[2] Heldewier to Gericke 7 July 1873 and enclosure, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Ignatiev described this as a new, rather than a newly-discovered, appeal. But if there really had been such a letter in 1873 it would certainly have been mentioned elsewhere. Guber, Levinson and Mazaev I, p. 61.

[4] Heldewier to Gericke 23 July 1873, Woltring I, pp. 591–2.

Ignatiev later told his Dutch colleague that he himself had modified the draft, limiting it to an offer of the Sultan's good offices in the war.[1] Certainly the final letter was so guardedly moderate that the Russian might well have been responsible for the 'much tact and ability' which a British diplomat admired in its wording.[2]

Rashid Pasha finally despatched this letter to Musurus Pasha, who was accredited to both the Dutch and the English courts, on 11 August. Its greater part was devoted to explaining Atjeh's past acts of submission to Turkey which, although never communicated to Holland, 'nevertheless belong to the domain of facts'. In view of Turkey's friendship for Holland, the Porte had decided to offer only such mediation as the Netherlands Government desired to profit by. Turkey had no thought of disputing Holland's right 'to be sole judge of the measures imposed on her by the care of her dignity and the honour of her arms'. The Porte only appealed to the characteristic humanity of the Dutch nation, in the hope that the great moral influence of the Sultan of Turkey in Atjeh might be useful in the interests of peace.[3]

The Porte had made its gesture, and it hoped this would be enough to satisfy public opinion. The mildly-worded offer of mediation in no way modified Dutch hostility to Atjeh, and Dutch officials were able to announce with pleasure that Abd ar-Rahman's mission had ended in complete failure. Yet the envoy's achievement had been very considerable. He had evoked, before its real time under Abdul Hamid, a wave of pan-Islamic feeling in the Turkish capital, and won for Atjeh the sympathy of the best men in Turkey. The pressure generated had moved the Porte to acknowledge to the Powers (copies of the letter to Holland were sent to the major embassies) that Turkey had formally accepted suzerainty over a Sumatran state. The absurd contrast between this declaration and the moderate language in which it was couched was only another indication of the schizophrenic nature of Turkey's position in the world.

[1] Ibid. Ignatiev's own despatches do not mention his role in drafting the letter.

[2] Harris to Granville 1 September 1873, F.O. 37/512.

[3] Woltring I, pp. 612–14.

Naturally Gericke had no hesitation in rejecting the Turkish offer, once he had survived a ministerial crisis in September. He disputed the significance of Turkey's links with Atjeh, and claimed that the peaceful intentions and liberal religious policy of the Netherlands in any case made Abd ar-Rahman's mission unnecessary.[1] Rashid Pasha's principal emotion on receiving the Dutch reply appeared to be 'profound satisfaction' at its friendly tone.[2] His relief at ending the problem without a rupture with Holland or Russia is easy to imagine.

The greatest fear of the Dutch had not been realized. This was that the Porte would assert itself in sufficiently decisive a way to make it clear to Indonesian Muslims that it sympathized with Atjeh in the war. How dangerous this would have proved for Dutch prestige was illustrated by the consequences of a false alarm. On 9 July 1873, a notice in the Constantinople newspaper *Basiret* announced that the Imperial Government had decided to send a fleet of eight warships to the waters of Sumatra to prevent any hostile attack on Atjeh, and that one of these vessels would remain permanently stationed near Atjeh. The report was based on nothing more than the hopes of the nationalist party and some unrelated shipping movements; within thirty-six hours it had been written off as 'an absurd fiction' and the *Basiret* had been suspended for its pains.[3] But in the meantime the report had been repeated by the other Turkish newspapers and carried throughout the world by Reuter's as if it were authentic. Official denials proved less effective in Sumatra and the Straits than in the capitals of Europe. In fact this one piece of journalistic invention had more real effect on the fortunes of Atjeh than the fruit of all the wrangling in the Turkish Cabinet.[4]

Abd ar-Rahman lingered on in Constantinople, pressing for a personal interview with Sultan Abdul Aziz, or at the least Turkish decorations for himself and his Sultan. At last, in December, after the Dutch had renewed, more successfully, their operations in Sumatra, and Abd ar-Rahman's embarrassing presence in the capital had lost its popular appeal, he was

[1] Gericke to Heldewier 26 September 1873, Woltring I, pp. 623–5.

[2] Rashid Pasha to Musurus Pasha 19 Nov. 1873, copy in Musurus to Gericke 2 December 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Heldewier to Gericke 11 July 1873, B.Z. Atjeh. Davison, p. 276.

[4] See below, pp. 145–6 and 149–52.

politely advised that it was time he returned to his country. The envoy was given a minor decoration, the *Osmanié* second class; for Sultan Mahmud there was only a Vezirial letter summing up Turkey's attempts to assist him.[1]

On 18 December Abd ar-Rahman took ship for Mecca and the Straits. In the circumstances of his day, which did not provide many platforms for the champions of weak Asian nations, he had served his adopted country well. But by the time he left, he knew that Atjeh was beaten.

The Council of Eight

To most Atjehnese Turkey was a remote, half-mythical land, known only through the exaggerated reports of pilgrims returning from Mecca. It was in Penang that Atjehnese without Abd ar-Rahman's special Middle Eastern contacts came into regular contact with the modern European world. Because it was the centre of Atjeh's commerce, Penang was also the source of news from abroad and even from other parts of Atjeh. Most Atjehnese of any wealth had visited the British port to enjoy some of the pleasures of city life; some sent their sons there for education.

An important role was played by the group of Atjehnese who took up permanent residence in Penang, usually for commercial reasons. These formed the nucleus of an Atjehnese colony numbering about 300,[2] always augmented by casual visitors. The solidarity of this colony was demonstrated when 270 Atjehnese hajis were stranded penniless in Penang because their ship was prevented by the Dutch blockade from calling at Atjeh. They were supported by their compatriots in Penang from July 1873 to May 1874, and steadfastly refused the charity offered them by the Dutch.[3]

Simpang Ulim, the wealthiest of the new pepper-exporting states on the east coast of Atjeh, had a disproportionate influence on this colony. Its *ulèëbalang*, Teuku Muda Nyak Malim, was the owner of 'Gedong Atjeh', a building valued at $40,000 in the centre of Penang which was the pre-war *rendezvous* of all the

[1] Heldewier to Gericke 1, 6, and 15 December 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] The 1833 census listed 347 Atjehnese in Penang, Newbold I, pp. 54–5. That of 1881 listed 237 in Penang and Province Wellesley.

[3] Lavino to Read 16 July, 14 August and ? October 1873: Lavino to Alg. Sec. 21 March 1874: Lavino to Maier 2 May 1874: Cons. Penang 100.

Atjehnese there.[1] Teuku Paya,[2] the former war-leader of Simpang Ulim and owner of pepper-plantations in adjoining Tandjong Samuntoh, was looking after his business in Penang when the war broke out, and stayed to play a leading role until 1876. These energetic men had been the leaders of the war against Idi and their suspicion of the Dutch had been confirmed by the seizure of Teuku Paya's *Gypsy* in 1872.[3] Their influence led the Penang Atjehnese to assume a particularly patriotic attitude during the early years of the war. They were also the most enthusiastic supporters of Abd ar-Rahman's mission to Constantinople. Teuku Paya contracted heavy debts by forwarding sums to the Habib[4] while his nephew and co-proprietor at Tandjong Samuntoh, Nyak Abas, took part in the mission.

The principal creditor of Teuku Paya was a wealthy Arab trader, Shaikh Ahmad bin Abdullah Baschaib. He handled the business of several east coast pepper-growers, and owned at least three sailing vessels trading to Atjeh in 1873, when they were interfered with by the blockading fleet.[5] His sympathies

[1] Lavino to Van Lansberge 13 April and 2 August 1877, Cons. Penang 102.

[2] Teuku (or Tengku, as he was known in Malaya) Paya was a chief of Lam Bada in the XXVI Mukims, and evidently had some claim to be considered Panglima of that Sagi. About 1860 he and his brother and nephew acquired Tandjong Samuntoh from Juloh. He conducted a large trade in his own vessels and led Simpang Ulim's forces against Idi. In 1876 he returned to Tandjong Samuntoh, whence he led 150 men to Atjeh Besar in July 1876. He then took a leading part in the war until incapacitated by wounds in 1879. He lost one son in the Dutch attack on Tandjong Samuntoh in 1877. The other, Nyak Hassan, led the guerrilla war from 1881 until killed in 1883. Lavino to Van Lansberge 18 February 1875, 4 February 1874 and 12 July 1880, Cons. Penang 102 and 104. Pruys van der Hoeven *Mijne Ervaring van Atjeh* (The Hague, 1886) pp. 46–7.

[3] See above, p. 90.

[4] During 1873 Paya forwarded two telegraphic credits to Abd ar-Rahman of $4,500 and $1,400 respectively. His debts amounted to about $70,000 by mid-1874. He was then attempting to make a settlement of his debts to Sandilands, Buttery and Co. at 45 per cent. Lavino to Maier 24 June 1874, Cons. Penang 100. Shaikh Ahmad to Abd ar-Rahman 26 Rabil'awal 1291H (21 May 1874), translation in Kol. to B.Z. 25 August 1874, B.Z. Atjeh. Sandilands, a large buyer of pepper and a member of the Legislative Council after 1877, was himself one of the strongest critics of the Dutch. He denounced their attack on Atjeh as 'treacherous and aggressive' at a London banquet in honour of Sir Andrew Clarke, the Governor-elect. *London & China Telegraph* 21 July 1873.

[5] 'Statement of suspected ships', copy in Van de Putte to Gericke 22 October 1873, B.Z. Atjeh; Lavino to Van Lansberge 27 April 1877, Cons. Penang 102.

were wholly with the Atjehnese, and his greater experience and wealth made him an influential *éminence grise* to the Atjehnese in Penang. He was a close friend of Abd ar-Rahman az-Zahir, who exchanged telegrams with him from Constantinople.

Among the Penang 'Atjeh party', only Teuku Ibrahim was not involved in commerce. This 'intelligent young Achinese of prepossessing appearance and good manners'[1] arrived in Penang from Pidië about a year before war was declared. He had natural prestige there as a connexion of the Sultan's dynasty through his uncle, Teungku Raja Pakeh Dalam of Pidië. This leading position was confirmed when, shortly after the retreat of the first Dutch expedition, Sultan Mahmud sent him a formal authorization to act on behalf of Atjeh in negotiations with foreign Powers.

As the effective leaders of the Atjehnese party in Penang, Teuku Paya, Shaikh Ahmad and Teuku Ibrahim tended to form Atjehnese 'foreign policy' in the important six months between the first and second Dutch expeditions. But the Atjehnese liked to make decisions by a process of discussion and general consensus, so a larger group of partisans was usually consulted. It was common for one of them to invite others to offer prayers together in one of the Penang mosques and then to discuss the affairs of Atjeh.[2] By September 1873, a group of eight men had begun to sign letters jointly and to meet regularly in committee under Teuku Ibrahim's chairmanship. Though the significance of this so-called 'Council of Eight' as a body was perhaps overestimated at the time, it did serve to channel Atjehnese efforts until the middle of 1874.

The remaining five members of the council were two Atjehnese, Nyak Abu and Panglima Prang Haji Yusuf; two Penang-born Indian Muslims, Gullahmeidin and Umar; and one Penang-born Arab, Shaikh Kassim. All were pepper-traders with special interest in the east coast of Atjeh, though Gullahmeidin was also a clerk in the Penang office of Lorraine, Gillespie & Co.[3]

[1] Lavino to Van Lansberge 4 February 1877, Cons. Penang 102.

[2] Lavino to Van Lansberge 13 September 1876, Cons. Penang 102.

[3] Lavino to Read 24 September 1873, Cons. Penang 100. Nyak Abas was always considered a member of the council after his return from Constantinople in 1874.

Great latitude had to be given these men in their attempts to find powerful allies for Atjeh. They were much better versed in international politics than the Sultan and *ulèëbalangs* of Atjeh Besar, and the difficulty of communication in any case prevented frequent consultation. Moreover Sultan Mahmud was too weak, particularly after the outbreak of war, to give any central direction to policy. Consequently the only consistency that could be expected from the various diplomatic efforts of Panglima Tibang in 1872, and Abd ar-Rahman and the Council of Eight in 1873, was the urgent desire to find all possible help against the Dutch. All these agents were given very wide theoretical power to act in the Sultan's name,[1] but in fact none of then could be sure the agreements they came to would be subsequently endorsed in Banda Atjeh.

Though much of the work of the Council of Eight deserves to be called diplomacy, some was simply propaganda designed to induce fellow Muslims to join the fight against Holland. It was often crude, but nevertheless significant as the first attempt at a popular pan-Indonesian movement against the Dutch.

A third function of the Atjehnese party in the Straits was to encourage and inform the leaders of Atjeh's resistance. It was rumoured that an Arab in Buitenzorg (Bogor) assisted them with information about Dutch intentions,[2] but many of the details of the second expedition could have been gathered from the Penang press. As a centre of communication for Atjeh Penang could even play a more direct role in organizing the resistance. One circular letter from Penang in June called on

[1] For example the Sultan's letter to Teuku Ibrahim of 19 Jumad'il akhir 1290H (15 July 1873) during the American negotiations: 'We the said Sultan desire to inform our Chief Officers, who are at present residing at Penang, that we have authorised, directed and empowered the said Teuku Ibrahim bin Raja Pakeh Ali, Teuku Muda Nyak Malim, and Teuku Maharaja Mangkubumi [Habib Abd ar-Rahman]; either of them can act for us and on our behalf to do all and everything relating to the Law of God and of his Prophet Muhammad and also we authorise our said agents to do and execute our orders as directed by us and to perform all such acts whatsoever that may be necessary to be done for us and we direct that all our officers at Penang may support the authority given by us to our said agents in doing such acts and in making agreements and Treaties.' Translation in Studer to Washington 4 October 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 11.

[2] Read to Loudon 23 June 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 6 September 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

eight coastal *ulèëbalangs* to adopt the policy of collecting $5 for war funds from the owner of every *sawah* (rice-field).[1] The letters of Teuku Paya in particular tended to exaggerate the difficulties of the Dutch and hold out the promise that the war was not as hopeless as it seemed.[2]

Lastly, the Council of Eight was expected by the Atjehnese to forward arms and ammunition through the Dutch blockade, though it had little success with this until the later years of the war.[3]

European sympathizers

The special importance of the Straits Settlements for Atjeh was not lost on the Dutch. Immediately after the first expedition a colonial official, George Lavino,[4] was placed under Consul-General Read 'to acquire useful information at Penang about all that may transpire between the many Atjehnese residing there and the merchants of that place'.[5] He not only did so, but also helped to make good from Penang sources the catastrophic ignorance about Atjeh in Batavia. In July 1874, after several disagreements with the English merchant acting as Dutch Consul in Penang, he was given clearer status as 'Agent of the Netherlands Indian Government for Acheen affairs at Penang', responsible directly to Batavia.[6]

[1] Lavino to Read 18 June 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[2] Report of Raja Burhan Udin 17 October 1873, translation in G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[3] See below, p. 192.

[4] Though born of Dutch parents Lavino was educated mainly in England. He lived for only one and a half years in Holland before going to Java as a colonial official in 1864. Attached to the first Atjeh expedition, he was left behind in Penang because of the usefulness of his fluent English, Dutch and Malay, and proved his worth sufficiently to be retained there. In 1874 he was nominated Consul at Penang by Read and the N.I. Government, but Gericke decided to keep this post in the Padday family for fear of losing their important local influence. As 'Agent' Lavino did most of the work of the consulate and was made acting-Consul when Padday resigned in 1877. He was full Consul from April 1881 and succeeded Read as Consul-General in Singapore in March 1885. Most of his important reports were in English. His reporting was very thorough but unlike Read he seldom attempted to influence Dutch policy directly. See Lavino to Willebois 28 January 1882, Cons. Penang 11.

[5] First Government Secretary to Read 11 May 1873, Cons. Singapore 100.

[6] First Government Secretary to Padday 16 July 1874, Cons. Penang 46.

Special agents were also appointed to help Read watch the anti-Dutch movement in Singapore. Two European spies, one English and one apparently Dutch, were working for him until August 1873,[1] when another Dutch official was seconded from Java to Singapore to deal with Atjehnese developments.[2] In addition both Lavino and Read employed a considerable 'secret service' of Malays and Arabs to report on the movements of the Atjehnese and their friends.[3] Consequently the two men were able to give very full reports to Batavia, which incidentally provide excellent material for the historian.

As the Dutch had feared, traders of all races in Penang were very sympathetic to the Atjehnese resistance. Just as the second expedition was landing in Atjeh, Lavino wrote:

> . . . it is my firm opinion that even up to the present moment the majority of the European merchants here hope to see the Achinese successful in their attempts to resist our forces. . . . The natives [Lavino meant *all* non-Europeans] all sympathise with Acheen and frequently give evident signs of their antipathy towards the Dutch.[4]

The feelings of most of the European and Chinese traders, at least, arose more from fear of Dutch interference with trade than from a real sympathy with the injured party. But this did not alter the great importance of their alignment. As Lavino complained: 'The fact of many Europeans sympathising openly with the Achinese, naturally inspires them with self-confidence and deters them from entertaining ideas of submission'.[5]

The most open of all the sympathizers was a fighting Scot called Stuart Herriot. A Penang trader since the 1830's, Herriot had lost most of his money, and with it inevitably his standing in the European community, some fifteen years before

[1] Read to Loudon 3 June 1873, copy in B.Z. Blokkade Atjeh; Read to Loudon 23 June 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 6 September 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] First Government Secretary to Read 2 August 1873, Cons. Singapore 100.

[3] In the 1880's, when Lavino had to give three-monthly accounts of his expenditure for the 'secret service', this averaged about $150 a month. The figure must have been higher in 1873. Singapore police claimed that Read employed nineteen paid spies in November 1873, Studer to Washington, 17 November 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 10.

[4] Lavino to Read 29 November 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[5] Idem 8 July 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

the war. Since then he had supplemented his languishing business by advising Malays in law-suits and other difficulties. Despite Herriot's doubtful name among the Europeans, Lavino had to concede:

> . . . the native population still place a certain confidence in him, more especially since as member of the Municipal Council he has rendered good services by strongly advocating several useful measures, which have been of benefit to the poorer classes in particular.[1]

In the first two years of the war Herriot co-operated closely with the leading Penang Atjehnese, especially in diplomatic overtures.

Herriot was also one of the ten shareholders in the *Pinang Gazette*, for which he wrote a series of vigorous articles against Dutch policy in North Sumatra. The articles 'were eagerly perused and discussed in the Straits, more especially by the Mohamedan population, and its sensational communications on Atjeh affairs found a ready echo among all classes of the community.'[2] But in April 1874 a court awarded $1000 damages to the Assistant Colonial Surgeon, who held himself libelled by one of Herriot's articles attacking vaccination policy in Province Wellesley. The other shareholders of the *Gazette* decided to publish no more articles by Herriot, much to the detriment of the newspaper's sales.[3]

Virtually alone among the Penang Europeans, Herriot was actively pro-Malay, and not simply anti-Dutch, as he showed by his opposition to British intervention in the Malay states.[4]

The Atjehnese were also advised and encouraged by the Reuter agent in Penang, W. Marshall.[5] Marshall's position enabled him to provide the world press with information from Atjehnese, as well as Dutch, sources—a procedure which greatly irritated Dutch politicians. The Netherlands envoy to London made continual complaints to Baron Reuter, and finally persuaded him in June 1874 to warn Marshall against

[1] Lavino to Van Lansberge 16 March 1876, Cons. Penang 102.
[2] Ibid.
[3] Lavino to Maier 2 May 1874, Cons. Penang 100. *Pinang Gazette* 2 April 1874.
[4] Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya*, 1961, p. 129n.
[5] Lavino to Maier 15 May and 11 June 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

involvement with the Atjehnese side. Marshall's despatches were subsequently less interesting.[1]

A special category must be found for Edouard Roura, the European best acquainted with Atjeh, who was particularly friendly with Abd ar-Rahman az-Zahir, and with the *ulèëbalangs* of the west coast of Atjeh whose pepper he bought. This sailor-trader from Marseilles used all his ingenuity to try to retain the trust of both sides. He gave information to the Dutch, hoping vainly that they would allow him to pass through the blockade. Batavia placated him temporarily by chartering his steamer *Patty*, and used him in May 1874 for relations with the west coast rajas.[2] But he soon fell foul of the Dutch because of his conviction that the Atjehnese could be met by negotiation, but would never submit to force. In September 1873 Roura offered to bring to Batavia some west coast *ulèëbalangs* anxious for peace,[3] and in 1874 he succeeded in bringing an authorized Atjehnese envoy as far as Singapore.[4] Both attempts were frustrated by the determination of the highest authorities in Java to obtain an unconditional surrender. Despite all his agility, Roura was clearly trapped in the crossfire by 1875, and had lost both his trade and the trust of the Dutch.[5]

Some Europeans were involved directly in the war on the Atjehnese side. Most were 'rice Muslims'—sailors discharged in Singapore or Penang without means of support or friends among the European community. They found the leading Muslims ready to provide a small allowance in recognition of a conversion to Islam, nominal or otherwise. This allowance usually did not outlast the reformed life of the convert, who was therefore obliged to find employment, often in the military service of one of the rajas of Atjeh or the Malay Peninsula. Even allowing for the unsympathetic accounts colonial society leaves of its outcasts, the evidence is not flattering to most of those who found their way to Atjeh.

[1] Van Bylandt to Gericke 11 October and 22 December 1873, 9 March, 16 June and 2 July 1874: B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] Kielstra II, pp. 106–7. Alg. Sec. to Naval Commander 26 August 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 5 November 1873, B.Z. Blokkade Atjeh. Contract between N.I. Government and Roura 24 September 1873, copy Cons. Singapore 100.

[3] Enclosures in G.G. to Kol. 23 September 1873, Kol. Kab. Q^{30}, 6040.

[4] See below, pp. 172–3.

[5] Lavino to Van Lansberge 13 October 1875, Cons. Penang 102.

At the outbreak of war there were at least four European Muslims living in Atjeh. Two of them were recent arrivals. A Dutchman, Thepen, and a Norwegian, Swendsen, both sailors, had met in Kedah where Thepen was training the Raja's troops. They went together to the east coast of Atjeh, where, having failed as traders, they entered the service of the Raja of Simpang Ulim. Thepen trained the Raja's men in the use of small arms, and even commanded his war-*prahus* in a battle against Keureutoë. Swendsen was more influential politically, and was used as an envoy in negotiations for an American alliance which he strongly supported.

In November 1873 both were captured at sea by a Dutch warship when on their way to Penang, either to carry messages or to escape a difficult situation, or perhaps both. Both proved very willing to earn their release by giving information to the Dutch second expedition.[1]

A German Muslim named Luhrig lived in Tandjong Samuntoh as a petty trader between 1871 and September 1873, without exercising much influence.[2] In 1876 he returned hurriedly to Atjeh after being accused of a murder in Penang, and died mysteriously on the east coast.[3]

An American who gave more indication of sincerity in his adopted faith was F. J. Sheppard, who performed the pilgrimage to Mecca and was considered 'well-versed in Mohammedan doctrines'. Sheppard settled in Samalanga in about 1869 and 'was on very good terms with the Raja', who was no friend of the Dutch. He probably helped the Atjehnese to manufacture gunpowder during the early years of the war, but when, late in 1875, a Dutch attack on Samalanga was expected, he left his home there and apparently gave some information to the Dutch. For several years thereafter he corresponded with Atjehnese leaders, including Teungku di Tiro, from his new home in Johor.[4]

[1] Lavino to Read 29 November, 4 and 13 December 1873, Cons. Penang 100; Locker de Bruyne (Bengkalis) to Loudon 8 January 1874, copy Kol. to B.Z. 1 June 1874, B.Z. Atjeh; J. A. Kruijt *Atjeh en de Atjehers* (Leiden, 1877), pp. 92–93, heard while serving with the blockading fleet that four European Muslims were living in Simpang Ulim in 1873.

[2] Lavino to Read 29 November 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[3] Lavino to Van Lansberge 20 June 1876, Cons. Penang 102.

[4] *Idem* 11 November 1875 and 8 May 1879, Cons. Penang 102 and 104.

Another American Muslim, Thomas Carr, boasted in Penang that he had been sent by a group of unemployed ex-Confederate mercenaries in Shanghai to examine opportunities with the Atjehnese. He reached Kutaradja in May 1874 as cook for two English tavern-keepers, but joined the Atjehnese the day after arrival. He is unlikely to have been of much help to the Atjehnese if he was as unintelligent as the Penang Malays reported him to be. He had left Atjeh again within two months and did not return.[1]

These were the only Europeans of whose presence Dutch sources were sure. But there were probably others who were unknown because they either remained in Atjeh or left quietly. A Dutch employee of the Raja of Kedah, which Malay state had close links with Atjeh, estimated that about eighteen Europeans must have been living in Atjeh in 1873. Six of these he knew personally, of whom four were those mentioned above, and the two others were both Englishmen—an ex-police inspector named Pennifeather[2] and a former Rangoon harbour pilot.[3]

In addition to these, some Turkish officers assisted the Atjehnese, though it is impossible to guess how many. One relatively experienced Turkish officer left Atjeh in 1875 after only twenty days there, claiming that divisions among the Atjehnese leaders made success impossible.[4] The following year two more Turkish artillery officers on their way to Atjeh were reported in Singapore.[5]

Thus there were usually at least a few Europeans in Atjeh during the early years of the war. Their numbers were considerably augmented after 1879 when Europeans from the

[1] 1st Government Secretary to Maier 2 July 1874, copy Kol. to B.Z. 25 August 1874, B.Z. Atjeh; Padday to Alg. Sec. 16 July 1874, Cons. Penang 4; James W. Gould *Americans in Sumatra* (The Hague, 1961), p. 5.

[2] Probably the same as Police-Inspector Arthur Pennifather, whose dismissal from his Singapore post caused a public protest in 1857 [Buckley, *An Anecdotal History of Old Times in Singapore*, pp. 645–6], and who according to Cowan's account was killed in 1872 during the Selangor wars [Cowan, 1961, p. 105]. In Halkema's version he went on from Selangor to Kedah and Atjeh, but lost each job because of drink.

[3] Halkema (Dutch spy in Penang) to Verspijk 11 August 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 26 August 1873, Kol. Kab. Q^{30}, 6040.

[4] Maier to Willebois 18 September 1875, B.Z. Atjeh.

[5] Read to Van Lansberge 16 March and 17 April 1876, copies to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

motley Dutch army began to desert to the Atjehnese with remarkable frequency.[1]

The material support of these men for the Atjehnese cause was insignificant in most cases, but their example seriously weakened the moral effect of Atjeh's diplomatic isolation. Without the sympathy of these outcasts and of the much more important merchant community of Penang, it is difficult to imagine that the Atjehnese could have sustained their hopes for thirty years or obtained what support they did in South-East Asia and in Europe.

Britain

The rulers of Atjeh were never in any doubt that they needed an ally with a strong navy if they were to resist the Dutch successfully. During the first Dutch expedition, therefore, Sultan Mahmud appealed to the local representatives of the three Powers with which Atjeh had had most contact—Britain, France, and the United States.[2]

Of these three, Britain had always been the most obvious candidate as an ally because of Penang's commercial dominance. Moreover, after Straits merchants revived the memory of Raffles's 1819 Treaty in the 1860's, many Atjehnese continued to believe that they had a formal defensive alliance with Britain. When the Penang Atjehnese were attempting to show the United States Government that Atjeh was free of foreign entanglements they confessed to the existence of the 1819 Treaty but stated 'the British cancelled this in 1871 and the Achinese abrogated it on 1 May 1873'.[3]

Sultan Mahmud had first appealed to the Straits for help against the Dutch in October 1871 after Dutch interference in Idi. The following March the Colonial Office vetoed Anson's plan to send a mission to Atjeh, and instructed Sir Harry Ord to reply that Britain was unable to interfere.[4] However, Ord did not report having given any reply until December 1872. By then he had received not only a visit from Tibang in September

[1] See below, p. 207.

[2] Lavino to Read ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[3] English version of draft Atjeh-U.S.A. treaty, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[4] Kimberley to Ord 19 March 1872, C.O. 273/63; and see above, p. 74.

but also a second letter from Sultan Mahmud introducing as his envoy an Arab trader named Sayyid Usman.[1] Ord's reply was reassuring and mentioned neither the recent Anglo-Dutch treaty nor the annulment of Raffles's treaty. He thought a Dutch attack most unlikely 'for the Dutch are like ourselves and wish to trade quietly with the countries round about'. He warned only that Dutch warships would be more likely in future to take redress for acts of 'piracy' on shipping of all flags in Atjeh.[2]

This unhelpful advice was delivered only a few days before the arrival of the first Dutch expedition in Atjeh roads. It naturally accentuated the disillusion in the Atjehnese court over the old British connexion, and the contrasting enthusiasm over the new American one. Nevertheless Sultan Mahmud addressed one final appeal to Ord. It was carried by the envoys who left Banda Atjeh at the height of the Dutch bombardment in order to negotiate with Studer in Singapore.[3] The Sultan forcibly reminded the British of the defensive treaty of 1819:

> ...now we expect much aid from our friend [Governor Ord] in this matter with the Dutch, for from our late ancestor's time to ours we have never been friendly with the Dutch Government, and have always kept up connection with the English Government; neither do we like the Dutch at all; if our friend were to rule us in any way, we should prefer it ten times as much, for we have been accustomed to it for a long time.[4]

Ord forwarded this appeal to Kimberley with calculated casualness, remarking 'it is not my intention to reply unless Your Lordship should think it necessary'.[5]

[1] Probably the same Sayyid (or Habib) Usman who gave his money and energy to the war effort in Atjeh Besar until 1876. He then moved to Simpang Ulim where he owned extensive pepper-plantations, but left it for Penang after the Dutch attack of 1877. From then until his death in 1879 he was the pillar of the remaining Atjehnese community in Penang. His Penang property was valued at $50,000. He was married to the daughters of the rajas of Simpang Ulim and Paté. Lavino to Van Lansberge 29 August 1877 and 5 December 1879, Cons. Penang 103 and 104.

[2] Ord to Sultan Mahmud 5 December 1872, P.P. 1873, 75, p. 3.

[3] Studer to Davis 30 April 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 10. See below p. 142–3.

[4] Sultan Mahmud to Ord 4 Safar 1290H (3 April 1873) P.P. 1873, 75, p. 4.

[5] Ord to Kimberley 12 May 1873, C.O. 273/66.

The Sultan's letter was taken more seriously in London. Granville asked the Law Officers whether Britain still had any obligations to Atjeh under the 1819 Treaty. Their conclusion was that Britain could be considered free of all such obligations, principally on the grounds that Atjeh, as well as Britain, had concluded a contradictory Treaty with the Netherlands. Their advice might have been different had they been given the correspondence showing that Atjeh had only signed the Dutch treaty in 1857 after being advised thereto by the Governor of the Straits Settlements.[1]

The Foreign Office's Percy Anderson considered the Sultan's letter an excellent opportunity to clear up 'the troublesome question of our relations with Acheen'.[2] He wrote a draft reply to the Sultan repudiating any obligations under Raffles's treaty, and warning the Sultan not to expect Britain to shield him from the consequences of his own misgovernment.[3]

At the Colonial Office Herbert righteously pronounced this 'a wise and good answer'.[4] The leading critic of the Government's Atjeh policy was hardly further from the truth in labelling it 'the most shameless document ever printed'.[5]

But good or bad, Britain's reply was received in Atjeh too late to be of any effect. Ord waited ten weeks before finally having the letter delivered in the new year, just as the Dutch were beginning their second siege of the capital and a few weeks before the Sultan's death.[6] It can only have strengthened the feeling that impressed a Dutch spy: 'The bitterness of Atjeh against Penang is great and real.'[7]

France

Though Captain Roura probably kept the name of France alive in Atjeh, little direct trade remained between these two

[1] See above, p. 23.
[2] Minute of 7 July on C.O. to F.O. 30 June 1873, F.O. 37/518.
[3] F.O. to C.O. 15 July 1873 and enclosures, C.O. 273/73.
[4] Minute of 20 July on ibid.
[5] Thomas Bowles in *Fraser's Magazine* January 1874, p. 126.
[6] Report of Commander of H.M.S. *Thalia* 20 January 1874, extract in Admiralty to F.O. 3 March 1874, F.O. 37/534.
[7] Halkema (Penang) to Verspijck 11 August 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 26 August 1873, Kol. Kab. Q^{30}, 6040.

countries in the 1870's. If, as Lavino claimed,[1] Sultan Mahmud really did write to the French Consul in Singapore to request help, his appeal probably went no further. The only letter the French admitted receiving was one written by Teuku Paya in July 1873. He appeared to require moral, rather than physical, support:

> The Dutch have publicly accused us of being robbers, slave-dealers, etc. Your people have had dealings with us for from ten to a hundred thousand dollars and have left their treasure with us without holding our documents for a year or two. Therefore your testimony is asked to say whether we are robbers or slave-dealers.[2]

But France in 1873 was in no mood to provoke unpleasantness with Holland over such a remote question. The letter remained unanswered 'as a sign of goodwill towards the Netherlands.'[3]

America

Political relations with the United States had begun only when Panglima Tibang received an unexpectedly warm welcome from Major Studer in January. When Tibang was followed back to Atjeh by the Dutch expeditionary force it was widely believed that he had sold Atjeh to the Dutch, and he escaped execution only by the Sultan's protection. Nevertheless his warm recommendation of an American alliance was followed. A meeting of Atjehnese leaders on 6 March decided in favour of a treaty.[4] Four days after Nieuwenhuyzen had begun shelling Atjeh from his ships, the Sultan sent off a letter to Studer with two envoys who travelled at night in a small boat. They were Thamby Meidin Shah, one of the Sultan's retainers, and John Swendsen, the Norwegian from Simpang Ulim.

[1] Lavino to Read ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[2] Teuku Paya to Marshal MacMahon 4 July 1873, copied from English text of French Minister in The Hague, in Gericke to Van de Putte 8 October 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Gericke to Van Zuylen van Nyevelt (Paris) 11 October 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[4] Preamble to draft Atjeh-U.S.A. treaty, copy in Studer to Davis 4 October 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 11.

After reaching Simpang Ulim they were put on a schooner for Penang by Teuku Muda Nyak Malim, who also sent his own letter offering his pepper to the Americans.

The Sultan's letter, pressing Studer to drive away the Dutch fleet from Atjeh and promising in return to accept American goods in trade, reached Singapore on 28 April. In his report to Washington Studer said he gave no encouragement to the envoys.[1] Certainly he should not have done, after being reprimanded by his government for his clumsy and unauthorized part in the Arifin affair. But the Consul was carried away by his sympathy with the Atjehnese, and perhaps influenced too by the ambitions of some local American traders. He continued to negotiate privately with the Atjehnese, and thus inevitably to encourage their hopes.

Soon after the arrival of the Atjehnese appeal Studer sent his Indian writer, Omar Chattab, to Penang to discuss a treaty with Teuku Ibrahim and the other Atjehnese there.[2] Omar Chattab was soon able to report that Ibrahim had drawn up a draft treaty on the lines suggested and that this had been sent to Atjeh for approval on 7 June.[3] During the next two months the draft was debated in Atjeh and Penang, while envoys passed back and forth.

In Penang Teuku Ibrahim was moved to write to President Grant at about the same time as Teuku Paya's letter to Marshal MacMahon and with the same request: namely, to clear the Atjehnese name of the slurs cast on it by the Dutch. The State Department replied simply that America had no complaints against Atjeh.[4]

In September, Teuku Ibrahim finally received definite authority from Sultan Mahmud to conclude a treaty on the basis of his draft. The Council of Eight met once more towards the end of that month and entrusted Stuart Herriot with the drafting of an English version to be submitted to Studer. This

[1] Studer to Davis 30 April 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 10. Gould, 1961, p. 4.

[2] Procès-verbal taken from Haji Muhammad Jeimal and Sayyid Muhammad bin Abd ar-Rahman Misjoor in Batavia, 2 July 1873, copies in Cons. Singapore 100.

[3] Enclosures in Maier to Loudon 27 June 1874, copy Kol. to B.Z. 25 August 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

[4] Gould, 1961, pp. 4–5.

envisaged a firm defensive alliance with provision for an American Consul with extra-territorial rights in Banda Atjeh. Its most substantial bait was the cession of Pulau We, an island commanding the entrance to the Straits and possessing the fine harbour of Sabang. All the members of the Council of Eight signed the draft treaty, and five of them, led by Ibrahim, took it to Singapore in September.[1]

In peace time this would have tempted most governments, but it was hardly likely to draw the United States into a colonial war. This time Studer was specifically reprimanded for even sending the treaty to Washington. The only encouragement the Secretary of State allowed the Atjehnese was that America would consider a commercial treaty if the war resulted in confirming the independence of Atjeh.[2]

Teuku Ibrahim waited in Singapore for three months to hear this reply, bolstering the hopes of his countrymen all the while with the promise of obtaining support. On the eve of the second Dutch expedition Lavino detected no despondency among the Atjehnese of Penang, who clung with 'no little confidence' to the American negotiations.[3]

Much of this confidence was dashed in January when Ibrahim heard the American reply from Studer and returned sadly to Penang. Even then he 'rejoiced that . . . America had not altogether abandoned them', because of the possibility that Washington would reopen negotiations if the Atjehnese could get the upper hand.[4] Four months later this idea could still stimulate Teuku Paya to new hopes of an American treaty when he heard of Van Swieten's departure from Atjeh with most of his men.[5]

[1] Padday to Read 23, 29 and 30 September 1873 (telegrams), Cons. Penang 35; Lavino to Read ? October 1873, Cons. Penang 100; Studer to Washington 4 October and 17 November 1873, and enclosures, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 11. A copy of the draft is in G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol. Kab. D^{33}, 6042.

[2] Gould, 1961, p. 4.

[3] Lavino to Read 15 November 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

[4] Studer to Washington 20 January 1874, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 11; also Read to Loudon 17 December 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 24 December 1873, Kol. Kab. A^{9}, 6047; *idem* 27 January 1874, copy G.G. to Kol. 4 February 1874, Kol. Kab. N^{16}, 6044.

[5] Teuku Paya to Nyak Abas n.d. (rec. 1 June 1874), translation in G.G. to Kol. 30 June 1874, Kol. Kab. E^{24}, 6052.

The effect on Atjehnese opinion

All the overtures of Atjeh to the western powers ended in failure. This by no means robs them of historical significance, however. There can be no doubt that the hope of help from abroad united the Atjehnese throughout 1873 in a determination to resist further attacks, despite the recognition by most of the leaders that they could not for long withstand the technical superiority of the West. Teuku Ibrahim, for example,

> ... hoped that, owing to their numerical superiority coupled with the determination not to fall under Dutch rule, they would be able to hold out against the latter until through mediation or foreign interference the Dutch would be compelled to leave them in peace.[1]

Morale was never again so high as during 1873, but the history of the war shows abundant examples of the effect on the resistance of revived hopes of foreign help.

The most important negotiations in this respect were those nearest to success: Abd ar-Rahman's appeals to Turkey.

Throughout his stay in the Turkish capital, Abd ar-Rahman exchanged occasional telegrams with Shaikh Ahmad in Penang. The substance of these was quickly sent on to Atjeh, together with important press items. Communication was not difficult except between September 1873, when the Dutch ceased issuing licenses for vessels to pass through the blockade, and April 1874, when some 'friendly' states were opened to trade. During this period letters could only go by the difficult route via Deli or Langkat, and the Council of Eight lost much of its influence on events.

The importance of the news from Turkey became apparent soon after the first Dutch expedition. In June some of the Penang Atjehnese were contemplating negotiations with Holland. They had even been in touch with the irrepressible Arifin, who had drawn up a treaty subsequently printed in the *Pinang Gazette* of 23 June.[2] In the middle of these deliberations four of the Council of Eight telegraphed to Abd ar-Rahman asking with some urgency whether or not Turkey was prepared

[1] Studer to Washington 4 October 1873, U.S. Consulate Singapore, 11.
[2] Lavino to Read 3 July 1873, Cons. Penang 100.

to help. An affirmative reply arrived ten days later, and so encouraged the Atjehnese that they abandoned all thoughts of conciliation.[1]

On top of this excitement came Reuter's cable of 11 July 1873, bearing the news that eight Turkish warships were on their way to protect Atjeh. Teuku Paya wrote at once to Simpang Ulim, whence the good news must have spread quickly throughout Atjeh. When a second Reuter cable contradicted the first within a few days, the leading Atjehnese in Penang soon lost hope of any substantial support from Turkey. But Teuku Paya never wrote to counteract the effect of his excited letter to Simpang Ulim.[2] On the contrary, he was reported to have announced later that the promised warships had arrived at Jidda on their way to Sumatra.[3]

This was the most dramatic instance of what must have been a general tendency among the Penang Atjehnese, to relay the good news more enthusiastically than the bad. Not surprisingly, Turkey's tactful offer of mediation was understood in Atjeh as an appeal to Holland not to attack Atjeh because that country stood under Turkish authority.[4] At least until the Dutch renewed their offensive in November the leaders of the resistance in Atjeh probably believed in the probability of outside support.

This view was not shared in Penang. Already in September Teuku Paya wore a worried look and confessed: 'that he does not know what will become of Atchin now that Turkey seems unwilling to lend her assistance'.[5] Before the end of the year Shaikh Ahmad sent three urgent telegrams pressing Abd ar-Rahman to return since Turkey had done nothing to help.[6]

The unexpected encouragement of the American Consul did partially revive the spirits of the Penang party, and probably also of the war leaders, at the end of the year. But the emotions aroused by the prospect of Turkish intervention were unique.

[1] *Idem* 15 June and 8 July 1873, Cons. Penang 100; Padday to Read 28 June 1873 (telegram), Cons. Penang 35.
[2] Lavino to Read 5 September 1873, Cons. Penang 100.
[3] Report of Raja Burhan Udin 17 October 1873, translation in G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol. Kab. D[22], 6042.
[4] *Idem.*
[5] Lavino to Read 5 September 1873, Cons. Penang 100.
[6] Heldewier to Gericke 15 December 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

Propaganda from Singapore

Keen supporters of Atjeh were also to be found in Singapore, but of rather a different kind. Singapore contained no Atjehnese colony and possessed no direct trade with Atjeh. 'The rancour against the Dutch, which the Muslim population here seems to have felt since the beginning of the war, cannot be ascribed to losses suffered, but only to religious and political causes.'[1]

The Muslim community of this mainly Chinese city formed a distinct minority, but it was important for two reasons. One was that it included some extremely wealthy Arab merchants with commercial connexions throughout Muslim Asia. The other was that Muslims from all the Dutch possessions in Indonesia gathered in Singapore to begin their pilgrim journey to Mecca. The Colony therefore had a very special position as a centre of communication and propaganda throughout the Archipelago.

When the news that the Dutch had declared war was received in Singapore it produced an immediate wave of excited sympathy among the Arabs there. Within a few days they had brought together 'a considerable sum of money' to help the Atjehnese.[2] Later they launched an appeal among the Arabs of the Straits and Java to raise a grant or loan of a million dollars, of which $100,000 was said to have been collected by November 1874.[3]

The centre for all the sympathizers was the mosque maintained by the al-Sagoff family in Kampong Glam. 'All the most fanatical Mussulmen' attended this mosque, heard weekly reports on Atjeh affairs from one of the agents of Sayyid Muhammad al-Sagoff, and offered prayers for the success of Atjehnese arms.[4]

The Arab family of al-Sagoff was one of the wealthiest and most influential among the Muslims of Singapore. The father was Sayyid Ahmad bin Abd ar-Rahman al-Sagoff, a great

[1] Maier to Van Lansberge 19 April 1875, copy to Willebois, B.Z. Atjeh.
[2] Read to Alg. Sec. 30 April 1873, copy Read to Gericke 30 May 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.
[3] Maier to Loudon 22 November and 14 December 1874, copies to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.
[4] Read to Van Lansberge 2 April 1876, copy to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

merchant, shipowner and Muslim benefactor who died in 1875. He owned two steamers on the Jidda-Singapore run and chartered others so as to dominate the whole South-East Asian pilgrim traffic.[1] He was no friend of the Dutch Consul-General, who considered him a 'dangerous fanatic' who 'has great influence among the Mohamedans of this place, and has made all possible attempts to incite Netherlands Indies subjects against the Government, and to arouse them to a religious war'.[2]

Ahmad's son, Sayyid Muhammad, was an even more active protagonist.[3] Read was convinced that these two men were behind all local attempts to arouse Muslims against the Dutch.

Read heard during June 1873 that a circular letter to the native Regents of Java was being drawn up in Singapore, to be signed by the two al-Sagoffs and another Arab merchant, Sayyid Junied: 'all viewed here as rather respectable men but warm religionists'.[4] The Consul was convinced that these inflammatory letters were posted or taken to Java on 26 June, to be distributed through the Arab headmen of Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya.[5] But no letters signed by these important merchants were discovered in Java. It is improbable that such men would have publicly compromised themselves in this way, though they undoubtedly lent their private support to some plans of this kind which for the moment came to nothing.

One other bundle of letters, written by some hajis in Singapore to incite Javanese aristocrats to support Atjeh, had been reported by Read earlier in June.[6] But these too appear not to have reached their destination. On 12 July, Read felt able to report with relief: 'The idea of a religious war, of which there

[1] Buckley, pp. 564–5; Hanegraaf (Jidda) to Gericke 3 February 1873, B.Z. Atjeh. During 1874 the al-Sagoff 'Singapore Steamship Company' took 3,476 pilgrims to Mecca in four steamers. 2,250 of the number were from Netherlands India. Report of Dutch Consul in Jidda, translation in F.O. to C.O. 9 February 1875, C.O. 273/82.

[2] Read to Gericke 27 November 1873, copy B.Z. to Kol. 30 December 1873, Kol. Kab. O, 6044.

[3] Read to Loudon 23 September 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 27 September 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[4] *Idem* 23 June 1873, copy Kol. to B.Z. 6 September 1873, B.Z. Atjeh. For Junied see Buckley, pp. 563–4.

[5] Read to Loudon 26 June 1873, telegram, Cons. Singapore 70.

[6] *Idem* 18 and 19 June 1873, telegrams, Cons. Singapore 70.

was talk, appears to be abandoned at least for the moment, and I hope it shall not reappear.'[1] His only fear was of developments in Turkey, which the Muslims of Singapore followed with great interest.

The day after this reassurance, a Reuter's cable announced to the citizens of Singapore that Turkey was sending eight warships to defend Atjeh.

The excitement of the enthusiasts was immediate and was not quelled by the subsequent denial of the report. A stream of exaggerated letters to Java called on all faithful Muslims to rise against their Dutch masters the moment the Turkish fleet appeared, or alternatively as soon as the second Dutch expedition to Atjeh had depleted the forces in Java. Read's spies could not keep up with the activity. The Consul reported despairingly: 'I believe that every native Arab leaving this place conveys letters to somebody or other and it is impossible to catch a tithe of them'.[2]

Nevertheless Read's information together with the selection of letters which the authorities in Java were able to seize enable us to establish the pattern of the campaign.

Most of the principal movers in it appear to have been Javanese hajis or Arabs from Java, making a living in Singapore through either the pilgrim traffic or a small trade with Java. One of the most prominent among these was Haji Ismail bin Haji Abubakar, who owned a hostel in Singapore for Javanese Mecca-goers, and especially those from his own province, Bantam. Haji Ismail wrote to his father, the Penghulu of Banjumas, and to the Regent of Serang, advising them that the Caliph was sending warships to assist Atjeh and that they and all the rulers of Java should encourage the faithful under their jurisdiction to join the holy war in Atjeh. Since Ismail requested that these recruits be sent to him in Singapore to be forwarded to Atjeh in good time, he doubtless hoped to further his pilgrim business as well as the Atjehnese war effort.[3]

[1] Read to Gericke 12 July 1873, Cons. Singapore 8.

[2] Read to Loudon 27 September 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 October 1873, Kol. Kab. D^{33}, 6042.

[3] Haji Ismail to Haji Abubakar 20 Jumadil Akir 1290H (16 August 1873), and Haji Ismail and Haji Mahmud Arifin to Raden Haji Pateh Bantam 24 Jumadi-ul-awal 1290H (21 July 1873). Dutch translations, forwarded by the Resident of Bantam, are under date of the original letters in Cons.

The plan discussed in June of circulating a letter to the Regents of Java was put into effect only after the alarm from Constantinople. The Arab headmen of Batavia and Semarang dutifully handed to the Dutch authorities packets they had received, enclosing letters addressed respectively to the Sultan of Riau and to various rulers in Central Java. The letter to Riau, possibly also inspired by Haji Ismail, related that instructions had been received from the Caliph for 'all Muslims in the lands below the wind' that all must join the holy war on the arrival of the Turkish warships.[1] Similar information was conveyed in the Semarang letters, which were intended especially to urge their recipients to persuade the Susuhunan and the Sultan of Djogjakarta to send their men to Atjeh.[2]

The device of using the chief Arabs of the major cities was clearly a desperate measure to avoid the vigilance of the postal authorities in Java. But these Arab officials were directly responsible to and dependent on the Dutch residents, and could hardly be expected to flirt with rebellion.

The safest way to send messages was to entrust them verbally to one of the many traders or pilgrims who passed between Singapore and Java. One such attempt, and probably the most carefully planned, was uncovered by Read. An Atjehnese in Penang told a Singapore friend in July that the Sultan of Atjeh had written to Penang requesting that a proper person be sent on his behalf to Java to confer with the rulers there. The Atjehnese had been unable to find a suitable messenger in Penang but had arranged that a Kelantan Arab familiar with Java, Shaikh Abd ar-Rahman, would confer with the Javanese Regents if given $1000.[3] This Arab did leave Singapore the

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Singapore 100. See also Resident of Bantam to Loudon 14 October 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 15 October 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[1] Raja Bech and Shaikh Abd ar-Rahman Jourana (Singapore) to Sri Paduka Tuan Raja (Riau) 23 Jumadi-ul-awal 1290H (20 July 1873), Dutch translation, forwarded by 1st Government Secretary, under original date in Cons. Singapore 100.

[2] Resident of Semarang to Loudon 8 September 1873, telegram, and Haji Abdul Mejid (Singapore) to Inche Taib (Semarang) n.d., both under original dates in Cons. Singapore 100. Procureur-General to Loudon 24 September 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 October 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[3] Muhammad Taif (Penang) to Tambie Jaiboo (Singapore) 20 Jumadi-ul-awal 1290H (17 July 1873) translation in Read to Lavino 21 August 1873, Cons. Penang 99.

following month on a mission to the Susuhunan of Surakarta, but was captured by the Dutch Resident of that state.[1]

The inexperience of these earliest propagandists against Dutch rule is well shown by the direction of their appeals to the traditional Indonesian rulers who, particularly in Central Java, had become fully dependent upon the Dutch régime, even if they were not yet identified with it. No other candidates had yet presented themselves as conceivable leaders of an Indonesian movement.

For this reason, the irrepressible wave of gossip about the Atjeh war spread through the Archipelago by traders from Singapore was considerably more effective than the organized appeals. Atjehnese developments aroused greatest interest in those areas in close comercial contact with Singapore—Borneo, the Celebes, and eastern Sumatra. Atjeh had always borne a fabled reputation for military prowess, which seemed justified by its repulse of the Dutch. Every trader coming from Singapore was asked for the latest news, and storytellers did not always scruple at a few exaggerations. Likewise visitors to Singapore from the nearby states always showed a keen interest in Atjehnese developments.[2]

Rumours of probable risings against the Dutch were constantly being reported, especially by the excitable Consul-General in Singapore. Yet no rising occurred. The only repercussion of the war was a great deal of excitement and anticipation throughout the Archipelago, particularly in those parts of the Netherlands Indian 'Outer Possessions' where Dutch influence was most nominal, and where the traditional leaders were still capable of opposition.

The Resident of South and East Borneo summed up the

[1] Enclosures in G.G. to Kol. 27 September 1873, Kol. Kab. D^{33}, 6042.

[2] Governor of Celebes to Loudon 8 December 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 2 January 1874, Kol. Kab. A^{9}, 6047; Read to Loudon 8 December 1873, copy in Kol. Kab. B^{28}, 6039. An interesting example of the Muslim literature on the subject is the lithographed 'Sha'ir Perang Atjeh', a copy of which a Dutch official found in the market at Banda (South Moluccas). It describes the defeat of the Dutch first expedition in heroic terms, attributing Kohler's death to divine intervention. The author, calling himself 'Budak Jauhari' was presumably a Singapore Malay. His ignorance of Atjeh internal politics suggests he was at least not Atjehnese. E. Blok (trans.) 'Sjair Perang Atjeh, naar een te Singapoera(?) gelithographeerden Maleischen tekst' *TBG* 30 (1885), pp. 568–95.

position in his own district: 'That the war with Atjeh produces a certain tension here, and arouses in many the hope of seeing a change of things brought about as a result, is only natural.' But, he continued, the news of an impending second Dutch expedition would tend to delay any rebellious plans which did exist in Borneo and make their realization dependent on the success or failure of that expedition.[1]

The same was true of other districts. The Atjehnese success certainly created hopes among discontented elements. Muslims throughout Indonesia were indignant at the Dutch attack, and the success of Atjehnese arms was prayed for in the mosques of the Archipelago, as well as in those of Penang, Singapore and Johor.[2] But belief in European military superiority had by no means been decisively shaken, and everywhere leaders preferred to talk about revolt rather than to indulge in it.

This, in different words, was the conclusion of K. H. Hall, the Adviser to the Netherlands Indian Government on Native Affairs, who was instructed to investigate the repercussions of the war in Java and Singapore. Although he found many religious and secular leaders in West Java sympathetic to Atjeh, he concluded that the Singapore agitators would find insufficient inflammable material in Java 'to set all alight'. One of two things, he stated, would be necessary before the situation could become 'really serious': a second setback for Dutch troops in Atjeh, or an intervention by Turkey. Hall did not seriously contemplate the latter. On the other hand, he found general belief in Java as well as in Singapore that Turkey had every right to interfere, since Atjeh was under its protection. Nor did anyone appear to doubt that Turkey had the strength to interfere if she wished. But, Hall added, the disillusion when Turkey failed to intervene would thereby be the greater and the more beneficial for Holland.[3]

All this excitement and sympathy produced only a trickle

[1] Tramp to Loudon 26 November 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 19 December 1873, Kol. Kab. A^9, 6047.

[2] A private European informer of Read wrote categorically: 'I know prayers are offered in every mosque in the Straits, Java and the Eastern Archipelago on behalf of the Acheenese,' Read to Gericke 1 June 1873, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Secret Report of K. H. Hall, 30 July 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 16 August 1873, Kol. Kab. Q^{30}, 6040.

of Javanese sufficiently enthusiastic to wish to take part in the holy war in Atjeh. Though more dangerous, this was considerably cheaper than the pilgrimage to Mecca and was regarded by many as of equal spiritual worth. But the largest numbers appear to have tried to reach Atjeh in the last two months of 1873, after the Dutch had ceased allowing any ships to pass the blockade. As a result, the number who succeeded in taking part in the war was probably very small. In December Read reported the return to Singapore of thirty such Javanese who had found it impossible to cross the Straits from Penang.[1]

The attempts of the Atjehnese to find allies against the Dutch were only effective close to home, among the hill-tribe of Gayos, who had always been under Atjehnese political influence. Although they, together with the Alas people and various Batak tribes, had initially told the envoys of Sultan Mahmud that they wished to remain neutral,[2] they were in fact drawn into the war in increasing numbers as Dutch forces penetrated nearer their homeland.[3] Early in 1874 Atjehnese envoys also stirred up considerable anti-Dutch feeling among the pagan Karo-Bataks, whose lands bordered the Deli plantation region. But the envoys were later killed in a skirmish, evidently on the instructions of Karo chiefs who wished to avoid further trouble.[4]

These inland tribes had not come into contact with Europeans before the time of the Atjeh war; they were primarily non-Muslim and outside the usual pattern of Indonesian politics. Thus the help which they did provide for Atjeh had nothing to do with the beginnings of an 'Indonesian consciousness', but was simply an expression of their distrust of the foreign invaders.

Evaluation

Though it bore no immediate fruit, the agitation against the

[1] Read to Loudon 17 December 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 24 December 1873, Kol. Kab. A[9], 6407. Also *idem* 23 October 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 29 October 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042; Read to Assistant-Resident of Deli 29 October 1873, Cons. Singapore 8.

[2] Report of Burhan Udin to Verspijck 11 and 14 October 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 November 1873, Kol. Kab. D[33], 6042.

[3] Lavino to Van Lansberge 7 January, 13 and 27 September, and 25 October 1876, Cons. Penang 106; *idem* 24 May 1877, Cons. Penang 107.

[4] Resident, East Coast of Sumatra to Loudon 5 April, 5 May and 6 June 1874, copies G.G. to Kol. 25 April, 23 May and 21 June 1874, respectively, Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052.

Dutch during 1873, with its spasmodic echoes throughout the next three decades, marked an important new step in Indonesian development. Atjeh's resistance was certainly defensive and backward-looking—the death-struggle of the old Indonesian order. But many of the sympathizers with the Sultanate were men of greater sophistication and vision than the old-world Atjehnese *ulèëbalangs*, and for the first time they were armed with the telegraph and the steamship. The result was the first ripple of awareness that Muslims throughout the Archipelago might be involved in a contest with the ruling European minority. Islam was the only possible focus for such a feeling under the conditions of the nineteenth century. The fact that the state with the greatest reputation for Muslim zeal became for so long the centre of resistance to the Dutch gave added impetus to the religious factor in what was later known as nationalism.

It is easier to assess the impact of the pro-Atjeh agitation on the Netherlands Indian Government than on its subjects. Reassured by the report of its Adviser for Native Affairs, the Government had no immediate fear of uprisings. But the realization of Holland's weakness if the peoples of Indonesia ever did find a common banner appears to have deepened. This accounts for the Dutch determination to crush Atjeh in the second expedition, and the exceptional anxiety with which that expedition was followed in Holland.

In the middle of 1873, the Netherlands Colonial Department prepared an appeal to London for solidarity against the movement provoked by the Atjeh war and other developments:

> A certain emotion already appears to have arisen among the Mahomedan population in some countries in the Indies, an emotion which thus far is not of a nature to cause serious apprehension, but which, by developing in the direction which the fanatic Mussulman party strives to give it, may lead to a serious state of affairs for the Christian powers which have major interests to safeguard in those regions—in the first place for the Netherlands and Great Britain.[1]

Holland had used this type of appeal before, when seeking British support for excluding Turkish influence from South-East Asia or for unpopular Dutch expansion in Sumatra. But

[1] Enclosure in Gericke to Van Bylandt 16 July 1873, Woltring I, p. 586.

the point had never been made with such conviction. Harris reported from The Hague that Gericke was 'seriously impressed with the idea that there is an extensive Mahomedan propaganda on foot'.[1]

Having received similar evidence from Syria,[2] the Foreign Office was sufficiently impressed to issue a circular to all consuls in Muslim countries, asking them to report any signs of a 'religious and political revival' among Muslims.[3] But the official reply from India, where the Dutch always hoped to find the British sympathetically sharing their problems, was a blank: '. . . we have no reason to believe that the proceedings of the Dutch at Acheen have excited any great sympathy, or even ordinary attention, among the Mahomedans of India'.[4]

Even the Malays of the Peninsula, who shared a common culture with Sumatra and followed Atjeh developments with great interest, did not share the quickened hope of ousting the Europeans. Some observers in the Straits did suggest that the violent resistance in 1875 after the appointment of the first British Resident in Perak had been encouraged by the relative success of the Atjehnese against European arms.[5] But the politically-conscious Muslims of Penang and Singapore who had grown so bitter against the Dutch had no sympathy whatever for the Perak rising.[6]

The real significance of the 1873 agitation was the greater sense of religious solidarity it brought about among those with specific grievances against the Dutch. Historians of Indonesian nationalism may legitimately see in it the first example of a popular movement against the Dutch to affect all major parts of the Archipelago.[7]

[1] Harris to Granville 22 July 1873, F.O. 37/534.

[2] W. Kirby Green (Damascus) to Granville 25 July 1873, F.O. 78/2282.

[3] Circular to Consuls in Moslem Countries, 22 August 1873, F.O. 83/414.

[4] Government of India to Argyll 2 October 1873, copy I.O. to F.O. 3 November 1873, F.O. 37/519.

[5] Clarke to Jervois 26 November 1875, quoted R. H. Vetch *Life of Lieut.-General Sir Andrew Clarke* (London, 1905), p. 188. Lavino to Van Lansberge 9 December 1875, Cons. Penang 102; Maier to Van Lansberge 14 December 1873, copy to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

[6] Lavino to Van Lansberge 25 November 1875, Cons. Penang 102; Maier to Van Lansberge 16 November 1875, copy to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

[7] The movement is discussed in the context of pan-Islam in Reid, 'Nineteenth-century pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia', *JAS*, 26, No. 2 (1967), pp. 274–9.

5

Hopes of Peace
1874–1878

Despite the bitterness which eventually marked the long, tragic war in Atjeh, the gulf between the parties was not at first too great for careful statesmanship to bridge. Had Dutch policy been less intransigent in the years after the second expedition the realistic Atjehnese leaders could probably have carried most of their countrymen with them in a compromise settlement. But by 1884, when the Dutch began to revert to their time-honoured policy of accepting and using existing institutions, Atjehnese moderates had long lost their leadership.

Van Swieten's 'annexation' of Atjeh

Before 1873 the Siak Treaty of 1858 was the model for further Dutch advance in North Sumatra. The Dutch hoped to bind the Sultan of Atjeh to their side either peacefully, by supporting him against his turbulent vassals, or if necessary by demonstrating forcefully to him the futility of resisting European arms. However, the former alternative was ruled out in 1873 by Dutch impatience; the latter by the defeat of the first expedition.

Even after the first expedition the Dutch made it explicit that their aim was only to obtain a treaty with the Sultan like that already concluded with Siak. 'We covet no direct control over your country,' Van Swieten proclaimed on landing in Atjeh, 'nor desire to meddle with your religion and customs.'[1]

Whatever these terms might have achieved if advanced more

[1] Van Swieten to Mahmud, n.d., translation Harris to Granville 14 January 1874: also Harris to Granville 21 November 1873: F.O. 37/534. Fransen van de Putte *Atjeh. Parlementaire Redevoering* (Schiedam, 1886), pp. 123–4; Van de Putte's report to States-General, translation Harris to Derby 13 August 1874, F.O. 37/526.

skilfully before the war, they made no impression after the Atjehnese had lost hundreds of men from an unprovoked Dutch attack. A month after the retreat of the first expedition Lavino had explained the Dutch terms to Shaikh Ahmad in Penang: 'He laid his fist upon the table and said in the most emphatic manner, that if I had spoken to him thus some four months ago, he is persuaded the war would not have taken place . . . but now, he says, it is too late.'[1]

Lavino later warned his government that only 'the conviction that they are supporting an entirely hopeless cause' would induce the Penang Atjehnese to favour submission.[2] This condition was virtually fulfilled in 1874. But just as the more sophisticated Atjehnese were becoming resigned to accepting Holland's terms, the terms were radically altered by the decree of General Van Swieten.

The elderly commander was a cautious, unimaginative and humane soldier. He was appalled at his heavy losses in Atjeh, and extremely relieved to be at last in possession of the 'kraton' to which such importance had been attached in Holland. The Atjehnese had resisted all his attempts to negotiate with them, going so far as to murder the first messenger he sent to them. The simple notion that Atjeh's politics were a replica of Siak's proved illusory. To add to the difficulty Sultan Mahmud died of cholera on 26 January without leaving any obvious successor.

Thus the original plan appeared to be destroyed. Van Swieten was not the man to press on with his attack, but nor was he sufficient of a statesman to make the necessary allowance for the national pride with which he had so obviously come into collision. On the contrary he yielded to the desire to put the occupation on a permanent footing which would enable him to declare his task complete, without waiting until he understood the real position. On 31 January 1874, he proclaimed Atjeh a part of Netherlands India by right of conquest. Two days later he wrote to the *ulèëbalangs* that any new election to the Sultanate would be invalid because there was no sovereign in Atjeh except the Netherlands Government.

In his reports Van Swieten offered no alternative to these arrangements. The home government therefore approved the

[1] Lavino to Read 18 June 1873, Cons. Penang 100.
[2] Lavino to Maier 11 June 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

change of policy in a telegram which reached Van Swieten on 12 February. He then took the final step, declaring that the Netherlands Indian Government had taken the place of the Sultan, and that chiefs who did not acknowledge this within a month would be declared fallen from office.[1]

The home government had evidently intended to approve only provisional measures to regulate the occupation until the question of the Sultanate was clarified. Yet the policy was not changed when the mistakenness of Van Swieten's optimism became immediately apparent to his successors; nor when Pel's reports, not to mention Lavino's, removed any doubt of Atjehnese unwillingness to submit on Van Swieten's terms; nor when the Atjehnese chose a new Sultan in the person of Muhammad Daud, the ten-year-old grandson of Sultan Ibrahim, who was placed under the guardianship of Tuanku Hashim. Sure in his opinion and supported by his first-hand knowledge, Van Swieten was in too strong a position for a Ministry then facing a crisis of confidence. Thus during 1874 the abolition of the Sultanate was allowed to become a rigid principle of policy on which Dutch prestige was thought to depend. There could be no more talk of negotiations or treaties but only of unconditional submission by 'rebel' *ulèëbalangs*.

Clarke's offer of mediation

On the Atjehnese side the first man fully to grasp the hopelessness of a struggle against a European army was Abd ar-Rahman az-Zahir—always a realist. His experience in Constantinople had convinced him that no help was available from the European Powers, and as a foreigner himself he did not share the determination of many Atjehnese to defend their country even against the most conclusive odds.

On his journey from Constantinople back to Indonesia, Abd ar-Rahman was already thinking in terms of arranging an honourable submission of Atjeh.[2] In Jidda, he asked the Dutch

[1] Kielstra, *Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog* I, pp. 325–7 and 333–4, and Appendices XXVII, XXVIII, and XXXII. Van de Putte, pp. 124–6. Van de Putte's report to States-General, translation, loc. cit. Van Swieten to Knoop 17 October 1874 (open letter), translation in F.O. to C.O. 16 November 1874, C.O. 273/77. Kreemer, *Atjèh* I, pp. 15–16.

[1] Resident of Preanger to Loudon 8 April 1874, copy G.G. to Kol. 14

Consul for an introduction to the Governor-General of Netherlands India, which was refused.[1]

Arriving in Singapore in March 1874 Abd ar-Rahman immediately established himself in Johor, where he was known from his residence ten years before.[2] Beside the Maharaja, his two constant friends and advisers there were the two leading Arab merchants of Singapore, Sayyid Muhammad al-Sagoff and Sayyid Junied. Like the Habib himself, both were realistic Muslims who knew the European world and had successfully, though reluctantly, come to terms with it. Knowing the Atjehnese could never again hope to drive the Dutch into the sea, they supported Abd ar-Rahman's desire to save what he could by negotiation.[3]

The Maharaja of Johor[4] had made himself unique in the Indonesian world by successfully achieving respectability in the European society of Singapore, while remaining fully independent, at least in form. He was anxious to increase the prestige of this role in the eyes of Malays by mediating in disputes between European and Indonesian governments, of which the Atjeh war was the outstanding case.[5] Very soon after Abd ar-Rahman's arrival in Johor, the Maharaja suggested to Sir Andrew Clarke that Britain should take some initiative towards ending the war. Clarke was sympathetic and asked the Maharaja to report fully about the Atjehnese envoy.[6]

This new Governor of the Straits Settlements[7] had none of

April 1874, Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052. The Resident's informer had been a fellow-passenger of the Habib.

[1] Hanegraaf (Jidda) to Gericke 20 February 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] Alexander, 'Korte Levensschets', p. 1010.

[3] Maier to Loudon 24 March 1874, copy to Padday, Cons. Penang 46.

[4] Abubakar (1833–95) succeeded his father Ibrahim as Temenggong of Johor in 1862, but changed his title to Maharaja in 1866 and Sultan in 1885. 'In his tastes and habits . . . an English gentleman', he received a European education in Singapore, visited England six times, and was friendly with all the leading British officials of Singapore. He never knowingly opposed British interests, and built Johor into a modern state by accepting British advice. He was, however, on very bad terms with Read. Cowan, *Nineteenth Century Malaya* (1961), pp. 38–9 and 158–9. Winstedt, 'A History of Johore', *JMBRAS* X, Part 3 (1932), pp. 97–119.

[5] This was Read's unsympathetic description of his motives, to Loudon 25 August 1873, copy G.G. to Kol. 15 October 1873, Kol. Kab. B[28], 6039.

[6] Read to Loudon 17 March 1874, extract in Kol. to B.Z. 1 June 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

[7] Lt. Gen. Sir Andrew Clarke (1824–1902) was like Ord an Officer of the

his predecessor's special sympathy for Holland, and was considerably more influenced than Ord by the general hostility of the British merchants to Dutch advances in Sumatra. He soon made clear his disapproval of the way Ord had stretched British neutrality to favour the Dutch. When Lavino was officially named 'Agent of the Netherlands Indies Government for Atjehnese affairs at Penang', Clarke had him warned:

> . . . that although he was aware that a belligerent power had made a neutral port the basis of operations against another friendly nation, still if anything connected therewith were to be placed before him in a decidedly official manner, it might lead to a strict observance of the neutral laws in the Straits Settlements.[1]

Furthermore, Clarke's confidence in his ability to deal with Malays had been boosted by the Pangkor Engagement of 14 January 1874, which had apparently settled the Perak troubles by establishing British indirect rule there.

After hearing reports about Abd ar-Rahman from both the Maharaja and the Solicitor-General, Braddell, Clarke announced his willingness to meet the Atjehnese envoy. Hearing of this, the Netherlands Consul-General immediately approached the Governor. Clarke later reported that Read was anxious to know whether the Straits Government could be persuaded to take advantage of Abd ar-Rahman's presence to 'intervene' in the interests of peace. He led Sir Andrew to believe that the Dutch would welcome British mediation, since: '. . . the civil administration, and especially the present Governor-General of Netherlands India were heartily sick of the undertaking and not over sanguine as to its results'. Clarke was able to reply in the words of Granville's draft of a reply to Sultan Mahmud, that both parties: '. . . could always rely upon

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Royal Engineers. He had a reputation for exceptional ability and decisiveness which, backed by his powerful Whitehall connexions, enabled him to wield power more naturally and acceptably than his predecessor. Clarke was an 'Imperialist' in his time, who valued the imperial connexion and official protection for pioneer trade. He worked in Australia and New Zealand from 1847 to 1858. As Governor of the Straits Settlements (4 November 1873–10 May 1875) he carried a reluctant Whitehall towards a policy of intervention in the Malay States. Cowan, pp. 176–8; Vetch, *Life of . . . Sir Andrew Clarke.*

[1] Lavino to Alg. Sec. 7 August 1874, Cons. Penang 101.

the friendly efforts of Great Britain to promote the restoration of peace and tranquillity'.[1]

The following day Read cabled to Loudon that Clarke was soon to receive Abd ar-Rahman and requested the Governor-General not to hesitate to make use of his services for negotiations with Atjeh. The curt reply came back without hesitation: 'I value the intentions of Sir Andrew. Envoy has no mandate: his principal dead: whose kingdom ceased to exist. If the envoy values the good of his country he will use his influence to promote submission quickly and completely.'[2]

The uncompromising tone of this reply failed to deter Clarke or even the Dutch Vice-Consul, Maier, who acted for Read when the latter went to Europe in April. On 11 April Abd ar-Rahman paid his visit to the Governor, and convinced him both of his own authority to act for Atjeh and of the necessity of British mediation if the Atjehnese were to be brought to accept Netherlands sovereignty. The following day Maier in his turn raised the matter privately with the Governor. If Clarke can be believed, Maier asserted that 'the envoy would be received with open arms in Batavia' if he made overtures for a settlement. The Vice-Consul blamed 'the influence of General van Swieten and the military party in Holland' for the resumption of the war and for subsequent Dutch intransigence. The civil government, he thought, would be found ready to accept even the mediation of a third party.[3]

Thus encouraged, Clarke expounded his conviction that the Atjehnese could be brought to accept Dutch rule provided this was exercised indirectly, as was done in Perak by the British and in Siak by the Dutch.

Only one difficulty stood in the way of peace in the opinion of Sir Andrew, namely that the Atjehnese wanted England as mediator. If this could be agreed to, then H.E. was so certain of the matter that he said 'I am almost sure I might make peace in five minutes'.[4]

[1] Clarke to Carnarvon 23 April 1874 (private) P.R.O. 30/6/40. Read's account of the interview, dated 17 March 1874, is in Kol. to B.Z. 1 June 1874, B.Z. Blokkade Atjeh.

[2] Read to Loudon and reply, both 17 March 1874, telegrams, copies Kol. to B.Z. 1 June 1874, B.Z. Blokkade Atjeh.

[3] Clarke to Carnarvon 23 April 1874 (private), P.R.O. 30/6/40.

[4] Maier to Gericke 16 April 1874, Woltring *Bescheiden Betreffende de Bui-*

Clarke explained his views more guardedly in a private letter to the Earl of Carnarvon. Thus far he had followed ministerial instructions by remaining 'wholly inactive' in the war. Now he thought the time had come for a new policy. The Atjehnese were prepared to accept British mediation to end the war and would live up to an agreement even involving the loss of their independence, just as 'they have always kept their obligations with us'. On the other hand, many of them would prefer death to any direct dealings with the Dutch. The war might then continue for years: '. . . keeping alive if it does not fan into a flame of which we may feel seriously the consequences, the spirit of Mahometan fanaticism; for the sympathy of the whole Malayan peninsula is with the Achinese'.[1]

Opinion in Holland

How far was Clarke justified in believing British mediation might have ended the war?

The weakest part of his case was the claim that Holland was prepared to accept foreign mediation.

The two Dutch representatives in Singapore both showed greater flexibility than their government. But they can hardly have been completely ignorant of the strong feeling in Holland that nothing short of complete victory could vindicate the national honour after the initial defeat. More cautious than Batavia about the declaration of war, the home government was obliged by the indignantly patriotic popular mood to be more stubborn about the peace.

Holland's attitude to third party mediation had first been defined in the case of the proposed Turkish intervention.[2] This had been firmly rejected on the grounds that it might appear to admit some form of Turkish responsibility for Muslim Indonesians. As the diplomatic struggle in Constantinople dragged on, and as more and more doubts were expressed as to Holland's ability to end the war satisfactorily, this attitude hardened in The Hague until the mere mention of mediation became

tenlandse Politiek van Nederland I, pp. 688–9. Maier reported only Clarke's share of this conversation, whereas Clarke reported chiefly Maier's.

[1] Clarke to Carnarvon 23 April 1874, (private), P.R.O. 30/6/40.

[2] See above, p. 122.

enough to arouse the deepest feelings of national pride and resentment.

The prospect of a specifically British mediation had already been brought before the Netherlands Cabinet in 1873, when Read had given the false impression that Britain's reply to Sultan Mahmud's appeal offered mediation. The Cabinet concluded firmly:

> Foreign mediation in our conflict with Atjeh cannot be desired by us. It is especially undesirable from the side of the authorities in the Straits Settlements, because the result of that would again be a collision between Netherlands and British influence in North Sumatra, the avoidance of which has been the subject of so much anxiety, both in the London Treaty of 1824 and subsequently.[1]

In conveying this decision, Van de Putte also asked whether Read had been reprimanded for having told a Singapore Arab: 'that should they [the Atjehnese] wish to treat direct or through the British Government, they would find every reasonable facility afforded them'.[2]

Sir Andrew Clarke's claim to be able to make peace 'in five minutes' naturally produced an indignant outburst in The Hague. Van de Putte exploded: 'They [the British] are very badly suited now to want to act as Angels of Peace, so as to create the appearance of putting *both* Atjeh *and* the Netherlands in their debt.'[3] They would do better, he suggested, to discourage the propaganda from Penang which so inflamed Atjehnese resistance. Even if mediation were not unacceptable to the Dutch, it could not possibly succeed when all General Van Swieten's appeals to the Atjehnese had fallen on deaf ears.[4]

The official Netherlands attitude to mediation was therefore clear enough, and there can be little doubt that Sir Andrew

[1] Van de Putte to King 15 October 1873, Kol. Kab. B^{28}, 6039. Also Notulen Ministerraad 14 October 1873, Woltring I, pp. 638–9.

[2] Van de Putte to Loudon 14 October 1873, telegram, Kol. Kab. B^{28}, 6039. Loudon protested in defence of Read: 'It can hardly be in accord with our aims to refuse peaceful overtures towards submission on our conditions.' Loudon to Van de Putte 16 October 1873, Kol. Kab. X^{31}, 6041.

[3] Pencil note on Maier to Gericke 16 April 1874, copy B.Z. to Kol. 18 May 1874, Kol. Kab. O^{16}, 6049.

[4] Van de Putte to Gericke 1 June 1874, B.Z. Blokkade Atjeh. The more moderately worded despatch forwarded to London, 15 June 1874, is in Woltring I, pp. 727–8.

Clarke was aware of it, even though he may also have known that many Dutchmen in Java disagreed. Clarke's private letter to Carnarvon must be seen as an attempt to persuade the Foreign Office to press mediation on The Hague in view of British interests in the area. It was to these interests that Clarke appealed at the end of his letter. Here and at intervals throughout his term of office Clarke attempted to show that Article III of the 1871 Treaty, which safeguarded the racial distinction in Netherlands Indian law, withdrew from most Straits traders the benefits the treaty was designed to secure. Nothing could finally be found to support this view.[1] Nevertheless Clarke continued to hope that London might take the initiative to end the war, and his regular private letters to Carnarvon seldom failed to mention Holland's poor progress in Atjeh.[2]

Either Clarke or some of the Straits merchants possessed enough influence in London to have a gentle pressure maintained on the government there. Disraeli's victorious election campaign had aroused interest in the new government's intentions for Atjeh. These were first tested in May, when a questioner asked Disraeli what would be done about Britain's obligations to Atjeh under the 1819 treaty. While not denying the validity of this treaty, Disraeli considered that: 'under the first article of the Treaty of 1871 . . . it would be morally impossible for us to interfere in that country under existing circumstances'.[3] After the Easter recess a second questioner asked specifically whether Britain was prepared to mediate. The reply was non-committal: 'No application for good offices having been received from either side, the question of mediation has not been entertained.'[4] Later in the year it was left to a section of the London press, led by the *Morning Post*, to urge mediation as the least Britain could do for 'her old allies', the plucky Atjehnese.[5]

In Whitehall, Clarke's views won sympathetic support from

[1] Clarke to Carnarvon 24 April 1875, C.O. 273/80. Van Goltstein to Willebois 22, 26 and 28 May, and 22 July 1875, and enclosures, B.Z. Atjeh.

[2] Especially Clarke to Carnarvon 2 and 29 June, 13 July and 4 November (all private) 1874, P.R.O. 30/6/40.

[3] Debate of 4 May 1874, *Hansard* 218, col. 1589.

[4] Debate of 6 July 1874, *Hansard* 220, col. 1085.

[5] *Morning Post* 2 July, 7 September and 2 October 1874; *Vanity Fair* 12 September 1874.

the Earl of Carnarvon, who confessed: 'Of the two parties my feeling is rather with the Atchinese, though my sense of our interest is . . . rather on the Dutch side.'[1] The Colonial Secretary's motives for seeking peace in Sumatra were primarily the personal and humanitarian ones of Clarke. For the benefit of the Foreign Office, however, he devised a complex argument that a serious Dutch defeat in Indonesia might upset the delicate balance in Europe and lead Holland to appeal to a stronger power for support in South-East Asia.[2]

The Foreign Office was more realistic. After discussing the matter with Lord Tenterden, Derby replied: 'I am very doubtful of there being any prospect of doing good by interference: and having got (however unsatisfactorily) out of one Acheen complication, I see no use in volunteering to get into another.'[3]

Until August 1874 the possibility of offering mediation was only discussed privately between the two ministers. Clarke brought it on to an official level by telegraphing in full a letter of 8 August from the Maharaja of Johor. The Maharaja had read the Government statement in the House of Commons that mediation had not been considered because neither side had asked for it.[4] 'This', he complained, 'is not exactly the case. The Acheen envoy had therefore requested me to inform you that the Acheen have been always desirous of seeking the intervention of Her Majesty's Government in order to put an end to the hostility.'[5]

The Colonial Office now recommended a British offer of mediation, which, it considered, would be to both belligerents a welcome escape from their difficulties.[6] This illusion was dispelled by the Foreign Office's Percy Anderson: 'Sir A. Clarke can judge of the feelings in the Straits, where the difficulties of the Dutch are known and felt, but he does not know the feeling in Holland, where the pride and tenacity of the national charac-

[1] Carnarvon to Derby 22 July 1874 (private), P.R.O. 30/6/8.

[2] Ibid. Also *idem* 3 June 1874 (private), P.R.O. 30/6/8. Carnarvon to Clarke 16 August 1874 (private), P.R.O. 30/6/40.

[3] Derby to Carnarvon 4 June 1874 (private): also *idem* 24 July 1874 (private): P.R.O. 30/6/8; Van Bylandt to Gericke 3 August 1874, Woltring I, p. 773.

[4] See above, p. 164.

[5] Clarke to Carnarvon 8 August 1874, telegram, copy C.O. to F.O. 13 August 1874, F.O. 37/533.

[6] Herbert to Tenterden 13 August 1874, F.O. 37/533.

ter are roused.' Anderson himself had taken pains while visiting Holland to test opinion about the war, and summarized it as 'thorough dissatisfaction with the way it has been conducted, but a determination to go through with it'.[1]

Lord Derby was equally sceptical. Nevertheless he instructed Harris to find out privately from Baron Gericke how an offer of mediation would be received. The request caught Harris just as Gericke's government was giving way to a Conservative one. The Minister was unable to find that any members of the new ministry had advocated peace since the second expedition had begun its task, however critical some had been of the declaration of war. It was generally assumed, he reported, that any withdrawal from Atjeh 'would fatally compromise the prestige of Holland in her Eastern possessions'.[2]

This was the end of mediatory thoughts in Whitehall, since the government was unwilling to make an offer in the face of certain Dutch resentment. Carnarvon sadly informed Clarke that intervention was out of the question: 'I greatly regret that this should be the case, but under the circumstances stated there is obviously no alternative.'[3]

Opinion in Atjeh

If Clarke was wrong about the Dutch attitude, how right was he in claiming the Atjehnese could be induced to surrender their sovereignty in a gentlemanly agreement?

It is impossible to answer this question satisfactorily for all Atjehnese, since the proudly independent spirits of the interior seldom agreed with the political compromises made by the Sultan or the coastal rajas in the interests of their commercial prosperity. We only know in any detail the views of the relatively moderate coastal leaders who had always conducted relations with foreigners, and with whom the Dutch would have to co-operate if they were to establish any permanent influence in the country. It was these mercantile princes whom the Atjeh party in the Straits best represented.

Until Abd ar-Rahman's arrival in Singapore in March 1874 there was little talk of accommodation with the *Kompeuni*

[1] Minute of 14 August 1874, F.O. 37/533.
[2] Harris to Derby 28 August 1874, F.O. 37/526.
[3] Carnarvon to Clarke 17 September 1874, C.O. 273/77.

among any influential group. But nor was there any real hope left of defeating the Dutch. Lavino could write of the Penang party that the series of disasters that had befallen their country had '. . . somewhat paralysed their efforts to sustain the struggle. Now, indeed, they seem quite at a loss as to what policy they are to pursue, and all their hopes of foreign intervention seem now to have vanished'.[1]

Abd ar-Rahman brought them new direction. Standing head and shoulders above his colleagues in political ability, he had little difficulty persuading those he met to his point of view. Others were often provoked to jealousy, but the Habib's clear-sightedness, backed by his enormous popular influence as a religious leader, usually gave him the mastery of a situation.

From the moment he arrived in Singapore Abd ar-Rahman was looking for some kind of accommodation with the authorities in Java, preferably through British intervention. His early conversations with Braddell and the Maharaja of Johor must have led him to believe that this was possible.

Nothing definite was decided until April, when Shaikh Ahmad and Teuku Paya arrived from Penang. On 2 April these two attended a crucial meeting in Johor with Abd ar-Rahman, the Maharaja, his English secretary (Mr. Hole), Sayyid Junied and Nyak Abas, Abd ar-Rahman's companion in Turkey. All were obliged to agree that the only course was to try to negotiate a treaty of peace.[2] A few days later Abd ar-Rahman explained to his friend Roura:

> The chief article of the Treaty to be eventually signed must be that a European Power designated by the Netherlands, by preference France or England, guarantees the proper fulfilment of the undertaking, because he [Abd ar-Rahman] is of the opinion that the previous treaty signed was broken by us [the Dutch].

Under this condition the envoy considered Atjeh would be prepared to accept the Dutch flag.[3]

That the same anxiety was genuinely felt by other Atjehnese was shown by Shaikh Ahmad's later appeal to the Habib:

[1] Lavino to Maier 17 April 1874, Cons. Penang 100.
[2] Maier to Loudon 6 April 1874, copy to Padday, Cons. Penang 46.
[3] Maier to Gericke 9 April 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

'. . . please ask the Maharaja what is best to be done if we make a treaty with the Netherlands Government so that the Dutch cannot cheat us.'[1] Shaikh Ahmad was evidently still anxious to secure some guarantee later in the year,[2] but by June Abd ar-Rahman had abandoned this demand. The Netherlands Vice-Consul had made clear to him, through Arab intermediaries, that Holland could never accept third-party intervention, which would be quite needless anyway since any treaty agreed to would have to be published.[3] A British guarantee would certainly have made a treaty of submission more acceptable in Atjeh, if only as a way of salving the wounded pride of the *ulèëbalangs*. But Abd ar-Rahman pursued the idea of a treaty with no less vigour once this provision became impossible.

The day after the important meeting in Johor, Shaikh Ahmad and Nyak Abas left to try to persuade the Penang party to the same conciliatory view, leaving Teuku Paya in Johor.[4] The two delegates were faced with a difficult task in the northern settlement, where only one of the prominent Atjehnese had previously shown any inclination to seek peace. This was Paduka Sri Raja Bandahara, an octogenarian who had been one of the principal servants of the Sultans of Atjeh between 1822 and 1853. He still wielded some influence as an elder statesman, and had family connexions with the Raja of Pidië, and with Teuku Ibrahim and Shaikh Kassim of the Council of Eight. This influence he placed at the disposal of the Dutch early in 1874. During March and April the old man was several times on the point of departing for Pidië to advocate submission, and some of the Penang party began to be swayed by his example. But the younger spirits finally triumphed, and Raja Bandahara unpacked his bags and withdrew, crushed, to his former retirement.[5]

A treaty honourably negotiated was more likely to appeal to Atjehnese self-respect than the Bandahara's policy of simple

[1] Shaikh Ahmad (Penang) to Habib Abd ar-Rahman (Johor) 26 Rabil-ul-awal 1291H (14 May 1874), English translation in Maier to Loudon 30 May 1874, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 June 1874, Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052.

[2] Lavino to Loudon 30 September 1874, Cons. Penang 101.

[3] Maier to Gericke 29 June 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

[4] Maier to Loudon 6 April 1874, copy to Padday, Cons. Penang 46.

[5] Lavino to Read and Maier 30 January, 11 March, 17 April, 2, 15 and 28 May 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

submission. Nevertheless it was over a month before the Council of Eight gave any effect to the decision taken at Johor on 2 April. Its members were probably awaiting some guidance from Sumatra. This arrived in May, in a letter from Panglima Polem which described the sad state of the war and included the request: 'Please seek for a good proposal between us and the Dutch Government. There is a high Dutch official here anxious to make a treaty with us but we cannot do so now until the arrival of Habib Abd ar-Rahman.'[1]

Shaikh Ahmad promptly forwarded Polem's mandate to Johor with his own endorsement.[2] There a draft treaty was accordingly drawn up, with the help of the Maharaja's staff. Its key article was evidently to be the twelfth: 'H. H. the Sultan of Atjeh binds himself so long as sun and moon exist, to place himself under the protection of the Netherlands Indies Government, and shall absolutely not withdraw from this.' No specific mention was made of sovereignty, nor of a flag, which were crucial points on both sides. But although the draft referred to its contemplated Dutch representative in Atjeh as a 'consul', it is clear that his duties were expected to be similar to those of a Resident in Siak or Perak. The 'consul' was to be forbidden, for example, to interfere in certain religious and fiscal spheres without the Sultan's permission. The treaty was also to acknowledge the cession to Holland of Deli, Tamiang and Langkat on the East Coast.[3]

Thus defined, the Atjehnese position was very similar to that which the Netherlands had maintained until Van Swieten's disastrous declarations at the beginning of 1874.

In June the draft treaty was sent for approval to Penang,[4] where the Council of Eight were already planning for peace. Soon after the arrival of Panglima Polem's letter they had asked Lavino for the terms on which the Dutch would accept the submission of Atjeh Besar.[5] In Batavia this inquiry was taken

[1] Panglima Polem to Shaikh Ahmad and Teuku Paya 12 Safar 1291H (1 April 1874), English translation in G.G. to Kol. 7 June 1874, Kol. Kab. E^{24}, 6052.

[2] Shaikh Ahmad to Paya 2 Rabil-akir 1291H (20 May 1874), English translation in G.G. to Kol. 7 June 1874, Kol. Kab. E^{24}, 6052.

[3] A Dutch translation of the draft treaty is in G.G. to Kol. 4 July 1874, Kol. Kab. E^{24}, 6052.

[4] Maier to Loudon 14 June 1874, copy to Padday, Cons. Penang 46.

[5] Lavino to Maier 28 May 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

more seriously than Abd ar-Rahman's overtures. After consulting Van Swieten, who was then in Java, Loudon returned the reply: 'Population will be left in possession of domestic and religious laws and customs—will not be obliged to any cultivation or delivery of products.'[1]

The Council of Eight debated these undertakings, together with the policy statements of General Van Swieten to which Lavino also referred them. Their decision was sufficiently favourable for Teuku Ibrahim to be able to inform the Netherlands agent that he only awaited the proper credentials from Atjeh in order to begin negotiations for peace.[2] The following week Ibrahim finally gave Lavino a copy of the draft treaty drawn up in Johor with the request that it be sent on for the consideration of the Governor-General. However the treaty could not be forwarded officially since the Atjehnese delegate was unwilling to sign anything before receiving the proper authority.[3] Consequently it was not seriously considered in Batavia.

The expected authorization never arrived. Communications between Penang and Atjeh had been difficult for so many crucial months that the Atjehnese leaders could hardly have placed full trust in Ibrahim, even had they preferred him to Abd ar-Rahman as a negotiator.[4] In fact most Atjehnese certainly regarded the Habib as their diplomat *par excellence*. After such a long absence, however, he too was unable to speak confidently for Atjeh and became cautious about compromising himself in the eyes of his compatriots. Although he had at first been anxious to meet the Netherlands representative in Singapore, he had become more careful by the end of May, when Maier finally received official permission to see him. He then

[1] Alg. Sec. to Lavino 28 May 1874, telegram, quoted Loudon to Van de Putte 30 May 1874, Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052.

[2] Lavino to Maier 24 June 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

[3] *Idem* 8 July 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

[4] The rivalry between the parties of Ibrahim and of Abd ar-Rahman to win the honour of representing Atjeh is indicated by the contradictory impressions gained by the Dutch representatives in Singapore and Penang. Maier portrayed the Johor group as the party of peace being opposed by the intransigent Penang followers of Ibrahim, while Lavino had the position completely reversed. Each group portrayed the other as irreconcilable. Cf. Maier to Gericke 9 May and 29 June 1874, B.Z. Atjeh; with Lavino to Maier 24 June 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

declined to meet the Vice-Consul before having visited Atjeh to consult the chiefs. Through Roura, he requested the Governor-General's permission to go to Atjeh in the Frenchman's steamer, the *Patty*, in order to obtain written authority from the *ulèëbalangs* to begin definite talks for peace. This request was refused, 'for the moment'.[1]

Becoming more desperate, Abd ar-Rahman subsequently told British officials that he was prepared even to negotiate with the Dutch Commander in Atjeh[2]—one of the conditions previously resisted by the Atjehnese as tantamount to unconditional surrender.

Abd ar-Rahman's greater caution about meeting the Dutch representative was probably the direct result of a letter he received early in May from the Imam of Luëng Bata,[3] avowedly on behalf of Panglima Polem, Tuanku Hashim, and the leading *ulèëbalangs*. It contained a warning:

> . . . you better not stay out there longer or make promise of anything in vain as we all have sworn by the Koran that as long as souls are still in our persons or a single of us is living we will definitely not be on friendly terms with the Dutch.

Although in the next breath the Imam appeared to accept the Habib's idea of a peace settlement guaranteed by Britain, it was clear that he would much prefer to see Britain attacking the Dutch by sea while the Atjehnese dealt with them on land.[4]

Panglima Polem's authority had, in fact, received a severe setback since he had written in favour of peace on April 1. He had been in charge of the Atjehnese counter-attack, which finally collapsed on 11 April when only 200 men took part in a long-awaited assault on Dutch-held Kutaradja. Immediately thereafter he summoned a council attended by most of the

[1] Roura to Alg. Sec. and reply, both 30 May 1874, telegrams, copies in G.G. to Kol. 2 June 1874, Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052.

[2] Maier to Gericke 29 June 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Luëng Bata was one of the few mukims near Banda Atjeh outside the sphere of the three Sagis and its Imam a completely secular chief of similar power to an *Ulèëbalang*. He was a particularly popular leader and remained influential until his death in 1901, although in the limelight only during 1873–4. Snouck Hurgronje *The Achehnese* (1906), I, p. 173.

[4] Imam Luëng Bata to Abd ar-Rahman n.d. (late April 1874?) copy and translation in Clarke to Carnarvon 2 June 1874 (private), P.R.O. 30/6/40.

ulèëbalangs of the XXII Mukims, together with the most prominent lowland leaders and a few coastal rajas. Polem himself advised peace on a basis similar to Abd ar-Rahman's draft treaty. The majority however swore that despite all odds 'they would trust only in God' and never submit to the *Kompeuni*.[1]

Having thus failed to stop the war, and knowing his inability to win it, Polem wrote immediately to the Straits urging Abd ar-Rahman, Teuku Paya and Nyak Abas to return and try to prevent the chaos into which the country was in danger of lapsing.[2] There was little further point in attempts to negotiate with Holland, and Abd ar-Rahman was clearly the only man whose ability and religious mystique might have made a settlement acceptable to the Atjehnese. He, however, was unwilling to risk going to Atjeh without some prior understanding with the Dutch.

When the Habib failed to appear, Polem sent a personal envoy carrying to him a letter signed by all the three Panglimas Sagi and by one of the candidates for the sultanate.[3] The envoy selected was Teuku Nyak Abas of Maraksa,[4] who had been a minister of Sultan Ibrahim and bore a reputation for advocating better relations with the Dutch. His instructions were to discuss with Abd ar-Rahman whether any help might yet be found for the Atjehnese, and if not, to obtain Dutch permission for the Habib to return to Sumatra to make peace.[5]

Colonel Pel allowed Captain Roura to take Teuku Maraksa to Penang in the *Patty*, on the understanding that he obtain permission from Batavia before proceeding further. This was granted by the Governor-General, but only with the melan-

[1] Maier to Loudon 18 May 1874, copy to Padday, Cons. Penang 46. Lavino to Maier 15 May 1874, Cons. Penang 100. Kielstra I, pp. 355–6. K.F.H. van Langen, 'De Nisero-kwestie', *IG*, 6 (1884), p. 456. Dukarim, 'Hikayat Perang Gompeuni', pp. 64–5, describes the April Conference as an endorsement of Imam Luëng Bata as war leader.

[2] Pangima Polem and Teuku Muda Nyak Hussain to Teuku Paya and Nyak Abas 27 Safar 1291H (16 April 1874), translation in G.G. to Kol. 2 June 1874, Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052.

[3] Probably Tuanku Hashim, but it may have been Tuanku Hussain, an unpopular candidate of good family but weak character. The name is spelt variously in different Dutch reports.

[4] Not to be confused with Abd ar-Rahman's companion in Turkey, of the same name. To avoid confusion he will be referred to by his popular name 'Teuku Maraksa'.

[5] Tadema (Atjeh) to Lavino 10 July 1874, Cons. Penang 99.

choly warning 'there can be no question of treaties with the chiefs of Atchin Proper'.[1]

Roura did his best to have this policy altered. He assured Dutch officials in the Straits that the Atjehnese would never submit to Colonel Pel, and that Abd ar-Rahman was 'the only person who could conclude peace at the moment'.[2] Even at that time, Roura thought, 'the halo of sanctity attached to his person would assure him the adherence of the majority'.[3]

Arriving in Singapore on 20 July, Roura accompanied Maraksa to see the Habib, and later reported to Loudon the conclusion of the meeting. Abd ar-Rahman asked permission to go to Atjeh to consult the principal chiefs before making peace. While in Atjeh he promised to abide by Colonel Pel's conditions 'provided they are not too severe'.[4]

The Governor-General did not trust Abd ar-Rahman but was willing to try him under safeguards. He suggested to General Van Swieten that the Habib be permitted to consult the chiefs on board the *Patty*, in any port. But the old general's pathetic faith in his own work was not easily shaken. He replied:

> At Kutaradja we are strong, very strong, and we can energetically spurn everything which is not unconditional surrender. Holding fast to this we will most quickly reach the end of the war, especially if we refuse the intervention of any but the popular chiefs.

Abd ar-Rahman he wrote off as 'a domineering intriguer', who 'has always made disturbances'.

As Government Commissioner for Atjeh Van Swieten could not be ignored. Loudon gave Roura the uncompromising reply: 'all submission must be offered at Kotta Radja. Abdul Rachman cannot be admitted'.[5]

Loudon had closed the door. It was locked by the Colonial

[1] Loudon to Lavino 14 July 1874, telegram, and other enclosures in G.G. to Kol. 14 July 1874, Kol. Kab. E[24], 6052. Also Kielstra II, pp. 106–8.

[2] Maier to Gericke 25 July 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

[3] Lavino to Maier 23 July 1874, Cons. Penang 100.

[4] Roura to Alg. Sec. 20 July 1874, telegram, copy G.G. to Kol. 28 July 1874, Kol. Kab. C[26], 6053.

[5] Loudon to Van Swieten n.d.: Van Swieten to Loudon 23 July 1874: Alg. Sec. to Roura n.d.: telegrams, copies of all in G.G. to Kol. 28 July 1874, Kol. Kab. C[26], 6053.

Minister in the Conservative Government which took office in Holland in August 1874. Baron van Goltstein censured Maier, who continued to hope for a peaceful solution, with the words: '. . . there can be no further question of the conclusion of peace, of negotiations, of treaties, in Atjeh Besar'.[1]

Van Goltstein reasoned simply. General Van Swieten had annexed Atjeh and there was no government there except that of Netherlands India. The Atjehnese could not negotiate, therefore, but could merely submit on the reasonable terms so often proclaimed to them. A better example could scarcely be found of that fatal rigidity which so often negated the achievements of a colonial system which was as highly-developed, as scientific and as humane as any in the world. During the first ten years of the Atjeh war Holland experienced not for the first time the disastrous consequences of attempting to deal with a fluid situation from a fixed and unrealistic legal standpoint.

This uncompromising attitude offered realistic Atjehnese leaders who understood the hopelessness of resisting Holland the choice of becoming either Dutch agents against their own people or martyrs in a lost cause. Instead such men tended to withdraw from an active part in the struggle, so that leadership inevitably passed to those extremists who 'trusted only in God' but lacked coherent policies.

Abd ar-Rahman's attempts for peace

The dilemma was acutely real to a man as ambitious as Abd ar-Rahman. His moves in the year following Loudon's rejection of his offer are notable chiefly for the indecision, verging on despair, which characterized them. Rumours were always current that the Habib was intending to return secretly to Atjeh, to appeal again to Turkey, to revive the hope of American or French intervention, or to abandon the whole affair and settle in Arabia.

While Maraksa was still in Singapore, Abd ar-Rahman tried to win British support for his plan to go to Atjeh. But Britain's position was by then quite clear. The two Atjehnese representatives were told by the Colonial Secretary that 'all intervention in this question was forbidden from London'.[2]

[1] Van Goltstein to Willebois 4 September 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.
[2] Maier to Willebois 3 August 1874, B.Z. Atjeh.

A few days later General Van Swieten passed through Singapore on his return journey to the Netherlands. Abd ar-Rahman hurried from Johor to meet him, but found that the general had already departed, although he had stated his willingness to see the Habib. Despite this disappointment, the Atjehnese envoy made another offer to the Dutch Vice-Consul, through an Arab intermediary. To allay all suspicions, he suggested going to Atjeh in a Dutch steamer and calling an assembly of chiefs in Dutch-occupied Kutaradja.[1] Later he wrote to the Governor-General himself in an endeavour to obtain a safe-conduct to Batavia to discuss the problem.[2]

Both these offers were again rejected by Batavia. Loudon at least had evidently considered them, but had concluded:

> As the spirit of the Atjehnese chiefs appears still to be, success could only be expected from Habib's mediation if he could obtain for them the autonomy [*zelfstandigheid*] of Atjeh, a condition with which the Government would never be able to agree.[3]

Abd ar-Rahman received this reply with a show of goodwill towards the Dutch, whose service he had clearly considered entering wholesale had he been met with trust. But as he lost face with both sides through his inability to bring them together, he evidently abandoned hope of peace. Late in November he left Singapore secretly for the Malabar coast, where he had maintained a wife and home since his youth.[4] While in India the Habib corresponded regularly with his Arab friends in Singapore, who continued to support him financially. He made one journey to Madras, where he appealed on behalf of Atjeh to the British Governor and to an Indian ruler.[5] Nevertheless, it is hard to believe his journey was anything but an escape from the impasse in which he found himself in Singapore.

In May 1875, however, the Atjehnese diplomat returned,

[1] Maier to Loudon 7 August 1874, copy to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

[2] *Idem* 23 August and 6 September 1874, copies to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

[3] 1st Government Secretary to Maier 26 August 1874, copy to Lavino 1 June 1875, Cons. Penang 99.

[4] Maier to Loudon 22 November and 1 December 1874, copies to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99; Alexander, 'Korte Levensschets', pp. 1008–9.

[5] Maier to Loudon 14 and 27 December 1874, 11 January, 9 and 23 February 1875, copies to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

this time to Penang, with renewed determination to help his adopted country.

The Atjehnese party in Penang had become increasingly irrelevant to the real struggle, particularly after the selection of Teuku Maraksa as a representative over the head of Teuku Ibrahim. After the collapse of hopes of foreign intervention and the failure of Maraksa's mission, diplomatists were of less importance than warriors. The Council of Eight resumed its former hostility once the Dutch terms were fully known, but it was weakened by the virtual defection of some of its merchant members, who found it possible to trade with the open ports of Atjeh despite the permanent state of war in Atjeh Besar. By the time of Abd ar-Rahman's return to the colony, only Teuku Ibrahim and Teuku Paya were still actively encouraging the war effort, and even these two had lost all influence outside their own states—Pidië and Simpang Ulim respectively.[1] Teuku Paya's debts were as crippling as ever, and he tried to lessen them by advising the submission of Tandjong Samuntoh, where his pepper awaited shipment, while continuing to incite leaders elsewhere to resistance.[2]

Abd ar-Rahman lodged in one of Shaikh Ahmad's houses in Penang, but took little part in the affairs of the Atjeh partisans. He appeared to be resolved to do nothing which would incur the mistrust of the Dutch representative or the British authorities, through whom he hoped to work.

Within a week of his arrival the Habib dressed himself and his horse with a magnificence which delighted the Penang crowds, in order to pay a call on Colonel Anson, the Lieutenant-Governor. Anson received him sympathetically, though refusing his renewed plea for British mediation. The Lieutenant-Governor then persuaded Abd ar-Rahman and the Netherlands agent to meet each other in his presence.[3]

Abd ar-Rahman and Lavino had three long discussions in the following month. The first meetings, on 22 and 30 May, took place at Anson's residence because the Habib was unwilling to compromise himself by visiting the Dutch Consulate.

[1] Lavino to Loudon 15 October and 27 November 1874, 18 February 1875, Cons. Penang 101.
[2] *Idem* 30 September and 11 December 1874, Cons. Penang 101.
[3] Lavino to Van Lansberge 27 May 1875, Cons. Penang 101.

This procedure earned the strong disapproval of Batavia, where the new Governor-General, Van Lansberge, faithfully reflected The Hague's horror of British intervention. Lavino was instructed: 'to avoid anything which could give opportunity to the unmistakable aspiration of the British authorities to meddle in Atjehnese affairs'.[1] A third meeting took place at Lavino's office on 11 June, but this too was disapproved because of the presence of Anson's interpreter, Kinnersley.[2]

These three talks were the Habib's first opportunity to put his case directly to the Dutch. He took good advantage of it. The Atjehnese, he warned, were a headstrong, unruly people who 'required the direct influence of men of strong character to govern them'.[3] It was no use simply to write, as Lavino suggested, or even to go to them with a palm of peace.

> . . . if he were to go and say to the chiefs, 'It is better for us to give in and come to terms', they would simply regard him as a traitor and throw him over. If he went he should say, 'Fight on, redouble your efforts, where are all your guns?' He could then point out that with their present force they had not a chance, and could show them the hopelessness of their case. Then by degrees he could bring them round.[4]

He could not guarantee success in this, but it was at least the only chance for peace. He thought he could count on the support of five out of the twelve leading chiefs, including Panglima Polem and the Imam of Luëng Bata.

Abd ar-Rahman's first suggestion was that he be allowed to go to Atjeh in a neutral vessel to reason with the *ulèëbalangs* before opening formal negotiations with the Dutch. Later he offered to go to a port still hostile to the Dutch accompanied by a Dutch guard which could ensure he did not even go ashore while consulting with the Atjehnese. If even this proposal was refused, he warned:

> . . . he could go to Atjeh and bid them fight on, the war could be con-

[1] 1st Government Secretary to Lavino 1 June 1875, Cons. Penang 99.
[2] *Idem* 19 June 1875, Cons. Penang 99.
[3] Lavino to Van Lansberge 27 May 1875, Cons. Penang 101.
[4] Anson, *About Others and Myself*, p. 326. Anson must here be quoting from Kinnersley's report of the 11 June meeting.

tinued for three years more. In the end the Atjehnese would be beaten, but what would the Dutch get?—a desert, all the pepper destroyed and the country desolate. If peace were brought about, 1000 soldiers would suffice to hold Atjeh, and two or three hundred the other places.[1]

Abd ar-Rahman's fluency won the reluctant support of Lavino, as well as Anson, for his plans.[2] Privately Lavino confessed that although he had previously opposed the use of Abd ar-Rahman:

> . . . since then we have gained important military advances, and still no sign of *rapprochement*. . . . men can only be raised with the greatest difficulty the war is unpopular in Holland, England and the Indies and I therefore hoped that the Government might make use of the services of Abd ar-Rahman.[3]

However, Batavia's attitude was as before—there could be no negotiations.

Abd ar-Rahman then asked through Lavino for a safe-conduct to Atjeh, so that he could at least use his influence to bring about submissions individually. Though still suspicious of the Habib as an instigator of 'fanaticism', the Government now began to soften. A safe-conduct could not be granted lest it suggest the Government was 'distrusting its own strength'. But if Abd ar-Rahman was really eager for peace, he could easily slip secretly into Atjeh on his own account.[4]

Lavino was not able to convey this reply to the Habib until September, when the two men broke their stalemate about the place of meeting by going separately to the house of Captain Roura. Lavino then explained that although the Dutch would not engage the Habib, they would not fail to reward him if he did promote submissions either by writing to the chiefs or by going secretly to Atjeh. This Abd ar-Rahman refused, claiming that his dignity would be injured if he entered Atjeh by stealth. He was willing to follow any course the Dutch wished 'provided

[1] Ibid. pp. 326–7. Also Lavino to Van Lansberge 27 May, 2 and 24 June 1875, Cons. Penang 101.

[2] Lavino to Van Lansberge 27 May 1875, Cons. Penang 101. Anson, pp. 324–5.

[3] Lavino to Read 29 May 1875 (private), copy Van Bylandt to Willebois 6 July 1875, B.Z. Atjeh.

[4] Alg. Sec. to Lavino 6 June 1875, Cons. Penang 99.

it did not compromise his reputation with the Achinese'.[1]

Abd ar-Rahman was certainly a man of exceptional vanity, but this was not the chief reason for his reluctance to go privately to Atjeh. To Europeans he had never made any secret of his self-interest in arranging a peace. 'He was not an Atjehnese,' he told Lavino. 'What was Atjeh to him? If he brought about a settlement would he not be a great man?' His first hope had been to become Regent for Sultan Daud under Dutch protection, though this scheme had soon fallen victim to Dutch opposition to the sultanate.[2] Nothing in his character or his subsequent actions indicates that his offers to the Dutch were anything but genuine. A Dutch naval officer later remarked that he was 'too proud to deceive, and . . . would not lightly break a promise once given'.[3] His great concern, however, was to avoid losing the respect of both sides. This might, he thought, have been the result of preaching peace in Atjeh without any definite agreement with the Dutch.

Before this final meeting with Lavino, Abd ar-Rahman had an apportunity to try his diplomatic skill on yet another British official. Sir Andrew Clarke had left the Straits in May—'no loss to the Dutch', in Lavino's opinion.[4] His successor, Sir William Jervois, had seemed to the Dutch representatives who first met him to have more acceptable views concerning Atjeh.[5] These views changed suddenly when Jervois paid his first visit to Penang on 22 June and received Abd ar-Rahman the following day.[6] On his return to Singapore, the Governor caused the dread spectre of British mediation to arise again in The Hague by telling Maier that the Atjehnese

> . . . would be quite willing to submit, if a representative of another Government, for instance of that of the Straits Settlements, held himself responsible for the proper fulfilment of the undertakings made on the Dutch side.[7]

[1] Lavino to Van Lansberge 15 September 1875, Cons. Penang 102.

[2] Anson, p. 326.

[3] Alexander, p. 1020, quoting the captain of the *Curacao*, taking Abd ar-Rahman to Jidda in 1878.

[4] Lavino to Read 12 February 1875 (private), copy Read to Willebois 16 March 1875, B.Z. Atjeh.

[5] Van Bylandt to Willebois 8 April 1875, B.Z. Atjeh; Maier to Van Lansberge 30 May 1875, copy to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

[6] Lavino to Van Lansberge 8 July 1875, Cons. Penang 101.

[7] Maier to Van Lansberge 10 July 1875, copy to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

Jervois may have been influenced by a revival of the idea of British mediation in Singapore[1] as it became apparent that the war would be a long and ruinous one. However, as he apparently told Abd ar-Rahman, he was not authorized to interfere in Atjeh in any way. All he could do was to forward to London whatever considerations the Habib wished to put on paper.[2] But Abd ar-Rahman had evidently abandoned any serious hopes of help from the side of England, and he never did put his views into writing. Although he continued to visit the highest British officials[3] this was more to bolster his standing with the Atjeh party than to seek diplomatic support.

By the end of 1875 the Habib was again in the predicament from which he had escaped in Singapore. Unable to reach agreement with the Dutch he was nevertheless losing the respect and the financial support of his Atjehnese followers. He sought another brief escape as a religious teacher in Kedah but there too his reception was disappointing. He returned to Penang at the end of February 1876, complaining that 'the English carried more weight with the Raja than his own subjects'.[4]

In Penang, the Habib received from the Dutch a more positive rebuff than before as his influence in Atjeh was thought to be at a minimum.[5] This at last persuaded him to take the step he had been avoiding for so long. On 7 March he took ship for the east coast of Atjeh disguised as an Indian. Teuku Paya, his most ardent disciple, followed him soon after.[6]

War in Atjeh, 1875–1878

Abd ar-Rahman was received with enthusiasm by the Atjehnese, who had been without real leadership since 1874. The

[1] *Straits Times* 11 March 1875.

[2] Maier to Van Lansberge 10 and 21 July 1875, copies to Lavino, Cons. Penang 99.

[3] Lavino to Van Lansberge 25 November and 9 December 1875, Cons. Penang 102.

[4] Lavino to Van Lansberge 2 March 1876; also Lavino's reports of December 1875 to February 1876; Cons. Penang 102.

[5] Lavino to Van Lansberge 2 March 1876, Cons. Penang 102. First Government Secretary to Lavino 16 March 1876, Cons. Penang 99.

[6] Lavino to Van Lansberge 16 and 22 March and 11 May 1876, Cons. Penang 102.

absence of any sense of purpose among the *ulèëbalangs* had become painfully apparent once Panglima Polem's attempt to arrange a peace had been out-voted and the series of attacks on the Dutch fortifications proved abortive. Some Atjehnese awaited a divine intervention in their favour; others simply lost interest in the struggle and awaited an initiative from the Dutch.

Panglima Polem took no part in organizing attacks on the Dutch after the meeting of April 1874. He remained the most respected leader, however, and together with Tuanku Hashim he fortified Luëng Bata (Longbatta), an important kampong adjoining Banda Atjeh. When this fell to General Pel in a major battle of December 1874 Polem retired to his XXII Mukims. New leaders came to the fore, but without any such broad support. Chief among them were the Imam of Luëng Bata, Teuku Muda Ba'et, and Teuku Chik Lamngoh. Encouraged by the lack of initiative from the Dutch these men succeeded by September 1875 in again assembling a reasonable force in Atjeh Besar. But though there was much talk of a new Atjehnese initiative there was insufficient organization to bring it about, and the warriors began to drift home again at the end of 1875.[1]

For their part the Dutch did not attempt to move beyond the tiny, fortified area linking Kutaradja to the sea until the end of 1875. The policy of General Van Swieten, vigorously defended in Holland by Fransen van de Putte,[2] was to reject every temptation to carry the war into the interior. Dutch prestige had necessitated the taking of the *dalam*, but no other divergence should be permitted from the traditional, economical, and usually successful policy of waiting on the coast until factions in the interior invited a further extension of Dutch influence. In any case General Pel was preoccupied at first with the need to secure his access to the sea and to fight disease among his troops. Cholera claimed 432 of his men in

[1] This account of developments on the Atjehnese side is taken mainly from Lavino's reports of 1874–6, supplemented by the very scanty information in Kielstra.

[2] Van de Putte, *Atjeh*, pp. 191–3, 199–200, 210–19, 239–41 and 264–5; Van Swieten to Knoop 17 October 1874 (open letter), translation in F.O. to C.O. 16 November 1874, C.O. 273/77.

February 1875 alone,[1] though it was steadily brought under control in the following months.

The more aggressive policy begun in 1875 was attributed by many[2] to the Conservative minister Van Goltstein[3] and his Governor-General Van Lansberge.[4] Its origin can be traced more directly, however, to the frustration of an army under siege in its small fortress and forbidden to take the offensive. General Pel visited Batavia in July 1875 and won Van Lansberge's approval for an offensive aimed at gaining control of the whole coast of Atjeh Besar, from Kruëng Raba in the west to Kruëng Raja in the east. Ostensibly the aim was to cut off Atjeh Besar from the sea and thereby isolate the war party—a futile task since hill roads linked the Atjeh valley to Pidië and to the west coast. In fact, there were no obvious limits to an offensive once begun, though the military frequently saw victory coming after one more campaign. The decision of 1875 began the ruinous oscillation in Dutch policy between the traditional foothold on the coast and offensives whose only logical end was a subjugation of the whole country.

Returning in November 1875 with strong reinforcements, Pel had almost completed his appointed task when he died suddenly in February 1876. The advance was halted by his successor, Wiggers van Kerchem, but already the Atjehnese had suffered heavily and lost most of the XXV Mukims to the Dutch.[5]

Arriving as the leaderless Atjehnese were still smarting from Pel's offensive, Abd ar-Rahman was received with tremendous enthusiasm. His journey from Idi to Atjeh Besar became a triumphal progress with thousands flocking to his banner. The coastal rajas were persuaded to give generously to his treasury.

The enthusiasts expected the Habib to deliver them from the Dutch, and his words did little to disillusion them. For two years his efforts were directed at regaining his pre-war authority

[1] Harris to Derby 12 May 1875, quoting Van Goltstein in 2nd Chamber, F.O. 37/660. And see Appendix 4, below.

[2] C. E. van Kesteren, 'De Nisero-quaestie en de Gouverneur-General Loudon', *IG* 6 (1884), pp. 427–32. Van de Putte, *Atjeh*, pp. 264–5.

[3] Minister of Colonies August 1874–September 1876, and again August 1879–August 1882.

[4] See below, p. 190n5.

[5] Kreemer I, pp. 17–19. *ENI* I, p. 79. 'Van Lansberge', in *NNBW* III, col. 740.

in Atjeh. At first he appeared to succeed. The Panglimas Sagi placed the future conduct of the war in his hands when he reached Atjeh Besar in July 1876. Most of the leading *ulèëbalangs* still supported him—Panglima Polem, Teuku Muda Ba'et and the Imam of Luëng Bata, as well as Teuku Paya, who was among the leading warriors until wounded in January 1877. He had, moreover, the allegiance of the two coastal rulers whose submission had most encouraged the Dutch. The Raja of Gigiëng joined the Habib in Atjeh Besar and seconded his efforts to unite the Atjehnese.[1] His powerful rival, Teungku Pakeh of Pidië, who had finally submitted to the Dutch early in 1876, helped Abd ar-Rahman with money and supplies. The Habib advised neither of these rajas to lower their Dutch flags.

On the other hand Abd ar-Rahman was never reconciled with Tuanku Hashim, who feared the Habib's ambition to replace him as regent. Those also who were impatient to strike back at the Dutch increasingly found fault with the prolonged inactivity of the new war-leader.[2]

While Abd ar-Rahman tried to consolidate his position in Atjeh the Dutch recommenced their offensive. Pel's objectives were reached early in 1877 under General Diemont. The sharpest fighting came on 30 January at Lam Bada, on the river above Kutaradja, where Teuku Paya led a vigorous but vain defence of his native kampong.[3]

By this time the war had cost the Dutch 70 million guilders and the home government opposed any further offensive once Pel's plan was complete. The Governor-General was sent to Atjeh in March 1877 to see whether expenditure could be cut down. His report was understandably over-optimistic. He declared that the most important chiefs were conciliatory and the remaining resistance due only to isolated bands incited by Abd ar-Rahman. Having successfully isolated Atjeh from the

[1] Though the first important Atjehnese to submit to the Dutch, the Raja of Gigiëng had retained the respect of the war leaders and worked consistently to bring about a general peace. At the end of 1875 he had twice tried to persuade the Dutch to negotiate with the Sultan. Kielstra II, p. 208.

[2] Lavino's reports March 1876–June 1878, Cons. Penang 102 and 103. Alexander, 'Korte Levensschets', pp. 1016–18.

[3] Two British Indian officers seconded to Atjeh received Dutch decorations for their part in this attack. Captain (later General) Lockhart received a leg wound. See below, p. 244n. Fenton to Derby 7 February 1877, F.O. 37/660.

sea, the offensive should now give way to a policy of goodwill, symbolized by the rebuilding of the Great Mosque destroyed in the second expedition.[1]

This decision inaugurated a year of inaction. Submissions did not follow as the Dutch had hoped, but nor was there any initiative from Abd ar-Rahman's headquarters at Mon Tassiëk, 8 miles above the Capital on the Atjeh river. Abd ar-Rahman knew the futility of attacking the Dutch, but he still lacked the support needed to sue for peace. Feeling his authority steadily slipping away by inaction, he at last undertook an offensive in June 1878. While the Governor was leading an expedition on the north coast his forces attacked Dutch positions in the XXVI Mukims, surrounded Kruëng Raba, and harassed the outskirts of Kutaradja. Hoping to improve his status as a party in negotiations, he twice offered to let the 100-man garrison of Kruëng Raba return to Kutaradja if they would surrender the fort.[2]

This was the end of Van Lansberge's policy of goodwill. He sent four extra battalions to Atjeh and decreed that the centre of Atjehnese resistance must be crushed. The offensive was now in the capable hands of Colonel Karel van der Heijden.[3] On 23 July he began to attack up the Atjeh river, and drove the Atjehnese back on their strongly fortified headquarters at Mon Tassiëk. When this fell on the 28th, few Atjehnese can have continued to hope for victory. Abd ar-Rahman convened a last meeting to try to obtain an organised submission. Of the twelve principal *ulèëbalangs*, however, 'only seven would hear of sub-

[1] Abstract of Colonial Minister's speech to 2nd Chamber 15 May 1877, translation in Harris to Derby 17 May 1877, F.O. 37/660. Kreemer I, p. 19. 'Van Lansberge', in *NNBW* III, col. 741. *ENI* I, p. 79. Cables received in The Hague on progress of war, 1876–7, translations, in F.O. 37/660.

[2] The siege was raised after two days. Kielstra III, pp. 219–26. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, p. 164.

[3] Karel van der Heijden (1826–1900) was an illegitimate Eurasian child educated in Holland by his adoptive father. Returning to Indonesia in the army, he rose through all the ranks. He became acting Governor of Atjeh in June 1877 when Diemont was incapacitated by illness, and was subsequently confirmed in office. He lost an eye campaigning in Samalanga (1877) and was respectfully known to the Atjehnese as *raja sa-mata* (the 'one-eyed king'). Dutch military success was greater under him than at any time before 1896, and he became the hero of the aggressive party in Holland, *NNBW* I, cols. 1104–5. An indication of his popularity with the Dutch army is given in the sketch by Brau de St.-Pol Lias *Chez les Atchés: Lohong* (Paris, 1884), pp. 8–10.

mission'. This was inadequate for united action. Although he continued a show of leading the Atjehnese resistance, Abd ar-Rahman then decided there was no future for him in Atjeh and began private negotiations with the Dutch. He and Teuku Muda Ba'et submitted in Kutaradja on October 13th, 1878. In return the Dutch undertook to transport the Habib and his following to Jidda, and to pay him a lifetime pension of $1000 a month provided he remained in Arabia.[1]

Though hailed as a great victory in Holland, Abd ar-Rahman's departure was a step backward from the end of the war. As an Atjehnese patriot there is much to be said against the Habib, for he acted consistently in the interests of his own ambition. But his ability, his understanding of the world, and his power to unite the feuding Atjehnese were unique. Perhaps he had underestimated the bitterness on both sides when he told Lavino that with Dutch sympathy he could end the war in three months.[2] There can be no doubt, however, that by using Abd ar-Rahman the Dutch could have put a short term to the period in which their only hold over the Atjehnese people was that of force. The Habib's own analogy was close to the mark:

> He was the key by which the Dutch could alone enter Atjeh. If they threw away the key they could not get into the box without smashing it. They had thrown away the key, and had battered the box with a crowbar. It had made a great noise, but the box was not broken by it. The key was there, and they would not try it.[3]

[1] Alexander, pp. 1018–9; Kielstra III, pp. 281–324; Kreemer I, pp. 19–20; *ENI* I, p. 79. Abd ar-Rahman lived quietly in the Hejaz until his death in 1896. Though briefly appointed Shaikh es Sadat (Shaikh of the Sayyids) by the Turkish Governor of Mecca in 1886, he was shunned by Atjehnese and unpopular with Arabs because of his role in Atjeh. Lavino to Van Lansberge 19 June 1879, Cons. Penang 104; De Vicq (Jidda) to Karnebeek 12 November 1886, copy B.Z. to Kol. 1 December 1886, Kol. Kab. C[13], 6169; *Idem* 23 December 1886, copy B.Z. to Kol. 12 January 1887, Kol. Kab. U, 6170.

[2] Lavino to Van Lansberge 24 June 1875, Cons. Penang 101.

[3] Quoted Anson, p. 328.



Map. 3 Atjeh Besar and Pidië, 1873–1898.

6

Civil Government
1878–1883

THE first five years of the war had seen a remarkable departure from the *festina lente* policy to which previous Dutch governments had subscribed. The motive now was less a sober calculation of practical advantage than a vindication of national prestige after an initial blunder. Each advance in Atjeh appeared to demand another if it was to be made secure. The bounds to this process were finally set not by victory but by the exhaustion of resources and of public support for such a programme.

The war spreads to the Dependencies

General Van der Heijden's offensive was halted for a few months when the submission of Abd ar-Rahman and Teuku Ba'et raised hopes of a final peace. However it soon became apparent that only one section of Atjehnese leaders had become reconciled to the Dutch presence, and Van Lansberge decreed that the offensive should continue until no resistance remained in Atjeh Besar. In March 1879, therefore, Van der Heijden began to advance up the river from Mon Tassiëk. In a series of heavy battles he took Indrapuri on 1 April, Gle Yuëng, the home of Panglima Polem, on 9 June, and finally Seulimeum, twenty-five miles from the sea, on 18 August. Meanwhile, in July, he overran the Sagi of the XXVI Mukims, on the left bank of the Atjeh river.

Everywhere villages were razed and the population fled either to the hills or to the North Coast. When the offensive was ended in September 1879 there was no further resistance in the valley of the Atjeh river. It was estimated that only 50,000 Atjehnese remained from a pre-war population of 300,000.[1]

[1] Stuart to Granville 31 March 1881, quoting Colonial Minister's state-

Twenty-three posts were set up from which constant patrols operated to protect the remaining population and try to persuade those who had fled that there was safety within the occupied area. Van der Heijden himself advised against the pursuit of the war leaders to their new headquarters in the hills between Pidië and Atjeh Besar. Even the proud inhabitants of the XXII Mukims had now been made to feel the might of the *Kompeuni* and it suited the needs as well as the hopes of the Government to believe that the time had come for the velvet glove in Atjeh Besar.[1]

Until this time the Dutch had considered their military task limited to Atjeh Besar. In the dependencies they had followed a more restrained policy, insisting on the recognition of Dutch sovereignty by the rajas but not attempting to exert any real influence. The pressure of the blockade alone sufficed to obtain this purely token submission from most of the rajas by the end of 1874. Action against the others was delayed until 1876, when Van Lansberge considered the Dutch position in Atjeh Besar sufficiently established to allow expeditions to the most notoriously recalcitrant coastal states.

Simpang Ulim and Tanjong Samuntoh were first on the list. Their old enemies, Idi and Pasai, supported a Dutch expedition in November 1876 which placed more pliable rulers in nominal control of these states. A son of Teuku Paya fell defending Tandjong Samuntoh, while Teuku Muda Nyak Malim fled further inland where he, and after 1878, his son, Teuku Nyak Usoh remained in effective control of Simpang Ulim despite the new Dutch puppet on the coast.[2] In May 1877 another expedition brought the submission of Langsa, the last defiant east coast state. With the submission of Teunom, Rigas, and

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ment to States-General 28 March 1881; F.O. 37/661; Kennedy's Acheen report 9 February 1882, F.O. 220/2. These figures cannot, of course, be relied upon, though all observers agreed that the majority of the population of Atjeh Besar was compelled to evacuate by the ravages of war and disease before 1880. As late as 1917 a rough census estimated a population of only 103,000 in Atjeh Besar, compared with 329,000 on the North Coast. Kreemer, *Atjèh* I, p. 215.

[1] Kielstra, *Beschrijving van den Atjeh-oorlog* III, pp. 348–460; Kreemer I, p. 20. *ENI* I, p. 79; Cables received in The Hague, 1879, relayed to Salisbury, F.O. 37/660.

[2] Lavino to Van Lansberge 4 February 1877, Cons. Penang 102.

Lhokkruët in April 1877, all west coast states also flew the Dutch flag.

The populous north coast offered stiffer resistance. An expedition in August-September 1877 brought the submission of the rajas of Samalanga and Meureudu only after a hard month's campaign. The most hostile chiefs were obliged to retreat to the hills at least temporarily and the blockade on these ports was raised for the first time.[1]

This initiative was intended to mark the beginning of permanent Dutch influence in the dependencies. Assistant Residents were appointed for the North, East, and West Coasts in 1877, and a few military posts established to help them. The first post was strategically placed at Sigli, at the mouth of the Pidië river, in October 1876. It was intended to exercise some influence over the important federations of Pidië and Gigiëng. Other posts followed at Idi, Simpang Ulim, and Meulaboh, where pro-Dutch rajas required protection, and at Samalanga, whose difficult conquest demanded an occupying force.

In varying degrees all these posts aroused Atjehnese resentment and were subjected to sporadic attacks. As long as the war continued in Atjeh Besar Dutch officials could not hope to win the trust of the coastal chiefs. They could visit only a few ports under escort, and their only weapons—bombardment or the reimposition of the blockade—were more calculated to embitter the Atjehnese than to win their allegiance. The one real achievement of the coastal posts was to show the Dutch that the dependencies were all helping the war party with men, money and morale and that Atjeh Besar could never be isolated as a theatre of war.

Consequently when Van der Heijden failed to obtain the submission of the 'war party' as a result of offensives in Atjeh Besar he naturally turned to the dependencies. Here Holland's outstanding advantage was control of the sea, yet this had hardly been used since the nominal submission of the coastal rajas.

In December 1878, during the lull after Abd ar-Rahman's submission, Van der Heijden declared the whole of Atjeh except Ulèëlheuë and Idi closed to shipping. He hoped by this sudden pressure on the whole country to tip the scales in favour of a

[1] Kreemer I, p.19; *ENI* I, p. 79.

general submission. The Governor-General, however, was unhappy about the effect of this measure on British opinion. When in February it had still not produced the desired submissions he ordered its repeal as part of the decision for a continued offensive.[1]

This offensive in turn failed to answer the question how to compel the obedience of the hostile leaders now in the hills. Van der Heijden pleaded with a reluctant Governor-General:

> . . . at the moment we enter a sort of crisis. We want to enforce submission. But for that it is necessary to deprive the party of resistance, now crippled and dispersed, of all the means to again oppose us. . . . If we leave the chiefs . . . wholly in peace and with the opportunity still to provide themselves with powder, caps, etc., then it is as good as certain that they will manage to make the condition of the returning population untenable, submission will thus be withheld, and the people will prefer to give up their kampongs and go and gather elsewhere.[2]

In two letters of June 1879, the General therefore suggested two ways to use the blockading fleet. First, he proposed to compel all vessels to visit Ulèëlheuë for a thorough inspection before proceeding to trade at other ports in Atjeh. Without this, he considered, 'the risk for smugglers of being caught virtually does not exist', since the blockading fleet could not hope to supervise the unloading of ships at every port in Atjeh. Secondly he requested freedom to close to even the coastal trade those states which disturbed the peace or in other ways earned the displeasure of the Dutch. A petty feud was already disturbing the Pasai district, and if it was not stopped disorder would spread through the country to the ruin of all Dutch influence.[3]

In a telegram of 5 July,[4] Governor-General Van Lansberge[5]

[1] J. B. van Heutsz, 'De Onderwerping van Atjeh', *IMT* 1892, II, p. 1081. Kreemer I, p. 30; *Cons. Versl.* 1880, pp. 976–7.

[2] Van der Heijden to Van Lansberge 14 July 1879, copy G.G. to Kol. 31 July 1879, Kol. Kab. A[18], 6120.

[3] Van der Heijden to Van Lansberge 23 and 25 June 1879, copies G.G. to Kol. 17 July 1879, Kol. Kab. A[15], 6119.

[4] Van Lansberge to Van der Heijden 5 July 1879, telegram, copy G.G. to Kol. 17 July 1879, loc. cit.

[5] Johan Wilhelm van Lansberge (1830–1905) studied law before joining the Netherlands diplomatic service in 1856. After a series of minor posts in Paris, Madrid, St. Petersburg, and Brussels, he returned to The Hague in

approved the second of these proposals but forbade the first. As a former diplomat he was acutely sensitive to Holland's traditional dependence on British diplomatic support, in South-East Asia as in Europe; as a leading negotiator of the 1871 Sumatra treaty he realized the influence of Straits merchants over British policy. He considered that to channel all Atjeh's trade through Ulèëlheuë would virtually exclude the Penang trade from Atjeh's dependencies and would contravene Article III of the 1824 Treaty, which forbade restrictions on British trade with native ports. Thus it 'would . . . undoubtedly lead to justified and very serious protests from the side of the English Government, if not to worse'.[1]

Van der Heijden, however, had not waited for approval before proclaiming on 6 July that all ships must visit Ulèëlheuë before any other port, and that the naval authorities could order the unloading of a ship there for which a full inspection appeared necessary.[2] Though in essence the same as the scheme vetoed by the Governor-General, this *fait accompli* was now accepted by him as different. He approved it as 'a very temporary war measure' since it 'appears to be justified by the war situation of the moment'.[3] The trade restriction therefore stood until September 1881, though as a concession to Penang Idi was excepted from it after August 1879.[4]

Like his predecessors Van der Heijden hoped that the end of the war was in sight and he therefore failed to develop a positive way of using his command of the sea. His aim appeared to be to deny military supplies to the Atjehnese rather than to control the rajas in the interests of peace. His understandable

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1866 as acting Secretary-General of the Foreign Ministry. He was the permanent official responsible for negotiating the Sumatra and Gold Coast treaties with Britain. He took temporary charge of the London Legation in February 1871 before going to Brussels as Minister the following April. His appointment as Governor-General by the Conservatives in 1874 itself indicates the importance they attached to the diplomatic problems raised by the Atjeh war. *NNBW* III, cols. 739–42. Coombs, *The Gold Coast, Britain and the Netherlands 1859–1874*, p. 90n. Boon *J. W. van Lansberge* (Utrecht, 1943).

[1] Alg. Sec. to Van der Heijden 10 July 1879, copy G.G. to Kol. 17 July 1879, loc. cit.

[2] Van der Heijden to Van Lansberge 6 July 1879, copy G.G. to Kol. 25 July 1879, Kol. Kab. A^{18}, 6120.

[3] Van Lansberge to Van der Heijden 17 July 1879, copy G.G. to Kol. 25 July 1879, loc. cit.

[4] Lavino to Anson 29 September 1881, Cons. Penang 11.

resentment of the Penang trade was expressed in an exaggerated view of the importance of smuggled ammunition for the Atjehnese resistance.

In fact the Atjehnese had accumulated large supplies of powder and rifles immediately before the war when pepper-prices were high.[1] In addition, they manufactured their own low-grade powder, especially at Meureudu.[2] Many rifles were stolen or bought from Dutch soldiers. Percussion caps had to be imported, but were so small as to defy detection. The clandestine import of war materials other than percussion caps appears really to have been very small until about 1881, when it began to increase. Before then the Dutch seized only two lots of percussion caps in 1875 and a few rifles and revolvers in 1877 and 1878.[3]

Van der Heijden's other measure of closing troublesome states to all trade had some effect. Keureutoë and Samalanga were both humbled temporarily by this means during 1879.[4] But the direction of foreign trade to Ulèëlheuë as a first port caused more real annoyance to the traders of Penang than to the Atjehnese war leaders.

British protests

The inevitable complaint from Penang against this restriction was weakened by changes which had taken place in the structure of the trade.

The series of nominal submissions in 1873 and 1874 enabled the produce of all the pepper-exporting states except those north of Teunom to reach Penang during 1875. The export of the accumulated stocks of the previous two years made this a bumper year, which brought down the price of pepper in Penang from $11.75 to $8.75. Prices continued to fall during

[1] 80,000 lb. gunpowder and 4,049 stands of arms in 1872–3 alone. Parkinson, *British Intervention*, p. 33n.

[2] Lavino to 's Jacob 14 November 1883, Cons. Penang 13.

[3] Kennedy's memorandum on smuggling, 8 August 1883, F.O. 37/662; Maxwell's notes on conversation with Teuku Yit, copy S.S. to C.O. 8 March 1884, C.O. 273/126; Lavino's reports of 15 June 1873: 20 August and 30 September 1874: 5 and 18 February and 30 March 1875: 20 June 1876: 4 July 1877: Cons. Penang 100–3.

[4] Van der Heijden to Goltstein 29 October 1879, Kol. Kab. S^{19}, 6121.

the 1876 season, however, which brought exceptionally little pepper to Penang.[1] The trees which should have been harvested then had not been planted because of the war in 1873. Unable to collect their advances, four of the largest Chinese merchants trading to Atjeh went bankrupt between February 1876 and February 1877. Chettiars and European financiers began to withdraw credit facilities for similar operations by Chinese traders.[2]

Together with the expulsion of the wealthy merchant rajas of Simpang Ulim and Tandjong Samuntoh this disruption of the trade created opportunities for new middlemen. Dutch authorities were anxious for their own merchants to step in, so as to diminish the Penang influence which so complicated Holland's task in Atjeh.[3] Private Dutch traders, however, showed little interest in an uncertain field so far from Java, while the mail packets of the *N. I. Stoomvaart Maatschappij*, obliged by contract to begin a regular service to the new posts set up in 1876–7, were regulated too much in the government interest to trade profitably.[4]

The vacuum was at first partially filled by a number of smaller Chinese firms using small steamers and relying more than their predecessors on European capital.[5] But from 1879 the lion's share of the trade was absorbed by the contractors for the Dutch armed forces.

Since 1876 the contract to supply the Dutch army and navy in Atjeh had been held by a syndicate in which the Straits firm of Katz Brothers had two of the five shares. Two other shares were held by the British firms of John Price & Co. (Batavia) and G. P. Tolson (Penang), while the fifth was divided among three Dutch firms in Java. Katz Brothers provided the four steamers chartered by the syndicate and also conducted its business in the Straits Settlements. In Atjeh, however, the

[1] See Table 2 in Appendix 3.

[2] Lavino to Van Lansberge 4 February, 24 May, and 30 August 1876, 4 February and 27 April 1877: Cons. Penang 102.

[3] Lavino to Van Lansberge 27 April 1877, Cons. Penang 102. Van Lansberge to Van Bosse 25 April 1878, Kol. Kab. I[11], 6107.

[4] John Langhout *The Economic Conquest of Acheen by the Dutch* (The Hague, 1924), pp. 31–2. Note by Bureau A[3] on G.G. to Kol. 25 April 1878, Kol. Kab. I[11], 6107.

[5] *Cons. Versl.* 1878, p. 747, and 1879, p. 773. Lavino to Van Lansberge 5 July 1876, Cons. Penang 102.

syndicate was represented by De Lange & Co. of Batavia.[1]

During 1879 Katz Brothers, De Lange & Co., and the Penang firm of Mathieu & Co. jointly established at Kutaradja a new firm devoted to buying up Atjehnese produce, in order to fill the empty Katz Brothers steamers on their return journey to Penang. Within a year this firm dominated the entire trade of the west and north coasts. A few Chinese firms continued to run small steamers between Penang and Idi, and the farmer of the Atjeh opium monopoly, Chang Chen-hsun[2] ran his S.S. *Rajah Kongsee Atjeh* profitably to the west coast. But the old Chinese and Indonesian sailing vessels were doomed. The following table[3] shows the number of vessels other than those of Katz Brothers and the N. I. Stoomvaart Mij. which left Penang for Atjehnese ports:

	Steamers		Sailing Vessels	
	No.	Tonnage	No.	Tonnage
1876	82	13,758	381	23,087
1877	96	16,083	442	23,300
1878	61	12,416	352	21,990
1879	100	22,818	243	15,465
1880	89	13,131	163	7,751
1881	73	12,628	129	6,533

By 1880 Lavino could report that the Atjeh pepper-trade, though much reduced, was 'to a very large extent . . . being conducted by Europeans'.[4]

[1] Kennedy's report of 23 January 1883, F.O. 37/662; Lavino to Alg. Sec. 28 September 1876, Cons. Penang 102; Katz Bros. claim of 12 July 1883, in Huttenbach to Kennedy 12 July 1883, F.O. 220/2.

[2] Chang (1840–1917) was a Kwangtung Hakka who emigrated to Batavia in 1857. He rose to wealth there partly by contracting to supply the Dutch armed forces. On being awarded the Atjeh government opium farm in 1876 he moved to Penang, and within a year he acquired all the other important government farms (opium, spirit, and pawn-brokers') in the East Coast of Sumatra Residency as well as Atjeh. By 1889 he had also acquired most of the important farms in the Straits Settlements. It was largely because of his great influence among Indonesian Chinese that he was appointed by Peking to be its Vice-Consul in Penang (1893) and later Consul-General in Singapore (1894–8). He was known in the Straits Settlements as Thio Tiauw Siat, and traded under the name Chop Ban Joo Hin. Wen Chung-chi, 'The Nineteenth-Century Imperial Chinese Consulate in the Straits Settlements: Origins and Development' (unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of Singapore, 1964), pp. 233–9.

[3] From Lavino's reports in *Cons. Versl.* 1880–3.

[4] *Cons Versl.* 1881, p. 819. See also Table 2 in Appendix 3.

The expansion of this Katz Brothers concern was greatly assisted by Van der Heijden's regulations, which channelled all trade onto the Ulèëlheuë-Penang route operated by the army contractors. It was the small Chinese firms which suffered from the restrictions, but without the support of the European houses their protest could not be as effective as in the past.

A. Huttenbach, the managing partner of Katz Brothers in Penang, at first opposed Van der Heijden's regulations because of some petty official interference with his affairs. A vigorous movement against the regulations therefore began almost at once. It collapsed when Huttenbach withdrew in November 1879, having realized where his real interest lay. He was to have been the main witness before a special committee appointed by the Penang Chamber of Commerce to examine the grievances. Without him the committee produced only a general report on the hardships caused by six years of fitful blockade. Only a very doubtful claim that some Dutch vessels had been given privileges over British ones was brought forward as evidence that Britain's treaty rights had been broken. At the end of the year two public meetings resolved to have the *Report and Minutes of Evidence* printed and to draw up a petition to Government. A pamphlet was printed, but nothing was ever done about the petition.[1]

The complaints might never have reached Whitehall had not the Netherlands Foreign Ministry fallen into the old trap of *qui s'excuse s'accuse*. It compiled a detailed refutation of the Penang document for the British Colonial Office. Asked to report, the Straits Government still limited itself simply to forwarding a copy of the forgotten *Report and Minutes of Evidence*.[2]

The British Government was eager to find evidence of Dutch unreasonableness in Atjeh because it had just been checked in pleading an individual case of grievance. In May 1879 some Penang Chinese had been trading in Peusangan with Dutch

[1] Lavino to Van Lansberge 17 July, 10 and 24 September, and 5 December 1879: *idem* 25 March 1880: Cons. Penang 104. *Report and Minutes of Evidence taken by the Committee of the Chamber of Commerce to enquire into grievances brought forward by traders between Penang and Sumatra*, in S.S. to C.O. 19 June 1880, C.O. 273/103.

[2] 'Note refutant quelque allegations . . .', n.d., left with Hicks Beach by Van Bylandt 8 March 1880: Hicks Beach to Anson 23 March 1880: C.O. 273/106; Weld to Kimberley 19 June 1880, C.O. 273/103.

permission, when that state was subjected to one of the pointless bombardments which had become a feature of Dutch policy in the dependencies. Their claim for compensation was abruptly rejected by General Van der Heijden, who had as little patience with Penang traders as most officials in Atjeh.[1]

This incident stirred the latent indignation of men like Meade at the Colonial Office at the whole sad tale of Dutch intervention in Atjeh:

> Nothing can justify bombarding a defenceless village without notice, and considering the friendly manner in which we fall in with the regulations made by the Dutch from time to time I think the Governor of Acheen might have paid more attention to the remonstrances of the Col. Sec.[2]

The Foreign Office had obliged by defending the merchants' right to indemnity before the Netherlands Government. In reply the Dutch had not explained why the merchants were not warned of the bombardment, but the case collapsed when it was found that any real loss suffered by the merchants could not be attributed directly to the bombardment.[3]

Consequently Whitehall welcomed the *Report and Minutes of Evidence* when it arrived in July 1880, even though it lacked the expressed approval of the Governor or even of the Chamber of Commerce itself. At the end of the year the Foreign Office suggested that it provided grounds for a more general approach to The Hague in favour of greater freedom to trade.[4]

By this time the small Chinese and Indian traders of Penang had recovered from Huttenbach's defection. Over 200 of them presented a strong petition to the Governor in December 1880.[5] Not only, they claimed, did Van der Heijden's regulations

[1] Enclosures in Anson to Hicks Beach 13 December 1879, C.O. 273/100.

[2] Minute by Meade 26 January 1880: Herbert to Tenterden 4 February 1880: C.O. 273/100.

[3] Anderson to Pauncefote 14 February 1880: Salisbury to Fenton 27 February 1880 and reply 15 March 1880: Fenton to Salisbury 24 April 1880 and enclosures, and minutes thereon: F.O. 37/661; Minutes on F.O. to C.O. 31 May 1880; Kimberley to Weld 12 July 1880; C.O. 273/106. Weld to Kimberley 19 June and 30 July 1880, C.O. 273/103; *idem* 21 October 1880, C.O. 273/104.

[4] Pauncefote to Herbert 24 December 1880, C.O. 273/106.

[5] Petition of 208 Chinese and Tamil merchants to Weld, 2 December 1880, copy C.O. to F.O. 8 March 1881, F.O. 37/661.

force them to make a 100 mile detour to Ulèëlheuë, but once there they suffered great expense and delay from the Dutch customs officials.

These merchants found a champion in Sir Frederick Weld,[1] who assumed the Government of the Straits Settlements on May 6th, 1880. Weld was quick to criticise those who did not live up to his high Victorian standards, and reacted strongly against the brutal progress of the Dutch in Atjeh. He reflected fully the aggrieved sense of Penang, where he spent three months early in 1881, when he complained that with all the advantages Britain had afforded them, the Dutch had 'almost depopulated Acheen, whose rulers had been our allies since the time of Queen Elizabeth and who invoked our protection and offered their country to us'.[2] Like most Atjeh traders in the Straits, Weld suspected that Van der Heijden's regulation was an attempt to displace Penang by Ulèëlheuë as the entrepôt of North Sumatra. He therefore gave his full support to the Penang petition.[3]

[1] Sir Frederick Aloysius Weld (1823–91) came from an old Catholic family of Dorset. He studied at Stoneyhurst and Freiburg before emigrating to New Zealand as a gentleman farmer in 1844. Entering the House of Representatives in 1853, he became Minister of Native Affairs (1860–1) and finally Premier (1864–5) on a 'self-reliant' policy of settling the Maori wars with local troops. His success in thus balancing the budget impressed Whitehall, so that he was appointed Governor successively of Western Australia (1869), Tasmania (1875), and the Straits Settlements (1880–7). In Singapore he devoted most of his attention to consolidating the system of rule by advice in the Malay States. He was direct, honest, and generally respected, though rather blunt and a poor judge of men. Preface by Hugh Clifford in Lovat *The Life of Sir Frederick Weld* (London, 1914). *DNB* 60, pp. 157–8. Sinclair *A History of New Zealand* (London, 1959), pp. 108 and 140.

[2] Weld to Kimberley 22 September 1881, C.O. 273/109. Also *Pinang Gazette* 23 June 1881, quoted Lavino to 's Jacob 12 July 1881, Cons. Penang 11. The ancient alliance of England and Atjeh was a favourite argument of many Atjeh partisans in the Straits. It was based on the visit to Atjeh in 1602–3 of Sir James Lancaster with the first East India Company expedition. The British were well received as powerful opponents of Spain and Portugal, and in return for a letter from Queen Elizabeth, the Sultan gave Lancaster a series of 'articles' giving favourable terms to British traders. It was not the permanent 'treaty' which Lancaster desired. W. Foster (ed.) *The Voyages of Sir James Lancaster to Brazil and the East Indies 1591–1603* (Hakluyt, London, 1940), pp. 90–103 and 130–5; F. C. Danvers (ed.) *Letters Received by the East India Company from its Servants in the East* (London, 1896), I, pp. xxiii–xxv and 1–4.

[3] Weld to Kimberley 7 January 1881, C.O. 273/107.

Kimberley had returned to the Colonial Office with the 1880–5 Gladstone Government. Remembering the trouble caused him by the 1871 Sumatra Treaty,[1] he was as anxious as Weld to see that the Dutch were not violating its commercial provisions.[2] A protest would certainly have been made to The Hague, but its preparation was interrupted by the announcement in April 1881 that the war was considered over. Instead Britain requested assurance that peace in Atjeh would mean 'prizes will not be made, blockades will not be imposed, and the restrictions upon trade will give way to the freedom secured to British subjects by Treaty'.[3]

This assurance was given on condition that peace continued to reign. The Dutch Foreign Minister was even able to say that the withdrawal of Van der Heijden's restrictions had already been ordered,[4] though it was not for another six months that this order was put into effect. The grievances of Penang were at last removed by the end of 1881, though considerable bitterness remained among the small traders.[5]

The British Consulate in Ulèëlheuë

This controversy prompted the Foreign Office to seek a more satisfactory way of ending complaints from the Straits than the 1871 Treaty had proved. A suggestion made by an angry Chinese merchant for a British Consulate in Atjeh had been noticed in the *Report and Minutes of Evidence.* At the end of 1880 this was cautiously referred to Singapore for the Governor's opinion.[6] Both Weld and the authorities in Penang reported

[1] See above, pp. 75–8.

[2] Kimberley's minute 25 February 1881, and amendment of Herbert to Pauncefote, 8 March 1881, C.O. 273/107.

[3] Stuart to Van Lynden van Sandenburg 11 May 1881, B.Z. Atjeh. Granville to Stuart 4 May 1881, F.O. 37/661.

[4] Van Lynden van Sandenburg to Van Goltstein 18 May 1881, and reply 18 June 1881, B.Z. Atjeh; Stuart to Granville 27 June 1881 and enclosure, F.O. 37/661.

[5] See below, p. 209. *Pinang Gazette* 10 May 1882; *Penang Times* 22 December 1882, copy in F.O. 220/1; Penang reports in *Cons. Versl.* 1882, pp. 368–9, and 1883, p. 1024.

[6] Pauncefote to Herbert 24 December 1880, C.O. 273/106. Also Anderson's minute 2 June 1881, on C.O. to F.O. 27 May 1881, F.O. 37/661.

enthusiastically that a Consulate was the only hope of real relief for the merchants. Kimberley agreed, and Treasury approval was obtained in November 1881.[1]

Henry George Kennedy was appointed Britain's first Consul for Sumatra in April 1882. It proved a wholly unsatisfactory appointment. There was no obvious site for a consulate since Penang was the only centre of the North Sumatra trade. Ulèëlheuë was finally chosen because it was near the seat of the Atjeh Government against which all Penang's complaints had been directed. Kennedy finally opened his office there in March 1883.[2] Yet like all Dutch posts in Atjeh Besar Ulèëlheuë was a town under siege, with only a strip of road 'as long as Sloane St.' safe to walk on. Even the good three-mile road to Kutaradja could seldom be used.

The Dutch at this time were in a critical position, unable to hold the area conquered by Van der Heijden, liable to attack at any time and almost in any place in Atjeh, yet incapable of agreeing on a remedy. The Dutch officials were more than ever ready to take out some of their nervous tension on the Penang traders, whom they naturally regarded as parasites drawing a profit from the sufferings of both sides in the war. With the forceful, opinionated Resident of Atjeh Besar, A. Sol,[3] in particular, obstruction to the Straits merchants was a fundamental doctrine. He began the first serious attempt to control trade in the interests of pacification, and in doing so intensified

[1] Weld to Kimberley 9 April 1881 and enclosure, C.O. 273/108; Kimberley's minute 18 May 1881 on F.O. to C.O. 7 May 1881: Pauncefote to Herbert 30 November 1881: C.O. 273/112.

[2] Granville to Kennedy 22 April 1882: Kennedy to Chief Clerk, F.O., 2 April 1883: F.O. 220/1; Kennedy to Granville 23 January 1883, F.O. 37/662.

[3] See below, p. 214. First Government Secretary in Batavia before 1883, Sol had a particularly detailed knowledge of Dutch Atjeh policy. Thus he was sent to Kutaradja early in 1883 with the unusual rank of Resident (subordinates to a Governor were normally not above Assistant Resident) to help a new Governor settle in while the Assistant Resident of Atjeh Besar was on leave. A minority of the *Raad van Indië* regretted the appointment, fearing that Sol 'who has his own settled views on Atjehnese affairs' would not accept the Governor's authority. One of his first decrees was that all Atjehnese should squat by the road when a high official passed. This 'deservedly caused general derision', and was overruled. Enclosures in G.G. to Kol. 30 May 1883, Kol. Kab. H[11], 6145; *Overzicht van de Stukken rakende de zaken van Atjeh 1874–1916*, Kol. 6572, p. 655; Kennedy to Granville 3 September 1883 and enclosed memorandum on Sol, F.O. 37/662.

the resentment of Penang traders who felt more than ever that they were the victims of persistent minor injustice and discrimination. Consequently relations between Penang and the Atjeh Government were never more strained than during Kennedy's term. Huttenbach himself journeyed to Kutaradja in July 1883 to express a new collection of grievances, and insulted Sol before a gathering of officials. 'I had before seen dissatisfaction,' he reported, 'but never such a deep hatred against Government or rather its officials than now, be it amongst the Achinese, Chinese or Penang merchants, etc.'.[1]

Kennedy, whose past experience had been as a junior official in the Bangkok Consulate, was too immature a man to cope with this atmosphere of tension and distrust. He quickly adopted the part cast for him by resentful Dutch officials, sided wholly with the Penang merchants, and pictured himself isolated among conspiring enemies. At first he deluged the Foreign Office with avowedly partial complaints which threw all the onus of decision on his superiors.[2] Meeting little response, he tried to put the responsibility for a formal indictment of the Dutch on the Straits Government.[3] Unable to remain detached from the tense, petty-minded European community, he was drawn into an open vendetta with Sol. In August he compiled a massive indictment of the Resident hoping that London would intervene to have him removed. Worse still, he appealed to the Governor of Atjeh and even the Governor-General to move Sol elsewhere, telling both he had invoked the intervention of his own Government.[4]

Kennedy confessed in August, 'the pressure is beginning to tell upon my nerves'.[5] By the end of 1883 he was so obsessed by his quarrel with Sol that he could only regret the official had 'slipped out of my clutches' when Sol was given compassionate

[1] Memorandum of an interview with the Governor, 3 July 1883, in Huttenbach to Kennedy 7 July 1883, F.O. 220/2.

[2] Kennedy to Granville 29 January, 30 June, 6 August and 4 September 1883, F.O. 37/662.

[3] Weld to Derby 12 December 1883, C.O. 273/123; Kennedy to Weld 18 December 1883, F.O. 220/3.

[4] Kennedy to Granville 3 September 1883 and enclosed memo on Sol: *idem* 30 June, 6 and 7 August and 29 September 1883: F.O. 37/662; Explanatory Memorandum for Governor-General 11 August 1883, F.O. 220/3.

[5] Kennedy to Granville 7 August 1883, F.O. 37/622.

leave because of the death of his wife.[1] The Foreign Office was appalled, and wondered whether 'Kennedy's head has been affected by the climate'. Sir Charles Dilke wrote two private letters rebuking the Consul for his excessive zeal.[2]

The failure of the consulate was apparent to all. Kennedy morbidly concluded that he should advise Penang merchants against trading in Atjeh at all. Consuls anywhere in Netherlands India, he thought, excited such animosity that they could only prejudice the position of British traders unless London was prepared to support them at all costs.[3] In April 1884 Percy Anderson therefore proposed the abandonment of the consulate 'which has proved a complete failure.'[4] Kennedy's departure was delayed until March 1885 by the captivity of the crew of the British steamer *Nisero*,[5] but his confidence collapsed after Dilke's letters and he attempted no further criticism of Dutch policy.

Civil Government in Atjeh

The surprising declaration of 1881 that the Atjeh war was over had been occasioned by the needs of the Dutch rather than any reconciliation between the two sides. In Atjeh, the Dutch had encountered a more formidable Indonesian enemy than ever before, and the Netherlands Indian army had been asked to perform a task of conquest for which it was ill-equipped. The heavy losses from disease during the first six years of the war disorganized the whole army, so that at times it would have been impossible to collect 500 fit soldiers in all Java.[6] Since the home government was unwilling to sanction special recruitment in Holland it was imperative that Van der Heijden's offensive be halted at the end of 1879 and his army reduced to a bare 6,500 men.[7]

[1] *Idem* 11 October 1883, F.O. 37/638.

[2] Memo by Anderson 11 October 1883, and appended minutes: Minutes on Kennedy to Granville 11 and 14 October 1883: F.O. 37/638.

[3] Kennedy to Granville 11 October 1883, F.O. 37/638; *idem* 21 January 1884, F.O. 220/4.

[4] Minute by Anderson, n.d. on minute by Hertslett 15 April 1884, F.O. 37/692.

[5] See chapter 7 below.

[6] E. B. Kielstra, 'De Toestand van het Indische Leger' *De Gids 48* (1884), Part II, pp. 154 and 157–8.

[7] See statistics of Dutch occupation in Appendix 4, below.

Moreover the economic situation was beginning to turn against the Netherlands Indian Government. In the early years of the war, government sales of coffee had yielded such exceptional profits that the war could be prosecuted with the minimum of special credits from the States-General.[1] Coffee and sugar prices fell rapidly however after 1877, the last year in which the Dutch treasury profited from an Indonesian surplus. The Liberals (in power from November 1877 to August 1879) were committed to ending the state cultivation of export crops, but could see no way of doing so as long as all available finance was required to fight the Atjehnese.[2]

To ask extra credits from the States-General had been possible only when the national honour appeared to be at stake as in 1873. Criticism of the war had brought Van de Putte's government down in 1874. The States-General continued to demand why such unprecedented bloodshed and expense should be necessary while official spokesmen continued to deny any intention to expand the area of direct Dutch control in the outer islands. The Anti-Revolutionary (Calvinist) Keuchenius spoke for many when he condemned the war in 1880 as 'one of the most horrible and unjustifiable ever undertaken in the Indies'.[3]

The Hague and Batavia were both anxious to believe, therefore, that having felt Dutch might the Atjehnese needed only a period of peace and stability in order to acquiesce in Dutch rule. The Commander-in-Chief, who visited Atjeh in September 1879, confirmed that resistance was at an end.

Van Goltstein was quick to fall in with the offer of Pruys van der Hoeven,[4] then on leave in Holland, to return as Civil

[1] Van de Putte, *Atjeh*, pp. 120–3. Kielstra III, p. 2. Credits of f.6.5 million were voted in 1873–4, but the bulk of the war expenses were derived from a planned surplus of f.23.3 m. in the 1873 colonial budget, and an unexpected surplus of f.16 million on coffee sales in that year.

[2] J. S. Furnivall *Netherlands India* (Cambridge, 1939), pp. 183 and 196. Vlekke *Nusantara* (The Hague/Leyden, 1958), p. 313.

[3] Quoted Vandenbosch, *Dutch Foreign Policy Since 1815*, p. 201. Also Rengers, *Schets eener parlementaire geschiedenis* II, pp. 111–14.

[4] Abraham Pruys van der Hoeven (1829–1907) went to sea as a boy but joined the government service when in Batavia in 1852. All his service from 1854 was in Sumatra. He was finally appointed Resident of the Lampongs (1870) and of Palembang (1873). After administering Atjeh he was pensioned in May 1883, but returned to Batavia later as a member of the *Raad van Indië* (1886–93). His successor in Palembang and Atjeh, Tobias, be-

Governor of Atjeh. He left Holland in December with the understanding that he would be so appointed, giving good grounds for later military criticism that he, the Colonial Minister, and the Governor-General were privately planning the end of military government over the heads of the men with first-hand experience. Van Lansberge appointed Van der Heijden and Van der Hoeven to a commission to study the form of government for Atjeh. The report came back at the end of 1880. It was agreed that civil government should be the goal. This alone could create the settled conditions necessary to destroy the following of the 'war-party', to create trust in the Dutch, and to induce the fugitives to return to their homes. Since most of the *ulèëbalangs* of Atjeh Besar had fled, the conquered district would have to be governed directly, despite earlier undertakings not to extend the directly-ruled area. The treaty system should be maintained in the dependencies. Van der Hoeven favoured the immediate introduction of civil government, while Van der Heijden maintained that the military regime would be necessary for at least another year. This difference was resolved only when an influential member of the *Raad van Indië*, Der Kinderen, made a supplementary investigation on the spot and fell out with the military commander. Shortly thereafter, on 6 April 1881, the war was declared over and Pruys van der Hoeven became Governor. The Atjehnese believed, not entirely without reason, that the fearsome 'one-eyed king' had been banished in disgrace.[1]

The undue haste with which this measure was pushed through was in large part a consequence of the exceptional international publicity surrounding the Atjeh war, which had seriously injured Holland's reputation as a colonial power. The western powers, as well as the Dutch and Indonesian public, had to be shown that the war was really at an end. In the West

lieved he was an incurable optimist, believing what he wished to believe. Certainly his view of Atjeh was welcome to governments anxious to believe further expenditure unnecessary. He had a large share in Atjeh policy after 1878, especially as an opponent of the 'military' point of view. *NNBW* I, col. 1131. Van der Hoeven *Mijne Ervaring van Atjeh* (The Hague, 1886); P. F. Laging Tobias *Phrasen en Feiten* (Amsterdam, 1886).

[1] Boon, pp. 50–73; Van der Hoeven, 1886, pp. 29–32; Laging Tobias, pp. 4–10, 20 and 36; Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, 1906, I, pp. 11–15; Kielstra and Muller in *NNBW* I, cols. 1104–5 (Van der Heijden) and 1131 (Van der Hoeven); Kreemer I, pp. 20–1; Van Heutsz, p. 1080.

Coast of Sumatra, by contrast, military government had been continued for decades after the defeat of all organized *Padri* opposition. Yet despite the claims of the military party, this mistake was by no means the major reason for the rapid deterioration in the Dutch position in the four years after 1881.[1]

Van der Heijden's offensives could only have been a permanent success had they been crowned by a durable understanding with traditional *ulèëbalang* leadership whose interest was in stability. Instead these had been driven out of the Atjeh valley and in many cases replaced by more pliable rivals. The ordinary villager whose home had been burned by ill-disciplined Dutch troops had little incentive to forsake his chiefs in exile and return to the land of the *Kompeuni*. Even Van der Heijden, who had more force at his disposal than any subsequent governor, failed to efface the reputation for arbitrary punishment which the Dutch had earned by claiming to rule where they lacked real power.[2]

After vainly defending one position after another in the Atjeh valley the Atjehnese leaders retreated to the hills between Pidië and Atjeh Besar. At the end of 1879 Tuanku Hashim and the young Sultan established themselves at Keumala well up the Pidië river. They were soon joined by the most important leaders of resistance—Teuku Paya, his son Nyak Hassan, the Imam of Luëng Bata and Teungku Sheikh Saman of Tiro.[3] As a

[1] The myth that the war was won in 1879 but lost again in 1884 was mainly the work of Van Heutsz, in 'De onderwerping', pp. 1064–80.

[2] Van der Hoeven, 1886, p. 36. Lavino to Van Lansberge 2 January, and 27 February 1879, Cons. Penang 104.

[3] Tiro, in the IX Mukims Keumangan, Pidië district, was the site of one of the most famous *Deah*, or religious schools of the highest level where the textbooks were chiefly in Arabic. The doyen of the *ulama* teaching at a *Deah* was given the title Teungku Chik. Although Sheikh Saman (1836–91) formally assumed this title only on the death of his uncle in 1885 (or 1887 following Ismail Jakub), he was widely known as Teungku di Tiro before then. He was more than any other responsible for portraying the resistance as a *perang sabil* (holy war) and uniting the *ulama* behind it after 1881. Ismail Jakub asserts that he went to Mecca via Penang immediately before assuming an active part in the war, and this is supported by his subsequent use of the title *haji*. Though Teungku Chik Pante Kulu, from a *Deah* close to Tiro, is reputed in Atjeh to have composed the *Hikayat Perang Sabil* on the way back from Mecca about 1880, this Hikayat was popularized by Teungku Sheikh Saman as a means to arouse religious fervour for the war. Ismail Jakub, *Tengku Tjhik di Tiro*, 3rd ed. (Djakarta, 1960), pp. 51–144. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, pp. 178–9.

result of Tuanku Hashim's vigour and organizing ability Keumala was gradually accepted as a second capital of Atjeh, and from a tiny kampong it grew to a considerable centre of agriculture and local trade.[1]

For a time these leaders hesitated after Van der Heijden's shattering offensive. In June 1879 the Imam of Luëng Bata had already summoned a meeting of *ulèëbalangs* to consider a concerted submission. When this meeting failed to reach agreement he showed little heart for maintaining the contest.[2] Panglima Polem Chut Banta, the other prominent leader in the defence of the XXII Mukims, died towards the end of 1879. At this point Van der Heijden began to seek contact with Keumala through the Raja of Gigiëng, who was authorized to offer the recognition of Tuanku Hashim as Raja of Majapahit (the east coast State which Hashim had governed between 1865 and 1873) in return for his submission.[3] Another conciliatory attempt was made by Sayyid Abdallah bin Abbas Aydiet, a former secretary of the rulers of Kedah and Klang. He left Penang for Keumala in July 1880 with encouragement from the Dutch and the recommendation of the remaining members of the Penang 'Council of Eight'.[4] Early in 1880 Keumala was indecisive and even Tuanku Hashim was reported to be considering submission. But as violence flared up again in the second half of the year there could be no doubt which side enjoyed the sympathies of the leading *ulèëbalangs*, and conciliation attempts were abandoned. Even Teuku Muda Ba'et, the most notable *ulèëbalang* to submit in 1878, had made his opposition to the Dutch so clear that within a year he was imprisoned and exiled to the Moluccas.

After the expulsion of organized resistance from Atjeh Besar, the north coast became the centre of open conflict. The Dutch posts at Sigli and Samalanga provoked the *ulama* of these districts to lead a series of attacks against them. After a severe

[1] Lavino to Van Lansberge 8 and 24 October and 20 December 1879, and 11 February 1880, Cons. Penang; 104. Lavino to 's Jacob 31 May 1881, Cons. Penang 11.

[2] Lavino to Van Lansberge 19 June 1879, Cons. Penang 104; Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, II, p. 108.

[3] Lavino to Van Lansberge 15 January and 19 May 1880, Cons. Penang 104; Van der Heijden to Goltstein 29 October 1879, Kol. Kab. S[19], 6121.

[4] Lavino to Van Lansberge 19 May, 14 June, and 5 October 1880, Cons. Penang 104.

attack on the Samalanga post in July 1880 Van der Heijden led three punitive sorties into Samalanga. The Raja submitted afresh, but the earth and bamboo fort defended by the militant party a few miles inland at Batèë Iliq successfully withstood several heavy assaults.[1] This clear defeat of the Dutch forces ought to have convinced Dutch officials of their precarious position even before civil government was introduced.

The pattern of guerrilla warfare which emerged after the introduction of civil government is more easily understood by a modern observer than by contemporary Dutch officers. The Atjehnese had abandoned hope of driving the Dutch out by pitched battles, or even of uniting their own forces as in the days when Panglima Polem or Abd ar-Rahman could command an army of several thousand. On the other hand there was no need to go on defending one position after another. The *ulèëbalangs* who had conducted the defence of their own districts now withdrew to the background. The initiative was seized by adventurers, young hotheads, and religious teachers who were prepared to undertake daring raids on the Dutch positions in the cause of patriotism, of religion, or of their own advancement. Nyak Hassan, the son of Teuku Paya, and Nyak Husain, the younger brother of the Imam of Luëng Bata, began to organize guerrilla bands to attack and plunder within the Dutch lines. Tengku Tiro was the most able and successful of the *ulama* who now exhorted their compatriots to heroism with the assurance that God was on their side. These enthusiasts and extremists gained an increasing influence over the minds of Atjehnese villagers at the expense of the *ulèëbalangs*. The life of those who had sided with the Dutch conquerors was made intolerable, and all were obliged to pay at least lip service to the ideals of the resistance. Thus instead of moderating Atjehnese hatred of the *Kompeuni*, civil government ingrained it more deeply in the minds of the ordinary Atjehnese.

Guerrilla attacks had begun even under General Van der Heijden.[2] Van der Hoeven, who abolished the regular military patrols his predecessor had found essential, was less able to cope

[1] Van der Hoeven, 1886, pp. 27–9; Lavino to Van Lansberge 12 and 27 July and 24 August 1880, Cons. Penang 104; Stuart to Granville 12 August and 19 September 1880, F.O. 37/661.

[2] Van der Hoeven, 1886, pp. 24–5.

with them.[1] During 1882 and 1883 hardly a week passed without some fatal attack on a Dutch post or transport.[2] The Chinese immigrant labourers essential for military works were frequently attacked, and began to leave Atjeh in large numbers after 1881.[3] Military morale declined to its lowest ebb. Unseasoned troops were liable at any time to have to face Atjehnese swords, but were denied the opportunity for effective retaliation. By the end of 1882 fifteen European soldiers had deserted to the Atjehnese.[4]

The first scheepvaartregeling

Civil government was less disastrous in the dependencies. Most of these had not experienced the heat of battle directly, and hatred of the Dutch was often insufficient to overcome hope of gain or jealousy of a neighbouring state. Dutch officials were able to use their experience in other parts of Indonesia to better effect, supplying arms to some states, closing the ports of others, and slowly trying to gain influence with the rajas. The collapse in Atjeh Besar made it an uphill struggle.

The most difficult task was that of acting Assistant Resident Scherer in the North Coast. He quickly became convinced that periodic blockades and bombardments were no substitute for a permanent control of all trade in the interests of pacification. He first submitted such a scheme, which became known as a *scheepvaartregeling* (shipping regulation), to the two Government Commissioners in April 1880.[5]

[1] Kreemer I, p. 22. Van der Maaten, *Snouck Hurgronje en de Atjeh Oorlog* I, pp. 17–18.

[2] Van der Maaten I,pp. 18–20. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, II, pp. 108–10; Kennedy to Granville 12 May 1883, F.O. 37/638; *idem* 23 January 1883: Fenton to Granville 23 May 1883: F.O. 37/662.

[3] Lavino to 's Jacob 26 July and 18 October 1881, Cons. Penang 11; Penang reports in *Cons. Versl.* 1882–4.

[4] Van de Putte, *Atjeh*, p. 272; Van der Hoeven, 1886, pp. 76–7; Laging Tobias, *Phrasen en Feiten*, pp. 42–3. This rate of desertion continued throughout the period of civil government, to the considerable benefit of the Atjehnese in their attempts to manufacture gunpowder. The total for the period 1882–92 was 70 desertions (48 assorted Europeans, 5 Eurasians, and 17 Indonesians), the bulk of which occurred in the period of civil government (1882–5). J. A. Vink, 'Desertiën van militairen der Nederlandsch Indische krijgsmacht naar de Atjehers in de laatste 10 jaren', *IMT* 23 (1892) Part II, pp. 467–80.

[5] Van Heutsz, p. 1083.

This was one of the most important measures on which the Commissioners were able to agree. They recommended that Van der Heijden's temporary diversion of all trade through Ulèëlheuë should be modified by limiting all overseas trade to four or five ports under Dutch control. These would grow in time into regular centres of trade as had happened elsewhere in the Archipelago. Dutch officials could then control the duties, the main revenue of the coastal rajas and source of dispute between them. This was the surest way to keep the obedience of the rajas.[1]

Van Lansberge and the Dutch Cabinet, on the other hand, saw the settling of all commercial conflict with Britain as one of the major purposes of civil government. On assuming office, Van der Hoeven received instructions to open all ports to foreign trade as required by the 1824 Treaty. The Civil Governor delayed giving effect to these instructions, however, until a new Governor-General had considered his renewed appeal in favour of the *scheepvaartregeling*. In words reminiscent of Van der Heijden in 1879, he defended this measure as

> . . . the only way to remove the serious danger which threatens us from the side of the dependencies. . . . If things remain as they are then sooner or later we will undoubtedly be faced with a new Atjeh war, to be waged against the state or states which, by conquering the smaller, will be powerful enough to refuse us all obedience, and finally to proceed against us with weapons or, by presumptious conduct towards foreign traders . . . to involve us in international difficulties.[2]

Frederik 's Jacob, who replaced Van Lansberge on 12 April 1881, was immediately faced with strong pressure from the Straits Settlements. At the end of 1879 acting Governor Anson had begun the practice of issuing prohibitions of arms exports to Netherlands India for only six months at a time, to be renewed on the application of the Governor-General.[3] No

[1] Van der Hoeven, 1886, pp. 18–23; 's Jacob to Van der Hoeven 7 September 1881, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 September 1881, Kol. Kab. F[11], 6134.

[2] Van der Hoeven to 's Jacob 25 April 1881, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 September 1881, Kol. Kab. F[11], 6134.

[3] Ord's prohibition of 1873 had been superseded by those of March and August 1874, each prohibiting arms exports anywhere in the Peninsula or Archipelago for six months. When these expired and the Perak disturbances

political motive was involved, but the change served to emphasize Holland's dependence on British goodwill, particularly as Britain had in 1877 insisted on free arms trade in the Sulu area despite Spanish opposition.[1]

When Sir Frederick Weld renewed the prohibition in May 1881 he expressed to 's Jacob the hope that this would be the last such extension necessary. Neither the Governor-General's remonstrances nor those of Van Bylandt to the Foreign Office could evoke any British undertaking that the prohibition would be renewed. Weld telegraphed home to prevent any such assurance being given until Van der Heijden's restrictions were ended in accordance with the promise of the Dutch Foreign Minister.[2]

This pressure reinforced the misgivings which had been felt in Batavia over any restriction of the Penang-Sumatra trade. In September 's Jacob firmly insisted on the withdrawal of Van der Heijden's regulation which 'was undoubtedly unlawful and no longer defensible' once the war was declared over. The Atjehnese dependencies were, as 'native Powers' in the sense of Article IV of the 1824 Treaty, entitled to 'free communication' with Penang. Moreover, he pointed out, the Dutch were now bound by the undertakings given to the British Foreign Office when the war has been declared over the previous May.[3]

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which had given rise to them appeared over, Sir Andrew Clarke refused to renew a prohibition for Atjeh alone. His successor Jervois however did so on 6 August 1875, in response to a Dutch request. In November 1875 the murder of Resident Birch prompted another prohibition of arms exports to the entire Peninsula and Archipelago 'until further notice'. In 1879 Read reported this was no longer in force and Van Lansberge appealed for a renewal covering Netherlands India. Anson then judged that the proclamation of November 1875 had been too vaguely worded to be valid anyway. Clarke to Carnarvon 17 November 1874, C.O. 273/76; Van Goltstein to Willebois 20 May 1875: Maier to Willebois 14 August 1875: B.Z. Atjeh. Jervois to Carnarvon 20 August 1875, copy C.O. to F.O. 4 October 1875, F.O. 37/660; Anson to Hicks Beach 19 November 1879, C.O. 273/100.

[1] De Robeck's minute 1 January 1880, on S.S. to C.O. 19 November 1879, C.O. 273/100; Sandenburg to Van Bylandt 31 December 1879, copy F.O. to C.O. 9 January 1880, C.O. 273/106.

[2] Van Bylandt to Granville 26 August 1881 and enclosure: Herbert to Tenterden 28 September 1881 and enclosures: F.O. 37/661; Weld to Kimberley 22 September 1881, C.O. 273/109. Also Granville to Harris 21 November and reply 28 November 1881, copies F.O. to C.O. 28 November and 5 December 1881, C.O. 273/112.

[3] 's Jacob to Van der Hoeven 7 September 1881, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 September 1881, Kol. Kab. F^{11}, 6134. Weld was mollified by this decision

In The Hague, Van Goltstein, who had begun a second term at the Colonial ministry in August 1879, approved the ending of Van der Heijden's restrictions. But he was less willing to interpret the 1824 Treaty in Britain's favour. The Atjehnese dependencies could not be 'Native Powers', he pointed out, since they had never been independent. The Government had every right to levy duties on behalf of the rajas or to make ships call at a Dutch port for inspection before proceeding elsewhere. Any abrupt change was undersirable in view of 's Jacob's correspondence with Weld, but experience might show the necessity of further restrictions before long.[1]

The Minister's fears were amply borne out. Less than a month after the raising of Van der Heijden's restrictions Samalanga was closed to trade in punishment for the murder there of the captain of a mailboat.[2] During 1882 Scherer persuaded Van der Hoeven to close the whole north coast, one section in May and the remainder in August. Vessels from outside Atjeh were permitted to visit only the four Dutch ports: Ulèëlheuë, Sigli, Samalanga, and Lhokseumawe.[3]

Weld was quick to complain on behalf of the merchants who claimed to have advanced over $100,000 on the pepper crop in the closed ports. The Governor-General was conciliatory, and modified the measure in accordance with Van Goltstein's suggestions. Vessels might proceed anywhere on the north coast provided they first submitted to a thorough examination at one of the Dutch ports.[4]

The appointment in March 1883 of a new Governor of Atjeh, Laging Tobias, did not alter the determination of Dutch local officials to control the Penang trade. On the contrary it

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and renewed the prohibition in October. It was continued at six-month intervals until the end of the century, but was seldom enforced unless the Dutch Consuls brought specific cases to police attention. Weld to Kimberley 5 November 1881 and enclosures, C.O. 273/110. Swettenham to Chamberlain 24 December 1896 and enclosure, C.O. 273/219.

[1] Van Goltstein to 's Jacob 21 November 1881, Kol. Kab. F^{11}, 6134.

[2] Van der Hoeven to 's Jacob 24 September 1881, copy G.G. to Kol. 15 October 1881, Kol. Kab. T^{12}, 6134; Lavino to McNair 17 October 1881, Cons. Penang 11.

[3] Fleury to McNair 16 May and 17 August 1882, Cons. Penang 11 and 12.

[4] Weld to 's Jacob 2 September 1882 and reply 16 September 1882, copies C.O. to F.O. 27 November 1882, F.O. 37/662; Fleury to 's Jacob 23 August 1882, Cons. Penang 12.

forced Batavia and The Hague to acknowledge that drastic measures were needed to retrieve the Dutch position. Pruys van der Hoeven's optimism had hidden the real strength of the resistance. He always maintained that the guerrilla bands were only isolated mercenaries, and that his policy of befriending the *adat*-party was well on the way to winning all but the most fanatical Muslims to a unified government under Dutch control.[1] Few officials or military officers in Atjeh agreed with this view, however, and Van der Hoeven's growing unpopularity obliged the Government to accept his resignation in the hope of making civil government acceptable under another man.

Tobias had not been in Atjeh a fortnight before he reported the Dutch position 'almost hopeless' and requested a battalion of reinforcements.[2] His words were given added point by two Atjehnese attacks during May 1883. In one, Nyak Hassan led a small band in an attack on Ulèëlheuë itself which threw the whole European community into panic. Later in the month a *Controleur* (civil official) was killed in another guerrilla attack.[3] Tobias's reports could leave no doubt that drastic changes of policy were imperative if Holland was to retain its position in North Sumatra. Consequently, his governorship marks one of the most critical periods in the Atjeh war.

The search for a new policy

Once more the *Atjeh-quaestie* became a heated topic in Holland, with both the aggressive party and the stronger cautious school of Van Swieten and Fransen van de Putte holding that the crisis would never have arisen had their policies been resolutely followed. This old debate was now dominated by the stern fact of financial crisis. Instead of the surpluses Indonesia had provided for Holland before 1877, deficits continued until a debt of f.45 million had accumulated by 1882 and f.70 million by 1884. On top of six years of low coffee and sugar prices came

[1] Van der Hoeven, 1886, pp. 60–4, 71–5, and 96–9. Kennedy to Granville 29 January 1883, F.O. 37/662.

[2] *Overzicht*, Kol. 6572, pp. 570–7; P.F. Laging Tobias, 'Het Herstel van het Sultanaat in Atjeh', *IG* 8 (1886), p. 1739.

[3] Kennedy to Granville 12 May 1883, F.O. 37/638; Fenton to Granville 23 May 1883, F.O. 37/662; Lavino to 's Jacob 16 May 1883, Cons. Penang 12; Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, II, pp. 108–10.

the sugar-crisis of 1884, precipitated by protection of the sugar-beet industry in Europe.[1]

In sending the battalion requested by Tobias, therefore, the Governor-General was obliged to emphasize the impossibility of any permanent expansion of the occupying force. Neither the finances nor the state of the army permitted it.[2] Civil and military authorities in Atjeh agreed that without such reinforcements it would be impossible to hold the area occupied since 1879. Consequently 's Jacob journeyed to Atjeh in August to discuss abandoning the outlying Dutch posts.

On 10 August 1883, an important conference took place in Kutaradja. The military insisted on special recruitment measures in Holland to enable them to hold their position. This, said 's Jacob, was out of the question. He pressed for withdrawal from the most untenable positions—Samalanga and the forts above Anak Galung in the XXII Mukims. But he was forced to concede that to do this immediately would involve a disastrous blow to Dutch prestige in Atjeh and perhaps all Indonesia. It was finally agreed that the military withdrawal must await some important advance which would safeguard a permanent Dutch influence.[3]

Each official had his own opinion about how to obtain such an advance. The three most discussed schemes were a restoration of the Sultanate, greater support for the 'friendly' rajas against the 'hostile' ones, and a harsher restriction of trade.

The first real initiative towards reversing Van Swieten's abolition of the Atjehnese Sultanate was that of F G. van Bloemen Waanders, the first Colonial Minister in the minority Conservative Cabinet which took office in April 1883. Reviewing the history of the war with commendable detachment, he came to the conclusion that the cautious *afwachtende houding* (wait-and-see policy) adopted after each offensive was the right policy in principle, but it had always failed because it was

[1] Gonggrijp *Schets Ener Economische Geschiedenis van Indonesië*, pp. 127 and 131–2; Rengers II, pp. 258–9; H. A. Idema *Parlementaire Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch-Indië 1891–1918* (The Hague, 1924), pp. 12–13.

[2] Tobias, 'Het Herstel van het Sultanaat', p. 1740.

[3] 's Jacob to Van Bloemen Waanders 16 October 1883, and enclosed proces-verbaal of Kutaradja conference 10 August 1883, Kol. Kab. U, 6149; Kennedy to Granville 21 August 1883, F.O. 37/662; P.F. Laging Tobias 'Onze tegenwoordige Politiek in Atjeh en Hare Gevolgen', *De Gids* 50 (1886), Part II, p. 285.

not linked with a recognition of the Sultanate. The introduction of civil government had been an unpardonable mistake which should be corrected as soon as possible. Then a military government should maintain the Dutch position with force until Sultan Daud could be persuaded that the Dutch desired his restoration to full dignity under Dutch supervision.[1]

Waanders' only immediate convert to this idea was Laging Tobias, to whom his despatch was sent so it could be considered at the Kutaradja conference. Tobias had already begun overtures to Tuanku Daud, whose recognition as Sultan now became his 'pet idea',[2] especially if further aggression was ruled out. A horrified *Raad van Indië,* on the other hand, thought such a reversal of policy would endanger Holland's whole position. The Governor-General too thought it an unnecessary counsel of despair, though he was willing to authorise Tobias to offer the title of Sultan and the status of a Javanese regent if Daud were to seek submission.[3]

This Tobias rejected as insufficient either to tempt Daud or to maintain his prestige among Atjehnese if he did submit. Bitterly disappointed at missing the opportunity provided by the Sultan's struggle late in 1883 to free himself from Tuanku Hashim's tight control, the Governor tendered his resignation in February 1884.[4]

Assistant Resident Scherer had a different solution, derived from standing his former policy for the North Coast on its head. Instead of bolstering the small states against their bullying neighbours, he now proposed to enlist the support of the strongest states against the guerrilla bands in Atjeh Besar. Pidië in particular could be tempted on this course with money, arms, and territorial expansion.[5]

This was certainly an extreme policy of weakness which could only have brought results over a very long period, if at all. However, Tobias and a new Governor-General, Van Rees,

[1] Van Bloemen Waanders to 's Jacob 2 July 1883, Kol. Kab. Y[10], 6144.

[2] Tobias, 'Het Herstel van het Sultanaat', p. 1723.

[3] 's Jacob to Weitzel 13 December 1883 and enclosures, Kol. Kab. E[7], 6151.

[4] Tobias to 's Jacob 4 February 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 21 April 1884, Kol. Kab. R[11], 6153. Tobias, 'Het Herstel van het Sultanaat', pp. 1747–50.

[5] Scherer's 'Memoire over het verzet in Groot-Atjeh', copy G.G. to Kol. 21 April 1884, Kol. Kab. R[11], 6153.

both appeared to think the situation demanded a thorough consideration of every conceivable scheme, and Scherer was summoned to Batavia in April 1884 to discuss it.[1]

Almost every official in Atjeh believed in greater control of trade, but Resident Sol was the most forthright protagonist of this as a solution. In his opinion it was neither necessary nor advisable to make any concessions to Penang:

> A trade from which the government draws little or no income and which gives rise to much contraband-import does more harm than good to the state. . . . When one finds, as now, a situation of war and rebellion, of complete disorder and insecurity, where the trade has adapted itself to this situation and even makes it a source of profit (one thinks not only of contraband-import but also of the influence of . . . the large advances to native chiefs and usurpers who take the place of the legitimate chiefs in many districts), then in my opinion the government is bound in the first place to hold this trade in order by effective controls.[2]

Sol had not been long in Atjeh before organizing a *scheepvaartregeling*, which Tobias decreed on his own authority on 29 May 1883. This was in essence the scheme of Scherer and Van der Hoeven which had been forbidden in 1881. Overseas shipping could visit only the seven Atjehnese ports with Dutch officials, while the intervening coastal trade was limited to very small vessels.[3] Another move in the same campaign was an alteration in the terms of the army provisioning contract for 1884 which enabled the Government to give preference to a tender undertaking to use ships under the Dutch flag. The result was the elimination of the syndicate dominated by Katz Brothers which had supplied the Netherlands forces with considerable profit for eight years.[4]

These were important steps towards making trade work for,

[1] Tobias to 's Jacob 19 March 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 8 April 1884, Kol. Kab. R[11], 6153; Van Rees to Sprenger van Eyk 5 April 1884, telegram, Kol. Kab. B[7], 6151; *idem* 3 and 12 May (despatches), Kol. Kab. I[14], 6154.

[2] Minute by Sol on Procès-verbal of Kutaradja conference 10 August 1883, copy G.G. to Kol. 16 October 1883, Kol. Kab. U, 6149. Also see above, p. 199.

[3] Kennedy to Granville 30 June and 6 August 1883, F.O. 37/662.

[4] Memorandum on new provision in army contract, in Kennedy to Granville 6 August 1883, F.O. 37/662.

rather than against, Dutch interests. They could not, however, produce the rapid results which the crisis of 1883 demanded. In the Kutaradja conference Sol therefore argued for a complete closure of all Atjeh except Ulèëlheuë to overseas shipping. The six Dutch posts in the dependencies at which foreign trade was permitted in 1883 could then be withdrawn since all, including even Idi, served no purpose but to provoke Atjehnese hostility. After thus eliminating Penang influence in the dependencies Sol hoped to be able to exert strong pressure through the coastal rajas on the 'war-party'.[1]

At the Kutaradja conference Governor-General 's Jacob was persuaded that it was 'urgently necessary to exercise a strong control over trade'. The problem as usual was how to do this without giving reasonable cause for offence to Britain. 's Jacob, like Tobias, considered Sol's scheme excessive. He also had misgivings about the *scheepvaartregeling* of May 1883, but was willing to give it a trial in view of the critical position. If there were no well-grounded complaints from Penang it could then become permanent.[2]

Towards the end of 1883 all these schemes were under consideration. The only point on which civil and military officials in Indonesia were all agreed was that the desired retrenchment in Atjeh Besar must not take place before some significant improvement in the Dutch position. The Netherlands Government, however, proved increasingly unable to see beyond its financial difficulties. Van Bloemen Waanders, who had opposed retrenchment until an agreement was reached with the Sultan, was forced to resign the Colonial portfolio when the States-General rejected his budget in November 1883.[3] To take his place the Heemskerk ministry despairingly summoned from Batavia J. P. Sprenger van Eyk, a member of the *Raad van Indië* who had gained a reputation for financial resourcefulness by his part in an earlier reform of the Batavia treasury.[4]

While awaiting his arrival the cabinet rejected 's Jacobs' finding that retrenchment must await an improvement in Dutch fortunes in Atjeh. This might take years. Meanwhile the

[1] Proces-verbaal of Kutaradja conference 10 August 1883, loc. cit.

[2] 's Jacob to Van Bloemen Waanders 16 October 1883, Kol. Kab. U, 6149. Also Kennedy to Granville 4 September 1883, F.O. 37/662.

[3] Zuidema, 'Van Bloemen Waanders', in *NNBW* IV, col. 166.

[4] Zuidema, 'Sprenger van Eyk', in *NNBW* V, col. 792.

army was in a perilous state, and no sizeable reinforcements could be sent out from Holland. The Government naturally left detailed policy to the decision of the local authorities, but it sternly warned against any further delay than was strictly necessary in withdrawing the unwanted posts.[1]

This difference hastened the resignation of 's Jacob, which had already become inevitable after an earlier difference between him and the States-General. The Conservative Ministry surprisingly chose Otto van Rees, the 'incarnation of Indonesian liberalism' in the States-General,[2] to succeed him. A bipartisan approach to the financial crisis would be attempted. Fully informed of the Government's desire for economy, Van Rees visited Atjeh on his way to Batavia to discuss retrenchment further. Like his predecessor he was persuaded by Dutch officials there that some lasting solution was necessary before the withdrawal of posts. His first letters and telegrams revived the restoration of the Sultanate as the ultimate aim. Meanwhile the Scherer-plan should be used to put sufficient pressure on the 'war-party' to allow an honourable retreat. If this failed then it would be time to try Sol's more drastic plan, which Sprenger van Eyk had supported in a telegram to the Governor-General in Atjeh. Van Rees appeared at this point to believe, however, that all economizing measures should be suspended until the results of the new plans became clear.[3]

[1] General Weitzel (acting Colonial Minister) to 's Jacob 20 December 1883, telegram, Kol. Kab. K^{20}, 6148; *idem* 10 January 1884, telegram, Agenda 1884, Kol. 6332; *idem* 15 January 1884 (despatch), Kol. Kab. U, 6149.

[2] Idema, p. 13; Harris to Granville 22 January 1884, copy F.O. to C.O. 29 January 1884, C.O. 273/131. As an official in Java (1837–72) Van Rees had compiled some critical and influential reports on the forced cultivation system, particularly that which led to the abolition of the *Preangerstelsel*. He returned to Java as Vice-President of the *Raad van Indië* (1873–8), entered the States-General as a Liberal in 1878 and became its chairman in 1881 after a brief period as Colonial Minister in 1879. In the States-General he had criticized both the extension of direct Dutch rule in Atjeh and the introduction of Civil Government. As Governor-General he proved a disappointment to Liberals. Stapel, 'Van Rees' in *NNBW* X, cols. 790–1; Van de Putte, *Atjeh*, p. 241; Stuart to Granville 31 March 1881, copy F.O. to C.O. 7 May 1881, C.O. 273/112.

[3] Van Rees to Sprenger van Eyk 5 April 1884, telegram, in text of reply 11 April 1884, Kol. Kab. B^{7}, 6151; *idem* 21 April 1884, telegram, in text of reply 2 April 1884, Kol. Kab. P^{7}, 6151; *idem* 3 and 12 May 1884 (despatches) Kol. Kab. I^{14}, 6154.

In supporting Sol's closure of the whole Atjehnese coast as the best measure to cover a retreat[1] Van Eyk had probably been influenced by a remark in 's Jacob's last despatch on the subject: 'If all import and export to the dependencies could be prevented for a time, then the hostile breed found in Atjeh would be broken.'[2] Though 's Jacob had rejected this as impossible because of the limited means available and the treaties with Britain, Van Eyk found ingenious means of overcoming or ignoring both these problems. As the crisis deepened during 1884 he became increasingly wedded to this as the only possible solution. The Scherer plan had to be abandoned in June because the supplies it involved giving to Pidië could not be reconciled with the strict blockade the Minister insisted upon.[3] The previous April Van Eyk had forbidden further attempts at a restored Sultanate as 'indefensible under present circumstances'.[4]

It is impossible to understand how Sprenger van Eyk came to adopt a complete closure of the coast as the only solution, how he was able to carry this point despite the better judgement of the local officials, or why the scheme ended in fiasco, without a thorough examination of the '*Nisero* question', which arose in the middle of this crisis in Dutch policy.

[1] Sprenger van Eyk to Van Rees 20 March 1884, telegram, Kol. Kab. 6150.

[2] 's Jacob to Weitzel 13 December 1883, Kol. Kab. E[7], 6151.

[3] Van Eyk to Van Rees 16 June 1884, telegram, Kol. Kab. L[11], 6153; Van Rees to Van Eyk 17 June 1884, Kol. Kab. A[16], 6155.

[4] Van Eyk to Van Rees 22 April 1884, telegram, Kol. Kab. P[7], 6151.

7

The *Nisero* Question
1883-1885

Teunom

At 8.15 p.m. on the stormy night of 8 November 1883, the S.S. *Nisero* ran aground near Panga, forty miles north of Meulaboh on the west coast of Atjeh. What the steamer was doing so far off course will always be a mystery, of which the extraordinary incompetence of its Captain Woodhouse seems the least unlikely explanation.[1] The brand new ship and its cargo of sugar from Surabaya were immediately seen to be irretrievable. Within two hours the bedraggled crew of twenty-nine men had made their way to the unknown shore, where they awaited the dawn while the news of their fate spread along the coast. By the following evening the most important *ulèëbalang* of the area, Teuku Imam Muda of Teunom, had arrived to take charge of the situation. Fortunately for the crew, their Chinese cook knew enough Malay to explain that they were British and not Dutch (though in fact only 18 of the 29 were British, and the rest an assortment of Dutch, Germans, Italians, Americans, Norwegians and Chinese). The Raja accepted both

[1] Built for Pinkney & Sons of Sunderland in 1882, the *Nisero* had been on route from Surabaya to Suez when Woodhouse decided to divert to Ulèëlheuë in order to take on better coal. At the time she struck Woodhouse thought the ship was forty miles from land. It is also curious that he was unable to see the mountainous coast before nightfall. These circumstances led to angry Dutch allegations that the *Nisero* had been intentionally grounded to collect the insurance or to smuggle arms. See Pauncefote to Admiralty 31 January 1884, F.O. 37/691; Kennedy to Granville 19 January 1884, *P.P.* 1884, 87, pp. 293–4; Woodhouse's statement in Penang, n.d., ibid. p. 311; W. Bradley *The Wreck of the Nisero, and our Captivity in Sumatra* (London, 1884), pp. 1–9. The *Nisero* affair was the basis of a romantic novel by Hugh Clifford *A Free Lance of Today* (London, 1903). It has also been suggested as the inspiration for the site of the *Patusan* of Conrad's *Lord Jim*.



Map 4. Teunom Coast.

ship and crew as special favours from God to remedy his troubles. After plundering the ship he took the crew off to his capital on the Teunom river, in as congenial a captivity as his meagre resources permitted, and waited to see what advantage they might bring him.[1]

Teunom lay in the district which was the centre of pepper-growing in Sumatra between 1839 and about 1860.[2] Though settled early in the century by men from the XXII Mukims, Teunom was handicapped by its very exposed port, which permitted trade for only a few days each year. Not until Teuku Imam's vigorous rule in the 1870's did Teunom achieve a pepper production of over 6,000 piculs a year and dominate the neighbouring states of Bubun, Wojla and Panga. Teuku Imam Muda was then a young man but nevertheless won general respect by his strong-mindedness, piety, and high sense of his own dignity. In February 1874 he had led 800 of his men to assist in the defence of Atjeh Besar and suffered 300 casualties there. Before returning the following May he had taken the oath never to submit to the *Kompeuni*, and he held to it more consistently than most of the rajas.[3] In March 1877, however, he too submitted, moved by a desire to sell his stockpile of pepper, which had reached 20,000 piculs, and by a jealousy of his enemies at Meulaboh, where a Dutch post was established at the beginning of 1877.

Whether or not there was any sincerity in this submission, Teuku Imam was soon on bad terms with the Assistant Resident at Meulaboh, K.F.H. van Langen. In 1878 he denied that he had undertaken the previous year to pay the Sultan's *hasil* to the Dutch, and though he sometimes paid it subsequently to avoid a renewed blockade he never acknowledged his obligation to do so. A more important source of friction was the constant Atjehnese attacks on Meulaboh and its Dutch garrison, which rendered Teuku Imam always liable to the Assistant Resident's suspicion. The climax came when bands from Bubun, Wojla, and upper Meulaboh attacked the Dutch post in October 1882. A warning of this attack from Teuku Imam arrived a

[1] Bradley, pp. 9–38.

[2] Gould, 'Sumatra—America's Pepperpot' (1956), pp. 238 and 239. See also above, p. 15.

[3] Lavino to Loudon 22 January 1875, Cons. Penang 101. Above, p. 171–2.

day too late. The Raja subsequently denied all part in it and claimed that Van Langen listened only to his enemies. The Assistant Resident, however, saw the attack as the product of Teuku Imam's annoyance at his refusal to force twenty-nine Indian brickmakers to return to Teunom after they had abandoned their contracts to the Raja the previous month.

The Dutch, supported by Teuku Imam's vindictive enemies in Meulaboh, attacked and destroyed the Raja's main port at Bubun on 13 December. Soon after they closed all Teuku Imam's ports to trade, and in January 1883 they shelled Teunom itself. Consequently the Raja saw the wreck of the *Nisero* as a gift of God to enable him to correct the gross injustices of which he felt himself a victim.[1]

The breakdown of negotiations

The enormous opportunities presented by the capture of the crew for creating friction between Britain and Holland were at first very dimly perceived by Teuku Imam. In his first response to Van Langen's demand that the captives be brought to the Dutch post in Meulaboh, the Raja claimed that he had never altered his obedience to the Dutch. The sole condition he made in writing for the release of the men was that Khoo Tiang Poh,[2] formerly the main buyer of his pepper, should come to

[1] Van Langen's policy was to some extent a personal one, as many other Dutch officials regretted the attack on Bubun. Van Teijn to Van Rees 5 February 1887, copy G.G. to Kol. 18 February 1887, Kol. Kab. N[4], 6171; Kennedy to Granville 24 June 1884, F.O. 37/694. The best accounts of Teunom's relations with the Dutch are those of Van Langen, 'De "Nisero-kwestie"', *IG* 6 (1884), pp. 454–69; and Maxwell, minute of 22 March 1884, copy S.S. to C.O. 22 March 1884, C.O. 273/126. A very partisan account was presented to the Dutch Second Chamber on 9 June 1884, and is translated in P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 397–8. The murder of two rash French explorers, Wallon and Guillaume, in upper Teunom early in 1880 caused further friction. Teuku Imam apparently attempted to arrest the culprits, but Van Langen insisted nevertheless on a chastisement which he thought richly deserved on other grounds. A show of force was made by Van der Heijden, which Van Langen (op. cit. p. 461) considered had a salutary effect. Van der Hoeven (*Mijne Ervaring*, pp. 26–7), on the other hand, considered this pointlessly alienated Teuku Imam and led to the *Nisero* affair.

[2] Khoo Tiang Poh (1830–92), known as 'Tempoh' among Malays, was one of the most successful Hokkien immigrants to the Straits Settlements. His wide-ranging ship-owning firm Bun Hin & Co. was established in association with Raja Wichit of Phya Puket (South Thailand) in 1874. From that date some of his steamers, notably the *Kalahome* and the *Phya Puket* were

Teunom in person to repay a debt of $5,000. As it later appeared, the debt had arisen in April 1883 when Tobias had made a special exception to the blockade of Teunom in order to enable Khoo to ship out a cargo of pepper. Bad weather had forced the ship to leave Panga before the pepper was paid for, and the blockade was strictly imposed immediately thereafter. Teuku Imam may have wished to discuss with Khoo how to use the *Nisero* affair to revive his pepper trade. In any case the messenger who brought his letter to Van Langen on 21 November added verbally that the Raja demanded to be reinstated in Dutch favour and to have his ports opened.[1]

The previous day Van Langen had received authority from Laging Tobias to offer anything up to 100,000 guilders for the release of the men. Both officials were thinking in terms of forcibly recovering the sum out of Teunom's exports once the men were released. Tobias also suggested using Edouard Roura, who had returned to the area in October 1883 on a surveying mission for the French Government, to take a message to the Raja, whom he knew well.[2] Van Langen found Roura at Bubun with Teuku Yit (alias Sayyid Hassan), the leading private merchant of Teunom, who was 'decidedly a very able man'[3] and had great influence with Teuku Imam. Both men expressed their willingness to help, and Van Langen sent them to Teunom on the 21st with authority to offer the opening of Teunom to trade and up to 100,000 guilders in cash.

Thus far the Dutch had been free of pressure from Britain.

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taking a large share of the pepper from Atjeh's west coast. After 1876 these steamers appear to have been frequently chartered by Katz Bros., who bought them over in the early 1880's. Bun Hin and Katz Bros. continued to co-operate in the west coast pepper business, and each had a share in the disputed shipment from Teunom in 1883. Song Ong Siang *One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore* (London, 1923, reprinted Kuala Lumpur, 1967), pp. 176 and 201–2. Lavino to 's Jacob 11 and 24 December 1883, Cons. Penang 13.

[1] Teuku Imam to Van Langen, n.d., translation in Van Bylandt to Granville 3 July 1884, F.O. 37/695; Tobias to 's Jacob 28 November 1883, copy Kol. to B.Z. 18 January 1884, B.Z. Nisero; Statement of Khoo Tian Poh 6 February 1884, copy C.O. to F.O. 13 March 1884, F.O. 37/692; Maxwell's minute of 22 March 1884, copy S.S. to C.O. 22 March 1884, C.O. 273/126; Lavino to 's Jacob 12 December 1883, Cons. Penang 13.

[2] Tobias to 's Jacob 28 November 1883, loc. cit; Nota of 17 March 1884, copy Kol. to B.Z. 17 March 1884, B.Z. Nisero.

[3] Bickford to Dowell 14 March 1884, copy Admiralty to F.O. 26 April 1884, F.O. 37/692.

Not until 22 November did the news of the shipwreck reach Penang, whence it was telegraphed to the world. The British reaction was immediate. Weld sent the *Pegasus* to Atjeh under Commander Bickford, who reached Ulèëlheuë on 26 November, the same day that Van Langen arrived from Meulaboh and Kennedy from leave in Penang. At their first conference with Tobias all was harmony. The Governor undertook to open all the ports of Teunom to the coastal trade (i.e. subject to the *scheepvaartregeling*) and to pay the outstanding debt until it could be recovered from Khoo Tiang Poh. Bickford, Kennedy and Van Langen sailed together to Rigas, a safe bay north of Teunom, from where they sent letters calling for the release of the men on these conditions.

These letters reached Teunom on the 30th, in the middle of the deliberations between Roura, Teuku Yit and Teuku Imam. The result of these deliberations, expressed in the Raja's letters of reply to Kennedy and Van Langen, was that the captives could only be released in return for a guarantee by the British Consul that Teunom's ports would be permanently free from trade restrictions. The Dutch were also to pay $300,000 as compensation for the damage wrought by their bombardments.

The demand for a British guarantee was a master-stroke of diplomacy which turned the affair immediately into a major international issue. It is very doubtful whether the Raja himself was capable of conceiving it, and the Dutch immediately suspected both Roura and Teuku Yit of having pointed out to him the strength of his position. Though they indignantly denied the charge, they certainly had no reason to love the Dutch or their commercial restrictions.[1]

The next envoy sent to Teunom by the party at Rigas was the minor *ulèëbalang* of the latter state. He made no impression on Teuku Imam's position, but he did return with three of the crew members. The Captain had offered to allow the Raja to kill the whole crew including his own nephew if he neglected his promise to return after negotiating with the

[1] The view advanced by Dutch politicians and repeated by some historians was that the Raja raised his demands only because British interest was forced on his attention by the *Pegasus*. There is no need for such an explanation, particularly as by Roura's account the Raja had fixed his terms before letters arrived from the *Pegasus*. However, later British involvement naturally confirmed the position taken.

Consul. Teuku Imam therefore released him, together with the Second Engineer, who was critically ill, and the Malay-speaking cook to whom he had carefully explained his views. None of the three returned and Teuku Imam naturally made no further concessions of that kind.

The Governor of Atjeh was unwilling to add anything to his earlier terms beyond the offer of a small sum for the maintenance of the crew. Any British guarantee was complete anathema, representing the negation of the ten-year struggle to assert Dutch sovereignty in Atjeh. Hence Tobias felt obliged to issue an ultimatum on 13 December that Teunom would be attacked and destroyed if his final offer was not accepted. Teuku Imam was unmoved, and the Dutch began to make reluctant preparations in Kutaradja for an expedition for which they lacked adequate means and which everybody knew to be futile.[1]

With the failure of these initial overtures the harmony between the two European Powers began to break down. Sir Frederick Weld had been anxiously awaiting developments in Penang, and was easily persuaded by Khoo Tiang Poh that the prestige of the 'Governor Besar' of Singapore would bear more fruit than all the blustering of the Dutch. He obtained Whitehall's approval to send a personal letter and gift to Teuku Imam by means of the *Pegasus,* unaccompanied by any Dutch ships or officers. This was seen in Kutaradja and Batavia as the first of Britain's outrageous infractions of Dutch sovereignty. Since it had approval from Europe, however, it could not be forcibly resisted.[2] Nevertheless the name of the 'Governor Besar' failed to work its magic. The Raja was gratified to receive such attention, but he refused to come on board the *Pegasus* or to meet Kennedy or Bickford on the beach. The British, unwilling to venture into the Raja's territory, were obliged simply to correspond with Teuku Imam in as cordial but as futile a fashion as before.[3]

[1] Bickford to Willes 20 December 1883, P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 281–3; Journal of Captain Roura, ibid. pp. 305–6; historical statement of the *Nisero* case presented to States-General 9 June 1884, translation ibid. pp. 398–9; Kennedy to Granville 19 January 1884, ibid. p. 294.

[2] Tobias to 's Jacob 25 December 1883, copy Kol. to B.Z. 20 February 1884: Weitzel to Willebois 28 December 1883: B.Z. Nisero.

[3] Bickford to Willes 20 and 31 December 1883, P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 284 and 291–2; Weld to Teuku Imam 18 December 1883, ibid. p. 301; Letters be-

As Tobias and Bickford both feared that the threatened Dutch expedition might result in the murder of all the captives they were anxious to delay it as long as possible.[1] In the new year one more envoy was sent to Teunom with 'power to grant anything of a pecuniary nature, but nothing of a political'. This was Captain Christiansen, who had long traded for Bun Hin and Katz Brothers on the west coast of Atjeh. The only result of his discussions with Teuku Imam, now constantly advised by Teuku Yit, was the assurance that if attacked the Raja would not murder the crew but simply move them further inland.[2]

Tobias's ultimatum was finally carried out on 7 January. A Dutch force was landed after some heavy fighting in which the Dutch lost ten men and the Raja many more. The Dutch then burnt all the villages and pepper-plantations within a day's march, including the main kampong where the men had been detained until the Dutch attack. They, of course, had been marched to a more secure camp up the river.[3]

Tobias had justified the expedition and the British Consul had approved it on the understanding that a garrison would be left behind to assist a possible escape by the crew. But the military commander, Colonel Demmeni, evidently judged his resources inadequate.[4] Consequently the only possible result of the expedition was to harden the Raja's position. Before this he had apparently hoped for a quick solution safeguarding him against further bombardments and trade restrictions, and had not sought to use the *Nisero* captives as part of the wider struggle against the Dutch.[5] The attack drove him towards the Keumala

tween Kennedy and Teuku Imam 21–28 December 1883, F.O. 220/3.

[1] Tobias to 's Jacob 25 December 1883, copy Kol. to B.Z. 20Febr uary 1884, B.Z. Nisero; Bickford to Willes 20 December 1883 and 15 January 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 284 and 296; W. Ph. Coolhaas, 'De Nisero-kwestie, Professor Harting en Gladstone', *Bijdragen en Mededelingen van het Historisch Genootschap* 78 (1964), p. 280.

[2] Christiansen to Huttenbach 4 January 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 308–10; Lavino to Tobias 26 December 1883, Cons. Penang 13.

[3] Bickford to Willes 15 January 1884 and Kennedy to Granville 19 January 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 294–7; Bradley, pp. 59–63.

[4] Kennedy to Granville 21 July 1884, F.O. 37/696; Tobias to 's Jacob 24 January 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 12 February 1884, Kol. Kab. B[6], 6151. The Governor-General tried, too late, to prevent the expedition. Weitzel to Willebois 7 January 1884, B.Z. Nisero.

[5] Bradley, pp. 42–57; Maxwell to Kennedy 1 March 1884, F.O. 220/4.

party. Teungku Tiro was reported to have sent 300 well-armed men to help defend Teunom. Immediately after the expedition Teuku Imam wrote to Tuanku Hashim, who apparently advised him on no account to surrender the crew but to look after them well, in the hope that their detention could serve the war effort.[1]

Van Langen's subsequent efforts to use the Raja's enemies to force him to yield served to keep Teuku Imam in his bitter mood. Teunom's fiercest enemy, Raja Itam of upper Meulaboh, submitted immediately after the expedition in the hope of obtaining Dutch help against Teuku Imam, and he was given arms and encouragement to try to get the Raja or one of his relatives into Dutch hands.[2]

Maxwell's mission to Teunom

An important part of Dutch strategy was that the British presence should be entirely removed to demonstrate the futility of the Raja's demand. After constant complaints from 's Jacob about Weld's intervention in the affair, the British Government was requested on 29 December to withdraw the *Pegasus* from Atjeh. Lord Granville gave his consent, though reserving the right to interfere again if the Dutch measures failed. On 15 January Bickford received instructions to withdraw, and sailed back to the Straits after seven weeks in Atjeh.[3]

In the Straits, however, even those well-disposed to the Dutch believed that Britain would have to interfere again. The attack on Teunom appeared to confirm the inability or unwillingness of the Dutch to rescue the crew.[4] Moreover there were many who already had ample reason for seeking a stick with which to beat the Dutch. In the hands of Resident Sol, the

[1] Lavino to 's Jacob 24 January 1884, Cons. Penang 13.

[2] Van Langen to Tobias 6 February 1884, copy Kol. to B.Z. 1 April 1884, B.Z. Nisero; Tobias to Van Rees 14 March 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 25 March 1884, Kol. Kab. R[11], 6153; *Overzicht*, pp. 651 and 654, Kol. 6572.

[3] Weitzel to Willebois 27, 28, and 31 December 1883: Van Bylandt to Willebois 1 January 1884: B.Z. Nisero; Van Bylandt to Granville 29 December 1883: Minute by Granville 31 December 1883: Pauncefote to Herbert 31 December 1883 and reply 3 January 1884: F.O. to Admiralty 5 January 1884: F.O. 37/691; Bickford to Willes 15 January 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, p. 297.

[4] *Penang Times* 23 January 1884 (copy in B.Z. Nisero); Lavino to Van Rees 7 February and 23 June 1884, Cons. Penang 13 and 14.

Atjeh *scheepvaartregeling* of May 1883 seemed a harsh restriction aimed at eliminating the Penang trade altogether. In particular it had virtually ended the pepper trade of the Teunom area, because the small vessels to which local trade was restricted under the *scheepvaartregeling* could not brave the tempestuous conditions of the west coast. The termination of Katz Brothers' long tenure of the Atjeh army contract confirmed Penang's suspicions. In August 1883 the Penang Chamber of Commerce had declared itself 'dissatisfied with the late restrictions', and the chairman had accurately announced: 'It is felt by all that our relations with Acheen generally are *very* unsatisfactory'.[1] Although the Chamber had not then appealed to Weld, he was kept more than adequately informed by Kennedy and by Sandilands, the Penang unofficial member of the Legislative Council.[2]

Thus there were many in Penang ready to sympathize with Teuku Imam's desire for secure and free trade with Penang. There were also a few influential men with a more direct interest in Teunom, chief among them being Khoo Tiang Poh and Sayyid Puteh. The latter, the son of Teuku Yit, had confirmed his standing in the Muslim community by marrying the daughter of Sayyid Usman, a former leader of the Atjeh refugees.[3]

Sir Frederick Weld was a natural adherent of the growing school which wanted Britain to side with the Raja of Teunom against the Dutch in its efforts to free the captive crew. The *scheepvaartregeling* had confirmed his earlier view that the Dutch authorities in Atjeh put more zeal into destroying Penang's trade than ending the Atjeh war. In November 1883 he had confessed to the Colonial Office that the *scheepvaartregeling* was not demonstrably in conflict with the 1824 and 1871 treaties. Nevertheless the spirit of the treaties had been broken and 'a most serious blow . . . inflicted on our commerce in a manner calculated to lower us in the eyes of the natives'. The Governor

[1] *Pinang Gazette* 20 August 1883; Lavino to 's Jacob 25 August 1883, Cons. Penang 13; Anthony to Kennedy 19 September 1883, F.O. 220/3.

[2] Weld to Kennedy 28 June and 9 July 1883: Sandilands to Kennedy ? June and 30 June 1883: F.O. 220/2; *idem* 21 and 24 July 1883: Weld to Kennedy 10 September 1883: F.O. 220/3. For Sandilands see above, p. 130n.4.

[3] Weld to Derby 9 February 1884, copy C.O. to F.O. 13 March 1884, F.O. 37/692. For Sayyid Usman see above, p. 140n.

had therefore recommended that Holland be forced to restore full freedom of trade in the spirit of the treaties, by threat of withdrawing provisioning facilities and ending the prohibition on arms exports to Netherlands India.[1]

Apart from commercial grievances like these, it would be foolish to ignore the sense of moral superiority among British officials since Raffles as a cause of Anglo-Dutch tension. Nineteenth-century Britain found empire enough in India, and its trade had flourished in South-East Asia even with few of the expansionist wars and commercial restrictions that had marked Dutch progress. Englishmen in South-East Asia had traditionally taken pleasure in emphasizing the commercial and political tyranny of the Dutch, although by the late nineteenth century this reputation was justified only in Atjeh. The contrast between Holland's progress there and Britain's in Malaya had already prompted Clarke to revive the tone of Raffles, but righteous indignation sat yet more naturally on the shoulders of Sir Frederick Weld. He upbraided Captain Woodhouse for failing to return to Teunom 'to the disgrace of the English name'.[2] In the same spirit he inveighed against a plan of Van Langen's to have the Raja of Teunom murdered: 'It is clear that the Netherlands Acheen Authorities fail to realise how widely our ideas and sense of morality in regard to treatment of native races differ from theirs.'[3]

Teuku Imam's reply to Weld's letter was delivered in the middle of January, and was well calculated to appeal to such a disposition. The Raja sought the Governor's compassion to have the injustices visited on him by Van Langen righted. He would be delighted if Atjeh were governed in the manner of the British-protected Malay states, which were renowned for the 'great happiness of the inhabitants . . . not like the rule of the

[1] Weld to Derby 1 November 1883, C.O. 273/123. Also Weld to Kennedy 9 July 1883, F.O. 220/2; Lavino to Willebois 3 December 1883, Cons. Penang 13.

[2] Weld to Derby 25 January 1884, C.O. 273/126.

[3] *Idem* 9 March 1884, copy C.O. to F.O. 12 April 1884, F.O. 37/692. Such views found an echo in the Colonial Office, where the Parliamentary Under-Secretary Ashley saw British success in Malaya as proof 'that we know how to manage these people and the Dutch do not. I believe they are entirely ignorant of the first principles of governing these races'. Minute of 2 July 1884, F.O. 37/695.

Dutch which is intolerably oppressive to the people of a country'.[1]

Weld was sympathetic, and urged upon London his conviction that neither force nor money could secure the release of the prisoners without a British guarantee that Teunom's welfare would be better protected in the future. A British mission should therefore be sent to try to reach agreement with the Raja in an atmosphere of trust. Admittedly British interference was forbidden by the regrettable 1871 Sumatra Treaty, which had cost Britain 'one of the very finest islands in the world'. This should not be considered a permanent obstacle to any British initiative, however, for:

> When that Treaty was made it was not contemplated that under it ports would be closed to the great injury of our trade and ruin of native chiefs; closed not by an efficient blockade as in War, but as if the country had already been conquered and was actually *de facto* Dutch territory—whereas no Dutch official would dare to land in many parts of it.[2]

In the absence of any alternative plan, Weld's scheme was accepted by the Foreign Office and even by the despairing government in The Hague. Weld was authorized to send a personal envoy to Teunom at his own risk and with the final caution, 'Rajah must not expect assistance against Dutch'.[3]

Weld had chosen W. E. Maxwell[4] as envoy because of his

[1] Teuku Imam to Weld 4 January 1884, translation in P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 301–2.

[2] Weld to Derby 25 January 1884: also *idem* 2 February 1884: C.O. 273/126; Weld to Derby 22 January 1884, Telegram, copy C.O. to F.O. 23 January 1884, F.O. 37/691.

[3] Herbert to Pauncefote 23 January 1884, and minutes thereon: Pauncefote to Herbert 26 January 1884: Willebois to Pauncefote 28 January 1884: Herbert to Pauncefote 4 February 1884 and minutes thereon: Pauncefote to Herbert 7 February and replies 8 and 9 February 1884: F.O. 37/691.

[4] William Edward Maxwell (1846–97) was the son of Sir Peter B. Maxwell, Chief Justice of the Straits Settlements 1867–71. He trained as a lawyer and held legal posts in the Straits Government until appointed Assistant Resident of Perak in 1878. He became Commissioner of Land Titles in 1882 and a member of the Executive and Legislative Councils the following year. Subsequently he was appointed Acting Resident Councillor of Penang (1884–9), Resident of Selangor (1889–92), Colonial Secretary (1892–3), and Acting Governor (1893–5). From 1895 until his death he was Governor of the Gold Coast. He was awarded a C.M.G. for his part in the *Nisero* affair, and a K.C.M.G. in 1896. *DNB* 22, pp. 1030.

exceptional knowledge of the Malays and their language. Having experienced the very flexible Resident system of Perak, he was as ready as Weld to believe that these methods could solve Holland's problems in Atjeh.

On 3 February Weld and Maxwell went to Penang to make final arrangements for the mission. With them went Tengku Muhammad Arifin, whose knowledge of Atjeh Maxwell wished to use. The Netherlands Consul-General was consulted about the use of his employee, but gave his blessing in order to have a source of information about Maxwell's doings.[1] Once again Read's desire to have a finger in every pie was of poor service to the Netherlands. Maxwell had hardly arrived in Penang before Arifin brought him into contact with the remaining leaders of the Atjehnese party in Penang.

Of this party only Shaikh Kassim and Nyak Abas maintained a correspondence with Keumala. Kassim had offered to mediate between the Dutch and Keumala in August 1883, and had brought Nyak Abas, who had greater influence with Tuanku Hashim, into his abortive discussions with Lavino. Lavino thought Kassim genuinely interested in peace, though he distrusted Nyak Abas, who had been implicated in an attempt to ship arms to Atjeh in 1881.[2]

Possibly neither of the men shared Lavino's interpretation of peace. But both certainly shared the desire of most Atjehnese to increase the status and prestige of the Sultanate. In two Penang meetings they persuaded Maxwell that the detention of the *Nisero* captives was on the Sultan's orders. The only way to ensure their release, they claimed, was for Maxwell to go to Keumala after a preliminary mission by Kassim, Abas, and Arifin, and there to negotiate an agreement based on some form of British protectorate over Teunom. British intervention to end the whole war was also discussed, and Maxwell apparently said nothing to discourage the idea.[3] Not long after this Shaikh Kassim wrote to advise Tuanku Hashim that the *Nisero* affair

[1] Read to Alg. Sec. 9 February 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 18 February 1884, Kol. Kab. B[6], 6151.

[2] Lavino to 's Jacob 29 December 1881, Cons. Penang 11; Lavino to Van Rees 13 May, 11 and 19 July 1884, Cons. Penang 13 and 14.

[3] Arifin to Read 7 February 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 18 February 1884, Kol. Kab. B[6], 6151; *idem* 13 February 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 26 February 1884, Kol. Kab. R[11], 6153.

might be used to bring about British intervention in the war,[1] while Nyak Abas became excited by the prospect that Queen Victoria might come to the aid of the Atjehnese.[2] News from Penang was probably also responsible for the hopes of the *ulèëbalangs* in Atjeh who were reported at this time to be looking forward to the end of Dutch authority as a result of British intervention.[3]

Maxwell and Weld both appeared to believe that the fate of the crew rested with Keumala, and Weld's instructions to his envoy included a special request to find how far this was so.[4] The Governor hoped that it would not be necessary to outrage the Dutch by sending a mission to Keumala, but he did plead with London for authority to offer Teuku Imam some guarantee of free trade in the spirit of the 1871 Treaty. As yet, however, the Foreign Office saw no reason to alter its 'settled Acheen policy' of non-interference. Maxwell's mission to Teunom should limit itself to establishing the Raja's real demands.[5]

[1] Maxwell to Col. Sec. 14 September 1884, P.P. 1884–5. 87, p. 587. In reply Tuanku Hashim authorized Shaikh Kassim to negotiate with Weld. Hashim to Kassim 8 Jumadi-akir 1301H (5 April 1884), translation S.S. to C.O. 14 May 1884, C.O. 273/127.

[2] Read to Alg. Sec. 25 February and 31 March 1884, copies G.G. to Kol. 4 March and 21 April 1884, Kol. Kab. R[11], 6153.

[3] Atjeh political report for 15–29 January 1884, *Overzicht*, p. 651, Kol. 6572.

[4] Lavino to 's Jacob 13 and 27 February 1884, Cons. Penang 13; Weld to Maxwell 13 February 1884, copy S.S. to C.O. 8 March 1884, C.O. 273/126. Maxwell could report only Teuku Yit's statement that the *Nisero* affair was known throughout Atjeh, and therefore at Keumala (Notes on conference with Teuku Yit 24 February 1884, copy S.S. to C.O. 8 March 1884, C.O. 273/126). In fact there was a regular correspondence between Keumala and Teunom concerning the crew carried by the relatively easy portage between the Teunom and Pidië rivers. After receiving Kassim's letter early in April Tuanku Hashim also sent a personal envoy, Teuku Jamal, to Teunom to tell the Raja not to release the crew. Teuku Imam told the Chief Mate of the *Nisero* early in July that 'if the Raja of Acheen wishes us to be released, . . . he could not keep us'. This was made much of in Singapore, but it was probably only a tactical move prompted by advice from Penang. There can be no real doubt that Teuku Imam, like his fellow chiefs, had great respect for the Sultan but did not bow to his wishes unless they accorded with his own. Tobias to Van Rees 28 April 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 12 May 1884, Kol. Kab. X[16], 6155; *Overzicht*, p. 652, Kol. 6572; Maxwell to Col. Sec. 14 September 1884, P.P. 1884–5, 87, p. 587; Smith to Derby 16 July 1884 and enclosures, C.O. 273/128.

[5] Weld to Derby 9 and 11 February 1884, and reply 11 February 1884,

From 19 February to 11 March the *Pegasus* lay in the relatively sheltered bay of Bubun, south of Teunom, while Maxwell, supported by Khoo Tiang Poh and Sayyid Puteh, attempted to gain the trust of Teuku Imam. Teuku Yit soon came down to Bubun and had several long conferences with Maxwell. Finally, after careful preparation, Maxwell and Bickford both ascended the Teunom river on 9 March for three days' discussions with the Raja.

The British were warmly received everywhere. Teuku Yit began by telling Maxwell that Britain should invade Atjeh, whereupon the Atjehnese would hoist the British flag after a token resistance. The Anglo-Dutch treaties should no longer be an obstacle now that Holland had proved its inability to conquer Atjeh. When Maxwell tried to restrict the discussion to the release of the captives, Yit insisted that nothing would suffice except a British guarantee of free trade.[1]

The discussions at Teunom demonstrated the influence over the Raja of Teuku Yit, whose main motive was to safeguard his trade.[2] The Raja himself appeared preoccupied with his immediate grievances, and his most emphatic demand was that his enemies at Meulaboh should be banished. After some discussion, however, he also endorsed Teuku Yit's demand for a British guarantee of free trade. The Raja was reluctant to give a precise statement of his minimum demands, but Teuku Yit assured Maxwell that 'a really substantial concession' would suffice, provided it included 'permanent free trade' for the Teunom area. Maxwell concluded that unless he was able to offer this there was no point in negotiating further in Teunom. In Kutaradja on 16 March Laging Tobias told him that such a concession was impossible as it would destroy the principle of the *scheepvaartregeling*, allow the import of arms and ammunition, and provide a dangerous moral victory for Teuku Imam,

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all telegrams, copies C.O. to F.O. 9 and 11 February 1884: Weld to Derby 9 February 1884 (despatch), copy C.O. to F.O. 13 March 1884: F.O. 37/692.

[1] Maxwell's notes on conference with Teuku Yit 24 February 1884, copy S.S. to C.O. 8 March 1884, C.O. 273/126.

[2] Curiously, Maxwell himself did not report this decisive influence directly until another mission in September. Maxwell to Col. Sec. 14 September 1884: Bickford to Dowell 14 September 1884: P.P. 1884–5, 87, pp. 588 and 579; Lavino to Van Rees 20 September 1884, Cons. Penang 14.

who in his eyes was no better than a pirate. Maxwell therefore returned to Penang.[1]

Neither Maxwell nor Weld had expected much more of the mission, and Weld did not wait to know its result before pressing his own solution on Whitehall. Britain should mediate between Holland and the Atjehnese Sultan at Keumala, with a view to restoring to force the notes exchanged in 1824 which guaranteed the independence of Atjeh. The Dutch, he considered, were now fully alive to the tenuousness of their foothold in Atjeh. Weld had been advised by Tengku Muhammad Arifin in February 'that we should intervene, send an embassy to the Sultan, mediate, and make peace', or else the Atjehnese would fight for ever. The Governor naïvely believed, or pretended to believe, that Arifin could not have said this unless it was suggested by 'his paymasters, the Dutch'. Thus mediation should be acceptable to both sides.[2]

Back in Penang, Maxwell wrote an important minute which followed the Governor's ideas very closely. He argued convincingly that the crew could only be released if Britain forced Holland to grant free trade in the Teunom area, which it had every right to do anyway on the grounds of treaty rights. Maxwell also thought Britain should mediate between Keumala and the Dutch to end the whole war. Peace should be possible if the Atjehnese agreed to surrender a certain amount of their territory.

Weld forwarded this minute to London on 22 March with his fullest approval.[3] Four days later he departed on home leave, and the affair was left in the less assertive hands of C. C. Smith, the Colonial Secretary.

[1] Maxwell to Col. Sec. 1, 15, and 21 March 1884, copies S.S. to C.O. 8 and 22 March 1884, C.O. 273/126; Bickford to Dowell 14 and 21 March 1884, copies Admiralty to F.O. 26 April 1884, F.O. 37/692; Lavino to 's Jacob 19 March 1884, Cons. Penang 13; historical account presented to States-General 9 June 1884, translation in P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 401–2.

[2] Weld to Derby 22 February 1884, copy C.O. to F.O. 27 March 1884, F.O. 37/692. Arifin's words could not, of course, have been further removed from official Dutch thinking. Once more Read's role is dubious however, as he admitted having told some of the Atjeh party that if Tuanku Daud had the captives delivered to Britain or Holland, it might lead to his recognition as Sultan. Read to First Government Secretary 22 May 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 23 May 1884, Kol. Kab. X^{16}, 6155.

[3] Weld to Derby 22 March 1884, and enclosed minute by Maxwell 22 March 1884, C.O. 273/126.

The crisis in Anglo-Dutch relations

The Colonial Office, guided by R. H. Meade, was as sympathetic as ever to the plight of Atjeh. On receipt of Maxwell's minute it quickly recommended an offer of mediation 'as apparently offering the only means of effecting the release of the prisoners'.[1] In the past such suggestions had been greeted with cautious realism at the Foreign Office, which had shown no interest in the case against the Atjeh *scheepvaartregeling* the previous January.[2] But now it was faced with mounting political pressure. Letters were constantly received from relatives of the captives, and Fitzmaurice, the Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, had already faced three questions on the subject in the Commons.[3] The matter was made more urgent by the arrival on 26 April of news that one of the captives had died of cholera and three others were sick.[4]

Pauncefote, the Permanent Under-Secretary, allowed himself to be rushed into drafting a remarkably clumsy offer of mediation, which failed to specify how or between whom the mediation should be effected. Its object was to be not only 'the release of the captured crew of the *Nisero*, but also the restoration of peace and the re-establishment of trade'. Without an equitable accommodation between the Dutch and the Atjehnese the British Government saw no hope of the crew's release. Moreover, the letter continued, the Anglo-Dutch treaties gave Britain a legitimate interest in such an accommodation. However, it was left for the Netherlands Government to guess whether mediation was being offered with Keumala, as Weld desired, or simply with Teunom.[5]

Naturally the Dutch ministers preferred to believe the latter. Nevertheless they decided in a meeting of 1 May to decline Britain's offer. They could hardly have done otherwise. The crisis in Atjeh had done nothing to blunt Dutch resentment of

[1] Minute by Meade 24 April 1884 on S.S. to C.O. 22 March 1884: Herbert to Pauncefote 25 April 1884: C.O. 273/126.

[2] Minute on C.O. to F.O. 8 January 1884, F.O. 37/691.

[3] Sittings of 6 and 25 February 1884, *Hansard*, 284, cols. 320 and 1864; Sitting of 7 April 1884, ibid. 286, col. 1798.

[4] Smith to Derby 26 April 1884, telegram, C.O. 273/127.

[5] Memorandum by Pauncefote 26 April 1884: Granville to Van Bylandt 29 April 1884: F.O. 37/692.

any suggestion by bigger Powers that Holland could not manage its own affairs. Moreover, the reports from Batavia suggested that far from solving the problem, British interference simply increased Teuku Imam's demands.[1]

Public pressure hardened the positions the two governments had now taken up. It did little good for Fitzmaurice to explain to the House of Commons that 'it was one of the most difficult minor questions they had ever had to deal with, because it was complicated by questions both of policy and International Law'.[2] The men had been in captivity for seven months, and opposition members brandished the charge that 'practically nothing had been done for their release'.[3] The most persistent critic was Storey, Radical member for Sunderland, the *Nisero*'s home port. After a series of questions during May he finally provoked a debate on the 22nd, when several members called for tougher measures against the Dutch.[4] Straits interests were quick to exploit the advantage given them by the publication of Maxwell's report as a parliamentary paper. They succeeded in directing public indignation over the captivity of the *Nisero* men against the Dutch rather than the Atjehnese.[5]

Sensitive to this mounting pressure, the Foreign Office pressed ahead on its collision course with the Netherlands. On 15 May Pauncefote drafted a stronger and much clearer letter to Van Bylandt. It contained a specific offer to send a mission to Keumala to arrange a peace with the Sultan's party. One of its terms would have to be 'the re-establishment of trade on a basis of commercial freedom'. The Government felt justified in making this offer because the result of the 1871 Treaty had been the opposite of that intended.[6] A bite was added to the despatch by the Solicitor-General, Herschell, who represented a constitutency in the north-east and thought the des-

[1] Willebois to Van Eyk 1 May 1884 and minutes thereon, Kol. Kab. M[8], 6152; Notulen Ministerraad 1 May 1884, Dr. Woltring's typescript awaiting publication; Van Eyk to Willebois 2 May 1884, B.Z. Nisero; Van Bylandt to Granville 9 May 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, p. 368.

[2] Sitting of 22 May 1884, *Hansard* 288, cols. 1115.

[3] Ibid. col. 1104.

[4] Sittings of 1, 5, 6, 8, 16, 20 and 22 May 1884, *Hansard* 287, cols. 1029, 1321, 1480, and 1695; Ibid 288, cols. 542, 848–50, and 1103–16.

[5] See, for example, the persuasive case against the Dutch in the *St. James' Gazette*, 9 May 1884.

[6] Memorandum and draft by Pauncefote 15 May 1884, F.O. 37/693.

patch would be criticized for not taking 'a strong and decided position enough towards the Dutch'.[1] Thus the final despatch declared that the Government had 'a right to urge the acceptance of their mediation', because the captivity of the crew was producing an agitation 'calculated to impair the friendly relations between the countries'. The letter was handed to Van Bylandt on 31 May, and printed at once for Parliament.[2]

Such pressure could only be resisted in Holland as 'an act of oppression by a strong power on a weak one'.[3] Successive governments had taken the view that it would be virtually as serious a loss of prestige to accept mediation in Atjeh as to abandon that country altogether. Yet the Government was left in little doubt that the alternative danger was a British military expedition to Teunom, the results of which might be even more serious. In May, Fitzmaurice told Van Daalen, a Dutch capitalist in close communication with Van Eyk,[4] that 'the British Government with the aid of the Sultan of Acheen might possibly send an expedition over the mountains into Teunom, attacking the Raja in the rear'.[5] Later the Dutch Cabinet was privately informed that Fitzmaurice and the members of parliament interested in the case had agreed that a British force should be sent to Teunom if the men were not released by the end of July.[6] As the Foreign Minister told an angry Second Chamber after the event:

The Netherlands might then have protested, have recalled its Minister from London, and England her Minister from The Hague. We should then have drifted into a state of armed peace with England

[1] Herschell to Pauncefote 26 May 1884, F.O. 37/693.

[2] Granville to Van Bylandt 31 May 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 373–5.

[3] Van Bylandt, in conversation with Pauncefote, Minute by Pauncefote 3 July 1884, F.O. 37/695.

[4] Van Daalen was the Director of the Java Railway Company, among whose shareholders were many influential Englishmen. He was in London during May and June, and used his influence on several members of parliament with interests in Netherlands India to moderate parliamentary attacks on Holland. Brogden and MacKinnon were his most useful friends. Brogden introduced him to Fitzmaurice. Van Daalen to Van Eyk 21 May 1884, and Van Bylandt to Willebois 24 June 1884, and footnotes under both, Woltring typescript. Brogden's speeches in *Hansard* 289, cols. 816 and 1901–2.

[5] Van Daalen to Van Eyk 21 May 1884, Woltring typescript.

[6] Van Swieten to Ministerraad 17 June 1884, Woltring typescript.

. . . but I believe we, as well as the English, would have found the consequences very injurious, and precisely in the Indian Archipelago.[1]

Dutch policy

To prevent this, Holland was obliged to produce a more drastic plan of its own for the release of the crew. It could no longer afford to hope that 'the Raja of Teunom, if no further notice is taken of him, will perhaps himself come forward with some reasonable proposal'.[2] The attempts of the Atjeh Government to use Teuku Imam's enemies against him appeared increasingly futile. The most notable such attempt was that of Teuku Uma,[3] a brilliant opportunist who chose this moment to side with the Dutch. Uma was finally landed at Rigas on 3 July with arms and money to free the crew, but instead he seized the ship's boat in which he had been put ashore, killed its crew, and began again to increase his authority on the west coast at the expense of the Dutch.[4] This disaster merely confirmed the pessimism which London and even The Hague had felt over such attempts. Their effect, indeed, seemed the reverse of that intended. The constant rumours of attacks on Teuku Imam threw him into such a panic that he wrote to Maxwell early in May denying responsibility for the crew if he was

[1] Sitting of 31 July 1884, *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal* 1883–4, p. 1844. A translation is in P.P. 1884–5, 87, p. 539.

[2] Van Eyk to Willebois 24 April 1884, B.Z. Nisero.

[3] Teuku Uma was the classic example of a talented adventurer for whom the war was a great opportunity. Born in Meulaboh, his 'energy and consummate tact' first gave him prominence as a war leader during civil government. After a flirtation with the *Kompeuni* in 1883 he submitted in March 1884. As always his candour was convincing, but because of his past record Tobias insisted that he undertake a task which would destroy his standing with the 'war-party', such as the freeing of the *Nisero* crew. Early in August, after his defection, he appears to have visited Teunom in a vain attempt to have the crew moved to Keumala (Bradley, pp. 126–8). Subsequently he extended his authority to the whole West Coast except Teunom, and became the dominant figure of the war in the 1890's. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, pp. xii-xiv, and 152–3; Tobias to Van Rees 14 and 21 March 1884, copies G.G. to Kol. 25 March and 8 April 1884, Kol. Kab. R^{11}, 6153; *idem* 28 April 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 12 May 1884, Kol. Kab. X^{16}, 6155; Kennedy to Granville 1 May 1884, F.O. 37/693.

[4] *Overzicht*, pp. 664, 684, and 688, Kol. 6572. Kreemer I, pp. 23–4. Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, II, p. 112.

attacked, and taunting the British for their failure to stand up to the Dutch.[1]

To Sprenger van Eyk's already harrowing task of carrying through a retreat in Atjeh, therefore, there was now added the urgent necessity to show Britain that credible measures were being taken for the release of the *Nisero* crew. Reports from Batavia had suggested that a complete closure of the Atjehnese coast would be the most effective way to bring pressure on the 'war-party', had it not been ruled out by the treaties with Britain. The growing crisis now presented an opportunity to make this closure acceptable to Britain as a means to the release of the crew. In March Van Eyk had already indicated his preference for this way of covering the retreat in Atjeh.[2] The first British offer of mediation prompted him to demand a rapid decision on this proposal from Batavia.[3]

The Governor-General accepted the plan, though he stressed that it alone would not suffice to ensure a permanent Dutch influence, and that the retreat should not take place until the effect of the new plans became clear.[4] However, the Minister was more concerned to prevent the two immediate threats of a financial crisis or a humiliation at the hands of Britain than the more remote danger in Atjeh. He began at once to plan for a full blockade.

The stronger British letter of 31 May and its publication as a parliamentary paper increased the urgency. On 9 June members of the Second Chamber expressed politely but firmly their determination to resist such pressure from Britain. Van Eyk put his package plan for a complete closure of the coast to the Cabinet on 10 June, and to a secret sitting of the Second Chamber on the 15th. Approval was given, and the Second Chamber voted f.1.5 million on the 16th to cover the cost.[5] The Minister telegraphed again to Batavia: 'Expostulations Eng-

[1] Teuku Imam to Maxwell 16 Rajab 1301H (11 May 1884), translation S.S. to C.O. 29 May 1884, C.O. 273/127.

[2] Nota klerk 14 March 1884, Woltring typescript. See above, pp. 216–7.

[3] Van Eyk to Van Rees 2 May 1884, telegram, Kol. Kab. M^8, 6152.

[4] Van Rees to Van Eyk 3 and 12 May 1884, Kol. Kab. I^{14}, 6154. And see above, p. 216.

[5] Translation of debate of 9 June in States-General P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 406–10; footnote under Notulen Ministerraad 1 May 1884, Woltring typescript; Stuart to Granville 17 June 1884, F.O. 37/694; Coolhaas, pp. 286–7.

land, which presses mediation with whole enemy party, are so pressing that very forceful measures must be shown very quickly. Only police-blockade can be considered for this.'[1]

A careful repudiation of the British letter, which denied the existence of even a pretender-Sultan as a possible party to a mediation attempt, was sent to London on the 17th.[2] But Britain had heard most of its arguments before, and Van Eyk rested his real hopes on a later despatch explaining the new Dutch policy. All ports except those of the most trusted chiefs would be closed as soon as possible. They would only be re-opened when the *Nisero* captives were freed and the attacks on Dutch positions in Atjeh Besar ceased. This policy was ingenuously presented as a fruit of the new discovery (really made in 1877) that all Atjeh participated in the resistance. This knowledge would eliminate the need for any future blockades. Hence: 'The Government has also definitely decided, when the measures of force have had their effect and been withdrawn, to abandon for good all restrictions on trade in the Atjehnese ports.'[3] By this promise, if not by the plan itself, the Minister hoped to woo Britain away from its dangerous support of the Atjehnese case. To make certain Holland's point of view was understood, he also sent to London the permanent head of the Colonial Department, Van der Wijck, and Pruys van der Hoeven, whose indestructible optimism concerning Atjeh made him particularly useful to the Government during this crisis.[4]

All these moves came to naught. The expected meeting between Van Eyk's special emissaries and Lord Granville was delayed by a misunderstanding until 5 July, when Britain had already changed its policy.[5] The really major concession which Van Eyk intended to make over the future freedom of trade was curiously overlooked by Van Bylandt when he translated some of the Minister's confidential despatch for the benefit of the

[1] Van Eyk to Van Rees 16 June 1884, telegram, Kol. Kab. L^{11}, 6153.

[2] Willebois to Van Bylandt 17 June 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 419–24. Some of the appendices to this despatch, which is in F.O. 37/694, were not printed.

[3] Nota van Koloniën 19 June 1884, Woltring typescript.

[4] Van Eyk to Van der Hoeven 18 June 1884, Kol. Kab. O^{11}, 6153; Van Bylandt to Willebois 23 June 1884, printed in Netherlands Parliamentary Papers, *Nisero*, No. 4, p. 7, copy in F.O. 37/697.

[5] Van Bylandt to Granville 4 July 1884 (private), P.R.O. 30/29/156.

Foreign Office.[1] Even after The Hague had taken steps to remedy Van Bylandt's oversight,[2] Van Eyk's intended promise was understood in the Foreign Office only as a vague expression of goodwill, which had no effect on policy. As for the plan to close the Atjehnese coast, it was dismissed in London as 'a wild scheme' and 'an absurdity'.[3]

Joint action

The Netherlands Cabinet had one final resort which it had considered on 19 June at the suggestion of General Van Swieten.[4] This was an Anglo-Dutch mission to Teuku Imam to demand the release of the captives under pain of a joint attack on his territory. As later protests showed,[5] such a solution was bound to arouse widespread public resentment in Holland as a violation of supposed Dutch sovereignty in Sumatra. But it had the great practical advantage of demonstrating to Indonesians that Britain was on the side of Holland rather than Atjeh in the war. Consequently Van Bylandt was instructed on 20 June to consider how a proposal on these lines could be evoked from Britain, if it became necessary.[6]

Van Bylandt apparently required no further prompting to drop a few hints that a co-operative approach would be acceptable to Holland.[7] Sir Julian Pauncefote raised the idea of a joint expedition in a minute of 28 June, and mentioned that Van Bylandt had told him privately this would be 'gladly accepted' in The Hague.[8] The idea appeared to win some immediate support in Whitehall.

This changed with the arrival at the end of the month of a

[1] Van Bylandt to Granville 27 June 1884, F.O. 37/694.

[2] Willebois to Van Bylandt 30 June 1884, telegram: also Stuart to Granville 18 June 1884: F.O. 37/694.

[3] Minute by Pauncefote 28 June 1884, and appended note by Fitzmaurice 30 June 1884, F.O. 37/694.

[4] Van Swieten to Ministerraad 17 June 1884, Woltring typescript.

[5] *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal* 1883–4, pp. 1841–54. Coolhaas, pp. 294–5 and appendices.

[6] Willebois to Van Bylandt 20 June 1884, Woltring typescript.

[7] For instance, he suggested a joint approach to Van Daalen, who may well have repeated it to one of his British contacts. Van Bylandt to Willebois 24 June 1884, Woltring typescript.

[8] Minute by Pauncefote 28 June 1884, F.O. 37/694. Van Bylandt (to Willebois 29 June 1884, Woltring typescript) reported only that Pauncefote volunteered the idea of a joint mission.

despatch covering a visit to Teunom by the *Pegasus* with supplies for the crew. An expedition would be impossible before October because of the monsoon, it reported, and would in any case be likely to provoke the Raja to kill the crew.[1] At the same time a telegram arrived announcing the death of three more crew members in a cholera epidemic.[2]

At this, the Colonial Office dug in its toes. Its Parliamentary Under-Secretary, Ashley, claimed that a joint expedition would liberate the crew 'only as corpses'.[3] At a meeting of the four Under-Secretaries concerned on 1 July Pauncefote was outvoted. A minute by Fitzmaurice, whose only aim was to quieten the parliamentary attacks of which he was the main target, argued the contrary case. 'Prompt and vigorous action' was required by Parliament, and since it could not be taken against the Raja until October it would have to be taken against the Dutch at once. They should be forced to grant the Raja's demands by the threat of negotiating directly with Teuku Imam, or of suspending the prohibition on arms exports. The Colonial Office was in full agreement.[4]

Mounting public pressure now obliged the Cabinet to take a stand. In June seamen's organizations began to call more vigorously for the despatch of gunboats to Teunom,[5] while Parliamentary critics quoted Maxwell's printed report arguing that only concessions from Holland would liberate the crew. On 3 July Storey finally moved an adjournment to attack the Government's 'masterly inactivity', and received strong support from Opposition and Irish members.[6] Two days later the question was hammered out in the Cabinet. Here Pauncefote again argued that to force Holland to grant the Raja's demands would be rightly condemned by European opinion. The risk to the crew of a joint approach was small and should be taken.[7] On the other side were ministers like Harcourt, who 'upbraided

[1] Smith to Derby 28 May 1884 and enclosures, C.O. 273/127.
[2] Smith to Derby 27 June 1884, telegram, C.O. 273/128.
[3] Minute by Ashley 2 July 1884, F.O. 37/695.
[4] Minute by Fitzmaurice 1 July 1884, and appended minutes by Ashley and Meade 2 July 1884, F.O. 37/695.
[5] The appeals of five seamen's organizations, dated between 4 and 12 June 1884, are printed in P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 396 and 402–3. Another appeal, dated 7 July 1884, is in F.O. 37/695.
[6] *Hansard* 289, cols. 1873–5 and 1891–1921.
[7] Minute by Pauncefote 3 July 1884, F.O. 37/695.

us for our degeneration from the days of Palmerston, insisted on our throwing over the Dutch, and that orders should be sent to our men of war to seize the prisoners *coûte que coûte*'.[1]

Pauncefote's plea to avoid a rupture with Holland eventually won the day. The issue of mediation with Keumala was now completely shelved as irrelevant to the urgent question of the *Nisero* crew. On the other hand it was agreed that a joint Anglo-Dutch mission should be able to offer the Raja the opening of his ports, as well as the original sum set aside by Tobias.[2]

This change of policy was welcomed in principle by the Dutch[3] for the same reason that it was indignantly opposed by Weld and the Singapore Chamber of Commerce[4]—it signified that Britain was for, rather than against, the Dutch war effort. However there were serious misgivings in The Hague over the details:

> . . . our dignity does not permit that this criminal enjoys financial rewards and the opening of his ports while the rest of Atjeh is blockaded to a considerable extent, unless he is first and foremost summoned to submission by the threat of force.[5]

A sharp exchange ensued over the proportion of force and bribery in the joint approach to the Raja. Both governments were sensitive to the charge that they had abandoned their original positions. While the Dutch Government was willing to open the Raja's ports if he submitted again and released the prisoners, it accepted only after very hard bargaining any public British responsibility that the ports would remain open to trade.[6] The final agreement was worded with minute care:

[1] Granville to Gladstone 13 September 1884 (private), A. Ramm (ed.) *The Political Correspondence of Mr. Gladstone and Lord Granville 1876–1886* (Oxford, 1962), II, p. 255. Granville may have been referring to an earlier Cabinet meeting.

[2] Gladstone's minute of 5 July Cabinet, B.M. Add. MSS. 44645, f.138; Granville to Stuart 5 July 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, p. 451; Van Bylandt to Willebois 6 July 1884, Netherlands Parliamentary Papers, *Nisero*, No. 4, p. 13, in F.O. 37/697; *idem* 9 and 11 July 1884, Woltring typescript.

[3] Willebois to King 14 July 1884, Woltring typescript.

[4] Singapore Chamber of Commerce to Col. Sec. 25 July 1884, copy S.S. to C.O. 30 July 1884, and Meade's minute thereon 29 August 1884, C.O. 273/128.

[5] Willebois to Van Bylandt 9 July 1884, Woltring typescript. Also Willebois to Stuart 21 July 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, p. 471.

[6] Correspondence of 19–25 July 1884, in P.P. 1884, 87, pp. 467–81. The original correspondence, with F.O. minutes, is in F.O. 37/696.

1. Joint demand to be addressed to Rajah for release of captives by given day.
2. If Rajah complies and submits to Dutch rule the Netherlands Government will raise the blockade of his ports, which will be re-opened to trade unless he rebels again.

   The Netherlands Government will also pay, on delivery of captives, to the person who delivers them, the sum previously offered by Governor of Atjeh, namely 100,000 rupees [or florins].
3. If Rajah refuses, British and Dutch will immediately combine to punish him and his people.[1]

The Straits Government was naturally concerned about the application of the second article to the *scheepvaartregeling*,[2] a crucial question which had been overlooked by the negotiators. However, Maxwell and the acting Governor were satisfied by Tobias's agreement that if Teuku Imam submitted all vessels would be allowed to enter his ports, provided they first visited Ulèëlheuë to take on a customs official.[3] It was already obvious in any case that the *scheepvaartregeling* was unduly harsh on the west coast.

The terms to be offered the Raja were therefore very close to those which Maxwell had thought he would accept. Whitehall was obliged to evade Storey's persistent inquiries whether the essential demand for a British guarantee of free trade would be granted.[4] Privately, however, Ashley told the Radical member that a guarantee was implied in the nature of the joint approach, but this could not be stated overtly because of Dutch feeling.[5]

Maxwell and Tobias were chosen to form the mission, which put these terms to the Raja in a series of elaborate negotiations between 12 August and 10 September. Teuku Imam was delighted when he heard the terms offered. He even unbent to the extent of joining his prisoners in their customary game of makeshift cricket.[6] The long delay and the inroads of cholera into the

[1] Granville to Kennedy 26 July 1884, telegram, P.P. 1884, 87, p. 481.
[2] Smith to Derby 28 July 1884, and minute appended, C.O. 273/128.
[3] Smith to Derby 9 August 1884, C.O. 273/129.
[4] Sittings of 17 and 18 July 1884, *Hansard* 290, cols. 1404–5 and 1610–12.
[5] Minutes by Meade and Ashley on Storey's question 18 July 1884, C.O. 273/131.
[6] Bradley, pp. 129–30.

crew's number had reduced his hopes of any settlement.[1] The detailed arrangements for the Raja's submission and the liberation of the crew were eased by a gift of $10,000 which Maxwell thought it necessary to offer Teuku Yit, and by the accommodation Tobias was willing to allow for the Raja's pride. The terms of submission neither implied that Teuku Imam had broken his earlier word to the Dutch, nor insisted that he journey again to Kutaradja to submit. Moreover, Maxwell's demeanour was much tougher than it had been in February, and can have left the Raja in no doubt that further delay would not help him.

Consequently, Teuku Imam was pleased to release the eighteen survivors of the crew of the *Nisero* on 10 September.[2] No joint expedition against him was necessary. This was fortunate for Anglo-Dutch relations, for the whole concept of co-operation was vitiated by the plan of campaign submitted by Commander Bickford and Colonel W. S. A. Lockhart,[3] an Indian intelligence officer with experience in Atjeh. These reverted to the old (and quite valid) assumption that the captives would never be given up to an expedition containing Dutch troops. Lockhart envisaged a Dutch attack from the west coast, which would probably drive the Raja further inland while a large British force of 6,000 men would land at Pidië. The British could then march inland to Keumala with hope of success after assuring the Sultan's party that Britain expected only friendship from 'our ancient friends, the Achinese'.[4] The acting Governor of the

[1] In May the *Nisero*'s Chief Mate had already opined 'the Raja would let us go upon easier terms now'. Crichton to Maxwell 26 May 1884, P.P. 1884–5, 87, p. 513.

[2] Maxwell to Col. Sec. 14 September 1884: Bickford to Dowell 14 September 1884: Agreement and terms of submission 10 September 1884: P.P. 1884–5, 87, pp. 575–9; 584–92, and 596–7; Kennedy to Granville 12 September 1884, F.O. 37/698; Bradley, pp. 129–58.

[3] Later General Sir William Lockhart (1841–1900). An enterprising soldier, Lockhart served in the Indian Mutiny and the Abyssinian Expedition of 1867–8. He had risen to Major in the Indian Army when he took three months leave in the autumn of 1875 to observe the Dutch campaign in Atjeh. His reports aroused official interest, and he was sent back to Atjeh a year later as a British attaché, accompanied by Major Palmer (later Sir Arthur Palmer, also Commander-in-Chief in India). He was wounded in January 1877, and left Atjeh soon after with malaria. The natural choice to plan and lead a possible British expedition to Teunom, he was attached to the Maxwell/Tobias mission, during which he reported with Bickford on an eventual expedition. Lockhart ended his life as Commander-in-Chief in India from 1898. *DNB*.

[4] Kennedy to Granville 3 September 1884, telegram, and minutes there-

Straits Settlements, in response to a Colonial Office inquiry, also strongly recommended a mission to Keumala if the joint appeal to Teuku Imam failed. Two Penang Atjehnese, Nyak Abas and Nyak Abu, had again given Smith an exaggerated impression of the Sultan's real control over events.[1]

These plans underlined the poor prospect a genuinely co-operative expedition would have had of liberating the crew. But Pauncefote's gamble on the chance that this would not be necessary had been vindicated, and from Britain's point of view the case was satisfactorily closed.

Sprenger van Eyk's false solution

For Sprenger van Eyk, however, the agreed rewards for Teunom added another complication to his already fanciful master plan. Undeterred, he set himself to reconcile irreconcilables with the same dexterity he had applied to the original plan. The latter had intended to make the raising of the blockade conditional on both the release of the *Nisero* crew and the cessation of attacks in Atjeh Besar. The two issues would now have to be divided, the Teunom area opened to trade when the captives were freed and the remainder of Atjeh when guerrilla attacks ceased. To avoid appearing to favour 'the pirate of Teunom', this would be justified by the fictitious notion that the Teunom area did not support the war directly. But it was essential that the whole Atjehnese coast be declared closed before the joint mission to Teunom, so that the Raja did not seem later to be excepted from it. The retreat in Atjeh Besar should also be carried out 'as quickly as is in any way possible' so that all ports could be opened again and normality restored. The Minister revealed his motives more clearly in a private letter.

The attacks in Atjeh Besar will cease (although that will mean nothing) when we occupy the planned position as far as Lambaru [i.e. the 'concentration'] because the enemy will quickly see that he

on: Lockhart and Bickford to Granville 29 August 1884: F.O. 37/698; Gladstone to Granville 5 September 1884, and reply 13 September 1884 (both private), Ramm II, pp. 248 and 255.

[1] Pauncefote to Meade 28 August 1884, telegram: Herbert to Pauncefote 29 August 1884: Smith to Derby 6 September 1884, telegram, copy C.O. to F.O. 6 September 1884: F.O. 37/698. Smith to Derby 6 September 1884, C.O. 273/129; Lavino to Van Rees 5 September 1884, Cons. Penang 14.

gains nothing by these attacks. . . . As soon as the concentration is completed, we can raise the blockade with all speed. The aim of the blockade will then have been achieved. Our strength will have been seen and felt, and the inevitable concentration will have taken place without allowing any weakness on our side to be suspected, and without disadvantage to our prestige.[1]

On 22 July the Minister insisted that the closure of Atjeh to trade be declared at once, despite the Governor-General's complaint that the monsoon and the shortage of ships would prevent its being effective before October.[2] Otto van Rees was not a sufficiently forceful Viceroy to extract a practical policy from this contrived solution. Instead he obediently declared the Atjehnese coast closed on 30 July, though admitting to the Governor of Atjeh that naval strength would be inadequate for some months. He left the Governor free to decide how far to apply the closure on the north and east coasts.[3] On 19 August, when replacing the civil government of Tobias by the military one of Colonel Demmeni, he issued a 'Proclamation to the Atjehnese Dependencies' announcing that the ports would only be reopened when attacks stopped for good in Atjeh Besar.[4] This proclamation was presumably designed only for the Minister's consumption.

Within a few months Colonel Demmeni had successfully carried out his main task, the 'concentration' of occupied territory to about a third its former extent, despite the angry non-cooperation of his Commander-in-Chief.[5] Van Eyk's blockade plan, however, was entirely lost on him. Only on 12 September, when Teunom was reopened to trade, did Demmeni close any other ports. He then closed the west coast north of Teunom and the north coast as far east as Meureudu. The west coast ports were reopened again within a month, and of the five

[1] Van Eyk to Van Rees 23 July 1884, and attached extract of private letter, n.d. (23 July?), Kol. Kab. I^{14}, 6154.

[2] Van Rees to Van Eyk 18 July 1884 and reply 22 July 1884, both telegrams, Kol. Kab. F^{14}, 6154.

[3] Van Rees to Van Eyk 2 August 1884 and enclosures, Kol. Kab. O^{18}, 6156.

[4] *Idem* 19 August 1884 and enclosures, Kol. Kab. V^{18}, 6154.

[5] *Idem* 19 August 1884, and enclosed Pfeiffer to Van Rees 27 July 1884, Kol. Kab. W^{18}, 6156.

north coast states blockaded, two were freed again in March. Van Rees ended the whole blockade on 12 April 1885, after Van Eyk had expressed his annoyance that so little effect had been given to a measure attended by so much publicity and expense.[1]

Van Rees failed to give any explanation for this lapse. The truth appears to be that none of the officials responsible for executing the blockade took it seriously. Van Eyk had given them little reason to do so. In particular, Assistant Resident Van Langen, the highest civil official remaining in Atjeh under the stringently economical military government, had declared his view that 'strong blockade measures . . . produce only bitterness among the Atjehnese and in the Straits', because Dutch resources were inadequate to make them permanent or systematic.[2] Even the special f.1.5 million voted for Van Eyk's blockade seemed little use when compared with one Batavia estimate that a million guilders a month would be needed for an effective blockade.[3]

Despite all the warnings of local officials, therefore, the important Dutch retreat of 1884–5 was undertaken without any complementary measures to safeguard Dutch influence. Naturally it 'inspired the hostile Atjehnese with great enthusiasm',[4] and gave additional prestige to those who had preached resistance to the uttermost. To add to their humiliation, the Dutch also abandoned completely the control of trade towards which such painful progress had been made since 1877.

Sprenger van Eyk felt bound by the promise given to Britain even though it had not been taken literally in Whitehall. In September 1884 he made clear that the *scheepvaartregeling* should not be reimposed after the blockade:

> . . . in our discussions with the English Government . . . we have . . . made the definite declaration that after the cessation of these measures, all obstacles to trade should be removed for good. This declaration was necessary to dispose the British Government favourably to

[1] Demmeni to Van Eyk 2 April 1885: Van Rees to Van Eyk 17 April 1885: Kol. Kab. A[7], 6161; Van Eyk to Van Rees 24 January 1885, Kol. Kab. X, 6158; *idem* 18 March 1885, Kol. Kab. D[3], 6159.

[2] Van Langen, 1884, pp. 468–9.

[3] *Straits Times* 14 July 1884, quoting the *Bataviaasche Dagblad* 28 June 1884.

[4] Kennedy's Atjeh report for 1884, P.P. 1884–5, 78, p. 311.

our plan, but it was in no sense a *concession* to England, for I hold the firm conviction that we must proceed to the removal of these obstacles, the sooner the better, because . . . we have had nothing but trouble from them.[1]

The Minister was no doubt sincere in this, as the ending of the Atjeh war was not high on his list of priorities. But local officials who felt differently had no way of arguing against a promise solemnly made to Britain.

Demmeni, supported by the *Raad van Indië*, wished to retain some control over the rajas through their trade despite Van Eyk's clear instruction to the contrary. While ending the *scheepvaartregeling* in September 1884 he still insisted that vessels should call at Idi, Sigli, or Ulèëlheuë for inspection before visiting other ports.[2] In Singapore, Smith had no objection to these regulations in principle, and only asked that they be kept in force for a definite period to prevent the uncertainties of the past. But Van Rees thought the promise given to Britain excluded any obstacles to trade whatever, and ordered their termination in April.[3]

From April 1885 the trade with Atjeh was freer than at any time since 1873, while the area occupied by the Dutch was smaller than it had been for ten years—a triangle of twenty square miles around Kutaradja. It may be said for this change that it temporarily reduced the bloodshed and allowed the Atjehnese a more tolerable life than they had experienced since 1873. Such considerations were important to a small but growing minority in Holland, who would have welcomed a complete withdrawal from Atjeh. But for the Netherlands Government there was still no question of abandoning the claim to sovereignty over the whole of Sumatra. On this assumption it can only be considered a grave mistake to have abandoned the fruit of so much warfare without taking any serious steps to safeguard Dutch influence. It was natural that

[1] Van Eyk to Van Rees 20 September 1884, Kol. Kab. O^{18}, 6156. Also *idem* 23 July 1884, Kol. Kab. I^{14}, 6154.

[2] The stipulation that vessels trading to the west coast should carry some Dutch officials was quickly dropped when the traders protested at having to pay for the upkeep of the officials. Smith to Derby 29 September and 20 October 1884, C.O. 273/129.

[3] Van Rees to Van Eyk 17 April 1885, and enclosures, Kol. Kab. A^{7}, 6161.

The Hague should be more responsive to diplomatic and financial pressure, and Batavia to Indonesian conditions. The *Nisero* crisis of 1884 gave the initiative to The Hague and precipitated a false solution to the Atjeh problem before the necessary preliminaries could be arranged.

The critics of 'concentration' were justified in all but one respect. The retreat of 1884 produced no repercussions throughout the archipelago comparable to that of 1873. Nobody outside Atjeh really believed the Dutch could be defeated, and Straits merchants who desired settled conditions could only look forward to a Dutch victory, however much they sympathized with the other side. The desire of successive Netherlands governments to divert outside attention from the Atjeh problem was most fully realized in the years after 1884. The problem was stored up for the future.

8

The End of the Atjehnese Nation
1885–1898

The *Nisero* question marked Britain's last serious attempt to influence directly the development of northern Sumatra. One of the three protagonists rapidly dropped out of the struggle thereafter, although it was some time before the other two became aware of it. The arena was slowly being prepared for the final direct confrontation.

During the five years following the crisis of 1884 Dutch opinion reacted strongly against the previous decade of useless bloodshed. The very general who had first abolished the sultanate was himself led to the conclusion: 'Une nation ne meurt pas de reconnaître une faute, mais d'y persister'. He advised his government to sign a generous treaty with Sultan Daud and withdraw from Atjeh.[1] Though responsive to this mood, the Government was never willing for a total retreat. Yet it became increasingly apparent that the alternative was a thorough, costly, and bloody conquest of the whole country. This chapter concentrates on the process whereby Holland was led to adopt the latter course, while Atjeh wasted its last years of independence.

Atjeh Besar, 1885–1891

Sprenger van Eyk's three main objectives in Atjeh were to reduce expenditure, to restore army morale, and to avoid diplomatic difficulties. His chosen means to achieve them were the *concentratie-stelsel* (concentration system) in Atjeh Besar and complete non-interference in the remainder of Atjeh. By March 1885 Demmeni had abandoned the advance posts

[1] Van Swieten's 'Gedachten over Atjeh' 10 March 1886, forwarded to Van Eyk 16 March 1886, Kol. Kab. S[6], 6166.

without incident and built what was intended to be an impregnable triangle around Kutaradja—each side about seven miles long. Blockhouses and watchtowers were placed along the landward sides of the triangle, and linked by an all-weather tramway and telegraph. Beyond the elevated embankment for the tramway the land was razed for a width of one kilometre. The Dutch forces within the line prepared to await developments, without any policy at all for bringing the war nearer to an end.

In Atjeh Besar and the adjacent north coast the period of *concentratie* coincided with a strengthening in the position of the *ulama*, under the inspired leadership of Teungku Tiro. The Atjehnese *ulama* had always enjoyed a position of respect perhaps unrivalled in the archipelago as a result of Atjeh's strong tradition of Islamic education. But in normal times (of which Atjeh has seen little since 1873) the religious law as interpreted by them did not compete directly with traditional secular authority in the regulation of society. The Dutch invasion brought disruption. Most of the *ulèëbalangs* lost prestige by compromising themselves with an enemy which had eventually demonstrated its real weakness by the retreat of 1885. Many of them had also lost their stable source of revenue through Dutch blockades and bombardments. The *ulama* had from the start been strong opponents of *kafir* rule, but as the war progressed they grew increasingly critical of the failings of the *ulèëbalangs*, which were usually ascribed to their disunity, their greed, and their disregard of the law of the Prophet. Unity was maintained during the time of Habib Abd ar-Rahman, who had the ready support of most *ulama*. His defection gave *ulama* leadership to less accommodating Atjehnese. Teungku Tiro in particular was already organizing guerrilla bands in Pidië in 1878. He soon made his headquarters in Keumala, but spent much of his time touring the north coast and Atjeh Besar to preach the importance of the holy war and gain recruits for his guerrillas. Towards the end of his life he was given the authorization of the Sultan's *chap sikureuëng*[1] as

[1] The ninefold seal, so-called in reference to the eight circles containing the names of eight illustrious predecessors of the reigning Sultan, whose name and titles appear in the central circle. This royal seal was affixed to official documents from the court. For Teungku Tiro see above, p. 204n.

chief religious authority in the country. Though this only confirmed a position he had long enjoyed in practice, the *chap sikureuëng* was useful in shielding him from the jealousy of *ulèëbalangs* whose influence he was undermining. Among *ulama* there were others with strong local followings, but none who challenged his role as foremost theorist and tactician of the holy war.

This ulama activity of the 1880's produced a whole new literature of popular epic poetry in Atjehnese. The *hikayat perang sabil*[1] was the most famous of these exhortations to the holy war, but Teungku Tiro, Teungku Kutakarang and others also circulated their own shorter works stressing the helplessness of the *kafir* and the successes in store for the Atjehnese when once they accepted the true disciplines of Islam. Secular poets likewise composed more entertaining accounts of the heroism of the Atjehnese and the more comic aspects of Dutch policies.[2] These poems, read aloud by one of their number, became the most popular evening entertainment for the young men gathered in the *meunassah* (communal hall). By such means the war was gradually transformed into a genuinely popular cause under *ulama* inspiration, rather than a defence of one district after another by the woefully divided traditional chiefs.

Teungku Tiro and his disciples were able to dispose of considerable sums by the collection of the *hak sabil*, that portion of the obligatory *zakat* religious tax which is intended for the holy war. With these sums, the fruit of his frequent journeys along the coast, Teungku Tiro rewarded those who stole weapons from the Dutch and supported his guerrilla bands. These bands, as distinct from those of Teuku Hassan and Teuku Husain in the period of civil government, were given a rigorous training with special emphasis on religious exercises. Already by the end of 1886 they had made four attacks through the Dutch line. In October 1887 Tiro led four hundred armed men through the line on the pretext of praying at the *kramat* (holy grave) of the Atjehnese saint and mystic, Abdurrauf. They were only driven out after a bloody pitched battle. The following

[1] H. T. Damsté (ed.), 'Hikajat Prang Sabi', *BKI* 84 (1928), pp. 545–609.

[2] This literature is well described in Snouck Hurgronje, *The Achehnese*, 1906, II, pp. 100–20. Teungku Kutakarang's major work, the *Tadkirat ar-Rakidin*, is paraphrased in E. Gobée and C. Adriaanse (ed.) *Adviezen van Snouck Hurgronje*, (The Hague, 1957) I, pp. 98–103.

year Teungku Kutakarang took the initiative in sabotaging the Dutch tramway, telegraph, and blockhouses with dynamite, a technique learned from a Dutch deserter.[1]

Although Van Eyk succeeded in avoiding any really major military disaster without increasing expenditure (he did not reduce it substantially), he failed altogether to restore army morale. The new scourge of beri-beri put as much as a third of the military strength out of action in the first years of *concentratie*. The strain of constant watchfulness within a tiny area continued to take its toll in desertions from the Dutch side. Only at the end of 1888, after the departure of Sprenger van Eyk from the Colonial Ministry, was the military governor given permission to retaliate outside the line for attacks within it. The young Captain Van Heutsz was given the task of destroying some of the strongholds which Teungku Tiro had erected facing the Dutch defences. The contrast between the relative ease of these operations and the despair prevailing within the *concentratie* made Van Heutsz into the keenest advocate of further aggression in Atjeh Besar. Soon after, in April 1890, the *Korps Maréchaussée* was established—an armed police force of Indonesians officered by Europeans. This force proved so successful in giving stability to the small area under Dutch control that it was steadily expanded for further use in Atjeh and later Java.[2]

Whether for these reasons, or because of the death of Teungku Tiro and Panglima Polem in January 1891, there were no further attacks within the Dutch stronghold. The loss of Tiro in particular was a great blow to united effort on the part of the Atjehnese. Although the *chap sikureuëng* of royal favour was now bestowed on Habib Samalanga, neither he nor Teungku Kutakarang nor Teungku Tiro's swaggering son, Mat Amin, gained more than a local following. For all these reasons the position of the Dutch in Kutaradja began to appear more tolerable after 1890. Yet there was still no sign that the end of the war was drawing any closer.

[1] K. van der Maaten *Snouck Hurgronje en de Atjeh Oorlog* (Rotterdam, 1948,) I, pp. 23–5; Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, I, pp. 147–90; Snouck Hurgronje, 'Het Atjeh-verslag' in Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 64–94; Reports of Van Teijn 4 and 7 October 1887, translations S.S. to C.O. 2 November 1887, C.O. 273/148.

[2] Van der Maaten, I, pp. 25–6. M. H. du Croo *Marechaussee in Atjeh* (Maastricht, 1943), pp. 31–2.

The *concentratie-stelsel* had been inaugurated in a purely negative spirit, without any long-term policy at all to bring the war to a close. Only in 1886 did Van Eyk begin to resuscitate the plan he had rejected in 1884 of installing Tuanku Daud as a puppet Sultan responsible to the Dutch. Laging Tobias gave considerable publicity to the idea during 1886 and gained a ready hearing among the growing numbers in Holland who wanted nothing so much as to end the whole dreadful business.[1] In Atjeh itself Demmeni and Van Langen both supported it as the only logical complement to *concentratie*.[2] For Van Eyk a restored Sultanate appeared to offer diplomatic as well as financial advantages. The Minister had been frightened when Granville and Pauncefote, in discussing rival solutions to the *Nisero* question with the Dutch emissaries, had protested that any Dutch blockade of Atjeh would imply that Atjeh was a belligerent and could be treated as such by other powers. The best way to guard against European recognition of Daud in some future crisis was to win the Sultan to the Dutch side.[3]

The restoration of the Sultanate was placed even more in the foreground when the Christian parties gained power in Holland under a broadened franchise in 1888. As Minister of Colonies they chose the most prominent critic of the Atjeh war, L. W. C. Keuchenius[4]—an indication of popular reaction against the

[1] Laging Tobias, 'Onze tegenwoordige Politiek in Atjeh en hare Gevolgen', *Gids* 50 (1886), Vol. II, pp. 274–307; 'Het Herstel van het Sultanaat in Atjeh', *IG* 8 (1886), pp. 1722–66; *Phrasen en Feiten* (Amsterdam, 1886). Van de Putte also came out in favour of a restored Sultanate in his *Atjeh. Parlementaire Redevoeringen,* 1886, pp. xii–xiii. The public debate on the question is summarized in *IG* 8 (1886), II, pp. 925–32.

[2] Demmeni to Van Rees 5 September 1884, telegram, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 September 1884, Kol. Kab. R[20], 6156; Van Langen 'De "Nisero-kwestie"', (1884), pp. 467–8.

[3] Granville to Stuart 5 July 1884, P.P. 1884, 87, p. 451; Van Bylandt to Willebois 9 July 1884, Woltring typescript; *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal* 1883–4, pp. 1852–3; Advice of Raadslid Kroesen 6 June 1890, copy G.G. to Kol. 27 June 1890, Kol. Kab. G[6], 6204; Pijnacker Hordijk to Van Dedem 1 December 1891, Kol. Kab. V[1], 6206.

[4] Levinus W. C. Keuchenius (1822–93) was a lifelong nonconformist and idealist, and a devout member of the strictly Calvinist Gereformeerde Kerk. He had a brilliant early legal career in Java (1842–51) but suffered a stroke when on leave in 1853 from which he never fully recovered. Nevertheless he was acting Secretary-General of the Colonial Department in The Hague (1854–9) and later member of the *Raad van Indië* (1859–64). His official career ended, he claimed, as a result of discrimination against his unpopular religious views. In the States-General (1856–9) his famous motion against

fighting. Keuchenius willingly accepted the task entrusted to him, of ending the war by reaching a generous agreement with the Sultan.[1] With the co-operation of Van Rees he laid plans for a recognition of the Sultan as suzerain over all Atjeh but with real authority over Atjeh Besar alone. The coastal *ulèëbalangs* should pay the symbolic *hasil* to the Sultan but should follow the advice of Dutch officials on matters affecting general welfare. The Sultan himself would be required to live for most of the year in Kutaradja, which the Dutch would continue to occupy. But in the governing of Atjeh Besar the Dutch should afford him the greatest possible co-operation and freedom of action. Thus he was to have real power, unlike the 'paper-Sultans' of earlier plans.[2]

These handsome concessions came too late and were advanced too clumsily to be of the slightest use. Governor Van Teijn (1886–91) had the responsibility of reaching agreement with the leaders at Keumala, including Teungku Tiro who was to be offered the position of mufti in the new dispensation. But the Governor himself had little understanding of Atjehnese politics, while the non-military expertise among his staff had been reduced to an absolute minimum by the *concentratie*. The procession of 'friendly' Atjehnese sent from Kutaradja to negotiate in Keumala was received only as further evidence of the hopeless weakness of the Dutch. From the first the court circle was delighted to receive the homage and presents brought by these *ulèëbalangs* living within the Dutch line, and gladly bestowed on them the *chap sikureuëng* of royal approval in return. Teungku Tiro at first took a harsher view of these renegades who had come to terms with the *kafirs*, but was eventually persuaded by Teuku Uma that the war-chest could only

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Mijer's appointment as Viceroy brought down the Conservative Government. In 1869 he returned to a private legal practice in Java, whence he virulently condemned the Dutch attack on Atjeh. He returned to Holland and the Second Chamber in 1879, where he continued to oppose the Government over Atjeh and many other questions. When he finally reached Cabinet office he was crippled by ill-health. De Savornin Lohman, in *NNBW* X, cols. 1246–9; Idema, *Parlementaire Geschiedenis*, pp. 13–17.

[1] Rumbold to Salisbury 20 November 1888, copy F.O. to C.O. 27 November 1888, C.O. 273/156.

[2] Keuchenius to Pijnacker Hordijk 14 November 1888, Kol. Kab. S^{16}, 6184; Van Rees to Van Eyk 19 January 1888 and enclosures, Kol. Kab. Q^{5}, 6180.

benefit from contributions from within as well as without the Dutch line. For these reasons the overtures from Van Teijn were never directly rebuffed, but always evaded. For all the really influential leaders, however, and particularly the *ulama*, there was absolutely no inducement to submit to the Dutch at the price of certain condemnation from religious and popular feeling. Daud himself certainly gave real evidence of a desire to escape from the restrictions of life at Keumala. But by this stage his own prestige was almost worthless if once separated from that of the *ulama* and the few influential *ulèëbalangs* who had taken a leading part in the war.[1]

Royal diplomacy

The wider recognition brought to the court at Keumala by these peace overtures was not limited to Atjeh itself. The remaining members of the Atjeh party in Penang were not slow to join in. Since the *Nisero* affair Shaikh Kassim and Nyak Abbas had maintained a fitful correspondence with Keumala, and in June 1888 they were rewarded with a specific invitation from Tuanku Hashim to come and advise the Atjehnese leaders. With co-operation from the Dutch, Nyak Abas finally reached Keumala alone in September 1888.[2]

The only significant result of this mission was to interest the Atjehnese court again in the prospect of outside assistance. Kassim and Abas had consulted beforehand with Sultan Abubakar of Johor and conveyed to Keumala his offer of advice and mediation.[3] The result was a letter from Daud to Abubakar taken to Singapore by one Sayyid Dzin in January 1890. Abubakar was absent in Europe, and Dzin tried in vain to give the letter instead to Sayyid Muhammad al-Sagoff, who handled many of the Sultan's financial affairs. This contact had special significance for the Atjehnese, however, since al-Sagoff was at the same time regarded as an unofficial Turkish repre-

[1] Snouck Hurgronje, 'Atjeh-verslag', in Gobée and Adriaanse, I, pp. 75–80.

[2] Kruyt (Penang) to Van Rees 12 July, 8 August and 7 September 1888, Cons. Penang 20; Kruyt to Pijnacker Hordijk 6 December 1888, Cons. Penang 21.

[3] Lavino to Hartsen 28 August 1888, copy B.Z. to Kol. 10 October 1888, Kol. Kab. B[15], 6182.



The *chap sikureuëng* (nine-fold seal) used by Sultan Daud. The names of eight of his predecessors are in the small circles surrounding his own name. The small rectangular seal is the private seal of the Sultan, in the form of a ring.

sentative.[1] Moreover it was just at this time that Singapore Muslims were agog at the visit of the Turkish warship *Ertogroul*, on its way to Japan with a decoration for the Emperor. Dzin's report on this apparent evidence of Turkish power in Asia created further excitement in Keumala. He was sent back to Singapore in July, 1891, with more letters, this time for al-Sagoff and the captain of the *Ertogroul*. Both were asked to bring the plight of Atjehnese Muslims to the Caliph's[2] attention.

The *Ertogroul* had long since departed. Al-Sagoff replied offering to convey any letters from Atjeh to the Porte, but warning against exaggerated hopes from that quarter. Nevertheless, his subsequent departure for Europe aroused further hopes, and on his return early in 1892 he was asked by another Keumala envoy whether he had appealed to the Turkish Sultan on Atjeh's behalf.[3]

Al-Sagoff now took advantage of the continued Dutch desire for negotiation to send to Keumala his personal envoy, Raja Ismail bin Raja Abdullah of Selangor.[4] After several delays, during which Sultan Abubakar also associated himself with the mission, Raja Ismail spent five days of July 1892 in discussions with the Atjehnese court. Both sponsors of the mission claimed to be interested only in peace. Abubakar sent a letter pointing out that Britain could not interfere because of the 1871 Treaty, while al-Sagoff probably wanted to explain the results of his

[1] The amount of trade and pilgrim traffic between the Ottoman Empire and Singapore justified a Turkish Consul in the latter port, but the appointment of a Muslim to this post was always strongly opposed by the Dutch for fear of its possible use for pan-Islamic purposes. From the death of the first consul in 1865 until 1885 Britain yielded to this viewpoint and recognized no consul. In 1884–5 Turkey pressed again for the recognition of a consul, probably al-Sagoff, and Salisbury decided to allow it if Turkey would grant some extra privileges to British consuls. This Turkey refused, and no consul was recognized until 1901, although al-Sagoff appears to have filled this role unofficially. A. Reid, 'Nineteenth Century Pan-Islam in Indonesia and Malaysia', 1967, p. 271.

[2] Sultan Daud to al-Sagoff 18 Rajab 1307H (10 March 1890), translation in G.G. to Kol. 12 September 1890, Kol. Kab. H[16], 6198; Lavino to Van Teijn 16 January 1890, copy G.G. to Kol. 24 January 1890, Kol. Kab. P[8], 6195.

[3] Van Assen to Van Teijn 13 September 1890, copy G.G. to Kol. 26 September 1890, Kol. Kab. H[16], 6198; Memo by Maxwell 23 May 1892, copy Smith to Meade 30 May 1892 (private), C.O. 273/180.

[4] For Raja Ismail see A. Reid, 'A Russian in Kelantan?', *Peninjau Sejarah* I, No. 2 (1966), pp. 45–7.

conversations in Europe with Dutch as well as Turkish leaders. But whatever Ismail said to the Atjehnese, it apparently did nothing to dim their hope for outside assistance. Tuanku Hashim was overjoyed: 'Our happiness at receiving our friend's letter is like that of a dead man brought again to life', he wrote to Ismail.[1] Though giving no clear reply to al-Sagoff's message, he pressed ahead with attempts to contact Turkey. In March 1893 he sent Teuku Laota, son of the former *ulèëbalang* of Meureudu, on a mission to Constantinople, armed with a Turkish decoration and sword of honour as tokens of Turkey's historic role in Atjeh. Laota appears to have journeyed no further than Singapore, where he was probably dissuaded by al-Sagoff from proceeding. Instead Daud and Hashim dispatched a direct appeal to the Porte which fell into Dutch instead of Turkish hands.[2]

Ismail's was the last foreign embassy to the proud court of Atjeh. Dutch statesmen, at last disillusioned over the possibilities of a restored Sultanate, were beginning to experiment with other methods. Yet as late as 1905, two years after he had submitted to the Dutch, ex-Sultan Daud was still dreaming of foreign help for his country. He was exiled from Atjeh for having written to the Japanese Consul in Singapore.[3]

The control of trade

For the Atjehnese dependencies Sprenger van Eyk's parsimonious plan had prescribed a policy of non-interference, with the surrender of all Dutch posts except Idi. In the event small military posts were also left behind at Sigli and Meulaboh to protect *ulèëbalangs* who had been too closely involved with the Dutch for their own safety.[4]

[1] Tuanku Hashim to Raja Ismail 20 Shawwal 1309H (18 May 1892), translation G.G. to Kol. 26 June 1892, Kol. Kab. H^{13}, 6213.

[2] Sultan Daud and Tuanku Hashim to Sublime Porte 12 Jumadil- akhir 1311H (21 November 1893), translation in Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 153–7. Reid, 1967, pp. 278–9. Daud's last attempt to contact Turkey was probably in early 1898, when he sent letters to the enthusiastically pan-Islamic Turkish Consul-General in Batavia. Gobée and Adrianse I, pp. 231–6.

[3] *ENI* I, p. 87.

[4] Van Rees to Demmeni 19 August 1884, copy G.G. to Kol. 19 August 1884, Kol. Kab. V^{18}, 6157; Van Eyk to Van Rees 26 September 1884, Kol. Kab. W^{18}, 6157; Van Rees to Van Eyk 10 January 1885, Kol. Kab. S^{2}, 6159.

The Atjeh-Penang trade had already begun to revive during the *scheepvaartregeling* of 1883–4, and with the abandonment of all restrictions in 1885 it was able to flourish for the last time. Katz Brothers withdrew altogether in 1884 after the military provisioning contracts were given to Dutch-registered firms. Three of its ships were bought by the *N.I. Stoomvaart Maatschappij* for use on its regular mail service to the remaining Dutch posts in Atjeh. The army provisioning contract went to a syndicate financed by the *Nederlandsche Handel-Maatshappij* (N.H.M.), for which De Lange and Co. (Katz Brothers' former partners) handled the business in Atjeh and G.P. Tolson in Penang. Its goods were shipped in the regular mail steamers of the *N.I. Stoomvaart Maatschappij*. Unlike Katz Brothers, however, the new contractors had no contacts with the smaller Atjehnese ports, and therefore played a small role in the pepper trade. The reverse was the case with Chang Chen-hsun's firm, Ban Joo Hin. His steamers already flew the Dutch flag, so that he was able in 1884 to add the navy provisioning contract to the opium and spirit farms he had enjoyed since 1876. His three steamers now virtually monopolized the trade of the west coast. The only steamers under British colours visiting Atjeh were those of the smaller Chinese firms which now began again to trade with the east and north coasts.[1]

What little influence the Dutch had ever exercised in the Atjehnese dependencies rested primarily on their control of trade. Once this was entirely removed, the declarations of submission which almost all the coastal *ulèëbalangs* had made became more meaningless than ever. Only the Raja of Idi continued to uphold Dutch influence in his area, and this made necessary the only two Dutch military expeditions of the *concentratie*-period, to protect him from the hostility his attitude created.

It was Teuku Uma who forced the Dutch to reconsider this policy of passivity in the dependencies. Since his dramatic defection from the Dutch side in July 1884 he had become by 1886 virtual warlord of the whole west coast north of Teunom, as well as most of the XXV Mukims, to which he laid claim

[1] Kennedy to Granville 6 August 1883, F.O. 37/662; *Cons. Versl.* 1884, pp. 877–8, 1885, pp. 153–6.

through his famous wife, Chut Nyak Din. In some districts he took the lucrative pepper-exports entirely into his own hands; in others he levied a *hasil* of $0.25 a pikul, nominally on behalf of the Sultan. This wealth he generously disbursed to his followers, and also to the court and the *ulama*-party at Keumala. He was eventually rewarded with the Sultan's official recognition as *amir ul-bahr* (sea-lord) of the west coast. Only the energetic Teuku Imam of Teunom was able to stem his advance to the south, and so began to earn a high place in Dutch affections.[1]

On 14 June 1886 one of Ban Joo's steamers, the *Hok Canton*, anchored at Rigas to conduct its usual business with Teuku Uma. A few hours later about forty of Uma's men boarded the ship and tried to seize all the European officers on board, including the Danish captain, Hansen, and his wife. When they resisted, the German mate and the Scottish engineer were killed, while Hansen received wounds so severe that he died in captivity a few days later. Mrs Hansen and the Scottish second engineer, Foy, were taken prisoner by Uma, while a rich booty was plundered from the ship.

Uma may in part have been motivated by a personal grudge against Hansen.[2] But there can be no doubt that he had not forgotten how his great rival Teuku Imam had benefitted from the *Nisero* affair and wanted to use the *Hok Canton* for a similar purpose. Once more there were angry meetings in Penang to condemn Holland for the insecurity in Atjeh. But Uma himself could not hope for anybody's sympathy. Moreover, the *Hok Canton*, though based in Penang, was registered in Ulèëlheuë. Neither the British nor Straits Government gave any public evidence of concern in the question. Thus Uma had to be content with a Dutch ransom of $25,000 in September, after a

[1] Van Teijn to Van Rees 5 February 1887, copy G.G. to Kol. 18 February 1887, Kol. Kab. N[4], 6171; Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, pp. 148–53.

[2] Edouard Roura made a brief reappearance as a west coast trader in 1886, and had sailed with the *Hok Canton* from Ulèëlheuë to Rigas. He had disembarked first to do his own business with Uma, and appears to have told him that Hansen had boasted that he would capture Uma for the Dutch. Uma himself made much of this grievance in conversation with Hoy. It is, of course, improbable that Hansen had such an intention. There were also unsettled debts between Hansen and Uma. Petition of Foy 17 November 1886, copy in G.G. to Kol. 21 December 1886, Kol. Kab. N[4], 6171; Mohammad Said *Atjeh Sepandjang Abad* (Medan, 1961), pp. 539–41.

punitive expedition to Rigas had again demonstrated Holland's military impotence.[1]

The *Hok Canton* affair forcibly raised the issue of how to protect traders and at the same time punish people like Teuku Uma. Demmeni in Atjeh, and Pruys van der Hoeven in the *Raad van Indië*, both took the opportunity to press again for a *scheepvaartregeling* which would close all ports except those with a Dutch post. Without this, they urged, there was no hope of any Dutch influence in the dependencies. Sprenger van Eyk however ruled out any interference with trade on grounds of the promises made to Britain in 1884.[2]

Colonel Van Teijn, who became Governor on Demmeni's death in December 1886, proposed to close completely the ports controlled by Uma. This was also overruled by the Governor-General. The only alternative was for Dutch warships to convoy all merchant shipping to Uma's ports, and steps to this end were taken early in 1887.[3] But even Van Eyk finally objected to specifically protecting Uma's source of income. When the Foreign Ministry was consulted it proved unable to remember any binding promises having been given to Britain except those regarding Teunom. Van Eyk therefore redefined his policy so as to exclude the *scheepvaartregeling* but allow temporary closures for military purposes:

> During the negotiations with England over the *Nisero* affair, England was indeed promised that the trade would no longer be hindered by restrictive provisions and regulations, but our right to close part of the coast, when that was necessary to bring refractory chiefs to submission, was properly maintained.[4]

This decision paved the way for the closure of all Uma's ports between February and May 1888. The results were impressive. Uma quickly began again to negotiate for peace, and no pro-

[1] Weld to Stanhope 8 July 1886, C.O. 273/140; *idem* 11 September 1886, C.O. 273/141; Mohammad Said, pp. 538–46; Snouck Hurgronje, 1906, II, pp. 113–14.

[2] Van Rees to Van Eyk 10 July, and reply 12 July 1886, telegrams, Kol. Kab. V[7], 6166; Van Rees to Van Eyk 25 August and reply 16 October 1886, Kol. Kab. Q[11], 6168.

[3] Van Teijn to Van Rees 5 February 1887, copy G.G. to Kol. 18 February 1887, Kol. Kab. N[4], 6171.

[4] Van Eyk to Van Rees 29 August 1887: also Van Eyk to Karnebeek 12 July and reply 5 August 1887: Kol. Kab. V[11], 6176.

tests were heard from the Straits Settlements. Any remaining inhibitions against using such methods to bring pressure on the dependencies were finally removed with the resignation of Van Eyk in April 1888 and of Van Rees the following September.

With Keuchenius, the ending of the war was a more important objective than a balanced budget. He therefore accepted the view pressed upon him by one of the few civil officials in Atjeh, Van Assen, that the Sultan and his court would only come to terms under the pressure of being cut off from trade.[1] The whole north coast was closed to trade in two stages in December 1889 and August 1890, while the west coast north of Teunom was re-closed in January 1890.[2]

This measure, which inflicted considerable hardship on the Atjehnese for the first time since 1884, was designed only as a temporary means to a specific end. But it was apparent to local Dutch officials that even if the blockade did produce an agreement with the Sultan's party some permanent control of trade would be necessary. Van Teijn, like all previous Governors of Atjeh, had pressed consistently for a systematic *scheepvaartregeling*. He hoped to perfect previous schemes by linking the Dutch ports in Atjeh with each other and Penang by telegraph, and providing more adequate facilities for transhipment from Penang steamers to the small craft which would be permitted to undertake the coastal trade.[3] In 1888 Van Rees had agreed that such a scheme should be considered as a permanent measure after the submission of the Sultan.[4] His successor C. Pijnacker Hordijk went further in 1890, recommending that the closure of the Atjehnese coast should eventually give way to a *scheepvaartregeling*, though not as long as the closure offered hope of bringing agreement with Keumala.[5]

This idea was long resisted in The Hague, which was reluct-

[1] Minute by Van Assen (on leave in Holland) 23 September 1888, on report by Kruyt 7 August 1888: Keuchenius to Pijnacker Hordijk 14 November 1888: Kol. Kab. S[16], 6184.

[2] Van Teijn to Pijnacker Hordijk 23 January 1890, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 February 1890, Kol. Kab. P[8], 6195; *idem* 30 July 1890, copy G.G. to Kol. 11 August 1890, Kol. Kab. H[16], 6198.

[3] Van Teijn to Van Rees 23 November 1887, copy G.G. to Kol. 19 January 1888, Kol. Kab. Q[5], 6180; Van Teijn to Pijnacker Hordijk 30 July 1890, copy G.G. to Kol. 11 August 1890, Kol. Kab. H[16], 6198.

[4] Van Rees to Van Eyk 19 January 1888, Kol. Kab. Q[5], 6180.

[5] Pijnacker Hordijk to Mackay 29 July 1890, Kol. Kab. G[16], 6204.

ant to admit the need for permanent restrictions of the type which had always aroused resentment from British merchants. However, support for the *scheepvaartregeling* in the States-General increased when G. A. Scherer championed it before the *Indische Genootschap* in January 1891.[1] Moreover, Britain's failure to protest against the severe blockade of 1890 made it appear unlikely that the much milder *scheepvaartregeling* would be resented. Consequently Baron van Dedem van Vosbergen, who was given the Colonial portfolio by the Liberals in August 1891, overruled his permanent officials on this point. He authorized the Governor-General to replace the closure by a *scheepvaartregeling* whenever the time seemed ripe.[2] Batavia was anxious for future Atjeh policy to be freed from its dependence on the Sultan's submission, which appeared as far off as ever. There was, therefore, no further reason to delay the introduction of the *scheepvaartregeling*.[3]

In April 1892 G. A. Scherer and a new Governor of Atjeh, Colonel Deijkerhoff, were constituted a commission to study its implementation. After careful preparations, including a telegraphic link between the Dutch posts,[4] the system was ceremonially inaugurated on the east coast of Atjeh in October 1892. Only Idi was open to foreign trade. Dutch troops later occupied Lhokseumawe, which they had abandoned in 1885, and Pulo Raja (near Lhokkruët), which appeared a safer and more convenient base on the west coast than Meulaboh. These two ports were opened to foreign trade in April 1893, and the *scheepvaartregeling* was gradually completed the same year by allowing small prahus of twenty-five tons or less to conduct the coastal trade in the hitherto blockaded portions of the north and west coasts.[5] Henceforth all imported goods were

[1] Kreemer I, p. 31. For Scherer see above, p. 207.

[2] Minutes on G.G. to Kol. 27 June and 29 July 1890: Van Dedem to Pijnacker Hordijk 11 November 1891, telegram: Kol. Kab. G[16], 6204; Van Dedem to Pijnacker Hordijk 5 September 1891, telegram, Kol. Kab. H[13], 6203; *idem* 9 November 1891, telegram, Kol. Kab. E[16], 6205; *idem* 20 November 1891, telegram, Kol. Kab. R[16], 6204.

[3] Pijnacker Hordijk to Van Dedem 1 December 1891 and enclosures, and reply 6 February 1892, Kol. Kab. V[1], 6206.

[4] In June 1892 the telegraph along the north-east coast of Sumatra was completed, linking Ulèëlheuë, Sigli and Idi with Belawan (Deli). Belawan had already been linked to Penang in December 1891.

[5] Deijkerhoff to Pijnacker Hordijk 24 October 1892, copy G.G. to Kol. 3 November 1892, Kol. Kab. Z[18], 6215. Deijkerhoff's report on *scheep-*

unloaded at Idi, Lhokseumawe, Ulèëlheuë or Pulo Raja for inspection, while Dutch officials at these ports levied both import and export duties on behalf of the rajas. Though only really effective on the east and west coasts for which trade was all-important, this was one of the most vital steps towards permanent Dutch influence in Atjeh.

The end of British influence

The crucial factor making this advance possible was the relative weakness of the reaction from the Straits Settlements. The closure of the Atjeh coast from 1890 was the most severe action the Dutch had ever taken against the Penang trade, which was cut by almost half in that year.[1] But apart from Ban Joo and the army contractors, who were too involved with the Dutch to be able to protest, those most directly affected were the small Chinese firms trading to the east and north coasts. They had very little political influence, particularly after the Penang Chamber of Commerce had limited itself to Europeans. For the European agency houses like Sandilands Buttery Co., the Atjeh pepper they bought from such firms was by now a minor concern. It is notable that the protests which did emerge from the European element in the Straits Settlements in this period were more concerned with politics than commerce, and were influenced chiefly by the ideas and personalities of the previous decade.

This was particularly the case with the violent petition which a few merchants, led by Huttenbach, drew up in 1890. It condemned the blockade as an attempt to starve out the plucky Atjehnese—a move 'unprecedented in the darkest pages of history'—and called for British intervention to end the war. Naturally it was quickly dismissed by officials in Singapore and

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vaartregeling 22 March 1894, copy G.G. to Kol. 19 April 1894, Kol. Kab. E[11], 6227. Kreemer I, p. 32. Sigli and Meulaboh were added to the list of ports open to foreign trade in 1898. Teunom was excepted from the *scheepvaartregeling* in deference to the *Nisero* agreement until 1898, when it became the first state to sign the new *Korte Verklaring*. Teuku Imam Muda was very ready to abandon his privileges in this way in order to be sure of protection against his old enemy Teuku Uma, back in the anti-Dutch camp since 1896; Somer, *De Korte Verklaring*, pp. 265–6.

[1] *Cons. Versl.* 1891, I, p. 39. See Appendix 3 below.

London who had not been involved in the earlier conflicts.[1] The following year Sir Cecil Smith, who had been Colonial Secretary during the *Nisero* affair, returned to Singapore as Governor. He was quick to express the old sympathy for the Atjehnese cause and to endorse the Penang suggestion that Britain should mediate between the two antagonists.[2] At the Foreign Office, Salisbury icily suggested the Governor be told to mind his own business.[3]

Mercantile interests were better served by another petition from the Penang Chamber of Commerce in 1893, protesting sensibly against the introduction of the *scheepvaartregeling*. Though less severe than the blockade which preceded it, this was an avowedly permanent measure and one, moreover, against which Britain had protested publicly and successfully in 1884. Again the European merchants were not very enthusiastic. The petition was evoked and warmly supported by the Straits Government, now headed by none other than W. E. Maxwell.[4]

On this occasion Whitehall was disposed to be sympathetic, as several events had drawn its attention back to the Atjeh problem. Early in 1893 Atjehnese attacks began to spread to the East Coast of Sumatra with its heavy British as well as Dutch investments. A British warship was sent to investigate, and gave a very unfavourable report on the Dutch position in Atjeh.[5] In July another of Ban Joo's steamers, the *Rajah Kongsee Atjeh*, fell victim to Atjehnese bandits. Thirty-four passengers died, including two Englishmen.[6] Finally T. G. Bowles, chief instigator of the Conservative attack on the Sumatra treaty in 1874, had entered Parliament in 1892. In May 1893 he asked the Govern-

[1] Dickson to Knutsford 16 August 1890 and enclosure, C.O. 273/167; Lavino to Hartsen 19 August 1890 and Kruyt to Hartsen 16 September 1890, copies B.Z. to Kol. 15 September and 15 October 1890, Kol. Kab. F^{12} and N^{13}, 6197.

[2] Smith to Knutsford 6 January 1891, C.O. 273/172.

[3] Minute by Hertslett 21 October 1893 on C.O. to F.O. 14 October 1893, F.O. 37/824; Currie to Meade 10 March 1891, C.O. 273/177.

[4] Maxwell to Ripon 2 September 1893 and enclosures, C.O. 273/189; Fleury to Pijnacker Hordijk 23 August 1893, copy G.G. to Kol. 7 September 1893, Kol. Kab. X^{14}, 6223.

[5] Rumbold to Rosebery 13 and 20 July 1893: Macleod to Fremantle 4 and 18 April 31, May and 2 December 1893, copies in Admiralty to F.O. 31 May, 17 June and 25 August 1893 and 24 January 1894: F.O. 37/824.

[6] Smith to Ripon 1 August 1893, C.O. 273/189.

ment whether it would now honour Raffles's Atjeh Treaty. The Government had replied:

> It appears to have been held by successive Governments at various times that the provisions of the treaty of 1819 had not been uninterruptedly observed on either side and could no longer be said to be in force.

Though a quite accurate statement, this had satisfied The Hague as little as Bowles, and the Government had been forced to appease the former with the assurance that it still held by the 1824 and 1871 Treaties.[1]

Influenced by all these developments, the Earl of Rosebery protested firmly in November 1893 that Holland had failed to uphold its share of the treaties by continually interfering with trade in Atjeh.[2] This was of course denied by the Dutch Colonial Minister. However, alarmed that the protest 'could again cause an unfavourable trend for us in Atjeh', he instructed his Governor-General to avoid any unnecessary interference with the British trade.[3]

The Straits Government was anxious for the Foreign Office to keep up its pressure. A new Governor, Sir Charles Mitchell, repeated the old demand that Holland should either make war in a straightforward manner or else end the harassing trade restrictions. But the Foreign Office's interest was short-lived. Hertslett terminated the issue with the argument that although trade necessarily suffered in the war 'the Dutch are quite as anxious as we are that this state of things should cease'.[4]

The greater purposefulness of the Dutch effort after 1893 was certainly one of the reasons why there were no further demon-

[1] *Hansard* 4th Series, Vol. 12, cols. 1542–3. Rumbold to Rosebery 20 June 1893 and attached minutes: Rosebery to Van Bylandt 11 July 1893: F.O. 37/824; Van Dedem to Tienhoven 6 and 9 June 1893, Kol. Kab. D^{7} and K^{7}, 6218.

[2] Rosebery to Gevers 4 November 1893, F.O. 37/824. The Dutch Chargé d'Affaires explained Rosebery's unexpected toughness, less convincingly, as a result of his desire to make amends to the Straits interest for his weakness towards French aggression during the 'Paknam incident' in Siam; Gevers to Tienhoven 3 December 1893, Kol. Kab. E^{15}, 6223.

[3] Van Dedem to Tienhoven 25 November 1893, Kol. Kab. P^{14}, 6222; Van Dedem to Pijnacker Hordijk 11 December 1893, Kol. Kab. E^{15}, 6223; Tienhoven to Gevers 11 December 1893, F.O. 37/824.

[4] Minute by Hertslett 11 December 1894 on C.O. to F.O. 5 December 1894: Kimberley to Rumbold 21 December 1894: F.O. 37/824.

strations of concern from the British side. A more important reason, however, was a sharp decline in the relative importance of Atjeh for the merchants of Penang. The stagnation and later decline which the Dutch blockades and offensives brought to Atjeh after 1888 coincided with a dramatic period of development for the western Malay Peninsula. The value of Penang's trade with the Peninsula exceeded that with Sumatra for the first time in 1889. By 1905 it was four times as great.[1]

Moreover, the share of British or Straits Settlements capital involved in what remained of the Atjeh-Penang carrying trade was steadily eroded after 1883. Until 1890 Penang Chinese shipping was still dominating the east coast pepper trade, while the *N.I. Stoomvaart Maatschappij*, which carried the mails, the army provisions, and an increasing share of the trade, was in fact British-owned though registered in Batavia. Its mail contract for all Netherlands India expired in 1890, and was given the following year to the *Koninklijk Paketvaart Maatschappij* (K.P.M.), which had been founded with powerful Dutch government and commercial backing two years earlier in order to break the hold of Straits-based British shipping in the archipelago. Initially, the 'Atjeh-association' of De Lange, which had the army provisioning contract, switched over to the ships of Ban Joo Hin. But the K.P.M. was not, like its predecessor, content with its contractual obligations to the Government. It sought to dominate the entire coastal trade of Indonesia. A vigorous trade war ensued with Holt's East India Ocean S.S. Co., which feared for its lucrative trade with the East Coast of Sumatra in particular. A bitter contest on the Penang-Atjeh-Padang route ended in 1893 with Holt's defeat. By that time freight rates had been driven below the level which smaller firms could support, so that the K.P.M. remained master of the field. The *scheepvaartregeling* was another blessing for the K.P.M. by concentrating trade in the ports it was obliged to serve. After 1893 only one small steamer under British colours remained on the Penang-Idi route. Ban Joo's three Dutch steamers continued trading profitably until 1895 despite Atjehnese attacks on all of them, but the following year the military provisioning contracts went over to the K.P.M.[2]

[1] See Table 1 in Appendix 3, below.

[2] C.G. Allen and A.G. Donnithorne *Western Enterprise in Indonesia and Malaya*

The success of the K.P.M. did much to help the Dutch to free themselves from the division between commercial and political power which had made their task in Atjeh so difficult. But as long as even the K.P.M. was obliged to use Penang as the entrepôt for its Atjeh trade, the British colony would remain a magnet drawing the Atjehnese away from submission to Batavia. This fact had been sensed by many Dutch officials since the time of Van der Heijden. None, however, gave such forceful expression to this view as the great Islamologist Snouck Hurgronje, in a supplement to his Atjeh report of 1892:

For the Atjehnese Penang is truly the gateway to the world; yes, the world itself. . . .

The Atjehnese, who frequently go to Penang, fall under influences there which bring them anything but closer to the *Gompeuni* [*sic*]. They are also led to compare Penang with the abnormal condition of their own country, or with that of neighbouring Netherlands possessions, and these comparisons are very detrimental to our Government. Exclusively on the experience of Atjehnese in Penang rests the *general* conviction in Atjeh that the rule of the English would be infinitely preferable to ours. . . .

In view of all this . . . no difficulty or sacrifice can be too great for us to give the Atjehnese in their own country what Penang is for them now, and at the same time to open a direct route to Europe for their products.[1]

(London, 1957), pp. 215–19; F. E. Hyde *Blue Funnel: a history of Alfred Holt & Co. of Liverpool from 1865 to 1914* (Liverpool, 1957), pp. 83–5. *Cons. Versl.* 1888, p. 789; 1892, I, pp. 40 and 45; 1893, p. 34; 1895, I, p. 526; 1897, p. 265. Of Ban Joo's three vessels, the *Hok Canton* was plundered in 1886, the *Washi* in 1891, and the *Rajah Kongsee Atjeh* in 1893. Captain Ross, who survived the attack on the *Washi*, was murdered in a similar incident on board the British steamer *Pegu* in July 1897. Both the 1893 and 1897 attacks were the work of a small group of Atjehnese passengers who had boarded the ships at Idi with concealed weapons, and fled to the shore with their loot after a large-scale slaughter of crew and passengers. Twenty-four were killed on the *Rajah Kongsee Atjeh* and eight on the *Pegu*, while ten more were drowned in the former case after jumping overboard. The major motive for these attacks was apparently plunder, though the example of the *Nisero* can be seen in the successful attempt of T. Nyak Usoh of Simpang Ulim to use four female captives from the *Rajah Kongsee Atjeh* to force the Dutch to reopen his ports. Smith to Ripon 1 August 1893, C.O. 273/189; Mitchell to Chamberlain 21 July 1897, copy C.O. to F.O. 24 August 1897, F.O. 37/824; *ENI* III, p. 780.

[1] Snouck Hurgronje to Pijnacker Hordijk 18 January 1893, Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 115–16.

Snouck Hurgronje regarded the establishment of such an entrepôt, preferably at Ulèëlheuë, as second only in importance to the crushing of the *ulama* party as a means to subdue Atjeh.

This was an accurate diagnosis, although the remedy was beyond Dutch power to effect completely. The Colonial Minister, Van Dedem, was anxious to attempt it at the excellent harbour of Sabang, on Pulau We, which he had already authorized De Lange & Co. to use as a coaling station for supplying the blockading fleet.[1] The first official was appointed to the island in May 1893, and the K.P.M. contracted to supply coal from the new Ombilin mines in West Sumatra. On the return journey it was hoped that Atjehnese produce would be shipped from Sabang to Padang, which was directly linked to Europe. But trade developed very slowly. In 1898 Van Heutsz engineered the transformation of the 'Atjeh-association', which had supplied the Dutch forces, into the *N.V. Zeehaven en Kolenstation Sabang*, which continued to lean on the N.H.M. but had a sounder financial base. This firm gradually built Sabang from a station for supplying the forces into an important free port. When the *Maatschappij Nederland* brought it onto its direct route to Europe in 1903, it began to take a section of the North Sumatra trade away from Penang.[2] Although Penang's attractions for the Atjehnese were by no means removed, these efforts did further diminish Dutch dependence on an essentially hostile British port.

Conquest

Progress towards a more direct imposition of Dutch authority in the areas most affected by the war was more erratic. As we have seen, the Christian coalition of 1888–91 sought an end to the war through a generous accommodation with the Sultanate, though supporting this policy with increasing measures of force after 1889. The momentum of this policy carried through to the succeeding Liberal Ministry, though with rapidly decreasing conviction. Throughout this period the local officials played a relatively minor part in determining policy, and the degree of specialized knowledge of the

[1] Van Dedem to Pijnacker Hordijk 2 March 1893, Kol. Kab. R², 6127.

[2] Henri Moreau *Le Port de Sabang* (Paris, 1926), pp. 77–100. *ENI* III, p. 668. Mansveldt II, p. 423.

Atjehnese problem sank to a low level. Governors Van Teijn (1886–91), Pompe van Meerdervoort (1891–2), and Deijkerhoff (1892–6) were all poorly informed and all too ready to seize upon any internal dispute among the Atjehnese as evidence that the will to resist was weakening.

This lack of expertise, or indeed of urgency, at the local level for solving the problem at all, was remedied almost single-handed by Snouck Hurgronje.[1] His visit to Mecca in Muslim guise in 1884–5 had brought him into contact with the Atjehnese community and convinced him of the need for careful study of the Atjeh problem on the spot, but independent of the *Kompeuni* itself. In 1889 his attempt to go incognito from Penang to Atjeh, and perhaps Keumala, was thwarted by official opposition. Two years later, however, when his identity was too well known to allow him to venture outside the Dutch *concentratie*, he was commissioned to investigate 'how the disposition of the religious party in general was after the death of Teungku Tiro, and in what way the government should try to exercise influence on Keumala'. Snouck Hurgronje lived in Kutaradja from July 1891 to February 1892, and submitted his important 'Atjeh report' the following May.

Snouck Hurgronje's unique qualities were his tireless intellectual energy, the sharp precision with which all his views were expressed, and his complete freedom from the wishful thinking which characterized almost every other Dutchman's dealings

[1] Dr. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857–1936) studied theology and Semitic letters at Leiden, and remained there to lecture in Arabic (1881–9). He was among the first western scholars to visit Mecca, where he spent three months and made a special study of the Indonesian community (*Mekka*, 2 vols. The Hague, 1889). In 1889 his request to make a study of Indonesian Islam on behalf of the Netherlands Indian Government was granted, and in 1891 his position was formalized with the title 'Adviser to the N.I. Government for Eastern languages and Muslim law'. He exercised a steadily increasing influence over policy towards Islam, the pilgrimage, the Arab minority, and, after his visit to Atjeh, the Atjeh problem. In 1898 his function was more appropriately retitled 'Adviser for Native and Arab Affairs'. From that date until January 1903 he exercised a direct influence over Atjeh policy in partnership with Van Heutsz, but Snouck left Atjeh for good after a sharp disagreement with Van Heutsz over policy towards the former Sultan. He remained in Indonesia as Adviser until 1906, when he accepted the chair of Arabic at Leiden, though continuing to advise the home government on a variety of matters. Gobée's introduction in Gobée and Adriaanse I; H. J. Benda *The Crescent and the Rising Sun* (The Hague/Bandung, 1958) pp. 20–31. Van der Maaten I, pp. 37–58.

with Atjeh. He was willing to talk endlessly to Atjehnese on equal terms, to elicit and to record their real feelings. His report went to great lengths to stress the long-standing and intense hatred towards the *Kompeuni* throughout Atjeh. Because of this, nothing whatever could be gained from attempting to negotiate with the Sultan's family; still less with the *ulama* who now inspired the popular resistance. There could be no hope of real or stable Dutch influence without force. The Dutch must make the task of the *ulama* leadership impossible by ceaselessly attacking and harassing them wherever they were, while making greater efforts to conciliate the sullenly passive majority by encouraging trade under a *scheepvaartregeling*.[1]

The fact that it was a world-famous Islamic scholar rather than a soldier who recommended a ruthless policy towards the *ulama* earned widespread support for this policy. Moreover, time was on the side of many of Snouck Hurgronje's arguments. The penetration of the whole archipelago by western capital rendered Atjeh an increasing anomaly and reproach to the Government. The attempt to hide the problem by removing all possible objects of Atjehnese attack collapsed finally in March-June 1893, when a band of Atjehnese under Nyak Makam extended the war into the booming plantation district of Sumatra's East Coast. A series of attacks on European plantations in the Langkat-Tamiang area culminated in an attack on the headquarters of the Royal Dutch Petroleum Company at Pengkalan Brandan.[2] In July came the attack on the *Rajah Kongsee Atjeh*. The Liberal Governments in office in The Hague from 1891 were more sympathetic than their predecessors to the growing demands of capital for a more forceful policy to end these depredations.

Yet the Government was still anxious to find a cheaper and less controversial solution. The British Minister to The Hague had reported in 1886: 'It is highly improbable that the States-General would vote the sums required for any extensive military operations unless the expediency of doing so should be brought home to them by some important and unexpected

[1] Atjeh-verslag of 23 May 1892 in Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 47–97. See also Somer, pp. 239–41; Van der Maaten I, pp. 59–93.

[2] Macleod to Fremantle 4 and 18 April 1893, copies Admiralty to F.O. 31 May and 7 June 1893: Rumbold to Salisbury 13 July 1893: F.O. 37/824.

event'.[1] This moment had not yet come. Until the end of 1893 the conclusion being drawn by the Government from Snouck Hurgronje's report was the opposite of that he had intended. By a policy of inactivity, it was argued, the Dutch would deprive the *ulama* and activists of their means of support, and thus bring about more settled conditions.[2]

When, however, the new Governor-General, Jhr C. H. A. van der Wijck, took up his duties in October 1893, he came under the direct influence of Snouck Hurgronje. It was largely on the latter's advice that Van der Wijck decided to allow Colonel Deijkerhoff to make cautious use of Teuku Uma, whose submission had at last been accepted in September 1893.[3] Uma was given weapons and money for the task of clearing Dutch enemies from those parts of the XXV and XXVI Mukims outside the Dutch line. For a time he succeeded brilliantly, less through his military prowess than his tact and flexibility in handling men. Uma formed a close alliance with Teungku Kutakarang, the leading religious teacher of the XXV Mukims, one of the centres of Uma's own following. Both men were strongly opposed to the guerrilla bands of Teungku Tiro's sons, Mat Amin and Teungku Beb, who were trying to raise the *hak sabil* in the XXV Mukims at the expense of Teungku Kutakarang. Teuku Uma quickly expelled these bands, which were something of a scourge on the populace, and then persuaded the most important *ulèëbalangs* and *ulama* that their interests could be well served by feigning loyalty to the *Kompeuni*. Thus a *modus vivendi* was established in these districts between the Dutch and Uma on the one hand and the upholders of the holy war on the other. But Uma always made clear to the Atjehnese that he would never take the field against the most important Atjehnese leaders, and even sent to Keumala some of the money he received from the Dutch. Similarly, he did nothing to prevent a number of *ulama* continuing to raise the *hak sabil* for the war in parts of the XXVI Mukims nominally under his authority.[4]

[1] Stuart to Rosebery 8 June 1886, copy F.O. to C.O. 15 June 1886, C.O. 273/142.

[2] Rumbold to Rosebery 1 September 1893, F.O. 37/824, quoting statements in The Hague by Van Dedem and Van der Wijck.

[3] Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 185 and 95n.

[4] Advice of Snouck Hurgronje 9 and 25 March 1895: n.d. (December 1895?): and 8 March 1896: Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 165–87. Van der

Dutch troops occupied eleven temporary posts in the area 'conquered' by Uma in order to retain an influence there. Thus the Uma system had the advantage of doubling the Dutch-occupied area with very small cost in lives and money. But as Snouck Hurgronje was anxious to point out, these were transient gains which could not form the basis of a permanent conquest. They rested entirely on the changeable personality of one remarkable Atjehnese. Deijkerhoff, on the other hand, after a very cautious beginning with Uma, placed increasing reliance on him, even for expanding into parts of the XXII Mukims where he had no real influence.

The death of Teungku Kutakarang in November 1895 was a considerable blow to Uma's position. The other important *ulama* of the XXV Mukims did not share their former teacher's dictum that resistance to Uma could not be considered a holy war. Early in 1896 there was a sharp increase in the number of attacks against the *Kompeuni*. Finally on 28 March 1896, Teuku Uma and his followers changed sides for the last time, after receiving from the Dutch $18,000 in money, 880 rifles, and adequate ammunition for a projected attack on Lam Krak. It seems clear that in view of the mood of the *ulama* Uma was unwilling to undertake this attack on a major centre of the religious party in the VII Mukims Ba'et (XXII Mukims). It was no longer possible for him to reconcile the demands of the Dutch with a respected position among his own people.[1]

Uma's defection dramatically ended the unreal air of '*main perang*' (playing at war) which had pervaded Atjeh, and threw the Dutch once more on to the defensive. Uma's well-provided men, now with full popular support, surrounded all the Dutch posts outside the *concentratie*. The Governor-General's immediate reaction was to dismiss Deijkerhoff and send General Vetter, the Commander-in-chief, as Government Commissioner to oversee the rescue of the detachments in

Maaten I, pp. 99–105.

[1] A. Kruisheer *Atjeh 1896* (Weltevreden, 1913) I, pp. 13–26. Kreemer I, pp. 32–4. Van der Maaten I, pp. 99–104 and 109–10. Among the various explanations advanced for Uma's defection are the influence of his warlike wife Chut Nyak Din, and various prophecies that he would meet his death at Lam Krak. Uma's own letters to the Dutch after the event (Kruisheer I, pp. 315–23) shed little light on his real motives, dwelling rather on various petty grievances and demands from the Dutch.

Atjehnese territory. This was accomplished only after several weeks of heavy fighting. Vetter returned to Batavia in June after taking Uma's main forts and making a show of force outside the line.

A sharp break in policy was clearly required, in one direction or another. The Socialists in the States-General, and G.A. Scherer in the *Raad van Indië*, called for a further withdrawal to coastal strongholds or off-shore islands, so as to deprive the guerrillas of any object of attack while exercising indirect influence through the *scheepvaartregeling*. Vetter on the other hand recommended repeating Van der Heijden's conquest of Atjeh Besar, while Snouck Hurgronje, whose influence appears to have been decisive with the Governor-General, continued to urge the relentless pursuit of the war leaders through the XXII Mukims to Pidië and beyond. Minister Bergsma gave cautious approval to a more aggressive policy designed to maintain control of Atjeh Besar.[1]

Three permanent military bases were now established outside the former *concentratie* but linked to it by an all-weather tramway—Tjot Mantjang for the XXVI Mukims; Lhok Nga (on Kruëng Raba bay) for the west; Indrapuri for the XXII Mukims. Lhok Nga provided a base for a series of sorties against Teuku Uma, who retreated from one place to another in the north-west coastal region until in January 1898 he crossed over to the VII Mukims Pidië. Sultan Daud and the young Panglima Polem[2] had already taken refuge there after being driven from one defensive position to another along the higher reaches of the Atjeh river.

Thus the conquests of Van der Heijden were repeated, more quickly and efficiently than the first time, though still with

[1] Bergsma to Van der Wijck 29 October 1896 and letters attached, Kol. Kab. Q^{18}, 6241; Snouck Hurgronje to Van der Wijck 13 July 1896, Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 205–14; Somer, p. 230; Idema, *Parlementaire Geschiedenis*, pp. 98–102.

[2] Panglima Polem Muhammad Daud (1879–1940) was placed under the guardianship of Teuku Muda Soloyman on the death of his father P. Polem Raja Kuala in 1891. He was declared of age in 1896, and became an important focus of Atjehnese resistance from then until his submission in September 1903. Thereafter he played a key part in the Dutch administration as Panglima Sagi of the XXII Mukims, a post he held until his death. Veltman, p. 70. J. Jongejans, *Land en Volk van Atjeh Vroeger en Nu* (Baarn, 1939), pp. 300–3.

substantial casualties. But experience had taught that it was easier to win the war than the peace. Throughout this period Snouck Hurgronje was urging upon the Governor-General the necessity of a consistent plan of pacification, the first essential of which should be an expedition to Pidië and perhaps beyond in order to deprive the war leaders of any place of refuge. Van der Wijck accepted the need for Snouck Hurgronje to exercise a more direct influence on the further development of Atjeh policy. The latter, however, was only willing to assume such a role in association with a governor both able and willing to carry out his policies. His own choice was Colonel J. B. van Heutsz,[1] an officer with whom he had frequently exchanged ideas about Atjeh policy since 1892. Van Heutsz was an energetic, impetuous soldier with unlimited confidence in his own capacity and that of his troops. In 1892, after three periods of distinguished service in Atjeh, he had published a brochure[2] arguing forcibly for a conquest of Atjeh Besar, which he claimed could be achieved in a year with no extra troops. The excessive optimism of this programme had not improved his already bad personal reputation with his superiors however, and it was only at Snouck Hurgronje's insistence that he was sent back to Atjeh with Vetter, to become column-commander at Indrapuri, responsible for the conquest of the XXII Mukims.

Van Heutsz's success in this capacity provided strong endorsement for Snouck's recommendation. In March 1898 Van der Wijck set the seal of official approval on the Snouck Hurgronje policy in three important pronouncements. The first authorized an expedition to attack and pursue the war leaders into Pidië, thus abandoning the old principle that the theatre of direct conquest and control should be limited to Atjeh Besar. Ten days later Snouck Hurgronje was given a new

[1] Joannes Benedictus van Heutsz (1851–1924) was sent to Indonesia as 2nd Lieutenant at the outbreak of the Atjeh war, and served in Atjeh 1874–6, 1879–81 and 1889–91, on the last occasion as Van Teijn's Chief of Staff. He returned from leave in 1895 to become regional commander of the East Coast of Sumatra, before being posted again to Atjeh as column-commander at Indrapuri in 1896. His energetic and remarkably successful governorship of Atjeh (1898–1904) finally earned him the viceroyalty (1904–9), where he helped lay the foundations of the ethical policy by extending his aggressive policy into all those parts of the archipelago to which the Netherlands had previously laid empty claim.

[2] 'De Onderwerping van Atjeh' *IMT* 1892, II, pp. 1065–90, and 1893, I, pp. 1–53 and 97–135.

title as Adviser for Native and Arab affairs, with instructions to spend as much time in Atjeh as he judged necessary for the formulation of policy there. Finally, Van Heutsz was named as Governor of Atjeh.[1]

A thorough programme of instructions for the Governor was now drawn up by Snouck Hurgronje, and minor changes made by Van Heutsz and the Governor-General.[2] The important new points were that no negotiations should be initiated with the Sultan's family or the *ulama*; that Teuku Uma and the other war leaders should be denied a safe place of resort anywhere in Atjeh; that the possession of firearms by any Atjehnese was illegal; and perhaps most important, that no houses should be burned by Dutch troops, nor any requisitions made without full payment. The punishment for clear non-cooperation with the *Kompeuni* would be a fine on the *ulèëbalang* or kampong concerned, to be carefully measured in terms of the victims' ability to pay.[3]

Finally on 8 April 1898, the Atjeh Government was officially informed that Snouck Hurgronje would assume a direct influence over the formulation of Atjeh policy, and that the Governor would co-operate with him in non-military matters.

These decisions inaugurated a substantial period of consistent

[1] Van der Maaten I, pp. 125–56. Somer, pp. 240–7. J. W. Naarding *Het Conflict Snouck Hurgronje—Van Heutsz—Van Daalen* (Utrecht, 1938), pp. 20–6. *ENI* I, p. 83. Snouck Hurgronje to Rooseboom 2 October 1903, Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 320–8.

[2] The share of responsibility for the successful conquest of Atjeh which should be given to Snouck Hurgronje and Van Heutsz respectively has been the subject of great controversy in Holland. Snouck Hurgronje's important role was naturally little publicized at the time, and the view that Van Heutsz was chiefly responsible for the successful policy was endorsed by the first volume of the official *Politiek Beleid en Bestuurszorg in de Buitenbezittingen* compiled by Colijn under Van Heutsz's viceroyalty in 1907. From the 1930's, however, this 'Van Heutsz-legend' was attacked by a number of old Atjeh hands, who all made use of Snouck Hurgronje's own papers: J.M. Somer, *De Korte Verklaring* (1934); H.T. Damsté, 'Drie Atjeh-mannen: Snouck Hurgronje-Van Heutsz-Van Daalen', in *Koloniaal Tijdschrift*, 1936–8; Naarding, op. cit. (1938); Van der Maaten, op. cit. (1948). The above account owes most to these later writers, though the present author is keenly aware that we must now beware of a 'Snouck Hurgronje legend', particularly as the vast quantity and the brilliant clarity of that scholar's published writing tempts the unwary to probe the question no further.

[3] See Snouck's draft instructions in Gobée and Adriaanse I, pp. 226–30, and Van Heutsz's version, based upon it, in Van der Maaten II, Appendix LXXIV.

action towards clear and well-thought-out objectives. They mark the beginning of the end of the Atjeh war. Starting from the decisive Pidië expedition and the conquest of Keumala in June 1898, Van Heutsz pursued Polem and Daud along the north coast as far as the Pasai district and even into the mountain fastness of Tangsé, behind Pidië. Uma was ambushed and killed near Meulaboh in February 1899, Sultan Daud submitted voluntarily in January 1903, and Panglima Polem the following September. By the end of 1903 a stable *ulèëbalang* administration had been brought under Dutch control and the remaining resistance, though still very strong, was fostered only by the *ulama*.

The success of Van Heutsz's expeditions owed much to the constant activity of Snouck Hurgronje. He was able to provide intelligent direction to the military sorties as a result of patient hours spent interrogating Atjehnese about the whereabouts of leaders. At the same time his authority was sufficient to curb the inclination of the military to resort to the old impatient tactics of burning and destroying which had negated most of Van der Heijden's conquests. He exerted himself to see that *ulèëbalangs* enjoyed under the Dutch as much dignity and influence as they had under the Sultan. His vigilance, and the system of fining *ulèëbalangs* for anti-Dutch activities in their districts, increasingly gave the secular *élite* a vested interest in stability under Dutch authority, and so drove deeper the wedge between them and the *ulama*.[1]

The Korte Verklaring

Until the 1898 Pidië expedition, the *ulèëbalangs* of the dependencies, unlike those of Atjeh Besar, had been regarded as self-governing princes in a contractual relationship with the Netherlands Indian Government. Since 1876 this relationship had been formally defined in a lengthy declaration of eighteen articles by each *ulèëbalang* who 'submitted'. It affirmed that his district was a part of Netherlands India, guarded against any unauthorized involvement with foreigners, and allowed for Dutch supervision of duties and other taxes if the occasion

[1] Van der Maaten I, pp. 165–216. Somer, pp. 248–50 and 232–3. *ENI* I, pp. 83–5.

arose. In Netherlands Indian Government usage this declaration identified the dependencies as 'self-governing districts' like Deli and Siak rather than as 'directly-governed territory' like most of Java, West Sumatra, and Atjeh Besar.[1] Despite some occasional hesitant exceptions in the interests of controlling Atjehnese trade, it was Dutch policy to apply the provisions for 'Native Powers' in Article III of the 1824 Treaty to all such districts in northern Sumatra, in order to avoid complications with Britain. In 1881 and 1891 governors of Atjeh had tried to remove this impediment to an effective *scheepvaartregeling* by declaring the dependencies directly governed components of Atjeh. On both occasions they had been overruled on the grounds that Britain would never agree to this.[2] The question of a permanent Dutch administration in the dependencies, therefore, like the *scheepvaartregeling* itself, involved a departure from the traditional timidity towards the neighbour across the Straits.

Van Heutsz and Snouck Hurgronje raised this issue at the beginning of the Pidië expedition in June 1898. Their views, expanded in a letter of 12 November 1898, were that a clear break should be made with the lengthy declarations of the past. The *ulèëbalangs* themselves had never shown any interest in the terms of these declarations, regarding them merely as tokens of submission to be ignored in practice as far as Dutch weakness would allow. In future, the duumvirate recommended, the *ulèëbalangs* should be required to state only that they were subject to the Netherlands Indian Government and would obey all its instructions. The whole of Atjeh should be considered as directly-ruled territory, and Van Swieten's mistake in originally separating the dependencies as autonomous units should at last be put right.

Van der Wijck was in fundamental agreement, though he rejected classifying the dependencies as directly ruled, mainly on economic grounds.[3] It was in The Hague that the diplomatic

[1] This distinction was historical rather than functional, and was very difficult to define in precise terms. See R. Emerson *Malaysia. A Study in Direct and Indirect Rule* (New York, 1937), pp. 409–41.

[2] Somer, p. 257.

[3] Somer, p. 276, quoting Van der Wijck's letter of 1 January 1899; though Emerson, p. 388, considered that fear of the British reaction was a major motive.

issue loomed largest. Officials feared that such a radical change would arouse protests from the Foreign Office, to which the declarations of Atjehnese *ulèëbalangs* had been forwarded since 1884 in fulfilment of Article III of the 1824 Treaty. But J. T. Cremer, the Deli tobacco magnate of the 1880's, now held the Colonial portfolio in the Liberal Ministry. He knew from experience that it was the substance rather than the form of Dutch rule in Sumatra which had annoyed Straits interests in the past. If the *scheepvaartregeling* could be applied since 1893 in clear contradiction to the 1824 Treaty there was no danger in the new proposals. Cremer telegraphed approval on 19 March 1899, with the rather unnecessary proviso that the specific renunciation of relations with foreign powers would be maintained in a new *Korte Verklaring* (short declaration).[1]

Aftermath

This recognition of realities may be taken as the last act of the drama with which we are here directly concerned. It marked the final renunciation of the over-concern with the Straits Settlements which had cramped Dutch policy for so long. At the same time the *Korte Verklaring* raised the curtain on a new drama involving all Indonesia. The 'Atjeh school', as Snouck Hurgronje, Van Heutsz and their leading associates became known, had apparently proved that attack was the best means of defence; that it was easier to rule a whole than a part. As a result of their energetic policy Atjeh gradually ceased to be the agonizing wound of the Indonesian body politic. The effect of this achievement on Dutch colonial policy as a whole cannot be overrated. Under the Anti-Revolutionary (Calvinist) Government of 1902–5 the 'Atjeh school' was rewarded with the key posts throughout the colonial establishment.[2] Its programme was based on the surmise that Dutch

[1] Somer, pp. 252–88. Van der Maaten I, pp. 227–38.

[2] The Colonial Ministry went to A. W. F. Idenburg, who had been at military headquarters in Batavia until 1901. In 1904 he appointed Van Heutsz Governor-General after a series of discussions in The Hague about policy towards the 'outer islands' in particular. These discussions also involved Hendrik Colijn, one of the most successful military administrators in Atjeh under Van Heutsz, and a member of the Anti-Revolutionary Party. Colijn joined the General Secretariat in Batavia with special responsibility for formulating policy towards the outer islands. Even after Van Heutsz's

power had first to be unchallengeably established in every part of Indonesia before a start could made in the reformation of Indonesian society which was the aspiration of 'ethici' and liberals alike. Within remarkably few years Van Heutsz's troops asserted Dutch power in almost every state which had previously enjoyed the autonomy of a token submission to Batavia. A diverse and colourful array of traditional rulers were forced to sign the *Korte Verklaring* and to accept a position where they were incapable of exercising any effective power independent of the Dutch administration. For good or ill, the basis was laid of a colony governed direct from the centre—a potential nation.

The beneficence of this energetic policy is less clearly apparent to a sceptical post-colonial generation than it was to grateful Dutch contemporaries. In the particular case of Atjeh, it is proper at least to question the unanimous praise which Dutch historians have accorded the Snouck Hurgronje-Van Heutsz policy in contrast to its forerunners. The greater success of these men in contrast with Van der Heijden owed something, at least, to the intervening period of passivity on which history has passed such a negative verdict. In the years between 1884 and 1896 the Netherlands Indian economy had grown immeasurably stronger, and the army, in which Indonesian soldiers came to form the major part during the 1890's, had recovered from a state of near collapse. And though the *concentratie-stelsel* gave the Atjehnese no reason to favour or respect the alien invaders, it was certainly more successful than earlier systems in demonstrating that life with the *Kompeuni* could be tolerable. It seems fair to surmise that the progress made in this direction helped to dull *ulèëbalang* resistance to Van Heutsz's troops.

Despite the hopes of its designers, the policy of conquest proved irreconcilable with the development of the Atjehnese economy. Pre-war levels of pepper-production had been nearly maintained during the first twenty years of the war, even though Atjeh lost its place as the major world supplier. At the end of the century production fell away drastically and never

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departure in 1909 Idenburg succeeded him as Viceroy while Colijn began his brilliant political career in Holland. Snouck Hurgronje meanwhile exercised an enormous influence both inside official circles and beyond them.

revived.[1] Pepper disease and soil exhaustion were factors in this decline. But it is difficult to believe that the main cause was not the extension of the war to the dependencies and the greater difficulty which the *scheepvaartregeling* placed in the way of marketing. Higher export duties were also imposed on many dependencies to pay for Van Heutsz's expeditions against them.[2] Betelnut fared better, but it was many years before the staple crop, rice, returned to its pre-war levels.[3]

Although a remarkable feat of conquest had been achieved by the end of the Snouck Hurgronje-Van Heutsz partnership in 1903, the positive pacification of Atjeh had barely begun. The *ulama* still taught almost universally the virtues of resistance to Dutch rule, to western ideas, and to the traitor *ulèëbalang* class. Their alienation from the Dutch regime was only intensified by the policies of Snouck Hurgronje. Under Governors Van der Wijck (1904–5), Van Daalen (1905–8), and Swart (1908–18) the battle was continued against the most aggressive of them. Only when the *maréchaussée* pursued and killed several of the leading descendents of Teungku Tiro near Tangsé in 1910–12 did the *ulama* give up the guerrilla war. For the first time the annual death toll dropped below a hundred, and the Dutch occupying force could be substantially reduced.[4]

Bitterness remained. It found expression not only in the constant isolated attacks on Europeans, but in the negative *kafir*-hate which remained so marked a feature of religious teaching in Atjeh. Only in its last few years did Dutch rule begin to win the acceptance accorded to it in other parts of Indonesia. Even so the Japanese were welcomed in 1942 by

[1] See Table 2 in Appendix 3. During most of the nineteenth century Atjeh had continued to dominate the world supply by expanding its own production in response to price increases. During the war there were three periods of exceptionally high prices: 1871–5; 1881–9; and 1897–1900. During each of these periods production expanded rapidly elsewhere while Atjeh was unable to keep up. As a result of increasing production in Johor and South Sumatra, and later also in Sarawak, the pepper passing through Singapore exceeded Atjeh's crop for the first time in 1872, and went further ahead in the 1880's. In the twentieth century Atjeh was never an important source of pepper.

[2] Van der Maaten I, pp. 178–9.

[3] Jongejans, pp. 167–88.

[4] Ibid. pp. 343–53; Du Croo, pp. 125–74. See Appendix 4 below.

most Atjehnese but especially the *ulama*.[1] Nor did the antagonism between secular and religious leadership end with independence. The *ulèëbalang* class received its quietus in 1946 and a new left-wing secular leadership in 1966, but the end is not yet. Half a century of fitful peace has not sufficed to heal the wounds of an agonizing war.

[1] A. J. Piekaar *Atjèh en de Oorlog met Japan* (The Hague/Bandung, 1949).

Retrospect

The concern of the foregoing pages has been the special problem created by the division of commercial and political power in North Sumatra in a period of imperial expansion.

To Britain, North Sumatra was important because it was the mainstay of the commercial prosperity of Penang, and because in the hands of a strong Power it could have commanded the strategic Malacca Straits. At the beginning of our period, British policy was still opposed to any coherent political authority in the Malay states surrounding the Straits Settlements, because commercial freedom and competition were in the interests of the Straits trade. But the faith of the Foreign Office in this doctrine was weakening, especially in view of the steady liberalization of Dutch commercial policy. In the 1860's London's protests were neither firm nor immediate enough to prevent Holland's advance in the East Coast of Sumatra. The increasing interest of more dangerous Powers in the area made it seem desirable that Holland should be allowed effectively to occupy the island which the 1824 Treaty had seen as its 'sphere of influence'. Whitehall therefore entered into the 1871 Sumatra Treaty.

Had all Sumatra resembled its East Coast, this new British policy would have been a great success. From Britain's point of view the East Coast of Sumatra was a model foreign colony. Though administration was a charge on the Dutch, no restrictions were placed on British trade or investment. By 1929 British capital in the plantations of this district had reached f. 124 million, almost as much as in the whole of Java.[1] Although not bound to do so by the letter of the 1871 Treaty, Holland in fact accepted the area covered by that treaty as one where it

[1] Furnivall, *Netherlands India*, p. 311.

should do nothing to limit the complete freedom of commerce existing before the Dutch annexation. Whereas in every other Residency of Netherlands India only one or two ports were open to foreign trade, customs posts were installed at all the twenty-one tiny ports of the East Coast of Sumatra to cater for merchants from the Straits.[1] Until 1886 British ships monopolized the busy traffic across the Straits. With the exception of some Deli tobacco taken to Batavia after 1891, all the imports and exports of this district passed through Penang or Singapore until the 1920's, when Belawan was developed as an international port.[2]

But as Britain should have known, Atjeh was very different from the scattered river-*kampongs* of the East Coast which had never offered serious resistance to any conqueror. As Francis Light, Raffles, and many later British authorities in the Straits Settlements had discovered, Atjeh's long history as an independent state was founded on a national pride and warlike spirit unmatched in the Archipelago. Nothing was done to make use of this experience. Largely as a result of a change of personalities and policies in the Straits Settlements after 1867, Britain took no interest in the means by which Dutch authority was extended to Atjeh until it was too late. The Treaty was therefore a disservice to both British and Dutch interests. It was a much greater disservice to the Atjehnese, to whom Britain was obliged by a century of close commercial contact as well as by a specific treaty.

Nevertheless, there was little in Dutch history to suggest as complete a failure of policy as occurred in 1873. Atjeh's position in Netherlands colonial history is unique and crucial.

The maintenance of Netherlands supremacy in South-East Asia had always been closely linked to national prestige. In Dutch eyes the Treaty of 1824 had clearly fixed the limits of Holland's 'sphere of influence' as those of the Malay Archipelago, including all Sumatra. Successive governments were extremely cautious about the extension of effective Dutch responsibility to any part of this sphere except Java, but it was held to be of the utmost importance that no other colonial

[1] Schadee, *Geschiedenis van Sumatra's Oostkust*, II, pp. 237–8.

[2] Ibid. II, pp. 48–50 and 237–44. Hyde *Blue Funnel*, p. 51. Penang and Singapore reports in *Cons. Versl.* 1876–92.

Power should obtain a footing in it. Events in the middle of the century, however, particularly in Borneo, demonstrated that foreign Powers would no longer be deterred by an empty claim to hegemony which was ignored by the real rulers of the various states. It therefore became important to obtain more explicit treaties excluding other Powers.

Atjeh was the only state in this Dutch 'sphere' over which Holland had at no time had any claim by virtue of some local treaty. The 1824 Treaty explicitly forbade any Dutch authority over it. Moreover the usual process of peaceful penetration through trade was excluded there by the entrenched position of British, French and American merchants. Relations between Batavia and Banda Atjeh were dominated by the unfriendly exchanges resulting from Holland's advances at Atjeh's expense. An attitude arose in Batavia that war with Atjeh was inevitable. After the 1871 Treaty Dutch leaders wished to delay no longer lest other Powers be provoked to intervene. Fear of eventual foreign intervention was therefore the main motive for the war, but the immediate scare of February 1873 appears to have been manufactured by Loudon and Read, or at least greatly exaggerated, in order to induce a war mood.

The disastrous first expedition, and the second expedition which national prestige then demanded, placed the Dutch in an acute dilemma. They were committed to the permanent occupation of the tiny area they had conquered but lacked all influence on the Atjehnese, whom they had united against them almost to a man. Van Swieten's arbitrary 'annexation' of Atjeh and the rigidity with which this was upheld by his Government made a satisfactory solution impossible. The position of the most realistic Atjehnese leaders became untenable as a result of Holland's long refusal to negotiate. By the late 1880's, when the Dutch did seek a negotiated solution, there was no longer a responsible national leadership in Atjeh. Thus the only feasible alternatives were withdrawal or complete conquest.

The first was ruled out by Dutch fear of the reaction in other parts of their empire. The second was long delayed by financial and military weakness, reinforced by the traditional aversion in high places to extensive military and administrative responsibilities. The Dutch colonial empire, to a greater extent than the British, had been built up by diplomacy and naval power

rather than by strength of the army. The nineteenth century, in particular, had seen Dutch resources strained to breaking point by reluctantly undertaken wars in Java and West Sumatra. This reinforced the official doctrine that extensive colonial responsibilities should be avoided. The British in India, who shared this official doctrine at the time, could afford to interpret it more freely on the spot. Their army of 200,000 men dwarfed the Netherlands Indian force of about 30,000. It is significant that while British Malayan officials urged compromise and moderation in Atjeh, military men with Indian experience were always puzzled by Holland's failure to carry through a thorough conquest.[1] The Dutch were both too rigid for negotiation and too cautious to find a solution by force.

For twenty-five years Atjeh was the focus of the debate between those, mainly in Holland, who wanted to continue the cautious policy of abstention in the 'outer islands' and those, chiefly in the Indies, who sought a more assertive policy. The intense public interest in the matter limited the freedom usually given to the Governor-General. Dutch ministers were individually responsible to the States-General, and came in for attack at least once a year when their separate budget was debated. Moreover the Minister of Colonies was almost always a specialist with Indonesian experience, whose factual knowledge was as great as that of his scanty permanent staff. The Minister himself usually initiated policy, which therefore lacked the continuity given to British policy by permanent officials. Atjeh policy tended to change with each Colonial Minister, and there were seventeen of them between 1873 and 1898. But the importance of Atjeh in Dutch politics ensured that the solution eventually found to that problem was applied throughout the Netherlands empire.

Holland's reaction to British protests was a symptom of its nineteenth-century insistence on sovereignty, as essential to

[1] Major Lockhart, see Lavino to Van Lansberge 11 November 1875, Cons. Penang 102. Captain Bickford, see Lavino to Willebois 11 July 1884, Cons. Penang 14. Captain Macleod, to Fremantle 2 December 1893, copy Admiralty to F.O. 24 January 1894, F.O. 37/824. The same contrast between British Indian and Dutch methods emerges in the interesting study of J. C. A. Bannink, 'De verovering en pacificatie van Atjeh, vergeleken met de geschiedenis van Britsch-Birma', *IG* 35 (1913), Part I, pp. 145–75 and 284–322.

prestige, but not on power. Every suggestion of mediation was rejected with horror, yet for most of the war British protests over the blockade were treated with the greatest respect. This policy was dictated by colonial interests. In complete contrast to its British counterpart, the Netherlands Foreign Ministry never played an important role in decision-making. The Straits Government could certainly have made Holland's task in Atjeh much more difficult had it been seriously provoked into doing so. Yet the importance of avoiding hostile reactions among Straits merchants was for long exaggerated by Dutch statesmen because it suited their traditional and economical policy of non-interference.

In reality the Chinese and Indian traders of Penang who were really hurt by Dutch naval action pulled very little weight in British councils. With the many influential supporters of protest in Singapore and London it was political and humanitarian motives rather than commercial ones which were important. Governors Clarke, Weld, Smith, and Mitchell in particular supported and often encouraged commercial protests to try to end what they considered the pointless and brutal conduct of the Dutch in Atjeh. The Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1874 replied to Clarke's appeal for a mediation offer with the words: 'I need not say that it would be a great satisfaction to me to see an end put to the unnecessary bloodshed of the present hostilities but I should be glad to have evidence that British interests are suffering from the state of things.'[1] Had Holland imposed a rational regulation of trade, or even a total blockade, as part of a consistent and convincing attempt to end the war, British protests would probably have been short-lived and insubstantial.

The importance of the last phase of the war in Dutch colonial history has drawn the attention of most historians to that period in particular. This has given undue emphasis to the view fostered by Snouck Hurgronje and his contemporaries, that the Atjehnese were a fanatical, anarchic, and treacherous people with whom little could be done until a rule of force was established. What truth there was in this view was the result of two decades of warfare. For centuries the Atjehnese had proved their ability in commerce and agriculture, as well as in war.

[1] Carnarvon to Clarke 16 August 1874, private, P.R.O. 30/6/40.

And during the first years of its struggle with Holland Atjeh showed itself worthy of the considerable sympathy it obtained from Europeans as well as Muslims in many parts of the world. It also contributed, despite itself, to the growth of wider loyalties in Indonesia.

Appendix 1

The Last (Bugis) Dynasty of Atjeh

1	1727	Ala'ad-din Ahmad Shah		
2	1735	Ala'ad-din Johan Shah	Son of **1**	
3	1760	Mahmud Shah	Son of **2**	Overthrown
4	1764	Badr ad-din Johan Shah		Killed
3	1765	Mahmud Shah (restored)		
5	1773	Sulaiman Shah (Udahna Lela)		
3	1773	Mahmud Shah (restored)		
6	1781	Ala'ad-din Muhammad Shah	Son of **3**	
7	1795	Ala'ad-din Jauhar al-Alam Ward of **5** until 1802. Contested by Sharif Saif al-Alam 1815–23.	Son of **6**	
8	1823	Muhammad Shah	Son of **7**	
9	1838	Sulaiman Ward of **10** until 1850. Contested by **10**, 1850–7.	Son of **8**	
10	1857	Ali Ala'ad-din Mansur Shah (Ibrahim)	Son of **7**	
11	1870	Mahmud Shah	Son of **9**	
12	1874	Muhammad Daud Shah Ward of Tuanku Hashim until 1884. Submitted to Dutch and renounced throne 1903.	Grandson of **10**	

Netherlands Authorities in Atjeh

December 1873	General J. van Swieten	Government Commissioner and Military Commander
April 1874	Col. (later Gen.) J. L. J. H. Pel	Military and Civil Commander
February 1876	Gen. Wiggers van Kerchem	//
November 1876	Gen. A. J. E. Diemont	//
June 1877	Col. (later Gen.) K. van der Heijden[1]	//
April 1881	A. Pruys van der Hoeven	Civil Governor
March 1883	P. F. Laging Tobias	//
September 1884	Col. H. Demmeni	Civil and Military Governor
December 1886	Col. (later Gen.) H. K. F. van Teijn	//
May 1891	Col. F. Pompe van Meerdervoort	//
January 1892	Col. C. Deijkerhoff	//
April 1896	Gen. J. A. Vetter	Government Commissioner

[1] and Governor, from January 1878.

July 1896	Col. J. W. Stemfoort	Acting Governor
November 1896	Col. C. P. J. van Vliet	Civil and Military Governor
May 1898	Col. (later Gen.) J. B. van Heutsz	//
May 1904	Gen. J. C. van der Wijck	//
May 1905	Col. (later Gen.) C. E. van Daalen	//
May 1908	Col. (later Gen.) H. N. A. Swart (until 1918)	//

Appendix 2

Sumatra Treaty of 2 November 1871 between Great Britain and the Netherlands

Article I

Her Britannic Majesty desists from all objections against the extension of the Netherland Dominion in any part of the island of Sumatra, and consequently from the reserve in that respect contained in the notes exchanged by the Netherland and British Plenipotentiaries at the conclusion of the treaty of 17 March 1824.

Article II

His Majesty the King of the Netherlands declares, that in the Kingdom of Siac Srie Indrapoora and its dependencies as it is defined in the compact concluded by the Netherland Indian Government with that Kingdom on the 1st of February 1858, the trade of British subjects and the British navigation shall continue to enjoy all the rights and advantages that are or may be granted there to the trade of Netherland subjects and to the Netherland navigation, and further that the same assimilation shall be granted to the trade of British subjects and to the British navigation in any other native State of the Island of Sumatra that may hereafter become dependent on the Crown of the Netherlands, provided always that British subjects conform themselves to the laws and regulations of the Netherland Government.

Article III

The stipulations of the preceding article shall not interfere with the distinction established by the Netherland Indian laws and regulations between individuals of Western and individuals of Eastern extraction, nor with the application of the stipulations of the convention of 27 March 1851.

ARTICLE IV

The present convention shall be ratified as soon as possible and shall remain without force or effect until it has received, as far as shall be required, the approval of the States-General.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have signed the same and have affixed thereto the seal of their arms.

Done at The Hague the second day of November in the year of Our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one.

(signed) L. Gericke Van Bosse E. A. J. Harris

Appendix 3

Statistics of Trade

Although considerable trouble has been taken to obtain accurate statistics of the trade between Penang and Sumatra, these must reflect the inadequacy of the sources.

The figures for the years before 1850 in Table 1 are derived from T. Braddell *Statistics of the British Possessions in the Straits Settlements* (Penang, 1861); Cowan 'Early Penang', *JMBRAS* 23 (1950), Part 2, pp. 153–7 and 197; T. J. Newbold *Political and Statistical Account of the British Settlements in the Straits of Malacca* (London, 1839), Vol. I, pp. 79–83; and a report on 'Oriental Commerce' by John MacGregor, in P.P. 1847–8, 61, pp. 734–6. The later figures in both tables are taken from the Statistical Tables for the Colonies in various volumes of the Parliamentary Papers; the Penang Consular reports in the *Verzameling van Consulaire en andere Verslagen en Berigten* 1875–1898; a table in Maier to Willebois 11 March 1875, B.Z. Atjeh; and a document entitled 'Tabular Statements of the Commerce and Shipping of Prince of Wales' Island, Singapore and Malacca, 1853–4; 1854–5; 1857–8; 1862–3; 1867–8' (C.S.B. 184 in British Museum State Paper Room). With the exception of the reasonably reliable statistics of Penang exports to Atjeh collected by the Dutch Consulate in Penang (final column, table 2), all these figures are derived ultimately from the Penang Harbourmaster's Office, and share its defects. Penang was a free port, there was no way of obliging traders to declare the correct value of their goods, and the tendency of traders was always to underestimate out of fear that some tax might be levied. In 1883 the Chamber of Commerce began to provide figures because of dissatisfaction with previous methods. The result was a rise of about 40 per cent. in all the figures in that year (*Cons. Versl.* 1884, pp. 861–74). Again in 1894 there was a sudden jump in all figures because more care was taken with their collection (ibid. 1895, Vol. I, p. 519).

Official accounts were kept in Sicca Rupees until about 1840, in Company Rupees thereafter until 1867, and in dollars from 1868, though the figures were usually converted into pounds sterling for the Parliamentary Papers. For consistency I have converted all figures back to Spanish/Mexican dollars, in which they were originally recorded. Until 1867 a dollar was held to equal 2.1 Sicca Rupees or 2.2 Company Rupees, and Rupees of either sort were converted at 10 to the pound. Thereafter I have taken the dollar to equal 4s. 3d. in 1868–79, 3s. 9d. in 1879–81, and 3s. 7d. in 1882–4. From 1885 the Parliamentary Papers give the figures in dollars, although the value of the silver dollars in terms of sterling continued to drop to a level of 1s. 11d. in 1898. Dollars were also official currency in Atjeh until 1900.

The approximate total value of Penang's imports from Atjeh (column 5 in Table 2) is calculated by subtracting the value of tobacco, almost all of which came from the East Coast of Sumatra, from Penang's total imports from Sumatra. This is of course extremely rough, ignoring as it does the small amounts of pepper, rattan, gutta-percha, etc. exported from the East Coast of Sumatra. However it provides a useful corrective to column 1 of Table 1, in which the biggest fluctuations are caused by Deli tobacco, which was merely transshipped at Penang. This method is no longer useful after 1890, as there is a greater diversity of products in the East Coast of Sumatra.

Table 1

TRADE OF PENANG WITH VARIOUS AREAS 1829–1905
in thousands of dollars

Year ending	SUMATRA			MALAY PENINSULA	SIAM	TOTAL
30 April	Imports	Exports	Total	Total	Total	Total
1829	483	588	1,071	170	130	4,941
1837	856	686	1,542	247	354	6,369
1845	371	547	918	69	345	4,902
1854	790	943	1,733	572		8,872
1858	1,517	1,879	3,396			14,376
1862	1,001	1,471	2,472	1,413		16,932
1864	997	1,935	2,932	1,466	2,293	19,492
1866	805	2,237	3,042	1,193	1,971	19,568
Calendar Year						
1868	1,338	1,822	3,160	1,388	1,777	17,526
1869	1,761	2,435	4,196	2,161	2,689	20,437
1870	2,221	2,392	4,613	2,760	3,525	27,097
1871	3,425	3,157	6,582	3,599	4,176	34,209
1872	3,263	3,277	6,540	4,120	5,669	37,215
1873	3,556	2,970	6,526	1,356	6,253	27,288
1874	3,734	4,430	8,164	2,050	5,628	36,007
1875	3,584	5,463	9,047	2,319	4,710	35,382
1876	2,446	5,948	8,394	1,874	4,074	32,451
1877	3,200	6,371	9,571	1,732	3,601	38,479
1878	3,214	8,927	12,141	2,172	3,554	43,872
1879	3,411	7,843	11,254	2,741	2,748	43,423
1880	2,222	5,093	7,315	3,494	3,351	39,562
1881	1,787	3,976	5,763	6,805		36,501
1882	2,163	4,613	6,776	10,420		49,428
1883	4,427	5,693	10,120	14,980		66,417
1884	5,134	8,551	13,685	14,320		67,347
1885	5,817	7,653	13,470	8,452	5,308	69,107
1886	7,774	8,490	16,264	11,072	5,687	81,407
1887	5,342	10,015	15,357	13,867	6,058	88,659
1888	5,154	10,414	15,568	14,146	5,843	92,553
1889	3,431	10,128	13,559	15,021	5,946	85,015
1890	3,832	7,826	11,658	14,783	5,689	85,138
1891	3,031	8,983	12,014	15,804	4,243	81,778
1892	3,117	8,257	11,374	18,268	5,098	85,096
1893	3,316	7,772	11,088	20,451	5,009	87,604
1894	4,133	7,977	12,110	22,131	5,068	105,869
1895	3,325	9,698	13,023	22,205	5,257	99,156
1896	3,522	9,946	13,468	22,150	4,852	100,964
1897	4,803	10,324	15,125	17,317	3,922	99,355
1899	5,405	7,448	12,853	27,780	6,640	130,503
1905	5,530	6,940	12,417	48,105	11,102	172,728

Table 2

TRADE OF PENANG WITH ATJEH

Year	Imports from Atjeh PEPPER Quantity (piculs)	Price p. picul	BETELNUT Quantity (piculs)	Price p. picul	EST. TOTAL VALUE ($,000)	Exports to Atjeh PIECE GOODS Quantity[2] (pieces)
1868	114,400[1]	$ 5.2	79,700[1]	$1.9		509,300[1]
1869	113,900[1]	6.8	93,700[1]	1.7		606,100[1]
1870	141,200[1]	8.2	84,700[1]	1.4	2,241	692,500[1]
1871	170,900[1]	13.5	82,800[1]	1.5	3,345	618,400[1]
1872	141,900	11.6	50,400[1]	2.5	2,906	507,900[1]
1873	105,700	13.5	42,500[1]	3.3	2,590	533,900[1]
1874	96,400	12.5	114,800	2.8	2,609	785,500
1875	164,400	10.1	69,300	2.2	3,229	628,500
1876	55,100	7.9	73,000		1,747	282,500
1877	155,600	7.2	63,500		1,762	281,700
1878	133,800	6.8	53,700		1,731	247,100
1879	95,900	7.8	74,600	5.5	1,876	209,800
1880	91,500	9.3	100,300	3.2	1,909	202,800
1881	107,100	11.2	69,800	2.8	1,500	210,000
1882	106,100	12.4	65,100		1,657	214,500
1883	122,100	14.7	94,800		2,820	215,200
1884	105,500	16.3	46,900		3,334	387,200
1885	122,300	18.5	38,600		3,543	419,000
1886	145,500	20.0	79,800		3,320	280,600
1887	134,900	20.6	62,300		3,952	311,600
1888	131,300	21.3	93,700	3.7	4,434	266,900
1889	140,400	15.0	65,500	4.2	3,223	171,200
1890	130,700	10.0	17,500	4.8		155,200
1891	159,500	9.8	35,600	3.7		191,400
1892	176,000	8.5	13,000	3.1		210,300
1893	157,500	8.6	63,700	3.1		176,900
1894	194,100	8.0	104,800	3.8		156,300
1895	131,400	8.5	85,300	3.4		306,500
1896	119,200	9.6	91,700[1]	3.1		
1897	70,900[1]	14.5	95,700[1]	3.7		
1899	84,900[1]	23.0	147,600[1]	5.6		
1900–13	65,000 (average)					

[1] The figures indicated refer to all Sumatra. Almost all Sumatra betelnut was imported from Atjeh, but in the case of pepper about 15,000 piculs p.a. in 1868–71 and 12,000 piculs p.a. in 1897–9 probably came from the East Coast of Sumatra. A proportion of the piece goods exports before 1874 must also have been destined for the East Coast of Sumatra, but the figures there are in any case a substantial underestimate.

[2] Silks are included with cottons in this list, but they form a tiny and decreasing proportion of the whole.

Appendix 4

Statistics of Dutch Occupation of Atjeh 1873–1914[1]

	Average Military Strength	Killed or Died of Wounds	Died of Disease or Fatigue	Wounded	Estimated Atjehnese Killed	Estimated Expense
1st Exp. (Apr. 1873)	3,360	75	7	371	900	
2nd. Exp. (to 20 Apr. 1874)	8,500	115	1,274			f.45m.
20 Apr.–Dec. 1874	4,000	43	859	355		
1875	5,220	61	1,316	366		
1876	8,950	226	1,398	672		f.18m.
1877	9,420	107	944	n.a.		f.18m.
1878	10,455	126	778	n.a.		f.18m.
1879	10,500	89	n.a.	n.a.		f.18m.
1880–4	6,500	217	1,400	790		f.7m. p.a.
1885–92	6,000	258	3,169	916		f.7m. p.a.
1893–5	5,800	15	n.a.	188		n.a.
1896–7	8,250	253	n.a.	1,286		n.a.
1898–1903	7,300	334	n.a.	1,926	9,300	n.a.
1904–7	6,500	259	n.a.	1,093	11,187	n.a.
1908–14	6,000	89	n.a.	836	3,320	n.a.

[1] Taken from Kielstra, Kreemer, Van der Maaten, Kruisheer, *ENI*, and the reports of the Minister of Colonies to the States-General. The figures of those killed in the period 1875–96 are taken from the roll of honour in the Dutch cemetery at Banda Atjeh, which gives a higher total than the figures officially released in Holland.

Glossary

I *Malay/Atjehnese terms*

adat	tradition, customary law
bahar	measure of weight (=3 *piculs*)
chap sikureuëng	nine-fold seal of the Sultans of Atjeh
dalam	royal enclosure of the Sultans of Atjeh
deah	Atjehnese religious school of the highest level
firman[1]	imperial instruction
habib[2]	honorific adopted by some sayyids
hak sabil	religious tax intended to meet expenses of a holy war
hasil raja	portion of local revenues paid to Sultan as tribute
hukom[2]	law, especially religious law
jihad[2]	holy war
kafir[2]	non-believer
kampong	village
Kompeuni	Government of Netherlands India (from 'Company')
kramat	sacred grave
kraton	palace of rulers and regents in Java. Wrongly applied to the Atjehnese *dalam* by the Dutch
masjid	mosque
mejidie[1]	a royal decoration
meunassah	communal hall in Atjeh where young men sleep
padri	Minangkabau Sect of militant Muslim reformers, early nineteenth century
perang	war
perang sabil	holy war

[1] Turkish words
[2] Words of Arabic derivation

picul	measure of weight (=133 pounds)
prahu	small Indonesian sailing vessel
sagi	one of three territorial divisions of Atjeh Besar
sawah	wet-rice field
sayyid[2]	honorific for one claiming descent from the Prophet
Shaikh[2]	honorific given to important Arabs
suku	tribal division in Minangkabau and some Malay states
Tengku	title of *ulèëbalangs* in eastern Atjeh, and Malays of noble blood
Teuku	title for members of *ulèëbalang* families in remainder of Atjeh
Teungku	title for distinguished *ulama* in Atjeh
Tuanku	title for close descendents of Sultans of Atjeh. Among Malays a royal title
ulama[2]	religious teachers and scholars (lit: plural of *'alim*, learned)
ulèëbalang	district chief in Atjeh
zakat[2]	obligatory religious tax on property

II *Dutch terms*

concentratie-stelsel	concentration system. Defensive position in Atjeh 1885–96
controleur	Dutch administrative official of the lowest rank
cultuurstelsel	cultivation system. System of forced deliveries of agricultural produce adopted in Java from 1830 to about 1870
korte verklaring	short declaration. Form of submission demanded of Indonesian rulers from 1898
maatschappij	company (abbreviated *mij.*)
maréchaussée	mobile special police, often on horseback
Raad van Indië	Council of India. Advisory council for Governor General in Batavia
Raad van State	Council of State. Advisory Council for King
scheepvaartregeling	shipping regulation

Bibliography

I Manuscript Sources

A Algemeen Rijksarchief, The Hague and Schaarsbergen.

1. *Records of the Netherlands Ministry of Colonies.*

The records for the period 1850–1900 are held in a depository at Schaarsbergen, near Arnhem. Though isolated documents can be sent to The Hague, any extensive study must be made at Schaarsbergen.

All Colonial documents fall into one of three 'archives'—*Openbare* (public), *Geheim* (secret), or *Kabinet*. The *Openbare* is much the largest, and together with its indexes it fills dossiers 1–5815. It is, however, the least important since it deals with routine matters unrelated to policy decisions.

The *Geheim-archief* was originally designed to include letters bearing on important matters of policy, and the *Kabinets-archief* only those letters of personal interest to the Minister. This division could not be sustained. The *Kabinet* file held very few documents in the 1850's, but gradually expanded thereafter until it absorbed the *Geheim* series altogether in 1870. For the purpose of the present study, therefore, the *Kabinets-archief* is much the most important. The *Kabinets-archief* fills dossiers 5942–6270 and the *Geheim-archief* (1850 to 1869) dossiers 5816–5941.

Outgoing despatches of the Ministry in the *Kabinet* series were each given a letter. Thus the chronological sequence in any one year would follow the pattern A, B, C, . . . Z, A^1, B^1, . . . Z^1, A^2, B^2, etc. *Geheim* despatches on the other hand were simply numbered in chronological order. When the two series were amalgamated in 1870 all despatches carried letters as in the *Kabinet* series, though some despatches classified as *Kabinet Geheim* were also given a number—e.g. $K^{14}/314$. These additional numbers do not help to locate the document, and I have not used them in references. The letters, however, are essential. Incoming despatches from Batavia, the Foreign Ministry, or some other source were enclosed for reference in the relevant draft outgoing despatch and indexed under its letter. Although all the bundles so formed have now been organized in a regular series of dossiers, all indexes still refer only to the letter of the outgoing despatch which closed each file. In footnotes I have given the letter of the covering outgoing despatch, followed by the number of the dossier.

The amount of material in the *Kabinets-archief* relating to the Atjeh war in particular is enormous. One particularly valuable dossier is number 6572, entitled *Overzicht van de Stukken rakende de zaken van Atjeh 1874–1916.* This is a summary compiled in the Min-

istry of the regular reports from the Governor or Commander in Atjeh.

The following dossiers were also used in this study:

Openbare Verbalen
1863: 1344, 1356, 1359, 1362.
1864: 1434.
Geheim-archief
1861: 5914, 5916.
1864: 5926–7.
1868: 5938.
Kabinets-archief
1862: 5959.
1863: 5964–5.
1864: 5967, 5969, 5970–1.
1865: 5980.
1866: 5981, 5985.
1867: 5994.
1868: 5998, 6000.
1873: 6039–41.
1874: 6044–5, 6047, 6049–50, 6052–3.
1878: 6107.
1879: 6119–21.
1881: 6134.
1882: 6139.
1883: 6144–5, 6148.
1884: 6149–56.
1885: 6158–9, 6161–3.
1886: 6166, 6168–9.
1887: 6170–1, 6174, 6176.
1888: 6178, 6180, 6182, 6184–5.
1889: 6186–7.
1890: 6195–9.
1891: 6203–5.
1892: 6206–7, 6212–5.
1893: 6217–9, 6221–3.
1894: 6224, 6226–7.
1896: 6236–7, 6239, 6241.
1897: 6253.

Indexes, etc.
Subject Index, *Geheim* and *Kabinet*, 1850–69: dossiers 6299–6317.
Agendas, *Geheim*, 1850–69: dossiers 6271–89.
Agendas, *Kabinet*, 1850–69: dossiers 6290–8.
Agendas, *Kabinet*, 1870–1900: dossiers 6318–48.

2. *Records of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry, 1850–70*

Dossier 3076: The Relations of Indonesian states with Foreign Powers, 1852–70.

Dossier 3136: Negotiations with Britain concerning Sumatra, 1852–70.

3. *Consular Archives*

(i) Records of the Netherlands Consulate at Penang, 1872–90.

This is an important source because Lavino's valuable reports on the Atjehnese in Penang have usually been removed from the Colonial Archives, and cannot be found there. The copy-books of the Penang Consulate, however, are now in a very bad state. The following volumes were used:

4–22: Copies of letters sent by Consul, 1872–90.
35: Copies of telegrams sent by Consul, 1873–8.
46: Letters received by Consul, 1874.
97–99: Letters received by Agent of N.I. Government for Atjeh affairs, 1873–80.
100–4: Copies of letters sent by Agent of N.I. Government for Atjeh affairs, 1873–81.

(ii) Records of the Netherlands Consulate in Singapore, 1872–4.

Volumes 8–9: Copies of letters sent, 1872–4.
70: Copies of telegrams sent, 1873–4.
100: Incoming letters, 1873.

B Foreign Ministry Archives, Louis Couperus Plein 34, The Hague

The records of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry after 1870 have not yet been moved to the Rijksarchief, although they are open to the public as far as 1900. The dossiers have not been numbered in a complete series, and remain in their several files. Of these the most important are:

Atjeh, 1873–96.	6 Dossiers.
Blokkade Atjeh, 1873–4.	1 Dossier.
Nisero, 1884.	2 Dossiers.

Dr. J. Woltring is engaged in having the important documents from the above and other files printed for the whole period 1870–98. His typescript for the volume which will cover 1884 was particularly useful.

C Public Record Office, London

1. *Colonial Office Records*

C.O. 273: Straits Settlements, Original Correspondence, 1867–96, Volumes 1–223.
C.O. 426: Straits Settlements, Register of Correspondence, 1873–98. Volumes 13297–13302 and 15514–7.

2. *Foreign Office Records*

(i) F.O. 37. The Netherlands.

The following volumes in this series are exclusively devoted to problems in North Sumatra:

421: Dutch advance on the East Coast of Sumatra, 1862–4.

450: Dutch advance on the East Coast of Sumatra, 1865–7.
487: Negotiations concerning Sumatra, 1868.
488: Negotiations leading to the Sumatra Treaty, 1869–70.
534: War in Atjeh, 1873–4.
660–2: War in Atjeh, 1875–84.
691–9: The *Nisero* question, 1883–5.
824: Restrictions on British trade in Atjeh, 1893–8.

Not all the relevant material is in these volumes, however, and the regular series of correspondence with The Hague and various consulates has been consulted frequently.

(ii) F.O. 220. Records of the Consulate in Ulèëlheuë.
Volumes 1–4: Correspondence, 1882–5.
(iii) F.O. 78. Turkey.
Volumes 2263–4, 2267–8, 2282, and 2308.

3. *Private Collections*
(i) P.R.O. 30/6. Carnarvon Papers.
Volumes 8 and 40 add useful material to the official correspondence for 1874–5.
(ii) P.R.O. 30/29. Granville Papers.
Volume 55.

D India Office Library, London
Political Despatches to India, 1863–6. Volumes 6–9.
Collections to Political Despatches to India, 1860–6.
Volumes 11, 13, 30, 44, 65, 68, 69, 72, 73, 83.

E National Archives, Washington
Despatches of the U.S. Consul in Singapore, Vols. 10–11 (1872–5). Consulted on microfilm.

F Miscellaneous Private Collections
1. *Gladstone Papers*. British Museum.
B.M. Additional Manuscripts 44224, 44442, 44622, 44641, 44645.
2. *Clarendon Papers*. Bodleian Library, Oxford.
MS. Clar. dep. c. 484.
3. *Snouck Hurgronje Papers*, Leiden University Library. S.H. 58, Teungku Dukarim, 'Hikajat Perang Gompeuni'. Romanized Malay MS.

II **Official Print**

A *Hansard*
Third Series, Volumes 185, 209, 217, 284, 286–91.
Fourth Series, Volume 12.
All references in footnotes are to the Third Series unless otherwise stated.

B *Parliamentary Papers* (*British*)
1840, Vol. 49, pp. 1–218. Disputes over 1824 Treaty.
1842, Vol. 30, pp. 123–84. Dutch advance in Sumatra.

1872, Vol. 75, pp. 557–80. 1871 Anglo-Dutch Conventions.
1873, Vol. 75, pp. 1–14. British relations with Atjeh.
1884, Vol. 80, pp. 647–65. Atjeh trade report.
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1884–5, Vol. 87, pp. 507–600. *Nisero* affair.
Vol. 88, pp. 310–27. Atjeh trade report.
Numerous volumes have statistical material relating to the trade of Penang.

C *Handelingen der Staten-Generaal*
1883–4.
Verslag van het Verhandelde in de Vergaderingen der tweede Kamer in Comité-Generaal van 16, 17, 18, en 20 April, 1874. The Hague, 1881.

D *Netherlands Parliamentary Papers*
1883–4, Vol. 231, Numbers 1–4. *Nisero* affair.

E *Verzameling van Consulaire en andere Verslagen en Berigten*
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F *Officieele Bescheiden betreffende Het Onstaan van den Oorlog tegen Atjeh in 1873.* The Hague, 1881.

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Ia. A pre-war Atjehnese mission to Penang. Seated figures are Teuku Kali Maliku Adil (left) and the Imam of Luëngbata (right). The photograph was preserved by Lt. Gov. Anson

Ib. Dutch soldiers of the second expedition at the entrance to the *Kraton*. The partially-buried cannon at right is of British make, dated 1617

IIa. Tengku Muhammad Arifin in 1873
[Algemeen Rijksarchief]



IIb. Panglima Muhammad Tibang, after his submission to the Dutch in 1878

IIc. General Karel van der Heijden, the 'one-eyed king'

IIIa. The old mosque of Indrapuri, reputedly built by Iskandar Muda (1607–36), on older temple foundations

IIIb. The Masjid Raya of Kutaradja, built by the N.I. Government in 1879 as a token of peace. It was extended with two additional bays in 1936.

IV Dutch soldiers enjoy their victory (1874) at the *Gunongan,* built as a pleasure-ground for the ladies of the palace during the seventeenth century

Va. Teuku Imam Muda, Raja of Teunom, with his two sons, about 1898

Vb. Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje

Vc. Teuku Uma (seated left) as Panglima Prang Besar of the Dutch regime, with some followers



VIa. Tjot Mantjang, one of the fortified posts during the *concentratie-stelsel*

VIb. 'Main Perang.' A group of officers' wives on the way to a tea-party at a neighbouring post of the *concentratie*

VIIa. Van Heutsz and staff in bivouac at Kampong Kuta Meuntroë (Pidië) at the beginning of the Pidië expedition (1 June 1898). Snouck Hurgronje is at the extreme left; Van Heutsz fifth from right

VIIb. The Atjeh train derailed by saboteurs

VIIIa. Van Heutsz at the eventual conquest of Batèë Iliq (Samalanga) in 1901

VIIIb. Official group at the submission of Panglima Polem at Kutarajda in September 1903. Sultan Daud is seated in centre. To the right of him are Van Heutsz, Panglima Polem and Tuanku Raja Keumala. Van Daalen is seated third from left

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

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